Image and Concept: Mythopoetic Roots of Literature

Olga Freidenberg

Sign/Text/Culture: Studies in Slavic and Comparative Semiotics
Volume 2

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Contents

Introduction to the Series vii
Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xiv

Introduction 1
I Explanation of the Theme 20
II Metaphor 26
III The Origin of Narrative 48
IV Mime 65
V Excursus on Philosophy 96
VI Old Comedy 108
VII Tragedy 128

Notes 314
Many of the changes that have swept through Eastern Europe during the last several years have been linked to a wholesale transformation of symbolic systems. Streets, cities, regions, and countries have been renamed. Coats of arms and national hymns have been replaced. Churches and historical monuments have been restored. Previously forbidden literary, religious, and philosophical works have been published. The most radical avant-garde styles in literature, theater, and art have been revived and developed. Entire social systems and their component parts have been reshaped. As a result, the discipline of semiotics—the study of signs and texts that originated with the Greek Stoics and flowered in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the 1960s on (despite official prohibitions and pressures)—offers a privileged insight into human behavior. More than ever, to comprehend contemporary society and culture we must approach them through the realms of literary and artistic texts, symbols, traditions, and myths.

The monographs and collections of articles featured in the book series *Sign/Text/Culture: Studies in Slavic and Comparative Semiotics* are concerned with comparative semiotic analysis of Slavic and other cultural traditions. In keeping with the broad sweep of semiotics, the subject matter of these studies ranges from individual works and authors to entire periods of Russian and European cultural history; at the same time, like *Elementa*, the journal with which it is linked, this series pays special attention to several distinct areas. Since major steps in developing a new cross-disciplinary methodology in the humanities were made principally in dialogue with the science of language (by the Prague Linguistic Circle, the Moscow-Tartu School, and their predecessors in the Slavic world and elsewhere), the series encourages further study of the possibilities and limitations of strictly linguistic models for semiotics. Some of the volumes will explore the link of linguistics to poetics and possible alternate approaches to analysis of texts. The series will also feature further investigation into discrete units and rules of their combination, an approach that has proved fruitful in folklore and some other narratological studies, as well as probabilistic models aimed at understanding the behavior of continuous systems with a high degree of complexity.

As in other fields of contemporary research, one of the most prominent parts of semiotics has been the reconstruction of the past and of primeval sources of different structures in modern society. It is often impossible to grasp the original function of symbols or other elements of a Slavic text or other modern verbal compositions without recourse to their sources in Indo-European mythological and poetical discourse. Thus, a principal concern of the series is the relationship between mythology and literature, as it evolved across time and various cultures.

In an attempt to develop a new synthetic vision of the Russian and other Slavic traditions, as well as the traditions of Central and Western Europe, the series will focus on selected chapters of literary, cultural and social history and characteristic figures from those periods. It will explore the connections between Slavic cultures and other traditions of Eurasia, ranging from the distant past (particularly the Indo-European) to the present.
It will pay special attention to the discoveries of the Slavic artistic and scholarly avant-garde in this century, and to those works that have not been accessible to readers due to the historical situation of the last decades.

Vyacheslav Ivanov
I write this foreword to Image and Concept: Mythopoetic Roots of Literature with mixed feelings. As is often the case when one speaks about contemporary Russian culture and its outstanding representatives, one blurs the distinction between scholarly work and personal memories, between recent history as it forms new myths and the history of ancient mythology.

I first came to learn of Olga Mikhailovna Freidenberg through her relatives. Boris Pasternak, her cousin, had been a close acquaintance of my parents and later also became my own good friend. His son Evgenii Pasternak frequently discussed his aunt Olga and her wonderful studies on classical Greek literature. Their family stories and narratives were my initial exposure to her writings. Later, during my first year at the university, I read her 1936 book, and was deeply impressed by her innovative methods and the wealth of materials she used.

In the spring of 1955 I visited Leningrad and finally had an occasion to call her, to convey some family information from Evgenii. We made an appointment to meet. I was looking forward to seeing her, but on the designated day I was running a bit late while talking to other new acquaintances, the great Leningrad orientalist Igor D’iakonov and his students. I called Olga Mikhailovna to apologize for my tardiness. She answered, “Well, it is impossible for us to meet. I have had a serious fit of my illness; I was just wondering how I could contact you to postpone our meeting.” We never met; her illness proved fatal and she died soon thereafter. Our telephone conversation was mentioned in one of her last letters to Pasternak. When I subsequently read through their correspondence, I was struck by the likeness between her and Pasternak’s descriptions and observations: a family similarity or a common cultural legacy shared by both.

I came across her unpublished works much later, in the 1970s, when Iurii Lotman decided to publish her writings in Trudy po znakovym sistemam (Studies in Sign Systems), a series on which I served as an Advisory Board member. By that time several members of our Moscow-Tartu group discovered in Freidenberg one of their most brilliant predecessors. As shown in Kevin Moss’s Introduction, Freidenberg was a forerunner of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Mikhail Bakhtin. Both she and Izrail Frank-Kamenetskii, whose scholarly views were particularly close to her own, had anticipated the structural and semiotic approaches to myth and literature.

Even earlier, when I began studying the unpublished scholarly papers of the great filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, I realized that both he and Freidenberg shared certain features common to several pioneers of Russian structuralism and semiotics. They both were primarily interested in analysis of semantic structure; in this, they differed from the formalists, although some of the latter (such as Iurii Tynianov) were also moving toward semantic studies and away from the purely “syntactic” (in the semiotic sense) direction of the early 1920s. Other noteworthy scholars in this area include Iakov Golosovker (the author of the wonderful Logic of Myth), Vladimir Propp (who already in an unpublished chapter of his Morphology of the Folktale supplemented his “syntactic” schemes with
some diachronic semantic observations—developed later in his *Historical Sources of the Fairy Tale* and several essays), and Petr Bogatyrev (at that time working in Prague with Roman Jakobson). For all of them, the topic of carnival was particularly important, as it was for Bakhtin (regarding his connection to Freidenberg, see Moss’s Introduction). We may find similar themes in the works of the gifted writer and scholar Adrian Piotrovskii (who unfortunately did not survive Stalin’s purges). Piotrovskii probably borrowed this notion from his father Faddei Zelinskii (Tadeusz Zieliński, 1859–1944), who had been one of Bakhtin’s university teachers. Thus, it appears that the carnival theme was a productive topic of study at least within the circle of St. Petersburg classical specialists. One can find similar ideas in the works of many of these thinkers, such as the gifted linguist and literary scholar Iosif Tronskii, whose specific contributions on the mythological basis of Greek linguistic ideas came close to those of Freidenberg, although for social and personal reasons they were not well disposed to each other.

Freidenberg’s evaluation of carnival was linked to her general view of dualistic (binary) oppositions that she probably derived from the writings of Aleksandr Veselovskii, the Russian founder of the new conception of “historical poetics.” For the contemporary reader, binary oppositions in rituals and mythological texts, described both by Veselovskii and Freidenberg (and later in Bakhtin’s study on Rabelais), seem to anticipate the structural approach. The modern summit of the latter may be found in Jakobson’s marvelous study “Medieval Mock Mystery,” first published in 1958.1

Another aspect of Freidenberg’s book, and of her research in general, was an interest in the irrational, which was typical of the intellectual atmosphere of Russia in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Her ideas precede modern studies on this aspect of Greek culture by several decades. To mention Eisenstein once more, he founded at that time a circle of scholars interested in the archaic layer of consciousness as revealed in the human psyche, myths, language, and cinema. He himself based an entire aesthetic theory on the role of these layers in the structure of artistic form (as revealed in his manuscript “Grundproblem,” still waiting for the possibility of publication). The eminent linguist Nikolai Marr, together with two great Russian psychologists, Lev Vygotskii (a man with many followers among American psychologists, and author of *The Psychology of Art* and many other outstanding works now available in English) and Alexander Luriia (a founder of modern neurolinguistics and neuropsychology with whom I had the privilege of working on aphasia in the 1960s), also participated in the discussions of this circle (until Marr’s and Vygotskii’s deaths brought the meetings to a halt).

In his Introduction, Moss describes the relationship between Freidenberg and Marr, a man of linguistic genius. Some of Marr’s intuitive ideas are fruitful even now—such as those regarding the comparison of Georgian (Kartvelian) and Semitic (Afro-Asiatic) languages, and the independent existence of “Japhetic” languages as separate from the Indo-European family. But particularly thought-provoking are his ideas concerning ancient mythology. Marr was an unusual person; some of his visions even verged on madness (for example, his notion of the four word elements from which all languages supposedly derive, a topic which Freidenberg did not pursue at any length). The almost hallucinatory quality of his thinking enabled him to make sense of several features of archaic prelogical thought (his debt to Lévy-Bruhl was stated by Marr himself).

Of the various scholars who facilitated this flourishing study on archaic thought in Russia, Ernst Cassirer was probably the most strongly grounded in prestructuralism.
After he emigrated to the United States from Germany, he participated in the small circle of émigré scholars attended by Roman Jakobson and the young Lévi-Strauss. Cassirer’s prestructural study of myth as a symbolic form also approximates Freidenberg’s.

The unusual yet productive approaches to uncovering archaic motifs, elaborated by Freidenberg and Frank-Kamenetskii, can be illustrated through some concrete examples. While their studies of Greek culture were in the context of broader ancient Near Eastern parallels, discoveries in this field during the last decades may be used to prove (or in more technical terms “to falsify”) some notions suggested by Freidenberg.

One of Freidenberg’s early studies (printed posthumously) presents an analysis of the king-entering-the-city-on-an-ass motif, which perhaps seemed shocking to more traditional classical scholars. Here the respective Old and New Testaments’ locations are compared not only to data from different Semitic religions but also to such later works of literature as Apuleius’s novel. Long after Freidenberg’s death, an Old Hittite story concerning Zalpa was discovered. In this mythological narrative of the early second millennium B.C., the erotic (phallic) symbol of an ass appears before an episode in which twin brothers, borne by the queen, reenter their native city of Kanish (or Nesa, the ancient Hittite capital). The resemblance between this story and Freidenberg’s reconstruction is striking.

We can find another, perhaps even more impressive, example of Freidenberg’s brilliant insights into Greek mythology in several of her articles written in the 1930s (and only recently made available in English under the editorial guidance of Nina Perlina). Freidenberg suggests an extraordinarily interesting archetypal protoimage for the Phaedra plot. According to her studies, the plot of Phaedra is linked to the image of a sea monster. At the same time, Freidenberg understood Phaedra as a continuation of the image of the goddess Ishtar in her old warlike function: “in the person of Phaedra, we find the aspect of the goddess of love in which she is Ishtar the Destroyer.” Some recent publications on ancient Near Eastern mythology provide a similar interpretation, independently of Freidenberg. In the alphabetic cuneiform poetical texts of the XIV–XIII centuries B.C. in the Semitic (Canaanite) Ugaritic languages from the city Ugarit (Ras Shamra), there is a story about the Goddess Anat that contains some incipient forms of this motif. The goddess was insulted by the hero Aqht, who refused to give her his bow, and she urged her father the god El to take revenge. On the basis of recently discovered Hittite and Hurrian texts, one may confirm a part of Freidenberg’s hypothesis. Mythological topoi, such as the goddess Ishtar’s (a favorite object of Freidenberg’s studies) attempt to seduce sea monsters like the Hittite-Hurrian Ulikummi and Hedammu, seem to correspond to her reconstructions: “Poseidon sends a water monster in the sea tide that destroys Hippolytus. I have already mentioned that Phaedra, Theseus’s wife and Minos’s daughter, fell in love with her stepson, Hippolytus, and repaid him with death for his failure to return her love. Here the ‘water beast’ is Hippolytus’s double, and Pasiphae’s daughter repeats the same romance with the ‘sea monster’ as experienced by her mother and grandmother. We know from the sources that Pasiphae and Ariadne were local variants of Aphrodite. Andromeda, too, represented Aphrodite but in the myth remained her priestess; Europa, too, belongs to this category. What we have here is a female deity of water, the netherworld, and the sun that goes back semantically to a cosmic world view with the addition of agricultural fertility features, a deity associated with the motif of productivity that under feudal conditions became the motif of love.”

It might be interesting to attempt
to prove another suggestion of Freidenberg; she supposed that the myths she reconstructed had been reflected in the medieval Celtic legends. One may try to analyze the Middle Irish *Aided Mael Forthartaig maic Rónáin* from this point of view.  

Olga Freidenberg’s reconstructions of archetypal images, corroborated in several cases by recently discovered materials, show the strength of her intuitive powers. We are all indebted to Nina Braginskaia for her steady publication of Freidenberg’s writings. Among Freidenberg’s posthumously released contributions, the most prominent is her *Myth and Theatre* (in a way parallel to the work on theater by the great anthropologist Victor Turner, written in the last years of his life in the United States). Some ideas in these studies are close to the results of recent investigations. Thus, Freidenberg’s view of Greek tragedy as a special and unique form, its link to logical thinking and spatial symbols (such as the circle), its connection to Greek law, and her discovery of the two kinds of Dike’s in Greek tragedies approach the conclusions of J.P.Vernant and P.Vidal-Naquet. The whole notion of a movement from image to concept in Freidenberg’s book is very much in keeping with popular trends that arose after works on mythopoetical thinking were published in the last decades. One may try to reinterpret her conclusions in the light of neuropsychology, but, in any case, these recent developments demonstrate that Freidenberg remains our contemporary. Her writings read as if they were written only a month, and not a half a century, ago.

The recent publication of several translations under the editorship of Nina Perlina has revealed to the English-speaking world a plethora of early work by Freidenberg. These studies appeared while the present volume was being prepared for print.

This first attempt to bring out an entire book by Olga Freidenberg in English has been made possible by the extraordinarily energetic efforts of Kevin Moss. He has translated a most challenging scholarly text—not only because of its complex subject matter but also because of its intricate stylistic devices, worthy of a cousin of Boris Pasternak. He has supplemented the translation with a valuable introductory article expressing his own view of Freidenberg’s writings and their merits. Without this outstanding achievement as translator and commentator it would have been impossible to begin the task of introducing the book-long studies by Freidenberg to a wider scholarly audience outside Russia. Let us hope that the continuation of this enterprise will be as successful as the work accomplished by Kevin Moss.

Vyacheslav V. Ivanov

Notes


8. In addition to the two articles cited above, the issue of Soviet Studies in Literature guest edited by Perlina contains three other translations—“Thamyris” (pp. 33–40), “The Architectural Semantics of the Vertep Theater” (pp. 41–53), and “The Main Goals Used in the Collective Study of the Plot of Tristan and Iseult” (pp. 54–66),—as well as Perlina’s own article, “From Historical Semantics to the Semantics of Cultural Forms: O.M.Freidenberg’s Contribution to Russian Literary Theory” (pp. 5–21). Translations of several additional articles by Freidenberg are also found in Soviet Studies in Literature 27, no. 3.
Acknowledgments

Work on this translation was supported by a generous grant from the Social Sciences Research Council and by Middlebury College in Vermont. Nina Braginskaia, Olga Freidenberg’s Russian editor and the most knowledgeable authority on her, has been a constant source of valuable information and inspiration. Not only did she supervise preparation of the original Russian manuscript, but she always managed to track down the obscure references when I had exhausted the resources of my own libraries in vain. I would also like to thank Nina Perlina, whose suggestion that I look into Freidenberg eventually led me to this translation. I am grateful as well to Freidenberg’s students Berta Galerkina and Sofia Poliakova, who provided helpful information, and to the Pasternak family in Oxford, who allowed access to the archives held there.

Kevin Moss
Introduction

In 1972, when Nina Braginskaia first opened the trunk containing Olga Freidenberg’s papers, neither she nor Rusudan Orbeli, Freidenberg’s executrix, knew for sure what they would find. The trunk had stood for a decade and a half under a piano in Orbeli’s Leningrad apartment. When the trunk was opened, it was found to contain Freidenberg’s 40-year correspondence with her cousin Boris Pasternak, her retrospective diary of some 2500 pages, some two dozen unpublished articles, and ten unpublished book-length manuscripts including *Image and Concept*. At the time Freidenberg’s colleagues and students showed no interest in her work. Instead it was Iurii Lotman and the Moscow-Tartu semiotics school who lifted the veil of silence that had been imposed with the anathema of Marr in 1950.

Freidenberg was a Marrist, or at any rate, it was her association with Marr in the early years of her career that had guaranteed her position in 1932 as founder and chairman of the Department of Classics at LIFLI (the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy, Literature, Linguistics, and History, soon to become Leningrad State University). Marr died in 1934, but his influence survived him and dominated Soviet linguistics and humanities until 1950, when Stalin denounced Marr and Marrism in *Pravda*. The same association with Marr that had been a guarantee of Freidenberg’s success now assured her downfall.

To this day the Freidenberg revival in the Soviet Union is centered in Moscow rather than Leningrad, where she lived and worked. The Leningrad Classicists have made something of a scapegoat of Olga Mikhailovna: they find it hard to treat her objectively. In part this reaction is the legacy of Marrism and its administrative excesses, but in part it must be the result of Freidenberg’s own difficult personality, of which the diary provides some glimpses.

The discovery of Freidenberg in the West has taken a course very different from that of the rediscovery of Freidenberg in the Soviet Union. Soviet readers saw the publication of six of Freidenberg’s articles in the ‘70s followed in 1978 by the volume *Myth and Literature of the Ancient World*, which contains abridged versions of her *Introduction to the Theory of Ancient Folklore* and *Image and Concept*. Russian readers also have access to the 30-odd articles Freidenberg published during her lifetime, as well as to her *Poetics of Plot and Genre*. In English two articles were followed by the publication in 1982 of the *Correspondence with Pasternak*, interspersed with selections from the diary. While the *Correspondence* was published in Russian in the West in 1981, it was only in 1988 that it appeared in the pages of a Soviet journal. Freidenberg was first and foremost a Classical philologist, yet she is known in the English-speaking world only as a correspondent of Pasternak. Even the two articles published in English do not provide a complete picture of Freidenberg’s work: “The Origin of Parody” is merely a programmatic rough draft of Freidenberg’s first published article, “The Idea of Parody.” Both came out of a very early essay, “The Laughter of Comedy,” presented by Freidenberg as a student. In some 15 pages Freidenberg covers antiquity, the Middle Ages, Shakespeare, and the Spanish tragedians. “Three Plots,” while fascinating in itself,
is even less representative of Freidenberg’s work, since it is one of the few in which she deals almost exclusively with modern literature: Shakespeare, Calderon, Cervantes. This volume is therefore the first in English to give an accurate picture of Freidenberg’s interests.8

Olga Mikhailovna Freidenberg was born March 28 (Old Style) 1890 in Odessa to Anna Osipovna (née Pasternak) and Mikhail Fedorovich Freidenberg, an inventor. The family moved to Petersburg, where Olga took private lessons in French, English, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Swedish, and entered the Gedda Gymnasium. When she graduated in 1908, however, she decided not to enter the only university available to women at the time in Russia, the Higher Courses for Women.

With the revolution the universities were opened to women, and Freidenberg enrolled in 1917. By March 1918 she had chosen the field of philology, and she began studying Classics with Zhebelev in 1919. At first the revolution brought excitement to the university: lectures were open to the general public, distinguished scholars offered courses of their own choosing. But soon the cold, the hunger, and the arrests took their toll, and the university ground to a halt.

In November 1919 Freidenberg took ill and spent the whole cold winter in bed. With her at the time was Zhebelev’s copy of a Greek edition of the Apocryphal Acts of Paul and Thecla, which she undertook to study in depth. When she could walk in March, Freidenberg discovered that the manuscripts she needed for research on the Acts were in Moscow. In May she was granted a 1000 ruble stipend from the Academy of Sciences to travel to Moscow. But at the same time a doctor diagnosed her illness as tuberculosis and gave her one month to live. In August Freidenberg’s father succumbed to the hardships of life in the post-revolutionary city, but Olga survived to continue her studies of Paul and Thecla. Freidenberg kept copies of the Bible, the Ramayan, and the Decameron on her desk and found traces of Thecla in all three. Freidenberg’s adviser tried to force her to stick to a commentary only.

Three years later she defended her candidate’s dissertation (roughly equivalent to our Ph.D.) on The Acts of Paul and Thecla. Freidenberg refers to it as the first Soviet dissertation: after the revolution degrees were abolished, and a scholarly degree seemed as archaic a remnant of pre-revolutionary life as a noble title. A defense was also a way of publicizing one’s scholarly work. The defense of The Greek Novel as Acts and Passion on 14 November 1924 at ILIAZV (Research Institute for the Comparative History of Literatures of the West and East at Leningrad State University) was a major turning point in Freidenberg’s career. Her approach, which drew parallels between the Greek erotic novel and the Acts of Paul and Thecla—between the passions of novel and the Passion of Christ and the martyrs, was too revolutionary for the more traditional professors. The three official opponents—Malein, Tolstoi, and Freidenberg’s own mentor Zhebelev dissociated themselves from her work. She accused them of taking new principles for mistakes. Someone in the audience stood up and commented on the battle between two generations, “yet we, the formalists, are the new, young generation. I declare in the name of this generation that this dissertation is foreign to us.”9 Indeed, Freidenberg throughout her life viewed her work as opposed to the formalist school, and she would have been appalled to see her second English publication in a work with the subtitle “Formalism: History, Comparison, Genre” and in the company of Tynyanov and Eikhenbaum.
But at this same defense Freidenberg found new friends and scholarly allies: Frank-Kamenetskii and Marr. Frank-Kamenetskii, a biblical scholar and close colleague of Marr’s, defended Freidenberg’s work. Freidenberg had first met Frank-Kamenetskii at his lecture that summer. Freidenberg writes of the time that “everything he said repeated me to such an extent that it was almost uninteresting. I was studying Greece and looking for connections and explanations in the Bible. He was studying the Bible and looking for connections and explanations in Greece.” Of course Frank-Kamenetskii spoke in support of Freidenberg at her defense, as did Marr. The latter, who was the head of the Slavic Section of the Institute, quickly closed the defense with a strongly-worded favorable speech. For Freidenberg it was the beginning of an alliance that was to shape her academic career.

Marr, the Georgian linguist whose theories harmonized with the ideology of the new Communist state, was soon to become the most powerful voice in Soviet linguistics for almost a quarter of a century. And Freidenberg’s innovative and revolutionary scholarly approach proved to be consonant with Marr’s theory.

After her defense Freidenberg spent several years trying to find a job, occasionally working as a teacher of English, writing, publishing articles, giving papers. In 1925 she was “hired” at ILIAZV with Marr’s support for a salary of 24.33 rubles. In 1926 Marr invited her to his Japhetic Institute. She continued working on what became her doctoral dissertation, *The Poetics of Plot and Genre*. In 1929 ILIAZV became IRK, the Institute of Verbal Culture. In the late ‘20s (1929) Freidenberg organized and edited the collective work of the myth section of Marr’s Japhetic Institute on Tristan and Isolde. She tried, with no success, to publish her work on the Greek novel both in the Soviet Union and abroad.

Freidenberg finished *The Poetics of Plot and Genre* in 1928. She took it to Marr, who promised both to have it published and to accept it at his Japhetic Institute as a doctoral dissertation. The attempt to publish *Poetics* was Freidenberg’s first real encounter with Soviet bureaucracy. The red tape, readings, and reviews began from September to December 1928, when Marr told her her work was accepted for publication by the Communist Academy, but the Academy later refused to publish her until she came to Moscow to present a talk on her work. She traveled to Moscow, where she met Valerian Aptekar, Marr’s public relations man and agent. Upon her return to Leningrad, she sent Aptekar her manuscript, but it was not printed and the Communist Academy press was closed down.

The power of the Marrists grew yearly. In 1932, when the Department of Classical Philology was being organized at LIFLI, its director Gorlovskii wanted the department to be headed by someone with Marrist connections. His choice was Freidenberg. She tried for two months to decline in favor of Zhebelev, Malein, or Tolstoi, but eventually gave in. She organized the new department, inviting scholars from all over Russia and placing an emphasis on research.

Troubles began two years later. Gorlovskii was arrested and exiled. A lead article in the newspaper of the Institute appeared with the headline “Find Out What People Live By.” The article heralded a purge of the party ranks at the Institute. Students and party members were expected to spy and inform on professors who did not address themselves to the goals of the party. Freidenberg was asked to lower the grades of white-collar
workers and to raise those of blue-collar workers. She refused point blank. Suspicions and denunciations wreaked havoc in the department.

In 1935 new laws were promulgated on degrees and titles. Freidenberg requested the title of professor, for which Moscow required the defense of her dissertation within the year. On 9 June 1935 Freidenberg defended her doctoral dissertation, *The Poetics of Plot and Genre: the Period of Classical Literature*. The opponents were Zhebelev and Frank-Kamenetskii. It was apparently the first official doctoral dissertation defense in literature in the Soviet Union. The hall was filled, and Freidenberg was greeted at the end with ovations and flowers.

In May of 1936 Freidenberg’s *Poetics* finally came out in an edition of 5300. Three weeks later her colleague Tronskii called to inform Freidenberg her book had been confiscated. She tried to find out why, but with no success. On September 28 of the same year a scathing review by Cecile Leiteizen appeared in *Izvestiia*. Since a critical article in a party newspaper was usually a prelude to arrest, Freidenberg was understandably panic-stricken. Leiteizen grossly distorts Freidenberg’s argument in an attempt to show that she (unlike all workers and komsomol members) has no respect for world literature. Leiteizen accuses Freidenberg of belittling the genius of Homer and Shakespeare, of being religiously and mystically inclined, and of disliking ancient satire. In October Freidenberg took the step thousands of others threatened by persecution had been driven to take: she wrote a personal letter to Stalin. She was ostracized by students and called in by the rector of the University, Lazurkin.

On November 6 Freidenberg was called to Moscow, where she met with Volin, a censor for the Commissariat of Education. Volin assured Freidenberg there was nothing objectionable in her book, though the reasons for his reversal remain unclear. At the same time she was cleared by a court of scholars in Leningrad at GAIMK (State Academy of the History of Material Culture). Freidenberg returned to a warm reception at the university. But the trials were not over: for some reason a new article appeared on 14 November. Tsyrlin, the editor at the publisher responsible for *Poetics* had been removed from his post; and what, asked the article, was the Commissariat of Education doing about Freidenberg? Frank-Kamenetskii, who had approved Freidenberg’s book and was also named in the first article, volunteered to go to Moscow to clear up the situation. There he met Pasternak, who wrote a letter to Bukharin, the editor of *Izvestiia*. But Bukharin himself was already under house arrest at the time, and he never received the letter. Soon the misunderstanding was cleared up—the article had been sent before Freidenberg had been cleared by her first trip to Moscow. Freidenberg wrote Volin, who phoned the university and gave orders that she was not to be persecuted. This time he did not speak with Lazurkin, who was already being investigated and who was arrested and died in 1937. After all of this Freidenberg was made an offer to republish *Poetics* if she agreed to make changes in 10 places. She refused.

If Freidenberg survived the terror, her brother Sasha and his wife Musia were less fortunate. First Musia was arrested; Sasha followed in August 1937. Freidenberg saved food and money, standing in long lines for two and three days all autumn to hear news of her brother and send him packages. In January he was sent to Siberia, where he soon died. The late ‘30s and early ‘40s saw more trials for Freidenberg. Frank-Kamenetskii, Freidenberg’s friend and closest colleague, was hit by a truck and died in 1937. Ezhov repressed people for their names: Freidenberg’s colleague Trotsky, though no relation of...
Leon, was forced to change his name to Tronskii. At this time Freidenberg’s correspondence with Leonid Pasternak, Freidenberg’s uncle and the poet’s father, who lived in Oxford, was cut off. She almost stopped corresponding with Boris: there are only two letters in the period 1937–39.

Freidenberg’s next trials were to come in the war. Freidenberg remained in Leningrad throughout the blockade, when 3 1/2 million died of starvation. Terror threatened again in 1942 with the arrests of academics: Zhirmunskii and Gukovskii (arrested 1941) were among the first. The famine and the cold took their toll. Freidenberg came down with scurvy and could not walk for weeks. In 1942 the university was to be evacuated to Saratov. Freidenberg was on the train, but then returned to Leningrad on foot. There was no water and no heat, and food was hard to come by. Freidenberg kept herself busy working on Homeric similes and her Lectures on the Theory of Folklore. She gave English lessons in exchange for bread. During the blockade Freidenberg’s mother became very ill, and she died in 1944.

When the university resumed operation after the war the administration first asked Tolstoi and Tronskii to chair the department. Of 18 department chairmen only Freidenberg was not asked to head her department because she hadn’t evacuated with the university. Yet the others declined, and Freidenberg remained the chairman. All the former male students had been killed in the war. Now almost all the students were women.

The end of the war had stopped the starvation and the bombings, but a new internal war was begun by Zhdanov. Russian nationalism was forcibly promoted at the expense of anything foreign—European culture, Jewish background… The rector of the university opened the 1946–47 school year with a meeting at which, wearing a Russian peasant shirt, he deplored the fact that many Soviets had even set foot abroad. European culture was identified with toadyism. In November of 1947 the university received the order to “conduct in all departments a decisive battle with the facts of toadying and servility to bourgeois scholarship and culture on the part of individual scholars, to organize public discussions of such facts.”

The atmosphere continued to thicken. In the spring of 1948 a massive investigation of Freidenberg was initiated: her works, her students, her department—all were scrutinized for ideological purity. Freidenberg’s main opponent in these last years was Vulikh, a woman she describes as Tronskii’s minion and a party member. When the official hearing on Freidenberg came in June, the resolution censured both Freidenberg and Vulikh. When the new wave in biology was followed by a new wave in linguistics, Vulikh and Tronskii attempted to prove that Freidenberg distorted Marr’s theories.

In 1948 a meeting was held to “purge” all the departments. The topic of the meeting was the “relation between the agricultural discussion and philology,” and all of the professors were held up to ridicule: Zhirmunskii, Eikhenbaum, Propp, Tomashevskii. Freidenberg was so sickened she could not teach for a month. She asked the rector to allow her to retire early. The department was full of slander, gossip, and petty squabbles. Freidenberg was spied on. Nevertheless, the rector asked her not to leave the department at such a critical moment.

Characteristic of this period are the events surrounding Berta Galerkina’s candidate’s dissertation on the agon in Greek tragedy. The defense, though first considered a failure because of infighting between Freidenberg and Tronskii, was passed by the university
authorities in 1946. In 1949, when the battle against “Cosmopolitanism” was in full swing, Galerkina was called to VAK (the Higher Attestation Committee), where the earlier decision was annulled and her degree revoked for “toadying.” She bases her discussion on the works of Cornford, Harrison, and Murray. Galerkina was forced to defend a second dissertation, this time with Tronskii.

The moral and intellectual pogroms continued and intensified. Professors with Jewish names were persecuted and spied on by their students. Those who had survived the pogroms the year before began to succumb. Propp fainted in the middle of a lecture and was taken to the hospital. The linguist Bubrikh died at work. Eikhenbaum was an invalid. Sonia Poliakova, Freidenberg’s favorite student, could not become a docent because she was Jewish. Another student was removed because his father had been repressed. Freidenberg was baited, but at the same time not allowed to leave. In November 1949 she wrote Pasternak that she intended to retire in January. But she did not.

The following spring saw Freidenberg’s final trial: the so-called “free discussion” of Marr began in Pravda. At first anti-cosmopolitanism had contributed to the Marrists’ consolidation in linguistics—Marr’s theory was, after all, home-grown and unsullied by foreign influence. But it was also anti-nationalistic, a product of the ‘20s rather than of the ‘40s. Though Freidenberg’s work had little to do with linguistics, the immediate object of the controversy, she too was drawn into the aftermath. Stalin declared Marr and Marrism anathema, and anyone who had had anything to do with him was subject to persecution. Freidenberg’s enemies took advantage of the situation to organize a meeting to depose her. On the last day of the academic year, 30 June 1950, Freidenberg was the respondent in what she refers to as a “witch trial.” Vulikh, who but two years before had claimed that Freidenberg “distorted” Marr’s theories, now claimed that Freidenberg and Marr were equal.15 Yet again she applied to the rector to retire and was refused. Finally she retired the next year, in part because of failing health.

In retirement Freidenberg continued working, particularly on the Greek tragedies and Plato’s Symposium. She writes that “before her was a grandiose task: to summarize all my mental experience in the book Image and Concept.”16 Freidenberg died only one year after its completion, on July 6, 1955.

As a scholar, Olga Freidenberg was in many ways a product of her milieu. She suffered from the heritage of Germanic scholarship in its least attractive aspect. Her erudition is beyond question. She wrote two of her long books (Lectures and Image and Concept) with little access to scholarly materials. Her first book (Poetics) includes a thousand-odd footnotes from primary sources, ancient commentaries, and modern and classical mythologists from all over Europe.

The milieu in which Freidenberg lived and worked could only contribute to the exaggeration of dubious claims. Especially after the 1920s, Soviet scholars worked in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from the outside world and officially protected from debate within the Soviet Union. The style of scholarship remained nineteenth-century Germanic, but no further influence from the West was allowed. Only political errors could check the growth of a theory once it had gained official sanction—again on political rather than scholarly grounds. The scholarly world of the Soviet Union may be compared to a hothouse in which theories grow wild unhindered by healthy competition until they run afoul of the political gardener who—instead of trimming the unruly plants—rips out the whole plant root and all. So long as this does not happen, ideal
conditions contribute to the prodigious growth of any theory. A completely new science had to be built based on completely new principles; the problem of the “origin” of life, language, and man had to be solved posthaste. Because science had to be completely new, and the urgency of its acceptance precluded lengthy testing of new principles, originality counted for more than accuracy.

Marr’s theories are a case in point. From the initial claim that Georgian is related to Semitic, Marr (urged on by eager disciples) went on to solve the problem of the origin of all human language through the four elements sal, ber, yon and rosh. The new Soviet science of Marxist linguistics proved its originality by rejecting out of hand long-accepted theoretical assumptions. Marr rejected language families and linguistic borrowing. Freidenberg rejected literary borrowing. Like the manifestoes of the Futurists, Marr’s and Freidenberg’s works were calculated to shock. This was true of Freidenberg even before she came under Marr’s spell. Her dissertation on the Greek novel as acts and passion must have raised some eyebrows among the traditionalists with its contention that the Christian Gospel and the Greek erotic novel are genetically related.

One of the most important questions in the development of Freidenberg as a scholar is the role played by Marr. How did she view her relation to Marr? How close were their theories? Can her Marrist connections be written off as an expedient compromise with the dominant ideology? Because Marr’s legacy is so controversial, because so many of those who suffered at the hands of Marr’s followers are still alive, Soviet scholars would like to de-emphasize Freidenberg’s connection with Marr or to present it as something inessential. In fact there are numerous parallels in the theories of the two scholars.

Freidenberg’s success—even her freedom—was in part thanks to her association with Marr. But it was not merely a question of career. Even before Marr was consigned to oblivion in 1950, Freidenberg was careful to point out the differences between them. Freidenberg was introduced to Marr in the early 20s, when most of her ideas had already taken shape and before Marr’s New Theory of Language became the only acceptable school of linguistics.

Marr’s theories appear to have been strongly influenced by his romantic-nationalist approach to his native Georgian, combined with his bad impressions of Western linguists, who were ignorant of Caucasian languages. As early as 1886 Marr thought he saw an affinity between his native Georgian and Semitic, a “discovery” which was rejected out of hand by Marr’s teachers, but which eventually became the cornerstone of his theories. Marr extended his “Japhetic” family to include Georgian, Armenian, all native Caucasian languages, Basque, Etruscan, Pelasgian, Dravidian and the native languages of America. He generally looked at ethnic and geographical names as the most archaic forms in existing languages. As he found more and more “Japhetic” cognates in the languages of the world, Marr was forced to give up the idea of Japhetic as a linguistic family. Instead it became a stage through which all languages passed in what Marr perceived as the “single glottogonic process.” In Marr’s “paleontological analysis” of language origin he sought the most archaic elements and found twelve ethnic terms, then seven, then five, then finally four in 1926: sal, ber, yon, and rosh, sometimes designated simply as A, B, C, D. “All the words of all languages—so far as they are the product of a single creative process—consists entirely of these four elements.”

According to the New Theory of Language, the languages of the world all developed according to one pattern and went through stages which corresponded to stages in
economic and social development. Marr based his linguistic stages on stages of mentality such as had been outlined in anthropology by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and in philosophy by Ernst Cassirer. The most primitive stage was correlated with Lévy-Bruhl’s prelogical thought. The “diffuse” nature of prelogical thought helped Marr link various terms semantically. Prelogical thought, in Lévy-Bruhl’s term, or mythical thought, in Cassirer’s, does not differentiate between part and whole, thing and property, general and particular, space and time, and cause and effect.

It is obvious from the diary that Freidenberg’s closeness to Marr was natural and actually preceded his influence. Twice she protests that it was she, and not Marr, who introduced the discussion of the semantics of things, alongside words and actions,¹⁹ and the ideas expressed in some of Marr’s articles were anticipated by her own unpublished writings.²⁰ She is also outspoken about Marr’s personal limitations: “he thought about one thing all the time, night and day. Nothing existed for him except paleontological semantics as applied to separate words. Here he was a master, an artist, a genius, a god.”²¹ But he was the only one incapable of the “love of the teacher for his student.”²² In 1936, she wrote her own recollections of Marr, which have recently been published.²³ As she puts it, “I was driven to it by the sickeningly sweet and false recollections printed that year.”²⁴ But her version was not allowed by the censor at the time.

Freidenberg was equally outspoken about those who surrounded Marr, and she seems to support the opinion that the worst crimes of Marrism have more to do with these followers than with Marr himself: “Around Marr,” she writes, “there swarmed some worthless toadies, incapable of any kind of scholarship, ignoramuses, terrible fanatics, some kinds of Komis, Chuvashes, Armenians, Georgians ... When Marr wanted to promote his theory and started to ingratiate himself with the authorities, all of these Chuvashes in the role of party secretaries and chairmen of local committees turned into a huge force that Marr himself feared.”²⁵

Marr and Marrism affected Freidenberg both after his death and after hers. When Marrism became obligatory, Freidenberg was forced to claim even closer connections to him. This was particularly painful during the publication of the *Poetics of Plot and Genre* in 1936. “They demanded that I recognize that my book was written after Marr; all my own breath was driven out of it. In the section on ‘things’ they forced Marr on me—and this was incorrect, since I followed German archaeology, Usener and his metaphoristics of the thing.”²⁶ Marr was artificially introduced everywhere, and the foreword was rewritten 5 times to include more Marr. When the book came out, Freidenberg complains that “phrases about Marr written in my style were inserted.”²⁷

Valerian Aptekar is characteristic of the kind of people who rode the wave of Marr’s popularity. Aptekar helped Marr clothe his theories in appropriate Marxist slogans, as Freidenberg suggests in a description of her first meeting with him in 1928: “Happily and self-confidently he admitted his lack of education. Guys like Aptekar, ignoramuses, would come from the villages and out of the way places, bone up on party slogans, Marxist schemes, and newspaper phraseology and feel like rulers and dictators. With a clear conscience they would instruct scholars and were sincerely convinced that for the correct systematization of learning (“methodology”) knowledge itself was not necessary.”²⁸ When *Poetics* was published, Aptekar was disappointed, because there was not enough Marr in it. His comments to Freidenberg give an idea of what the atmosphere was like in 1936: “Now in the situation of open and hidden persecution of Nikolai
Iakovlevich, or rather of his great work—it is essential to pour full cauldrons of tar and other similar spices on the heads of the vermin, every wrong step is particularly dangerous, every insufficiently deep analysis plays into the hands of the enemy.”

Freidenberg recognized and deplored the change in the Marrist school: “Those many years I fought for Marr I was fighting for progressive thought and its independence; now I saw that that thought itself had become despotic, intolerant, small-minded.”

For Freidenberg, the more popular Marr became, the harder it was for her to remain with him. Freidenberg’s natural tendency was to protest against any orthodoxy, so it was a trial for her, when her mentor’s theories were accepted as canon and polemizing with him was forbidden.

Marr’s legacy has yet to be critically reviewed by unbiased Soviet scholars. Stalin’s anathema resulted in silencing any serious discussion of Marr’s contributions. Those who had suffered from Marrist persecution (and that meant the majority of linguists worthy of the name) refused to consider any Marrist theory even worth discussing. Braginskaia refers to “the derision and squeamishness surrounding Marr in the circles where I spent my student years, which made the position of an objective historian beyond my powers.”

Curiously, Braginskaia also confesses to the same kind of accommodations to modern tastes as Freidenberg was forced to allow. Freidenberg complains about having to insert obligatory references to Marr. In the 70s, with Marr and Marrism still very much out of favor with intellectual circles, Braginskaia would have liked to dissociate Freidenberg from her mentor: “this is more or less what made me remove references to Marr for publication of the article “Entry into Jerusalem on an Ass.” Today I am ashamed of this.”

From the point of view of Freidenberg’s scholarly production, Marr no doubt inspired Freidenberg to continue her studies, but he can also be blamed in part for the unrestrained claims of her early articles that make some of them practically unreadable. The case of Marr and Marrism also provides insight into the abominable conditions in which Freidenberg was forced to work. Constant scheming, threat of arrest, denial of access to scholarly works—all were commonplace in the Soviet academic community of the day. Scholars were judged not on their scholarly merit, but on their associations with foreigners or with newly excommunicated Soviets—such was the case with Freidenberg and Marr. When they were supported, they were isolated from real scholarly debate, a situation that led many scholars to lose all sense of critical perspective. Freidenberg, however, refined her theories and grew more restrained—even when she was denied access to scholarly materials and barred from the classroom.

Marr’s linguistic theory was dominated by what Jakobson would call the paradigmatic pole. He was interested in similarity and would set out to prove the genetic identity of two words on the basis of semantic identity. The transformational rules required to get from one form to another were invented ad hoc—they were less important to Marr than the identity of the forms. Contiguity in space and time was for all practical purposes ignored: there were no borrowings, linguistic elements did not travel, sound changes were determined neither by phonological conditioning (of contiguous sounds) nor by temporal conditioning (implying linear, horizontal change in a fixed sequence). Syntagmatic rules were also invented ad hoc. Syntax was effectively ignored.

The development of Marr’s own theories resembles the process he describes through which the original four roots proliferated through bifurcation, qualitative contradiction,
mixture, and stadialism to produce the many languages of the world. In view of the many directions he took, it is not surprising that he contradicted himself. In spite of Marr’s excesses, there was some wheat among his theoretical chaff, and the New Theory of Language did allow progress in fields in which interpretation and creative invention are at least as important as empirical reality. One of these fields is paleontological semantics in literary criticism.

Paleontological semantics in folklore and literature were the domain of Freidenberg and Frank-Kamenetskii. In effect they were the only representatives of a “school” which seems to have had more names than practitioners: “paleontological,” “Marrist,” “Japhetidological,” “semantic,” “genetic.” “Marrist” speaks for itself. “Japhetidological” comes from Marr’s designation of what he once thought was a linguistic family: Georgian, for example, belongs to the “Japhetic” branch of the “Noetic” family, of which Semitic was another branch, the terms coming from two sons of the Biblical Noah, Shem and Japheth. Later he applied “Japhetic” to a stage through which all languages were thought to have passed. Marr was interested in the pre-historical “paleontological semantics” of words, in their origins (“genesis”) in ethnic and geographical terms.

In a definition of paleontological semantics, Marr wrote that “in various phases of stadial development in semantics the same words receive different apprehensions of meaning content.” In other words, while the form remains the same, the meaning may change with time. This idea, Marr rightly perceived, had been overlooked by bourgeois formalists (including the Indo-European comparative historical school Marr was opposing) in favor of morphological analysis and phonological laws. Marr, and even more Freidenberg turned their attention to the interpretation of semantics of what might be a single unchanging form in the context of various stages in the development of society. The transition from Marr’s paleontological semantics as a linguistic phenomenon to Freidenberg’s paleontological semantics in poetics is fairly straightforward. Marr believed that the same form designated different meanings in various stages (thus the same word might signify “dog” in one stage and “horse” in another). In living languages, Marr’s primary field of study, it is easy enough to establish the meaning of the word on question—one simply asks a native speaker. In written language, the object of Freidenberg’s study as a Classicist, the problem is more complex. Meaning must be derived from context if the form remains the same. When the same form is used in a different context to signify something other than what it had meant (in an earlier stage) the empirical result is what we usually call figurative language. We consider figurative language to be the use of words to signify something other than what they normally signify. Freidenberg simply reverses this polarity: the natural use of words to signify something other than what they normally (or previously) signify produces the effect of figurative language. Hence Freidenberg’s interest in the historical poetics of metaphor and simile.

It was the early infatuation with Marrism that led Freidenberg to her most exaggerated claims. Marrist phonological laws, which could be applied with no constraint to all the languages of the world, allowed her to compile huge lists of related terms. Her justification for identifying widely scattered terms is that “semantic localization is more reliable than topographical.” Freidenberg is often guilty of such excessive identification. In her article on Thersites she links Thersites to Achilles, Odysseus, Agamemnon, Zeus, and scapegoats as a “diffuse image of the heaven-underworld.”
Often she compares motifs from widely scattered cultures and different historical epochs. She herself realized she was exposing herself to attack from many fields through her far-ranging claims: “instead of ten enemies I will have a hundred,” she once wrote. Freidenberg’s usual justification for claiming the “identity” of two motifs was the dubious idea that similar motifs are produced by a similar stage in cultural development—the cultural equivalent of Marr’s unity of the glottogonic process, in which societies at similar stages in development speak similar languages.

This theory resulted in the claim that any myth variant was as reliable as any other, no matter what the source or when it was attested. Lévi-Strauss similarly avoids the issue by defining the myth as “consisting of all of its versions.” His unity is based on the structure of the human mind, rather than in the process of cultural development. But even so, it is for this acceptance of all variants that the structuralist mythologies most often come under fire from more rigorous critics.

One central thought informs Freidenberg’s work throughout her scholarly career: the idea that content on one historical level becomes form on another, the transition from semantics to morphology and from myth to plot and genre. Freidenberg opposes her “genetic” approach to the formalist “evolutionary” approach. Formalists analyze continuous changes in the material of one order—morphology. Freidenberg, on the other hand, explains the development of forms through phenomena of a different order—the system of mythological semantics.

In the twenties and thirties Freidenberg incorporates her idea of the transition from content to form in an analysis of literary plot and genre as a precipitation of mythological semantics. In her candidate’s dissertation on the Acts of Paul and Thecla, for example, she finds behind the form of the Greek novel deactivated myths of fertility gods; the same myths underlie the Christian lives of the martyrs. Freidenberg’s early period goes under the rubric of Marrism, but her application of Marr’s methods and terminology (unlike some of the Marrists’) cannot be written off as mere fantasy. True, a few of her articles contain unrestrained Marrist etymologies which she accepted on faith. But she usually applies Marr’s paleontological analysis to larger forms—plots, genre, myth, where the results justify the use of the theory. Some of her early plot collocations are breathtaking in their convincing juxtaposition of plots that seem at first glance to be completely unrelated (“Three plots,” “The Myth of Joseph the Beautiful,” “The Gospel”).

In the forties and fifties Freidenberg develops her idea of the transition from content to form in another aspect: as a shift in cognitive function from image to concept. In Image and Concept she concentrates on the reinterpretation of the old form in the new conceptual system of thought. The mythological image builds up a series of tautological forms (concrete expression of the underlying semantics which she calls “metaphors” in Poetics) which differ from each other formally, but are united by the identity of their mythological semantics. Many of these forms are simply strung together as the image attains definition by tautological repetition. But with the shift in consciousness to conceptual thought, the former tautological forms are both reinterpreted as different and casualized—one term is now interpreted as cause, another as effect. Simultaneously the system is ethicized: destruction, for example, becomes not a mythical equivalent for impiety, but a divine recompense for impiety. A third consequence of the newfound difference between the formerly tautological variants is the appearance of figurality. Freidenberg claims that behind every Classical metaphor and simile lies a semantic
identity in myth. If a man is compared to a lion, it is not because they have a potentially discoverable abstract similarity—a \textit{tertium comparationis}, but because as presented to consciousness they are already metaphors of the same mythological content. The connection is essential, not accidental.

While these ideas are discussed by Cassirer and Frank-Kamenetskii, Freidenberg develops them on the material of Classical literature farther than either of her predecessors. The ground was uncharted and she had to invent a new metalanguage to describe the interaction between psychology, language, and phenomenology. She has been criticized for writing \textit{zaum’} (unintelligible, absurd language), but given the recalcitrance of her material, she can be forgiven. How can one describe an underlying semantic structure which no longer exists in our language and which is only reflected in concrete forms which we now interpret completely differently? Rather than coining a new metavocabulary, Freidenberg redefines image, concept, and metaphor, explaining the same process in various terms, backtracking, returning to the same ideas again and again until her goal slowly becomes visible. The image is the semantic unity underlying the formal diversity of the mythological metaphor. The image does not exist in reality as a hypostasis; its only real existence is in the form of concretized metaphor. By “metaphor” Freidenberg does not mean the poetic figure we know today, but the concrete form of the image, its morphological side. Many morphologically different metaphors correspond to one image. Thus sleep, imprisonment, and death may serve as metaphors of the same mythological image which Freidenberg calls ‘death,’ but no single concrete metaphor exhausts the underlying image. Concept disunites this structure, interpreting the metaphors as different semantically as well as morphologically. Their similarity is now attributed to some extractable or abstracted (and accidental, \textit{i.e.} not necessary to the thing itself) quality, which acts as a \textit{tertium comparationis}. It is this transition from image content to the conceptual interpretation of the image form (metaphor) which Freidenberg says produces the first literature. In ancient Greece literature did not come from a preceding literature (form from form), it came from material of another order—the system of mythological semantics.

Freidenberg’s conceptual thought is something we all take for granted. It was to explain the underlying mythological image that Freidenberg turned to theories of primitive mentality. Primitive or mythological mentality, the Marrists claimed after Lévy-Bruhl and Cassirer, does not distinguish between part and whole, attribute (or name) and thing, cause and effect. Nondifferentiation or diffuseness allows relation of two things we consider distinct by what Lévy-Bruhl calls the “law of participation.”

Lévy-Bruhl and Cassirer are no less controversial than Marr. While both are better known in the West, many of their theories—particularly as concerns “primitive mentality,” precisely the idea Freidenberg used—have been all but abandoned by modern scholarship. There was indeed a certain amount of prejudice involved in Lévy-Bruhl’s early thinking about “primitive thought.” In fact it was none other than Lévy-Bruhl who rescued the primitive from being half-witted by being the first to suggest that he uses a different style of logic. Earlier thinkers had assumed that primitives reasoned the same way we do, only with less success. Lévy-Bruhl introduced a qualitative distinction.

The Marrists’ and consequently Freidenberg’s use of Lévy-Bruhl’s “primitive” and “prelogical thought,” however, is another matter. Lévy-Bruhl allowed that the two modes of thought he identified might coexist in varying proportions. He used the opposition to
define what he meant by “primitive mentality.” The Marrists, guided in part by Marxist principles, fixed the distinction into a rigid sequence. “Prelogical” became unequivocally historical. Both Lévy-Bruhl and Marr can be rehabilitated by reinterpreting their categories as a typology, rather than as a historical sequence. That “primitive mentality” has been discredited does not mean that the categories associated with it are of no interest as a typology. While Freidenberg accepts the Marrist interpretation and presents her own account as a historical sequence, most of what she has to say, for example, about image and concept, concerns the conjunction of the two rather than their strict division. All literature, it seems, was created by the transition from image to concept. While it is possible artificially to describe one or the other, it is invariably the interaction of the two that interests Freidenberg.

While they need not be accepted as a historical sequence, many of Freidenberg’s typologies are useful critical tools for classicists, anthropologists, and semioticians. Her description of the contrast between choral lyric (based on mythological images) and iambic dialogue (based on conceptual thought) is useful as a typology, whether or not one is more “archaic” than the other. She describes the static “showing” or tautologically repetitive description of the lyric passages as opposed to the dynamic cause-and-effect narration of the dialogue. In the dialogues figural speech is meant to be “figured out,” translated into the language of concepts, while in lyric the mythological images function through their concrete meaning only. Mythological time spreads into the present, once and for all: it is one-dimensional. The discursive narration of the messenger, on the other hand, has a time in which concrete events follow one another.

Likewise useful as a typology is Freidenberg’s distinction between image and concept. Image unites two metaphors as given. Concept, conscious of the nature of language as a code, perceives them as “similar” in terms of some tertium comparationis, but originally as different (the connection is an effect of consciousness).

Freidenberg owes a scholarly debt to Marr, Frank-Kamenetskii, Lévy-Bruhl, and Cassirer; but she also bears comparison to Lévi-Strauss and Bakhtin. It would be facile to suggest that Freidenberg’s approach is worthy of study simply because it has certain affinities to Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist analysis and because it can be contrasted to Bakhtin’s dialogism. Nevertheless, there is something to be said for affinity to other theories that have been widely (if not universally) accepted as fruitful.

Freidenberg’s genetic method is not merely structuralism by another name. Like the structuralists and the Soviet semiotics school, Freidenberg studies semantics as a system. Form is explained through phenomena of a different order—mythological semantics; some argue that she studies only “relics” or “fragments” rather than wholes. In fact, however, Freidenberg reincorporates these fragments into not one, but two systems—that of mythological semantics and that of conceptual thought. If she concentrates more on explaining the structure of mythological image, then it is only because we all take the conceptual system for granted.

In the process of her analysis Freidenberg also anticipates several of Lévi-Strauss’s central ideas. Myth originally operates through tautological definition, by repetition in various forms of one meaning. The structure may be transformed in the transition from one stage to another. Former tautological repetitions may be reinterpreted and ethicized, one element now being perceived as causing another. Freidenberg’s law of semantization, which holds that the content on one historical level becomes form on another, anticipates
Lévi-Strauss’s *bricolage*, in which the *signifiant* becomes the *signifié*. But she differs from Lévi-Strauss on two major points. Freidenberg’s material—Classical literature—is much more complex and heterogeneous than that of the French mythologist—the oral myths of the Americas. In spite of the prominence of his programmatic article on the Oedipus cycle (which many consider unsuccessful), Lévi-Strauss devoted little analysis to Classical myths. And Freidenberg’s approach is always historical, while Lévi-Strauss claims to be synchronic.

If Freidenberg and Lévi-Strauss are similar in method but not in material, Freidenberg and Bakhtin are similar in material but not in method. Both investigate the same works: parody, folk humor, Menippean satire, Saturnalia, Lucian; but their approaches are diametrically opposed. Bakhtin’s interpretation of parody as revolutionary and opposed to the official forms it imitates is the more traditional. Freidenberg’s view that parodic forms are based on a genetic identity with official forms provides a provocative counterpoint to Bakhtin as well as an antidote to modernization of ancient literature. As usual, she warns against taking for granted that the interpretation of parodic forms was everywhere and at all times the same. The formal identity between the parody and its official double may function not through the absence of content as a negation of the official form, but through strengthening of content as its affirmation. Freidenberg’s point is supported by the fact that ritual parodies were often sanctioned by the official authorities: they were performed by the practitioners of the official cult in its very sanctuaries.

It would seem at first glance that Freidenberg and Bakhtin had everything in common. They were contemporaries; both were cultural historians who refused to separate the aesthetic function from other aspects of life—ideology, politics, mythology. But what kind of dialogue took place between these two scholars?

Bakhtin mentions Freidenberg only once, in a note to the introduction of his book *Rabelais and His World*.39 This is apparently the only evidence that Bakhtin knew Freidenberg. In fact, Freidenberg and Bakhtin seem never to have been in the same place at the same time. Bakhtin was at Petersburg University from 1913 to 1918, when he left for Nevel’. Freidenberg graduated from the Gymnasium in 1908, but as a woman she could not enroll in the university until after the Revolution. Their lack of scholarly contact can also be attributed to timing and the vicissitudes of Soviet publishing. The works of Bakhtin Freidenberg would have found most interesting came out after her death—the book on Rabelais (1965) and the essays from various periods published as *Questions of Literature and Aesthetics (The Dialogic Imagination)* (1975)—even though they were written in the ‘30s and ‘40s. “Discourse in the Novel” and “Epic and Novel” were read in 1940 and 1941—but at the Institute of World Literature in Moscow, Freidenberg’s *Lectures and Image and Concept*, also written in the ‘40s and ‘50s, were published only in 1978, after Bakhtin’s death.

That Freidenberg never knew Bakhtin is suggested by the diary in an entry which also supports the claim that Bakhtin wrote *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. In 1930 Freidenberg met N.V. Iakovlev, whom she describes as the right hand man of Desnitskii, the Marxist head of the Institute of Verbal Culture. Iakovlev had his own right hand man. “This was Voloshinov, an elegant young man and esthete, the author of a linguistics book written for him by Blokhin.”40 Freidenberg’s distortion of Bakhtin’s name shows that she still did not know him in 1949 or 1950, when she wrote this entry. Unfortunately, there is
no clue as to when or from whom she heard that Bakhtin had written Voloshinov’s book for him.

But Bakhtin had read Freidenberg’s *Poetics of Plot and Genre*, which he mentions in the introduction to his book on Rabelais. As Bakhtin suggests, his materials and Freidenberg’s overlap. Both study Menippean satire, Lucian, rituals of laughing invective, Saturnalia. But there the resemblance stops. Their interpretations of this material diverge. For Bakhtin parody is opposed to its original; for Freidenberg it is a shadow, but it affirms the same values. For Bakhtin parody is revolutionary, liberating, the epitome of free speech; for Freidenberg it reaffirms the *status quo*. Bakhtin sees in parody evidence of religious decline, a form ruthlessly driven from the official sphere by the church; Freidenberg sees in parody the apogee of religious consciousness that can use even laughter to affirm its forms. For Bakhtin the model of parody is medieval carnival, with its rebellious freedom; for Freidenberg parody is the hubristic “other aspect” of all that is real, authentic, official.

Freidenberg and Bakhtin approach the same problem from opposite directions. The problem: unity in opposition. For Bakhtin unity is a product of dialogue which preserves the opposition. Phenomena are presented to consciousness in opposition—two ideas, doubles, an original and a parody, two discourses—and it is the task of consciousness to unite them as a dialogue. For Freidenberg the opposition is always merely an illusion of contemporary consciousness. As they are given, the apparently opposing phenomena are already the result of a semantic unity in another plane. Usually Freidenberg describes this unity as lying “behind” the phenomena, in the depths of primitive consciousness. Bakhtin creates a unity while retaining duality in a microhistorical dialogue—here and now; Freidenberg reduces the duality to an underlying semantic unity through a macrohistorical perspective that reaches from the present to prehistorical times. Bakhtin sees difference in spite of unity; Freidenberg sees unity in spite of difference.

Freidenberg’s unity is the mythological image, which is expressed in concrete metaphors. The mythological image, like Bakhtin’s dialogic unity, is a phenomenon of consciousness, but it is a product of primitive consciousness rather than a project of contemporary consciousness. It cannot be perceived by the un-trained modern consciousness and must therefore be recovered by paleontological semantic analysis. The mythological image captures the semantic unity or semantic identity of the various metaphors.

Freidenberg considers the ability to see semantic identity behind formal difference a major advantage of the paleontological method over the formal method. The formal method does not compare formally different phenomena. Paleontological analysis enters into the cause of the phenomena and knows that they may be produced through antithesis and contradiction. Freidenberg seeks out the genetic identity that may underlie functional opposition: “From the point of view of genesis and myth what is compared and what it is compared to are the same; functionally they are already opposed.” While Freidenberg ignores functional opposition to emphasize genetic unity, Bakhtin emphasizes function at the expense of genesis or essence.

According to Michael Holquist, at the heart of everything Bakhtin ever did lies the concept of a ceaseless struggle between centrifugal and centripetal forces in language. In literature these two poles may be roughly represented by the monologic epic and the heteroglot novel. Heteroglossia, Bakhtin’s “master trope,” is unequivocally preferred by
Bakhtin. In her analysis of the same literary process, Freidenberg invariably privileges the one over the many; her master trope is the one “mythological image” (as she calls it) that makes sense out of the various “metaphors”—her term for the actual concrete realizations of the undifferentiated image. The two approaches can most effectively be compared in the areas Freidenberg refers to as “parody” and “the hubristic” (“vulgar realism” in *Poetics*), which Bakhtin calls the “folk culture of humor,” “carnivalization of literature,” and “grotesque realism.”

Both Bakhtin and Freidenberg warn their readers not to confuse ancient with modern parody. Bakhtin criticizes modern parody because it lacks creative or regenerative ambivalence—it lacks the potential to enter into a creative relation with consciousness through dialogue. For Freidenberg, however, the problem with modern parody is different. Modern parody is intentional, premeditated, striving for literary effect—she rejects it precisely because it is forward-directed, a creation of individual consciousness. For Bakhtin modern parody and medieval parody act as different causes to produce different effects (in consciousness and in dialogue); for Freidenberg they are different effects resulting from different causes (that is, literary intention in the case of modern parody, and semantic unity in the case of ancient parody).

Bakhtin’s carnival parody is revolutionary, as he writes in his book on Rabelais: “carnival celebrated a temporary liberation from the reigning truth and the existing order.” Bakhtin downplays the temporary nature of this liberation, reveling himself in the “gay relativity” and revolutionary nature of folk humor. Freidenberg’s view of carnival rituals is more sober. She writes in “Three Plots” that “it would be excessively optimistic to consider that these were days of some kind of social regroupings; their connection to the agrarian feast days and to the new year bespeak their cult character.” But Bakhtin did consider them revolutionary and socially leveling.

Holquist and Clark point out that Victor Turner, whose *communitas* is very similar to Bakhtin’s carnival, considers the temporary release from hierarchy an affirmation of the official structure through programmed antistructure. It must be significant after all that carnival is fixed to an official calendrical cycle—the cycle of the official feasts of the church, as even Bakhtin points out. In order to prove their different points, Freidenberg emphasizes the genetic and other links of parody with the official cult, while Bakhtin stresses that carnival activity was systematically placed outside the official church.

Freidenberg’s interpretation of parody sheds an interesting light on her own publications, many of which appear to use parody in the atheist cause against Christianity. “The Entry into Jerusalem on an Ass,” “The Gospel as a Type of Greek Novel,” “The Myth of Joseph the Beautiful,”—all of these articles of Freidenberg’s deal explicitly with the connection between official religion and humorous and novelistic forms. Freidenberg’s 190-page monograph, *An Anthology of Antireligious Motifs in Literature*, remains unpublished, but the letters and diary show that she was at the very least sympathetic to the religion her cousin embraced.

Bakhtin’s relation to religion provides an instructive contrast. It was for his connection with the Christian Voskresenie group that Bakhtin was arrested and exiled to Kustanai in 1929. Voskresenie aimed at combining communism and Christ in a kind of religious revolution against official state Orthodoxy. Thus it was that Bakhtin, arrested for his connection with a religious group, emphasizes in his work reaction against official
religion, while Freidenberg, who published in the journal *The Atheist*, considers parody an official form of religion, as a strengthening of content.

*Image and Concept* is for the most part devoted to the origins of Greek tragedy. Freidenberg’s central idea is that it was the transition from the kind of thinking associated with mythological image to the use of formal-logical concepts that resulted in the appearance of literature. With the transition to conceptual thought the content of mythological images became the texture of the new concepts. The inherited forms were now reinterpreted conceptually: causalized, ethicized, generalized, abstracted. And with this reinterpretation poetic figurality also appeared. Folkloric material from the mythological image past also began to be differentiated into various disciplines: religion, philosophy, ethics, literature, art. Yet differentiated and reinterpreted as it was, this folkloric material was preserved formally in poetic image, structure, plot, name in its new conceptual context with a new function.

Some of Freidenberg’s most interesting material concerns visual folk mime, balagan (low folk theater of the kind seen at fairs), and their connection both with tragedy and with mystery. The mysteries Freidenberg refers to as epideictic (showing) and epoptic (watching) originate in the mythological image of the disappearance and appearance of the sun. Freidenberg discovers a whole range of related image forms: the balagan with its showman who pulls the curtain aside to reveal a spectacle; the mystery which culminated in the revelation of a shining object, a “wonder to behold;” the circus magician who makes objects appear and disappear; riddles, with their concealment and revelation of the solution; scenes of opening and revelation (both physical and eschatological) in tragedy, comedy, Homer. These ideas help explain the connections between Socrates in the *Symposium* and the buffoon/sage: Socrates is ugly on the outside, a shining divinity within just like the statuette *sileni* which opened to reveal the shining gold figure of a god.

Freidenberg finds the oldest material to contain the most relics of this static “showing.” Before concept expanded space and time, visual showing was the only means of presenting mythological images. This explains the prominence in Freidenberg’s analysis of ecphrasis, the static descriptions of man-made objects common in epic. Prose narrative, with its discursiveness, its temporal sequentiality, its cause and effect could only appear with concept. Drama as a genre appears early because it is pre-narrative visual demonstration. When concept separates past from present and here from there, story can emerge from vision and revelation. The messenger comes from “there” and speaks “here” in the present about the past. That he speaks “about” what happened rather than showing it also demonstrates the new distinction between subject and object. But there are still traces of visual show in tragedy. What the messenger speaks about is death. But the dead are also “shown” and “watched” as concrete spectacle: the euryclema is wheeled in or the doors opened to show the dead body.

Also useful is Freidenberg’s analysis of the distinction between melic, the choral songs in tragedy, and iambic, the solo parts in the episodes. Melic is archaic in thought, language, and syntax because it is built on pre-conceptual, pre-logical mythological-image thought. The songs of the chorus are “à propos”—thematically linked to the plot, but they do not move the action forward. They contain no cause and effect sequentiality and attain definition by piling image on image as a chain of attributes or epithets. Most often the chorus “mentions” the myth without telling the story. Myth-stories as we know them now are conceived and told as narratives.
them today are a product of conceptual thought: mythological image can produce only static, plotless, prenarration, as tragic choruses show. It is characteristic of the Classical period that the solo-iambic principle developed through concept and was Atticized, yet the conservative choral song was preserved alongside.

Freidenberg is difficult. Her revolutionary spirit made her a maverick even in the context of the unrestrained Soviet scholarship of the ‘20s and ‘30s. She loved controversy, and when publication in a journal was difficult, as it was for most of her career in spite of her connections to the influential Marrist school, she published her ideas through public lectures and disputes. She expressed her view of scholarship in the foreword to her candidate’s dissertation on the Greek novel: “I do not offer my work to people who want to approach scholarship calmly, with standards set once and for all and completely impassive: my explanations are aimed at those for whom scholarship is first and foremost a manifestation of life, one nourished by life, taking good and bad from it and giving it back in turn, back into its hostile lap.”

As a scholar Freidenberg was an antagonist: she was more interested in provoking response than in formulating her thoughts into a logically coherent and unassailable edifice. One gets the impression both from her scholarly work and from her own comments on it that the material wrote itself faster than she could control it. As she wrote of her early work on Thamyris, once she started it was hard to stop: “Name began to lead to name, myth to myth, plot to plot.” Freidenberg’s thought itself was more suited to mythological identification than to the causal sequences of formal logic required in a scholarly article: “For me thought worked precisely in the direction of connections between phenomena, and I could not describe in terms of formal sequence because the ultraviolet rays of thought caused a glow in different layers of facts, and there was no intellectual method which could show the same thing in the radiation of thousands of connections. I rushed hither and thither piling up facts.”

In Image and Concept Freidenberg complains about the difficulty of translating the language of mythological image into the language of formal-logical concept. Her own thought was equally difficult for her to translate: “My scholarly fate would have been much happier for me if I could translate the language of intuition into the language of logical thought.” Early in the Diary she describes the importance of intuition in her work: “I wanted to learn, to understand, to discover, to touch. To learn and understand what? All this, everything in the world. But it seemed to me the way to do this was to close my eyes. And this was one thing in my life about which I was not mistaken.”

Freidenberg’s intuitive method was often compounded by lack of access to scholarly materials. Of her youth she writes that “books were never my companions. From childhood to the present day I use them only if absolutely necessary.” While her early works are copiously annotated, the Introduction to the Theory of Ancient Folklore (written in blockaded Leningrad) and Image and Concept (written after Freidenberg left the University) lack any scholarly apparatus because Freidenberg had no access to scholarly works. Considering they were written to a large extent from memory, it is remarkable how few factual errors there are.

The difficulty of Freidenberg’s works is further compounded by her language. The linguist Shcherba accused her of writing zaum’, trans-sense absurd language indulged in by some of the Futurists: “No one who looks into your works will understand anything.” Freidenberg’s response was that it was the thoughts, rather than the
language, which were difficult. “My compressed language was always the object of attack: I’ve been hearing the same thing about my language for 30 years: that it’s absolutely impossible to understand. Incomprehensibility of thought is always taken for incomprehensibility of language.”

Kevin Moss

I shall have to begin with the same thing: the prison-like conditions in which this work was written.

I do not have the right of access to scholarly books. Therefore I have written from memory. I have been isolated from scholarly thought. My pupils and my friends have turned away, my classroom has been taken from me.

Under such conditions I decided to synthesize my thirty-seven year experience in research and fall silent.

Passer-by! Pause at this work and pray for scholarship!

Olga Freidenberg
20.03.1954
1
Explanation of the Theme

Everyone knows how awkward and artificial titles, those archaic attributes of books, can be. I should have given this book a different title, one closer to its theme and content. The book, after all, is intended to point out the peculiarities of the ancient literary image and then to pose the question of the aesthetic significance of the ancient concept, or, to be more precise, of those features that make it a literary form. But I have avoided pretentious titles, choosing instead to explain separately everything I wanted to put into the title.

The most important thing I have to say is that this work is an experiment in historical aesthetics. Its main thesis is that the appearance of ancient poetic categories originates in the appearance of concepts, since the ancient concept is only a form of the image; and in this form of the image the concept has the function of “transferral” [perenesenie], translation of concrete meanings of the image into abstract meanings, “transferring” [perenosnye: figural, metaphorical] meanings, which gives rise to metaphors and poetic figurality.

Formulating such a problem requires first of all justification. First, concepts are not the subject of aesthetics. Second, they are considered ahistorical. Third, ancient poetry is recognized once and for all as analogous to any European poetry. Fourth, any poetry must be composed of images, but not of concepts.

I must give explanations for all four of these points.

First and foremost, there is a stereotype that a literary critic is allowed to study the problems of the image, but not of the concept, as if the image were the business of aesthetics, and the concept of gnoseology, that is, of philosophy. “Well then, study the history of thought,” I was told, “why should you work on literature?” What should one do, however, if it is just these concepts which determine the unique characteristics of literature? “Well then, study organic chemistry,” one might say to a physiologist, “why are you working on physiology?”

Precisely ancient literature provides the case in which the peculiarity of the image is created by the concept. But before we speak of this we must show that both concepts and images are not constant, but historically differing phenomena. The mythological image and the poetic image differ sharply. But poetic images too change their structure depending on the historical epoch. And concepts? Concepts too are changeable. They change not only in content (with this all have agreed a long time ago), but also structurally, in their ability to reveal deeper and newer sides and connections of phenomena. This is where the basic problem lies. It is usually said that concepts were inherent in man from the beginning, that posing the question of the historical appearance of concepts would lead us to the false idea of “prelogical thought.” And we are terribly afraid of arguing “from labels.” But let us leave the term “prelogical” thought alone—we have shown more than once the arbitrary character of this term, which does not at all
mean thinking without logic (if it were “pre-formal-logical” everything would be all right).

I consider exploring the problem of the origin and history of concepts not only justifiable, but also important. After all, if we deny the historicity of concepts, we thereby assert them as a priori, assert their innateness, their “pre-existence” for human thought. There is no third way. Phenomena either are historical—in which case they appear, change, take on other forms, or they are eternal and a priori. Therefore we need a definite answer to this basic question. Yes, there was a time when there were no concepts. Yes, concepts had their moment of origin. They had and have a long and very complicated history. The concept is a historical category like everything created by thought. True, we must agree on one thing. Science does not use philosophical terms in their everyday sense (“materialist”=lover of profit, “idealist”=dreamer, “concept”=summary idea). Of course man has always had “concepts” in the usual sense (summary ideas). But scientifically the term “concept” signifies the abstract way of thought. Man began to think abstractly no earlier than the appearance of class society, and the prerequisites for such thinking appeared no earlier than the period of dissolution of clan-tribal society.

But we are most unaccustomed to speaking about the aesthetic significance of the concept. The opinion has become firmly established in criticism that poetry is everywhere and at all times due to thinking in images, while prose (particularly practical prose) is due to conceptual thought. Image and concept are usually opposed. This is to say nothing of the fact that “concept” and “image” are taken as ahistorical, as permanent categories with no specific historical character.

This principle prevails among Classical philologists in particular. Ancient concepts are considered complete, poetic images analogous to modern poetry. For example, the ancient metaphor is understood exactly as is the metaphor in modern European poetry—as a phenomenon of literary style, as a trope with its complete figularity of meanings, even with their symbolism. But the later trope functions within a conceptual system and has the character of a separate “figure,” while the Greek metaphor has no stylistic function and appears freely in a general figural context.

I must point out that our textbooks give Classical literature short shrift. On the one hand, it is considered completely the same kind of artistic literature as they think any literature had to be and always was. Created in an age of developed concepts, such a literature differs from ours only in its themes and in a degree of incompleteness. On the other hand, however, Classical literature is also considered religious, no less so than that of the ancient East. The modernizers have also made Greece and Rome into states of the modern type; in speaking of the Classical period they paint a ready-made picture of democracy or monarchy, republic or empire with our contemporary forms of class struggle. Such a society also has conceptual thought, like we do in the 20th century (in this respect the modernizers are consistent). Hence the completely incorrect understanding of Classical literature, one that distorts its historical peculiarity. It is examined from the point of view of the end of the history of consciousness; it is forced and deformed; it is seen, like the moon, only on the surface. And this is done most of all by those who shout loudest about the specific nature of Classical literature. They maintain that the best way to dissect the specific character of a phenomenon is to take the fact in its readymade form, as something which begins and ends with itself, with no connections and relations, and even from the position of finished conceptual judgments.
maximally contemporary with our own. They are belligerently certain that the specific nature of Classical literature can be known through the existing readymade phenomenon and that they are fighting against formalism. These good folk imagine that rock salt differs from water in that one is water and the other rock salt, and anyone who does a chemical analysis is accused of “ism” and of ignoring the facts (spetsifika).

The concept of the polis does not save them either. By polis most understand a peculiar ancient form of state structure, that is, a separate and limited city-state which generates such qualities as local patriotism, local citizenship (in actual fact polis collectivism), a certain narrow-mindedness which makes political ideas too stagnant. These theories are now common in Classical philology. Born in the West, they have taken root among us as well, introduced by those who most of all demand “specifics” and the Marxist method.

The polis, they say, is born, flowers, and dies. We can correspondingly allocate the periods of birth (Archaic), flowering (Classical), and degradation (Hellenic) of Greek (and even Roman) literature. But when asked how they explain the polished completeness of these ancient polis forms, these theoreticians answer, “That’s exactly the problem, that low socio-political forms can generate high forms of ideology.” And they quote Marx.

Here there are two problems. No polis can be used to explain the appearance of poetic categories, and they do appear in the Classical world. One or another form of city structure cannot be a factor in literary thought. Furthermore, not only is the method of the polis theory incorrect, but so is its analysis of the social structure. Birth, flowering, and degradation are relative concepts. In the Archaic period, for example, lyric genres not only appear, but undergo degradation, and the age of Hellenism can in no way be considered degradation with its high forms of culture and with the appearance of independent verbal literature.

In our textbooks the polis theory, denying the class struggle, has managed to become mixed with the popular class method. But this has hurt more than it has helped Classical literature. We should have said long ago that ancient classes do not correspond to European classes. All freeborn men are considered one class, while within this class there are moneylenders and there are artists. Ancient slaves could also be freeborn men who were taken captive. Ancient slaves themselves were made up of yesterday’s slave owners and even kings and aristocrats, yesterday’s “intelligentsia,” but alongside them were debtors, poor, and conquered natives. To unite them in a class opposed, let us say, to the working freeborn is to force the facts. If we consider that there are two classes in Greece, the slave owners and the slaves, then we will not find a class struggle between them. The social struggle takes place not between these two classes, but exclusively between the rich and poor of one and the same free class of slave owners. The view of ancient democracy is also completely incorrect. Greek democracy faces not ahead to constitutional rights and freedom of the individual, but backwards, to the collectivism of the clan and patriarchal communal principles. It could not have been otherwise: the struggle of the old and the new 2000 years before our time had no other course but liberation from clan-tribal “democracy.”

I would not have to mention all of this, which has no direct bearing on my topic, were it not for the fact that the modernization of the ancient world as a whole and in all its parts is reflected in all questions of ancient literature. This modernization deprives
sciences of freedom. Modernization keeps crying “bring ancient literature closer to us, show it to us as a literature that is ours, comprehensible to us,” as if we cannot comprehend something that has its own character. The artistic nature of ancient literature is not a given but a problem. The connection of Greek literature to cults, as paradoxical as it may seem, does not run counter to its emancipation from religion. Its aestheticism is of a particular type. The greatest riddle is the fact that Greek literature, in spite of its connection with cult, became the first art in the world, that is, managed to set off on the path toward overcoming if not religion itself, then at least subjection to it, and gained independence by means of its aesthetic qualities. Greek literature was created without literary precedents, and therefore without literary traditions—in this lies its theoretical importance. It cannot be discussed as one discusses a continuing literature, although the problem is that it is discussed in exactly that way. For Greece there is a question which cannot be gotten around: how did its first literature appear? This is as fair and appropriate a question for Greece as is the question of its political system.

Before Greek literature there was no literature. That is, not in the Classical world. As far as the ancient East is concerned, there was none there either, though this is immaterial, inasmuch as the “childhood” of an emerging society could not take over the readymade patterns of an aging society.

At the same time, Greek literature does not appear out of nowhere, in a vacuum, like the Biblical world. What preceded it?

Scholarly literature has worked out the answer to this question beautifully. True, the field of this question is misnamed: what has up to now been called the history of religion, in the English sense folklore, in the French primitive thinking should be called something completely different. This thinking is not primitive, and this folklore is not yet folklore, and most of all, this religion is not religion at all. But that’s not the point. It must be pointed out that science has discovered and studied closely the huge field of pre-Classical semantic material—myths, rites, cults, semanticized things, and verbal forms. **(I use the term “semantics” throughout the whole book to mean only the mythological semantic system.) What is all this? Is it really the case that all this exists in itself, and Greek literature, consisting of a stack of writers’ works, exists in itself? Is it really the case that ancient slave-owners liked to use folk works as Pushkin liked to use Arina Rodionovna’s folktales? Must we imagine that Greek literature also had nothing to do with semanticized things as, let us say, Dostoevsky did with mirrored dressers or Romain Rolland did with department stores?

Why did Classical drama come out of cult? And if drama absolutely had to come out of cult and become tragedy, then why did tragedy appear only among the Greeks, when all the ancient peoples had cults? Why is it that not one folk theater had tragedies, but all presented only comedies? If “tragedy comes out of cult, and comedy out of life itself,” then that must mean that not one people ever had cults, and folk life was characterized by irrepressible gaiety and playful experiences. Comparison of performances occurring in the Classical world beyond the bounds of art (in religion, in everyday life, in science, in custom, in law, etc.) to those contained in art itself shows their homogeneity, with, however, the single difference that in art they take on a new artistic quality.

But what makes up the poetic composition of Classical literature is only half of the problem. There is, however, another half: if Classical poetic categories are the same as mythological images, then what made them poetic and what shows their poeticism? One
problem cannot be separated from the other. The study of Classical literature can set itself various goals.

But one must always remember that the Classical literary process consisted of the artistic re-creation of images that had not been artistic before. Metaphorization, objectively created by the birth of concepts, lays the groundwork for this process.

Classical literature without question requires a different method from that applied to literature that has already “become.” The one-track way is completely inapplicable. It is an absolute mistake to study it as something readymade in form, something logical and well known. Because of its uniqueness one cannot examine the system of Classical art from the positions of our contemporary conceptual thinking. I would even go so far as to say that one cannot apply so called “development” to Greek literature: in Greek literature concept rests on image and they must be studied together. Image and concept in Greek literature are not two pieces of clothing, inner and outer, but a single semantic whole that can be dissected only by science.

I maintain that the analogical method distorts our understanding of the very essence of Classical literature. I maintain that it must be taken from both sides, including its semantics, because semantics is precisely the element of concreteness that is subjected to recreation in the artistic consciousness. The Classical concept is formally constructed according to the semantics of the image, and if we ignore semantics, we ascribe to the Classical world our formal-logical thinking. Nevertheless I would very much like to stress that this double analysis must be done only in the case of Classical (Greek) literature, and by no means of post-Classical—not Pushkin and Goethe, not even Derzhavin or Lomonosov,—it is ridiculous even to have to mention the anecdotal examples by which some try to discredit the semantic method. But a universal method is a fiction of metaphysics. To analyze in the same way Sophocles and Byron (I am not speaking of the thematic content which, thank God, no one claims is identical) is tantamount to dressing Phaedra and Hippolytus in French court costume as was done in the age of Louis XIV. And this is exactly what is done by those who cry loudest about “specifics” and call themselves Marxists. The only thing they see “specifics” in is the differences between writers’ thematics and the complete absence of any kind of regularities.

Classical literature is still in the process of becoming. Its course is determined by the relation between old image-thought and new conceptual thought. One and the same semantic material, depending on the age, could turn into any genre, depending on the character of concepts. This character determines not only the genres of Classical literature, but also the literary means employed within the genres. And therefore the problem of the concept constitutes in this case an integral object of aesthetics.

I have yet to discuss the factual contents of this book. I would like to stress most of all those chapters in which I give my understanding of the Greek tragedy. In my analysis of tragedy I avail myself of every opportunity to show its origins not from cult, but from balagan; inasmuch as this idea is presented for the first time in scholarly literature, I was obliged to be rather persistent in my selection of material proof.

It may appear that the intervening four chapters have no direct bearing on tragedy, but in fact they too are necessary. They point out the features that appear and disappear, take on various aspects, and seem about to take shape when they vanish. Phenomena in these intermediate chapters date from various periods, some even later than tragedy, but the
elements they express are present in tragedy either overtly or covertly; they are effective in tragedy. These phenomena contain elements of tragedy in other forms and other combinations. In other words, the formants of tragedy are not archetypes and not “givens,” but moveable parts of a semantic system which are capable of being recreated. Internal connections link precisely different things (lyric, philosophy, comedy, tragedy). I would like to show these various phenomena exactly because it is in them that the formants of tragedy pop up here and there, formants that have nothing in common with tragedy until a certain time.

The same semantic inventory of images we find in tragedy appears before our eyes taking different shape in different texts and in various forms. The historical age changes not only the content of the concept, but also its structure. It was the historical conditions of the Classical world that made artistic concepts structurally dependent on mythological images.

19 Aug. 1954
Ancient Greek literature is significant for theory because it was the first in the history of world literatures to become art. But this literature was far from having the finished forms that were later ascribed to it. In Greece the literary system is only beginning to take shape. All the imagery contained in ancient literature had behind it more than a thousand years of existence as preliterary imagery. But it was in Greek literature that this imagery first began to acquire aesthetic qualities, and that which had had no poetic function before Greek literature now began to take on the lines of poetic forms. This changed the whole character of Greek literature, and “the genetics of aesthetics” (the peculiarities evoked by the birth of the literary function) became the basis of its peculiarity.1

We call the ancient verbal “muse” art literature only by convention. When we analyze this “literature” we find in it an entire system of thought which no longer has active meaning for it, but which at the same time cannot be extracted without destroying the literature. To put it more strongly, Greek literature owes its existence and its organic chemistry to this system of thought which is already inactive. The new system of thought grew up out of it directly and was directly dependent on it, so that unlike all other, later literatures, the whole of Greek literature was a whole at once dual and single.

This semantically inactive system of thought is simple to point to and label: it represents mythological imagery. Its nature is concreteness.

Extensive scholarly literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that ancient abstract concepts, in spite of their novelty and restructuring of meanings, not only derived from concrete images, but even continued to preserve these images within themselves and to be supported by their semantics. Mythological images began to disappear not because people stopped believing in myths, but because within the very image that reflected the structure of human consciousness a rift appeared between what the image was intended to communicate and the means of its communication. In this regard the history of ancient ideologies is the history of overcoming the concrete-image element. Greece begins this process; Rome finishes it.

The new form of thought, which was born directly from mythological image, is characterized by abstraction. It is thinking in concepts.

Mythological image (concrete sense-thinking) and concept (abstract thinking) are two methods of perceiving the world which are historically distinct and can be dated. The image, like the concept, is a logical cognitive category; but its essence lies in the fact that mythological image thought does not separate the knower from the known, the phenomenon (object) from its properties (symptoms), the represented from the representing. These two methods of cognition were distinguished by the Greeks themselves. One, corresponding to the concrete image, they called τὸ ἀἰσθητόν or τὸ ὀρατόν (that which is known by the sense organs, particularly by sight); the other,
corresponding to the abstract concept, they called ἰόνομ (known by speculation). Concrete thinking later came to be called sense or emotional thinking (for example, in Marxist logic, unfamiliar with the achievements of the new science of primitive thought, ethnography, and scientific folklore study). But this is an unfortunate mistake. Emotional thinking is an incorrect, unscientific term. And concrete subject-object thinking is also logical, and it is not evoked by any “emotions”: the distinction between “reason,” “will,” and “feeling” is a very old one. The Greeks were correct in distinguishing between two methods of perceiving the world. But we must add to this that the basis of ἰόνομ (speculation) was also perception of the sensible world, and cognition by the sense organs (αισθητόν) always represented semantics, that is, thought. The difference between image and concept is the difference between concrete and abstract thought. With this reservation, the distinction drawn by the Greeks remains in force.

Although mythological image and concept are two different means of knowing the world, at a certain historical stage they mutually conditioned one another. Classical antiquity was the epoch in which concepts began to arise, to spring up and to grow. But here we see no “fully hatched,” purely abstract concepts, which might have followed had feeling images died away. Quite the contrary, all the material from Greece shows that the original concepts arose not in the form of abstract categories which had overcome the sensuality of the mythological image, but exactly the opposite—in the form of those selfsame sensual categories which had only changed their function. I do not know how the process of the formation of concepts took place in the ancient East, but in Greece concepts were born as a form of the image, and their abstraction contained within it concreteness, which had yet to be removed. Coming into being as it did immediately from the sensual (more than that, even from the visual) image, the ancient concept represented the same concrete image, but in a new essence—an abstract one.

At this moment of the appearance of the ἰόνομ out of the ὀρατόν, at this moment of their contradictory symbiosis, that is, in the cognition of the abstract through the sensual, at this moment the literary image was born as well; it would be more precise to say that ancient concepts appeared in the categories of literary images.

But what does it mean that ancient concepts came into being as images with an abstract function? I have in mind the metaphor and its figurative meanings. Ancient concepts took shape in the form of metaphors—as figurative, abstract meanings of concrete meanings. But the metaphor was not a given quantity and did not take shape immediately. It had its own process of coming into being and historical evolution, the beginning of which took place precisely in Classical antiquity. Its figurality began in the archaic period in Greece with the transferral of concrete to abstract meanings, and was still being completed in the more recent times of conceptual “figurality.”

But all ancient concrete images represented a compact semantic system. Where did this system go with the formation of concepts? The point is that it did not go anywhere at all. It remained untouched. The former mythological semantics of the images acquired an abstract meaning, but this abstract meaning was suggested by the mythological semantics which acted as material for the abstraction. At the same time, the abstract meaning gave these semantics a completely new character in regard to meaning. This is why we come across these semantics in all ancient concepts with a greater or lesser predominance of meaning.
Characteristic of the mythological image was the lack of quality of representations, so-called polysemantism, the semantic identity of images.\(^3\) This phenomenon has been explained by the continuity of subject and object,\(^4\) of the world that is known and the man who knows it. Concrete thought, evoked by a mythological perception of the world, was such that man could conceive of objects and phenomena only in their individuality, without generalization, and in their external physical presence, without entering into their qualities. We call such mythological representations “images” precisely because of their concreteness (object-ness), as opposed to concepts which “abstract” or pull away the quality of the objects from the objects themselves, thereby giving objects a speculative character.

In earlier mythological thought the “property” of an object was thought of as a living being, a double of the object (in the words of Potebnia, the symptom was thought of together with the substance\(^5\)). Mythologically, the world was represented as divided into identical doubles, of which one had the “property” and the other did not. These images served to express man’s most basic, but also most summary representations of the alternation of life and death. The “property” corresponded to authenticity, to a certain essence which lay at the root of the object, that is, to life; the double without the “property,” on the other hand, was only an external “likeness” of the authentic and signified the image, that is, death.

The prerequisites for such a world view were brought on by gnoseological causes—the absence of qualitative determinants, the summarity and identity of representations. Summarity and identity forced people to divide the world into pairs of phenomena which had something in common—life and death, warmth and cold, light and darkness, and so on. These were personified in two beings that were “like” each other. One of them (the positive principle) represented the “property,” and the other being (the negative principle)—only its concrete “likeness,” external appearance without the “property.”

Such a division into two identical and equally concrete principles was subjected to conceptual reworking. The point is that in the formation of concepts the differentiation of the subject from the object played a decisive cognitive role. This differentiation slid apart and transformed the vision of the world, separated the knowing man from known reality, introduced a distinction between active principles and those subject to action (active from passive, things from their properties, result from cause). As soon as “I” was separated from “not-I,” objects lost their former “property,” which had apparently been inherent in them substantially, and the doubles were disconnected. Concept turned the property of an object into a speculative category. Abstracting the features of the object from the object itself and comparing these features, it introduced alongside identification and similarity the new category of differentiation. The doubles—things, elements, and beings received a separate abstract quality and a divided existence, having fallen apart both among themselves and internally. Thus already in the oldest epic, in Homer, the former hero-doubles have become different beings. Homer does not yet have conceptually forces of nature such as “water,” “fire,” “trees,” “animals,” but still has concrete individual (instantaneous) Poseidons, Hephaistuses, Aphrodites, and Heras; yet Achilles and Patroclus are already separated and qualitatively different, and Hector is different from Apollo, Penelope from Athena, Odysseus from Antinous. Just so in the folk puppet theater (balagan) one can sense the division into things and beings which are “like” one
another, which provoke by their “external similarity” two sets of similar events. This is a result of the conceptual reworking of the old images.

The separation of subject from object was a lengthy process, which continued into the beginning of Classical antiquity. First it took the form of perception of the subject in the categories of the object and of transferral of the object onto the subject. The object continued to retain its concreteness (the mythic world), and the subject was new, not completely discovered, and it was being modeled on the object. Ancient consciousness understood itself through “not-I” for a long time, and this was the cognitive basis for the formation of religion. Ancient man thought pantheistically, understanding even his own personal life as a manifestation of the divine will. When he composed songs, he ascribed their composition to the gods. Expressing his emotional states in lyric, he sang himself by means of showing the states of others and introduced for this purpose mythological characters. He created a special genre—tragedy—by means of which he could expound his views without ever revealing his physical presence. Such a world view was particularly in evidence in the archaic period in Greece, when the leading arts were architecture and sculpture. This epoch created dwellings of the gods and statues of the gods. Man did not see himself. The subjective could be understood only through the objective. And therefore, in essence, all Greek art was “human.” Whatever it might try to depict, in it, through the objective, was born man.

If concepts had replaced already obsolete mythological images, if there had been first images and then concepts, we would have before us such abstract thought as could only appear in recent centuries. The history of cognition, however, was different. Classical antiquity shows us that the content of the old mythological images turned into the texture of the newly arisen concepts. That the image did not disappear, but remained inside the concept, formally untouched and with its concreteness not completely eliminated, shows that early Classical concepts were actually images which had only changed their function. This also explains the fact that the new conceptual phenomena were named with the old image lexicon, that is, that the abstract was denoted by the concrete (for example, law by “pasture,” suffering by “labor pains,” et al.). The mythological perception of phenomena in the form of two identical opposites is preserved in the concept only in the structural side of its semantics. But its cognitive content changes. Concept breaks up these two identities, leaving behind only an external community, but it introduces the qualitative opposition of the authentic to the illusory. Phenomena begin to be divided into those which really exist and those which are externally “likened” to the real—phenomena whose existence is illusion. In ancient understanding, all “illusion” is not a mere mirage, but the external aspect of that which really exists, a formal variant or allomorph of the same reality (speaking in our modern times). But that is not all. That which “seems” is a copy of the “authentic”—a cast—based on a complete “similarity” with reality. With the dominance of concrete concepts, early Classical thought attributed all illusion to the world of space. Just such a copy-likeness, such an illusion of reality was the Classical “image” (εἰκών, εἴδωλον, imago). Such an image was founded on the idea of “imitation” (mimesis), understood as concrete and not illusory imitation, an imitation of reality in reality (cp. the ancient Indians’ “Samsara world,” where illusions reigned—
mirages and evil opposed to the world of truth and good). The theory of external reflections and copies occupied a large place in antiquity. The object prevailed over the subject, making the entire area of human action a gnoseological microcosm, illusory in essence, but “imitating” the authentic macrocosm. Mimesis also overcame the dualism which was so strong among many of the peoples of the ancient East who had not created their own literary systems. The antinomies of existence and nonexistence, of good and evil, of truth and fiction were gnoseologically reconciled in Classical antiquity in the theory of mimesis. The world had “essence” and “appearance.” Appearance was the “image.” The fact that it was not created by human free invention, but had a full external expression of authentic essence made it subordinate to the “truth,” made it an aspect of the truth; and together with the truth it composed a single indivisible whole.

The growth of concepts and the strengthening of abstraction, which overcame the concreteness of mythological thought, led to important changes in the conception of illusion. Alongside the former antithesis of “essence” and “appearance” there appeared a conscious distinction between the world of space and the world of thought. Now the “illusory” took on new features: not only was it opposed to “authenticity,” but it also became a category of imagination, appearance to the mind. The path of such recognition, however, was difficult and long. While it was still being perfected in the aesthetic theories of antiquity, literature came to it in practice. Classical antiquity, by the way, never worked out a term “illusion” which would show its new features (to the Romans “illusion” meant ridicule, with the Greeks it was replaced by “deceit”); imagination itself was long understood in the concrete sense as an “imprint” in the soul.

In the artistic consciousness mimesis took on a new nature. From imitation of reality in reality (in actual fact) it became imitation of reality in imagination, that is, an illusory reflection of real phenomena. But here we need to make a significant reservation. The Classical ideas of the real and the illusory were directly opposite to ours both gnoseologically and in the content of these ideas: antiquity took as authentic what we consider nonexistent, and what is for us real it attributed to the world of spatial “appearance.” It considered nonexistence real; existence, a “copy,” an illusion of the real. In our terms, the ancient literary image was an illusion of reality, but from the ancient point of view, it was an illusion of an illusion: the real world, the world of the microcosm, was considered only a “likeness,” an “imitation,” a sensory “image” of the authentic macrocosm, the other world that was perceived by speculation. And Plato was completely consistent in finding a basis for this “popular” view when in his theory of the literary image art is “the image of an image” or “an imitation of imitation.” I should say here that because of the particular ancient understanding of “realism” we cannot pose the question of realism in Classical antiquity without confusion, just as we cannot pose the connected question of its materialism or idealism. Ancient cognitive “biune monism” made idealism materialistic and materialism idealistic. Thus from the historical point of view the strongly antirealistic conception of the Classical period is actually an early form of realism. After all, the ancient “image” objectively corresponded to the whole world of reality, no matter that the Greeks explained reality itself as a kind of “illusion.” Everything that went beyond the bounds of “speculation” was not opposed to living truth, but strove to “imitate” it. And although ancient theoretical thought denied reality, literary practice was sustained only by reality. Though hostile to realism, ancient art was at the highest level of realism possible for its age. We, however, are forced to
speak about Classical antiquity in the language of abstract concepts: what we describe in this language does not coincide with the contents of Classical images, which are still only becoming concepts, concepts with a concreteness that has yet to be overcome. Our language smooths over and levels out the specific character of ancient ideas. But these problems are even greater when our terms turn out to be opposite to the ancient ones in content. Objectively, the task of the Classical literary image is to be, in illusory recreation, true to reality. It is the creative principle, not only “miming” the original that lies before it, but recreating anew all its visible forms in speculative refraction.

In the Classical artistic consciousness all forms of “appearance” are represented as illusory. The very category of illusion is still naive, with a strong shading of uneliminated concreteness. The unreliability characteristic of imagination becomes the basic feature of illusion.

With the appearance of artistic thinking there begins the construction of the “image” of the world, already consciously illusory in its nature. It corresponds in the imagination to all the visible forms of reality. The more ancient the art is, the more the “image” is tied to its original and the more thoroughly it attempts to imitate it. The plastic arts are born as mimesis of the human body; epic goes even further in this respect: in it the “image” is even closer to the visual, object reality. On the other hand, the later the age, the deeper the conceptual distancing of the “image” from the “literal” original that it imitates. In the mature Classical art of Greece—in tragedy—the comparison of the “image” is directed not towards “copying” reality (therefore it is not “realistic” as Homeric epic was), but towards representing in phenomena precisely their hidden side, that invisible to sight. Concepts require a selection of features, abstraction from object-ness; concepts provoke generalization and qualitative evaluation; in the Classical period in Greece—in tragedy—the literary image uses the concrete visible forms of external reality only as material for the abstract problems of ethics and for poetic figurality. The image ceases to strive for precision of that which it conveys and puts the interpretive meaning foremost. It “says differently” [ino-skazat', allo-agoreuein] what it sees and conveys concreteness in such a way that it turns into a metaphor of itself, that is, into a kind of concreteness that is an abstracted and generalized new meaning.

This led to the appearance of so-called figurative meanings—to the metaphor. The former identity of meaning of the original and its transmission was replaced by the mere illusion of such identity, with an identity that “seemed” to the imagination. Formally the semantic identity of the original and its transmission remained the same. But in actuality illusion introduced its “as if” into the transmission of the image, and precision turned into conscious unreliability—the same thing in form, but with a new content. Before, for example, “walk around” meant to walk in a circle. When Sophocles’ Creon says to the guard that the latter is “walking around,”14 he does not at all have in mind literal circular walking, but something that wittingly has nothing at all in common with the precise direct meaning of his own words. He has in mind exactly their other meaning, which only seems literal, but is in actual fact abstract and generalized, the metaphorical, figurative meaning (“you are walking around and confusing the issue”). And when the guard says to Creon that “the short way became long,”15 he has in mind both the real road he had to
take to the King’s palace and the way of doubts, the “way” in the metaphorical sense. In illusory refraction “way,” “walking” take on the meaning of “seeming” roads and travels “as if” real, but in fact completely different, only imagined by consciousness, containing in themselves another meaning, not at all literal. The figurative (transferred) meanings were the objective result of “transferring” the semantic features from one object to another, not identical to the first, but only illusorily compared to it.

The transfer of meaning could not have appeared if the concrete and real identity (the “way” really corresponding to the road) had not been forced to change into a seeming and abstract identity (the “way” in the sense of “course of thoughts”). Metaphor appeared on its own as a form of the image in the function of concept. Its appearance required one condition: two identical concrete meanings had to be split up; one of them continued to be concrete, the other became its own transposition to concept.

The Classical period provides just this kind of metaphor. The mythological identity of semantics is here still present; but it is precisely here that the concrete thought begins to move in the direction of the future abstraction. Without having before us semantic identities—without studying mythological semantics—we would never have been able to determine the most characteristic feature of ancient metaphor: the possibility of basing it on two such meanings which are both equal and different (“way” understood concretely and “way” understood figuratively). Eventually all metaphors are characterized by the “figurality” of their meanings, but between Classical and later metaphors there is an essential difference.

The gnoseological premise of ancient figurality is a characteristic feature that distinguishes all ancient figurative meanings: behind ancient transfer of meaning there must lie the former genetic identity of two semantics—the semantics of the object from which the features are “transferred” and the semantics of the other object, to which they are transferred. This former identity already bears a conceptual character of mere seeming illusory identity (hidden comparison). This formally continuing identity of the image and the concept which were cognitively different is the distinctive feature of Classical metaphor. The illusion of the apparent meaning had to come out of the correspondence to the real meaning and be its “copy” and “likeness.”

Modern metaphor can be created by transferring a feature from any phenomenon onto any other (“iron will”). Our metaphor leaves out the comparative “as” which is always present in it (“a will hard as iron”). Because of the generalizing sense of the metaphor, we can build it as we like without considering the literal meaning of the words (“health to reason!”). But ancient metaphor could say “iron will” or “health to reason” only if “will” and “iron,” “health” and “reason” were synonyms. Thus Homer could say “iron sky,” “iron heart,” because the sky, man, and man’s heart were represented in myth as iron. Later one synonym, “iron heart,” takes on in conceptual thinking the figurative meaning of “unbending,” “stern” heart; but “iron sky” remains a mythological image in its direct literal meaning “sky of iron,” and in archaic, pre-conceptual epic it does not become a metaphor.

Homer says “salty sea” because for the Greeks “sea” and “salt” are synonyms. But we never come across “salty food;” the pure concept without its image base cannot appear in Homer. One may object that the sea is also salty. We also say “salt tears,” and tears really can taste like salt; nevertheless, “salt tears,” “white hands,” and so on, while corresponding to real features of the objects involved have a “poetic” character; they are
figures that derive among the ancient peoples from image tautologies. Similarly the Classical singer says “flame of love,” “abyss of grief,” love and flame were identical personifications, the abyss was represented as underworld-suffering. In no way could ancient man have said as we can in Russian “abyss of light,” “abyss of happiness,” “abyss of beautiful things,” and so on [“abyss,” “bezdnia,” has the second meaning “multitude” in modern Russian]. Our language and our metaphors are made up of abstract concepts, the Classical words “love,” “abyss,” “suffering” are in fact concrete, and each continues to be an image personification, although it has taken on a second conceptual (abstract) meaning. Thus Arrogance was once an agrarian divinity; Aeschylus’ metaphor “blooming arrogance bore as its fruit the sheaf of destruction, therefore it was necessary to reap an all-crying harvest”18 was based on the semantic identity of “arrogance” and such agricultural images as blooming, bearing fruit, sheaf, reap, harvest, which take on in Aeschylus a figurative, abstract meaning. While ancient figurative meanings require like ours the presence of two meanings, one concrete and one abstract—a binary structure, in the ancient period both of these terms nevertheless had to have identical semantics, otherwise figurative meanings were impossible. Behind ancient transfer of meaning lay the identity of two semantics, an identity which derived from thinking in mythological images. Thus Aeschylus’ metaphor “to send the eye’s enchanting arrow”19 (to look with passion) is based on the semantic identity of “eye” and “arrow,” “enchantment” and “love;” the epithet “enchanting,” “bewitching” has the literal meaning of “charm” in the sense of “magic,” of that concrete force which was an attribute to Aphrodite (her magic girdle, which enclosed all the charms of love) and which was a “property” of all personifications of the passion of love. But in Aeschylus this mythological image, without changing its semantics, takes on the abstract meaning of a “passionate glance” only likened to the “arrow of an eye.” The two semantic meanings, of which one has been turned by conceptual thinking into an “illusion” and the other into a “comparison” to the other, were cast completely objectively in the form of semantic transference. Thus there appeared figurality.

It came about when the old image in its untouched form took on yet another, a new meaning. The old image is the mythological concrete image, with its one-dimensional unique time, with frozen space, immobile, without quality, and resultative—finished, without causality and without coming into being. This very image begins to take on a second meaning, an “other” meaning [allo, inoe]; it, the same thing, appears in the form of something else with which it merges and from which, in essence, it differs. The othersaying of the image, the figurality of the image has a conceptual character: concreteness takes on abstract features, uniqueness—the features of multiplicity, the lack of quality becomes tinged with sharply delineated, at first monolithic qualities, space opens up, the element of movement from cause to its result is introduced. The former mythological image acquires a second, “other” meaning of itself, of its own semantics. It takes on the function of figurality. But figurative representation of what? Of itself, the image.

In fact, in any Classical metaphor, the figurative meaning is tied to the concrete semantics of the mythological image and represents its conceptual duplicate. One of Aeschylus’ metaphors (whose age is shown by the use of alliteration) says “let us not experience that which causes great suffering, for which a great sea is ploughed by the sword.”20 The image “plough by the sword” leads to mythology; the semantic identity of the instruments of agriculture and war is well known. The great sea ploughed by the
sword is the sea across which Paris sailed with Helen to Troy, the sea of love which started a war among peoples. The mythological images continue to speak their own concrete language. But they also “figure” [ino-skazuiut] themselves, yielding the conceptual meaning “let us avoid the ruinous consequences of love.”

Classical figurality (“other-saying”) consists in the fact that the image, without losing its character (to plough the sea with a sword), acquires a meaning which does not at all correspond to its literal meaning (the destructive results of love). This new meaning begins to communicate the semantics of the image “otherwise,” differently, on a completely different mental level—abstractly, as if thought read one thing and said another. For later European figurality, to link two phenomena by analogy it was enough to find one common feature, even a purely abstract one. We say “my friend is my support,” meaning that a man can “support” in the abstract sense like a hard physical object. When we say “drown in bliss” we draw an analogy between immersion in the sea and abstract “immersion” in feeling. In our language “fruitless illness,” and “fruitless suffering” signify something useless and superfluous. But ancient figurality requires no abstraction; it is not satisfied with analogy of separate conceptual features, but seeks full semantic identity of its two parts. And this is possible only on the basis of mythological images. Where there is no full connecting identity of two meanings, there can be no ancient metaphor. Antiquity could have no metaphors that were abstract or based on broad generalization (“woe from wit,” “a great wind drives away clouds”). This predetermines the set of Classical metaphors. They can be only solar, agricultural, and chthonic—nothing else. Put another way, Classical abstraction is still formally connected to the concreteness of the mythological image and in its earliest forms it has the character of transferral, i.e. of still incomplete abstraction, of a conditioned, significantly concretized transferral (abstraction of what?—of this given phenomenon).

When Sophocles says “fruitless illness” he follows the mythological images of “fruitlessness” as drought, as death, and of “illness” as an ill-fated woman who cannot have children. It is precisely from this identity of “fruitlessness” and “evil” that ancient thought creates the figure of “death.” Without the image of “fruitlessness” such a figure could not appear. If for us these semantics no longer exist, if for us “fruitless” signifies the abstract concept “superfluous,” “useless,”—such a figurative meaning cannot appear. On the other hand, the very transferral of the Classical figurality still has an insignificant measure of abstraction when compared to later transferrals. The concreteness of the mythological image is still too close to the figurative meaning which “abstracts” and is “transferred” from the image to the concept. In essence, the early Classical concept differs from the image only in the abstract character of the very semantics the image expresses. Such synonymity of the image and the concept shows that the ancient concept was at certain stages a form of the image.

In Classical figurative speech the concept corresponds to the image not only semantically, but strictly formally as well, neither changing it in form nor adding anything to it. When Aeschylus says that his hero “went into the stormy sea,” he does not comment on his thought. The Classical audience, for which “storm” and “stormy raging sea” usually signified “death,” creates in its imagination a picture of complete
finality. There is no sea anywhere near the hero; he has not gone into anything, and the finality of his position is of a moral and religious character. Nevertheless, the audience, hearing about the sea, thinks about the hero’s moral conflict. The image speaks in its own language (of images) without recourse to any concept, and the audience hearing this language creates in its mind something completely different [inoe]—a concept abstracted into an idea. The semantics of the image are “transferred” onto the concept. The stormy sea is a moral collision. But what do they have in common? The semantics of raging waters and of inescapable misfortune, the mythological semantics of the “watery abyss” as an image of death. But does this semantic identity really still remain valid for Aeschylus? Does the 5th century audience think that Aeschylus’ hero dies in the abyss? Of course not. They understand that the hero suffers moral, not physical misfortune, and that he has not walked into the stormy sea, but it is “as if” he had walked in. Figurality is achieved by means of illusion “imitating” the formal side of the image and “compared” to the semantics of the image, but its similarity to the image is only “apparent.” The difference between the semantics of the image and the semantics of the concept, which rests on the illusion of identity, consists in the transference of meaning, in the figurality [inoskazatel’nost’] of the concept, in the abstract and generalized meaning of the same thing the image speaks of. Classical figurality appears as mimesis of the image, as an illusory form of the image, “seemingly” corresponding to it, but in reality “other” [inaia].

The mythological image always means what it says and says only what it means. Concept has a level at which it says something other than what it means and means something other than what it says. On this level concept appears in the form of the metaphor, or rather it is this level which gives rise to the metaphor. Such is the concept in the Classical period, when it has a dual nature—one in form, another in sense. The Classical concept from archaic Greece to late Rome is to overcome this duality by bringing the form and the sense closer together. In this process concrete ideas undergo abstraction.

Transferral or metaphorization is the beginning of this process. Concrete meanings take on figural meaning as well: the concrete meanings of the mythological image become the abstract meanings of the concept. The image meanwhile both remains formally the same and loses its semantic nature. And the concept serves as a new abstract form of the earlier concrete (sense) image. This is the beginning of the appearance of concepts and of the dying out of mythological images.

Figurative meanings! Who could have invented such a semantic obstacle if it had not appeared in human consciousness as the result of gnoseological laws! On the one hand, Classical figurality does not correspond to the authentic meanings of the image. However, its figural meaning is absolutely coordinated with its direct meaning. It preserves absolute conceptual precision of the image semantics, but in translation from the concrete to the abstract.

Figurality has its own history within the Classical period as well. At first its transferral of meanings is not yet figurality, but only “other-saying,” with more concreteness than transferral. Here its duality is preserved in its very structure—the image and the concept are separate. The farther one goes, the more the concept and the image merge, the more the concept “transfers,” abstracts the semantics of the image, the more obvious the figurality of the sense becomes.
The most ancient and the most concrete modification of figurality is preserved in extended epic similes. The extended epic simile is a kind of figurative speech in which the two members are still placed next to one another and transferral is achieved literally, by transferring the features of one object onto another by means of visual illusion (for example, Achilles “looks like” a lion in a given situation). What we find in similes, however, is present in the epos itself in episodes in which comparison is not the goal; the gods take on the “appearance” of heroes, so “like” in “appearance” that they are impossible to tell apart. We know that in balagan, which is based on purely visual illusion, heroes and gods “became like” mortals or one another also without any intention of comparison. In both cases we are dealing with literal “likening.” As to extended similes, in them concepts are considerably more developed; comparison makes the “likening” even more illusory. Here the visual side of that which “appears” (“like,” “seems”) has turned into the abstract category of unreliability (“as if”), that is, into the category of recognized illusion. By the way, there was a stage in which this unreliability was literal; the antiquity of these ideas has left its mark in so called negative similes, where instead of illusory identity (“as if”) we find negation of the identity postulated. For example, in the Iliad:

The wave of the sea howls not so much at the shore…
Nor so loud is the roar of a blazing fire…
Nor roars the wind so much in the high-haired oaks…
As was the voice of Trojans and Achaeans.24

Or:

Not so spirited is the leopard, nor the lion, not the destructive-minded
wild boar…
As the sons of Panthous25

The extended simile arises from the former semantic identity of its two members, but in its conceptual form it consists of two identical members of which one was the appearance of the other (seemed like the other); in it the image already had the form “as if” of the concept, but the concept was itself still attached to the image. Such is the comparison of the ancient simple, merged metaphor, in which image is concept (e.g. “hail”=precipitation and misfortune).

We are used to pointing out that in extended similes Menelaus, Achilles or some other hero is connected with a lion or another animal, a crowd with waves, sea sand, and so on—passing over the fact that both “lion” and “waves” are connected with heroes, with the crowd, and so on.

Meanwhile, in Homeric simile the explaining object is predetermined by the explained object. The lion which eats the grazing animal explains Menelaus’ actions, and the dogs and the shepherds explain the fear of the Trojans.26 But this is not just any lion whatever;
it is a specific lion, lion-Menelaus, whose feature is still the semantic connection between
the “hero” and his former animal form. Such a “lion” as a concept passes a stage in which
it is the given concrete lion in the given single situation described in the simile (this is
why it is extended), namely—when the shepherds are driving the flock, when the lion
eats one of the flock and all are paralyzed by fear and cannot attack the lion. Such a
unique concrete lion, still connected with Menelaus, provides the form which clarifies
one distinct feature of Menelaus: the fear inspired in the Trojans. It is not just any lion
that characterizes Menelaus, and it is not Menelaus as a whole that is characterized in all
of his features. The extended simile shows the limitations of the early concept, which is
still “given” and dependent on the image. Figurality is here narrow in scope. It is
exhausted by the fact that the meaning of the image (Menelaus) is conveyed by the
meaning of the concept (lion). If it were “lion in general,” the general concept of any
lion, a metaphor with its figural meaning would result (“Menelaus is a lion”). But in
simile two different images have one sense; in metaphor one image has two different
senses.

Image and concept in the extended simile are equated with the conjunction ὡς (“as
if,” “like”). The Greek ὡς means “as” not in its abstract conceptual form, but as a
concrete image, with the semantics of “likeness,” of some unreliability, some seeming. In
the oldest form of Classical particles and absolute constructions, where there are no
comparisons, ὡς expresses not fact, but conjecture. In similes ὡς emphasizes that the
vehicle does not at all coincide with the tenor, but only “seems” to do so. Thus “lion” has
in simile a figural meaning, in so far as it is not a lion, but Menelaus. In the given
instance ὡς emphasizes the illusory nature of the “lion,” which is not a lion in reality.

The transfer of meaning from the image to the concept was mediated in the simile by
the element of the imaginary [mnimost’]. Comparative figurality has the quality of
unreliability. “Other saying” here is inauthentic saying, but it is likened [upodoblennoe]
to the authentic. But metaphor too gives not the true sense of the image, but a seeming
sense. “Your lips are a cluster of grapes.” This late Classical metaphor is not about real
grapes which are sold at the market.27 The metaphor mentions the “sweet juice” (a kiss),
which the lover “presses out.” It could have said “lips like grapes,” and then a simile
would have resulted. In both cases the concept, describing a property of the object,
deprives the object of its true properties, ascribing to it what is not present in it. By this
“other-saying,” by substituting properties of the object the concept defines the quality of
the object. It is in this enrichment that the importance of the concept as an illusory form
of the image lies. Let us take, for example, the same metaphor “your lips are a cluster of
grapes.” The mythological image understood this expression literally: in myth the face,
lips, an entire human being could be represented as a grapevine—Dionysus and other
personifications of agricultural fertility were represented as “grape-faced,” “with a grape
face.” The connection between the ideas “grapes” and “love” can already be seen in
Aristophanes,28 and in later works this complex of agrarian images becomes more
syncretic. But concept discards mythological faith. It disproves it precisely by its illusory
quality. The lips of the beloved are “not” grapes, and the kiss “not” grape juice. “The
sweetness of a kiss” has a figural, abstract meaning. The sense of the image is expanded
and generalized. Diversity is introduced into the understanding of the object, but the
The riddle “overcame” meaning and deceived by it like a circus trick (balagan). The γρίφος (the Classical form of the riddle) and the trick occupied an equal and prominent place in balagan performance, later in festive (religious) ritual. The riddle, like the metaphor, said one thing and thought another; like the circus trick it tried to palm off an imaginary meaning that it knew did not correspond to the authentic one. But the goal of the riddle was different from that of the metaphor: to “reveal” the hidden authentic meaning and “recognize” what had been unrecognized. But in its separation of two identical senses into one authentic and one likeness the riddle had something in common with the metaphor and the simile; all the γρίφος had to do was combine the riddle and its solution with the conjunction “as if” or “like” to become an extended simile. For example, the γρίφος from “The Sleep” of Alexis:29 not mortal and not immortal, but...“always anew now vanishing, now present, with an invisible face, known to all.” The solution: sleep/dream. But if it had said “Sleep is like neither mortal nor immortal...” etc. the result would be a simile. On the other hand, all an extended simile needs is to be posed as a riddle to turn into a γρίφος. “Shepherds want to attack a lion that has stolen a cow, but they are afraid.”30 What is it? “The Trojans, afraid to attack Menelaus, who has killed Euphorbus.”

In order to become formally a metaphor, it is enough for the riddle to discard question and answer form. In comedy, particularly Middle Comedy, which derives directly from balagan, the actors speak in γρίφοι, which can be taken for either riddles or metaphors (“nymphic dew-like moisture”=water, “the juice of Bromius-the-spring”=wine, etc.).

Every metaphor contains a simile and a riddle. In Pushkin, for example, the metaphor “early urn”31 signifies “premature death, death in one’s youth.” Our metaphor “a blue bird at the window” signifies “happiness is nearby, one needn’t seek it far away,” etc. This feature is characteristic of Classical metaphor because of its genesis from two identical symbols. “Lips—grapevine” can be expressed as a simile (lips “like” a grapevine) and as a riddle (what are “lips—a grapevine”?—lips for a kiss). Every metaphor contains a riddle because it has to be understood, figured out, because it does not speak in straightforward meanings like the concept, finally, because its language is based on figurality and speaks in a special way: in form it speaks by means of the image, which is expressed in archaic language, but in content it speaks by means of the concept. In Pushkin, for example, the metaphor “early urn” signifies “death at a young age, before one’s time.” How can an “urn” be “early”? Conceptually it cannot, but as an image it can. The language of Classical metaphor is unique. Based neither exclusively on concepts nor exclusively on images, the language of Classical metaphor is the only example of a historical language of image-based concepts [the R here has the adjective obraznyi from obraz (image) modifying “concepts”—K.M.].

This is in fact what distinguishes metaphor from riddle. The γρίφος creates two parallel semantic series and consciously puts one in place of the other. It is by nature
question and answer; without the posing and solution of the riddle it turns into a simple simile. Formally the riddle contains everything simile and metaphor contain, with one exception: its goal is not reproduction. It has none of the elements of illusion, which organize the metaphor as well as the simile. It does not create any “picture” (“image”). It is not representational.

The poetry of Classical figurality is being born before our very eyes. Of course the riddle is in form figurative speech (other-saying). But it becomes frozen in folklore without further conceptual development; what develops further in it turns into metaphor, whose figurality consists precisely in the change of meaning. In other words, in riddle two different semantic series signify one and the same thing; in metaphor two identities signify different things.

The Classical metaphor is made into art by its illusoriness, its “mimesis,” which reproduces authenticity in an “image.” This mimesis makes the artistic material more expressive, gives rise to individual craftsmanship, and reproduces reality in forms that are figural in concept. The mimesis of the Classical “image,” which came about as a result of the metaphorization of thought, created a secondary “potential” level of reality—a reality that exists not in real facts, but in the “image.”

Later, when abstract thought made some progress, Classical philosophy began to establish what “image” is in relation to “reality,” what is “reality,” what “appearance.” But in the archaic period in Greece, concrete thought created a concrete understanding of the “image,” and this understanding took the form of thought in art, rather than theory.

The secondary character of illusion (in respect to reality) led early in the Classical mind to the idea of art as a “copy” (model) of reality made by divine powers, later by the skilled hand of man. There appeared the idea of a concrete object wrought of physical material (stone, wood, clay, metal), which miraculously turned into a “copy” of a living, authentic object. Such an “illusory living” object came to be called a “representation” [izobrazhenie], a fabrication, literally—a figure cast in clay or wax, carved from wood or stone, forged of metal, etc. The Greeks called it πλάσμα, the Romans fictio, and its semantics can be traced to the cosmic image of “creation.” Because of its semantics the Classical “fiction” did not coincide with our idea of “empty deception.” Even the “deception” of Classical balagan had to do with imitation of the authentic, and the “fiction” of art was an “image” of reality.

We find such a “fiction” in the Homeric ecphrasis. This is still a literal “reproduction of a reproduction,” a double reproduction, “representation of representation.” Ecphrasis describes a work of plastic art—what it depicts and how. The description of this “how” is the very soul of ecphrasis. Beginning with Homer the Classical ecphrasis attempts to show that a dead thing wrought by a skillful artist looks like it is alive. Ecphrasis depicts one thing—the illusory, as another—the real. That which has already been reproduced in the works of potters and sculptors, weavers and smiths it describes, recreating it a second time, “as if” real.

The Classical ecphrasis contains a hidden likening and comparison of dead to living, illusory to authentic. But unlike simile, its “as if” is only visual, not comparative; it is aimed only at communicating the visual illusion.

If similes are known in Greek as ἐικόνες, this term of “images” and “representations” (“pictures”) is even more applicable to ecphrasis. In fact Classical ecphrases, like similes, are also called ἐικόνες. Later rationalizing thought supposes that ecphrases are called
Because they describe paintings, \( \text{eikónes} \); in fact, however, ecphrasis describes \( \text{eikónes} \) pictures, because it is itself an \( \text{eikóv} \).

Neither similes nor ecphrases have moving plots yet; neither myths nor stories are attached to them. Similes and ecphrases are not narrative. They are only visual.

In both similes and ecphrases the “pictures” are phantom, unreal, though realistic in their depiction. These “pictures” are conceptual comments on the system of mythological images. Thus in similes the developed “picture” serves as a likeness of the mythological (unique) image. Likewise the Homeric ecphrasis describes realistic depiction on mythical objects made in the fire of the god of fire or having a clearly expressed cosmic character, which derives, as I have already said, from the semantics of the “created” and “creating” thing-cosmos, thing-“creation.” These things only “seem” in their “external appearance” to be authentic, just as in extended similes one object is “as if” similar to an apparently other one. In both cases the Classical literary image is based on the aesthetics of mimesis as “imitation” of reality, as its “likeness” and “picture.” We already find such an understanding of “mimesis” and the very term “\( \mu\mu\varepsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota\)" in the most archaic “Hymn to Apollo,” where it says that the Muses are a “great miracle.” “They can imitate (\( \mu\mu\varepsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota\)) the voices and sounds of all people;” and here the meaning of mimesis as an imitative, complete likeness of reality is revealed: “You would say that each speaks for himself, so harmoniously composed is their (the Muses’) beautiful song.”32 This original aesthetics of mimesis is not equivalent to the later views of the Sophists, Plato, or Aristotle, to say nothing of vulgar realism. Every work of art, not only a single discrete image, is called by the Greeks \( \text{eikóv} \), by the Romans \( \text{imago, simulacrum} \) in the Classical sense of a “fiction” which has a complete external similarity with the authentic, that is, what “is created by man” (in myth—created by god) in a clever imitation of life. Ecphrasis always describes a work of art as a “miracle,” a “wonder” (“such a wonder is presented,” “bronze tires fitted, a wonder to behold”33 etc.—preserved even in translation). This “wonder” or “marvel-miracle” must be understood in the visual sense (cf. \( \text{Rchudit’sia, divit’sia} \) = to look); in Greek “miracle” and “gaze,” “spectacle” sound almost the same,34 which apparently led to the fixed epic expression “wonder to behold,” literally “miracle to see”;35 in essence the expression is tautological. As to the content of the “miracle,” it is understood differently in the Classical world, as a “mirage” which is always concrete to the point of being physical and has the form of the authentic object.

I have already said that similes and ecphrases represent a conceptual addition [attributsiia] to the system of mythological images. Thus they prepare the way for the metaphor.

In fact, though they do not yet contain full semantic figularity, similes and ecphrases as a whole enrich the mythological part with concepts and increase the capacity of its meanings, resulting in both a combination of visible objects and the generalization of abstract meanings.

Before acquiring figurality, the metaphor as a conceptual form of the image is prepared for in the epithet. In Classical times not every image could produce a corresponding epithet and not every image could take on the function of epithet. As in the
metaphor and the simile, here too identical semantics of the two members, the defining and the defined, are obligatory. I must clarify that every object in the Classical languages originally has its own epithet and never appears without it, just as a simile never appears with only one member. It is wrong to think that only gods have their own epithets. All images have them, including all everyday things. For example:

Hecamede set up before the two a beautiful table,
Polished, with a dark blue foot; on it
A bronze basket of onion, to go with the drink,
With yellow honey and sacred barley flour;
Nearby she set a beautiful goblet brought from home by the old man,
Pierced all around with golden nails.36

And especially farther on:

…she grated goat cheese
With a bronze grater; and sprinkled it with white barley flour.37

It would seem that the epithet should establish the distinctive features of the object. In fact Classical epithets were tautological with the semantics of the objects they supposedly defined.38 It is well known that the poorer an idea is, the larger the circle of phenomena to which it can be applied. The problem apparently lies not in clusters of ideas (“diffuseness”), but in the extreme poverty of features (for example, earth and woman are endowed with only one and the same feature and are therefore identical). It might seem that in such phrases as “immortal god,” “starry sky,” etc, the epithet communicates a generalized quality of any god or any night sky; in fact we have here tautology, that is, two images joined by common semantics; furthermore, one image has the function of that which is being described, the other, of that which describes (this phenomenon precedes the categories active and passive). The features of “god” and “immortality,” of “sky” and “stars” are the same.

The epithet is originally tautological with the object and accompanies it; only in conceptual thought does it begin to designate the distinctive features of the object. Thus Zeus-black-cloud turns into black-clouded Zeus, Achilles-lion, into Achilles with a lion’s soul, Hector-fire, into fiery Hector, etc. In Greek πέζα means “foot”; from this root comes the term “table” (τράπεζα), literally “triple (or quadruple) foot.” In the above quotation from the Iliad “blue-legged” serves as an epithet of “table,” but this epithet represents the noun “blue leg,” which is tautological with “triple leg” (table); semantically it is an epithet, syntactically, an appositive; formally, a noun. Such for the most part are epic fixed epithets as well. When we speak of them, we usually have in mind their relation to the object. But there is another side of the coin as well: the relation of the object to its fixed epithet. Heaven-stars turn into “starry-heaven,” as “tribe-metal”
turns into “metallic tribe.” The first conceptual features of the object are taken at first from the semantics of the tautological image; when the unity of the subject and the object is dissolved and the identity destroyed, one of the images begins to communicate the summary characteristic of the object, semantically signifying the object itself. Concepts make “gold” or “stars” into a quality which characterizes people or the sky. But these qualities do not become abstract concepts immediately. For a long time they are still unique and concrete. The feature “starry” preserves for a long time the meaning “sky,” since that is the term with which it was merged as subject-object. We must point out that archaic concepts, being a new form of the image, continue to remain concrete, even though their contents are already abstract. The epithet “starry,” which defines the sum-total and obvious feature of the sky, is at the same time itself characterized by visual concreteness. At first the epithet defines a given quality of a given object. Then it is transferred to other objects with the same semantics. Thus the epithet for armor “starry” (by microcosmic identification with “the sky”) took on the meaning of “shining.” In transference from one mythological image to another identical one, the epithet changes its meanings with greater and greater extension and figurality. The concrete “light,” “ray,” “shining” of the luminary-heaven becomes in the epithet a feature of the object—“bright,” “shining,” “radiant.” Not only does the epithet define the object, but the object also motivates the defining features of the epithet.

Its figurality makes the epithet one of the forms of the metaphor. This comes about when the tautology of the two images is replaced by the internal likening of one image to the other. If the epithet says “fiery Hector,” this no longer means at all that Hector is fire. On the contrary, it means precisely that Hector is not fire. Hector is only “like” fire. Nevertheless, he continues to appear dressed in “flaming copper;” in other words he has fire as his attribute, first literally, then figuratively.

When the epithet says “lulling night,” “golden-rayed saffron,” “sleepless springs,” by this it means that “it is as if the night lulls,” “saffron is like a golden ray,” “springs seem to know no sleep.” The poet already knows that there is no gold in saffron, that rays as well are not made of gold, that night cannot lull to sleep, that springs cannot sleep or not sleep. Each epithet contains figurality. He has in mind something other than what he says. By “lulling night” he means dark night, by “golden-rayed saffron” the yellowness of saffron, by “sleepless springs,” the constant movement of the water. The Classical epithet continues in form to be an image, but it means something other than what it says; it means something that contradicts the sense of the image—namely, it signifies the sense of the concept. This concept, however, arises not in the free choice of the poet; instead it “translates” precisely the language of the image, “says it another way” into the language of abstraction and generalization. But “lulling night” in the Classical interpretation means not “quiet” but “dark,” because the concept rests on the mythological image: Night, the mother that gave birth to the Sun, laid him to sleep on a bed (lulled him to sleep), as Sophocles says. Figural speech, when it mentions the night “putting the sun to bed,” means the ensuing darkness.

“Sleepless springs” at first signified a living creature, water, which knew no sleep, running day and night down the streams of Kephis. This water “roams” from place to place, and therefore the “sleepless springs” retain even in Sophocles the definition “nomads of the streams of Kephis.” The transition from mythological image to concept takes place by transference of meaning. The image remains intact, but it already signifies
the external features of the Kephis spring in its constant motion. What before had to do with the mythological being water became a feature that defines this water, a concept of the given water, but one that is still purely obvious, summary, and completely dependent on the mythological image of Kephis. The restrictiveness of the first conceptual “features,” which are qualitatively still concrete and summary, creates a certain group of epithets which are closely linked to the objects they define.

“Golden ray,” which characterizes saffron in the epithet, acts as a summary feature of saffron separated, “abstracted” from it, as something that is not the material “essence” of saffron. It gives the idea of the subject about the object—saffron. But in our modern language the epithet can be used by anyone to describe any saffron at all. In the Classical world the nuances of meaning were different. There the metaphor was still restricted. It had its own locality and its own subject. If in Sophocles we meet “golden-rayed saffron” it is a specific saffron which grows in the sacred grove of the Colonus god, and the plant is described by the chorus, singing the praises of its native Colonus in a poem: it is the saffron of Colonus, of the Colonus grove, where everything is full of divine beauty.

On the Homeric shield “golden men” were engraved, Hephaestus has “golden servants,” Hesiod speaks of a “golden race,” but all of these are beings, and not qualities of beings. As to the Classical epithet “golden sun,” it already has the meaning of a concept, though one connected with the mythological image of the sun-gold. But the epithet-metaphors of our day “heart of gold,” “golden hands” (golden opportunity) have nothing in common either with mythological images or with “transferral” from the object to the subject; the connection between the two abstract concepts here is traditional (gold as something valuable).

In the context of thinking in images the metaphor historically performed the function of the concept. It became a subjective category, the focal point for qualitative definition of objects (a point of view). Its figural elaborations (“golden-rayed saffron,” “nomad streams”) came to mean not the objects themselves, but their features. The mythological image took on a secondary meaning in the concept, one which both remained faithful to the semantics of the image and recreated this image in figural speech. The concept no longer shared identity with the image, but it still had no function of its own; it remained the same image, but in another meaning, the figural meaning. The Classical metaphor is an image in two senses: mythological (in form) and conceptual (in content). This dependence of the early Classical concept on the image and the resulting appearance of figural meanings historically predetermined the appearance of poetry. Figural speech created the secondary meaning of the image, which was recreated in the concept and took on the quality of illusion. Abstracted from concreteness and maximally generalized (for Classical thought), this conceptual secondary meaning manifested itself exclusively in the form of the concrete unitary image.

7

Classical artistic thinking took shape in the form of thinking in image (figural) concepts, which changed finite into potential, concrete object into something speculative. It was only concept, which sprang from image as an illusory form of image, that could by its “mimesis” recreate reality as “imagined.”
Thus, for example, mythological image identified man and bird. The myth said that Alcyone, having lost her husband, became a bird that lamented its grief. In *Iphigenia in Tauris* the chorus of captives sings about its misfortunes and, identifying itself with Alcyone, calls itself a bird: “I am a wingless bird.”\(^4\) The poetry of this image lies in the fact that Euripides’ women are no longer birds, no longer Alcyones. The epithet “wingless” contains a hidden comparison, but not an identification of the women with a winged creature—a bird. The image “wingless bird” is as enigmatic as Pushkin’s “early urn,” but the form of the Classical metaphor shows clearly that what was once a riddle grew into a figure of speech. If one could ask a Greek, “What is a wingless bird?” and get the answer, “captive women, lamenting the loss of their homeland,” then in the poetic context of Euripides the riddle of the image is completely canceled by the transferral of meaning—the mythological image of Alcyone acts only as a format of the concept of women’s grief. If in the Homeric simile the mythological image is short and the concept explaining the image extended, so likewise in Classical poetic figurative speech is the mythological part limited and frozen (the image of Alcyone), while the figural meaning is broad and variable (longing for one’s homeland, for its beauty, for beloved and sacred customs, for culture, for religion, for the hearth). The Classical poetic image, however, can only arrive at generalization if the single meaning it generalizes is present. Sappho uses the concepts “light” and “ploughed field,” but within these concepts the mythological images of Selene (the light of the moon) and Demeter (the ploughed field) have yet to be removed. We think abstractly in abstract concepts. In Russian we may say “a substance suffers (undergoes) changes.” For us “suffers” means “goes through,” “experiences.” A Greek could not express himself so abstractly. For him “suffer”—even in all the abstract concepts built on this image—meant literally and physically to “endure torment,” and therefore a hint of concreteness would be preserved in the abstraction itself. The Greeks did not think in concepts without the presence of what the concept abstracted from and generalized.

It is precisely because of its origin in the first concepts that the Classical literary image is figural through and through. Poetic language does not speak in literal meanings. In the first place it changes all tautologies into qualitative determinants, or rather into binomials [dvuchlen—structure of two members—K.M.] in which one member acts as the attribute of the other.\(^4\) First “sleepless springs” and “nomad streams,” “woman-bird” and “wingless bird” are tautological. Then one part, still joined to its synonym, begins to compete with it as an attribute, takes on qualitative contents and the function of an attributive member. In some cases, when the determinant is expressed as a noun, apposition results: such are “nomadic streams” in apposition to “sleepless springs” or “wingless bird” in apposition to “I.” But it could happen in reverse: “sleepless springs” could be an appositive to “nomadic streams” or something else. In poetic language, which already expresses a certain intention, i.e. which relies on a semantic context, appositions are not merely doubles of meaning, but serve to define in the function of epithets. The unceasing motion of the water begins to be expressed by the image “wandering tribes”; conceptual thought makes the image “nomad streams” into an apposition with the function of an epithet. But why can’t Sophocles say straight out “eternal motion of the water?” Why does he disguise his thought in the form of a riddle and force the audience to translate from “obscure” to clear language? And most of all, why does the audience need this obscurity, this vague and enigmatic language?
Here an important role is played by figurative speech, which transfers the audience into the sphere of “mimesis,” of illusion, which requires an “other” kind of speech, one that is not everyday, not ordinary, only having some semantic connections with it. Conceptual speech with its literal and abstract meanings was not poetic in the eyes of Classical man. It did not meet the requirements of the essence of Classical art.

“Nomad streams” or “wingless birds” were figures of speech, though they still did not have the kind of figurality that would later be created by abstract thought. In this sense Classical epithets far correspond with our adjectives. They differ in that they are constructive. They recreate, actively describe, characterize, one might even say construct the image; while in our translations epithets only passively state the qualities of objects.

We say “nail-studded goblet” using “nail-studded” as an epithet for “goblet.” But with Homer it is different. First of all, the epithet is more concrete: the goblet is not “studded” but “pierced” with nails. Secondly, the epithet does not simply describe the object, it recreates its manner of manufacture, as if investing it with decorative qualities; the most important thing is to name it, to establish its quality, to evaluate it and even praise it, to show its “artificiality”—skillful workmanship. Thus Homer qualifies tables with the epithets “beautiful, blue-legged, well-carved” and a cup is “very beautiful” (“beautiful from all sides”).

Strictly speaking most Classical poetic epithets describe not just anything, but man-made objects: things that are well made, worked, that is, the “fiction” in the Classical sense that was the germ of the plastic arts—any utensil, everyday plastic folk art, but also gardens and fields cultivated, “worked” by human hands. As is shown by the many detailed epithets in the Odyssey—descriptions of utensils, living-places, ships, but also of gardens—“fiction” appears whenever mythological semantics produced the image of “creation” in the sense of the coming to life and birth of the cosmos.

Following semantic identity, the Classical epithet is found wherever there is τέχνη, where “creation” or, as the Greeks would say, “wonder” is recreated. Therefore the poetic epithet (especially in Homer) tended toward recreation of the “image” of the object in the realm of mimesis, i.e. in illusion, and was ecphrastic in nature. The most ancient ecphrases in Homer, those pictures of things which never existed but which have true form, were created by means of epithets (for example “a shield, smooth on all sides, beautiful, copper, forged…” or “a shield much-valued, unaging, immortal” etc). The epithets strung one after the other with no break into ecphrasis, that is they describe not only the exterior of the object, but also what is depicted on it:

In this [coat of armor] there were ten stripes of dark blue
Twelve of gold, and twenty of tin,
Dark blue serpents stretched to the neck,
Three on each side like the rainbows Kronion
Zeus fixed in the clouds, an omen for mortal men.

Further on there is a description of the sword and shield:
Golden nails glittered; but the scabbard around it was silver and joined by bands of gold. He took up his man-covering, cunningly-wrought impetuous shield, beautiful... etc.\textsuperscript{44}

Then he describes the depiction on the shield of the “ferocious Gorgon, glancing terribly” and on its silver strap of a “dark blue dragon, writhing” with three heads. Epithets consisting of compound adjectives, participles, even nouns make up the “stuffing” of the ecphrasis. Above I quoted epithets describing Nestor’s cup. Though they are few, they too turn into ecphrasis: “…a very beautiful cup which the old man had brought from his home, studded with golden nails; it had four handles and around each pecked golden double doves, under it were two bottoms.”\textsuperscript{45}

In the Greek plastic arts every god and every being was accompanied by certain attributes at all times. These attributes in the plastic arts correspond to fixed epithets in epic. In syntax we are used to calling any adjective that modifies a noun an “attribute.” But Greek syntactic attributes still have much in common with material “attributes.” The epithet starts out as the same thing as the attribute-thing, but later it takes on the role of a qualitative “modifier.” It already contains within itself the characteristics of objects; it describes and defines objects. But in the Classical period the connection between the epithet and the semantics of the object it defines is still strong. There are no free, individual and abstract epithets in the Classical period; descriptions and characterizations of objects achieved with epithets have in Classical poetry traces of the same “attributiveness” that is preserved in the plastic arts. If it seems to us that Euripides’ epithet for Medea δέξιθυμος\textsuperscript{46} [sharp-minded, quick to anger] is abstract and individual, our impression is wrong. The same epithet can be found in other tragedians, and in comedy, and in everyday life; it is completely concrete. Also concrete are epithets like “shameless,” “ox-eyed,” “sparkling,” etc. At first they are tautologies: Hera—“eyes of a cow,” Athena—“eyes of an owl,” then they are mythological attributes: Erinyes “with the eyes of a dog,” “with the eyes of an owl.” But such mythological attributes later become epithets. In Homer the epithet “eyes of a dog” (in apposition to “Hera” and “Helen”) takes on the connotation of a moral, qualitative judgment: Hephaestus calls his angry mother Hera by the epithet-adjective “eyes of a dog.”\textsuperscript{47} Hera mythologically has certain animal features, but Hephaestus already introduces into the epithet the meaning “shameless.” The same kind of value judgment is passed on Helen, when in the Iliad and the Odyssey she calls herself “eyes of a dog.”\textsuperscript{48} But it is even clearer in Aeschylus: the treacherous Scylla (a dog in myth) carries the epithet “dog-feeling”\textsuperscript{49} (the untranslatable κυνόφρων, a participial form with a strong resemblance to a compound noun). Each of these epithets, when its meaning becomes figurative, acts as if it is no longer a concrete attribute of the object described, but only a comparison to this attribute, only a figure of speech. But a hint of concreteness, or rather dependence on concreteness, remains in Classical epithets. When Gogol’s heroes say “son of a dog,” their curses are completely abstracted from the image of “dog;” when Agamemnon curses his wife as “dog’s eyes,”\textsuperscript{50}
the image of “dog,” the deceitful beast of the underworld is present in the concept, though Clytemnestra is already a “dog” not in the literal, but in the figurative sense.

The mythological image is subjective-objective. When it has only one meaning singled out from polysemantism, we have an attribute, or as I called it in my *Poetics* a mythological metaphor. When features are transferred from the object to the subject two meanings appear—the concrete plus the abstract, but abstracting only this concreteness. Then we have a metaphor-figure of speech.

Beginning from a binomial juxtaposed “transferral,” the Classical metaphor passed through the extended simile and the epithet to become a kind of figurative speech whose duality has merged into a single figurality. This is a phenomenon of individual artistic thought, which comes later than metaphor in languages. Thus in Anacreon we find such figurative expressions as “hold one’s heart by the reins,”51 “fall from the Leucadian cliff,”52 “be a racehorse,”53 etc. In each case the mythological image is figurative; it does not employ simile or comparison, but is based on the fact that it itself calls forth an abstract interpretation by its mythological concreteness. Such figurative meanings as a rule do not yet appear in lyric, although Pindar for example may seem to us overburdened by metaphors; in fact his images like “rains, the children of the clouds,”54 “let time creeping up not destroy happiness,”55 “beautiful-flowing wind,”56 “Zeus’ much-destroying rain, in the hailing murder”57 etc.—these are not metaphors, but archaized mythological images. As to metaphors, they are found to predominate over similes and comparisons. And metaphor appears not in the songs of the chorus, but in the conceptual recitatives, although the choral parts as a whole are related to the recitative parts as a kind of covert simile.

Furthermore, the very figurality of Classical metaphor, which reminds us so much of our own, has its own historical peculiarities. It not only springs from the concrete meaning of mythological semantics (“Leucas” in myth = unfortunate passion, “horse” = beloved, etc), but the level of its figural abstraction is also restricted by the bounds of a concept in which concreteness has not vanished.

Unlike later metaphor, a phenomenon of literary style (the so called “figure”), Greek metaphor still retains as much as possible the unity of concrete and abstract (but with concrete predominating), and this is why it is historically significant. Figurative speech created by Classical Greece paves the way for the future, for a new kind of thinking, for multiple levels, for linking unexpected phenomena and for their mutual transition, for the free and universal generalization of individual phenomena, free of any conditions or dependence on space or conceptual discursiveness. Poetic figurative speech, eliminating the “as if,” aimed at higher integration of meanings and continually deepened their internal content, which was represented by external depiction and by an αἰσθητόν that could become a νοητόν.

Since then figurality began to move towards the metaphor of the Shakespearian type and reached in the poetry of the last two centuries heights at which its meanings tear spatial thought apart and, liberating facts from their dependence on convention, show the all-embracing and the universal in the unique and single.

14 Jan. 1951
3
The Origin of Narrative

The binomial structure of metaphor, which moves from two meanings to the unity of figurality, is no exception for Classical poetic thought. On the contrary, the structure of the metaphor acts as a basic model for all Classical art, including literature (as arbitrary as this term may be when applied to the arts of the muses).

The ancient Greeks were neither dualists nor monists. All their ideology shows the dual unity (biunity) of their ideas, and this distinguishes them from the Eastern peoples. This biunity of ideas, which allows the light and dark principle, good and evil to live together in harmony, to change from one into the other, gives Greek thought a life-affirming tone and liberates even its idea of fate from dark irrevocability. It is well known that “fatality” and “catastrophe” are inventions of Seneca and the Europeans. For the Greeks “catastrophe” meant a turn to the opposite direction, down, but a “turn” all the same—that is, a circular movement that would later turn back upwards again. Ananke was fatal only for a short period of time.

The idea of the biunity of the world, which derived structurally from the image of the agon between the positive principle and its “shadow,” gave rise in ideology, particularly in the arts of the muses, to binomial constructions based on the polarity and “opposition” of both members. The positive sphere was invariably counter-posed to the “reverse” sphere, which accompanied it as its invariable antipode. In language, in speeches, in rhythmics, in the sung (music) genres, in individual works and in their parts wholeness was achieved by means of the internal opposition of two members with a concluding third (or truncated, without the third). The reader should recall such accepted facts as in religion—triple and double gods whose aggregate expressed unity, in agonistics—two litigants and one arbiter (a trinity in the form of a single whole), in language—two member constructions with an internal antithesis (μέν-δέ), in speeches—trinomial constructions (introduction—exposition—conclusion), in rhythmics—the binomial antithesis of long and short, high and low, in plastic arts—the principle of symmetry, in metrics—the binomial and trinomial construction of stanzas and so on ad infinitum.

The greatest “opposition” is found in “hubris,” which accompanied everything “authentic” and acted as its “reverse” (inside-out). Hubris (from ὑβρίς) was a particular expression of purely Classical ideas; it signified the principle of violating the moral and religious norm (everyday and spiritual cynicism). I will speak about it later in connection with comedy. In the genres of the muses, (“literary” genres) one finds another “opposition” in the form of the binomial—the symbiosis of poetry and prose. This biune polarity was even more ancient in the rhythmo-verbal system that did not have the finished qualities of either prose or poetry: the polarity of melos and recitative. The best example to survive from ancient times can be found in the parabasis of ancient comedy, the structure of which consists of “positive” odes (melos) and epirrhemes (recitative) on the one hand, and “negative” odes (antodes) and epirrhemes (antepirrhemes) on the other. Here then we have a double opposition, between melos and recitative and between their
“inverse” forms. Also important is the “paired” articulation of the whole structure of comedy discovered by Zielinski.\(^1\)

The comedic ode (“song”) contains, though in parodic form, elevated thoughts, while the epirrheme contains deliberately base ones, even obscenity. The form of the ode is for the most part that of prayer; the form of the epirrheme, a discussion with the audience. The ode is composed in the lyric system; the epirrheme in trochaic tetrameter. These tetrameters are not yet prose of course, but the metrical relation of the two semantic parts, the ode and the epir-rheme, is such that the principle of song underlies one—that of recitative, the principle of speech underlies the other. With time such an opposition grows into the great metric binomial: melic—recitative. Nevertheless, even within melic (dramatic and lyric) we find the same double or triple articulation: strophe with its antithesis, antistrophe, and with the epode. This structure is characteristic exactly of the most ancient forms of melos—collective choral songs. Strophe and antistrophe are united by metrical identity; the epode flatly represents the sum of the first two members—their later semantic sum.

This two-member or binomial set preserved in the structure of melos itself shows that the elements of the future division into poetry and prose were once contained in a single system of song. In some cases both members of the song had identical metrical structures (strophe and antistrophe); in others they were different (ode and epirrheme). But in both cases they were distinguished and opposed by different contents, which made the semantically unified binomial into an antithesis; one of the members contained a certain positive meaning, the other, which was inseparable, expressed the opposite meaning. In comedic song structure—parabasis—such an intense “inside-out” is very important. It was also preserved in the later two styles, high and low, of such genres as satura, where poetry and prose alternate, or of later belletristic prose. In some cases the high is parodied by the low; in other the high lies behind the melos, the low or the everyday behind speech; in still others elevated themes are developed in the high style, low themes in the everyday.

Satura has survived in a form in which it is hard to detect behind its contents the two parts; we must, however, remember that the folklore of the ancient Eastern peoples also contained a “mix” of poetry and prose like satura. The famous “sing—say” (singen—sagen) found in the folklore of many peoples disproves the old opinion of conscious “mixing” of two genres supposedly invented by Roman authors (satura=“mix”).

It would be no exaggeration to say that in Greece poetry and prose, which came out of the same system of rhythmic antitheses, were connected from the very beginning. But it would be more precise to say that in Greece there was neither separate prose nor separate poetry.\(^2\) In the ancient world prose is not yet simple exposition of thought devoid of rhythm and “figures”. But if Classical literary prose remains thoroughly rhythmic and metaphorical, in its folk-loric form it is completely indistinguishable from poetry. Here we must add that Attica hardly had any poetry of its own: its poetry was found in its prose. If it needed a song (in drama, for example), it was imported in its foreign linguistic form.

The arbitrariness of dividing poetry from prose is particularly well felt in the Classical world. Both poetry and prose have the same function here of figurativeness, later they have the same inventory of so-called “figures.” But one need only get beyond the formal
features of these genres for their differences to begin to disappear and for Greek prose to appear as poetry with a conceptual function.

Furthermore, if we speak about well-defined genres, there were no stable literary genres in Greece at all. All of the Classical poetic and prosaic genres could be recast in the qualitatively different forms of their opposite. Thus drama could take on the character of prose—in Lucian, for example—or the character of lyric—in the scenes of Theocritus. But poetry could also be expressed in prose, as in Gorgias, or as drama, as in the komos. In Xenophon prose took on the genre forms of poetry; in Sophron, of drama. Specificity as a genre comes last of all for prose; in effect it comes beyond the bounds of the Classical world. In the Classical age the formal difference between poetry and prose is very insignificant and arbitrary: prose is distinguished from poetry only by a weakening of metrics and musicality. Much more important for the Classical world is the fact that its poetry and prose appear paired, and the more ancient they are, the more indissoluble is their symbiosis: it has its original in binomiality and internal “opposition.”

The type of binomial with an internal antithesis can be found as early as Homer. But here we should speak not of poetry vs. prose, but of the two opposing elements of direct and indirect narration which appear joined.

The *Iliad* consists of a single indirect narration broken up by numerous direct speeches. The *Odyssey* presents in the form of direct speech a series of indirect narrations. Such a composition is later stylized in the Greek novel, but the *Odyssey*, like most folkloric narrations of the ancient Eastern peoples, (especially the Indians and the Arabs) shows a mixture of direct and indirect speech; instead of a single smooth narration, here we have exposition of the middle of events, return to the beginning, disappearance of the main plot, which is sometimes put aside, sometimes brought closer. The narrator deals freely with time and space; he ignores them.

Still, here I mean not the composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as a whole. I am talking about the binomial construction within the *Iliad* of a type of simile and opposition, contrast (usually called inaccurately “examples”). In the similes there are two members, of which the second contains an internal antithesis. Oppositions, which can be separated into two parts, are themselves such an antithesis, both in their function in the poem and internally. The similes are not found in direct speech (with few exceptions); their first part contains an indirect narration, their second, a “picture” which arises from showing a duel (agon) between two “likenesses”. The structure of oppositions is different. First of all, it is direct speech: direct speech addressed to a certain hero concerning his conduct (for the most part passive), which is opposed to different conduct (for the most part one’s own and active). This appeal in the form of direct speech falls into two perceptible parts: direct narration and exhortation or supplication. In content it is a warning admonition, advice whose goal is the activization of the passive hero. The elements of the epirrheme and song which distinguish the parabasis of ancient comedy are unquestionably present here as well: direct speech in the form of an address to a listener, reference to oneself and narration about one-self, boasting, supplication, or imprecation. Analysis of such “counsels” (*parainesis*) shows that at their root lie two “opposing” principles; their narration contains two enemies or two vessels (of good and
of evil), or an active and an inactive hero, or motifs of praise/abuse, prayer/curse. The agonistic principle of such “counsels” cannot be denied. Their goal is to oppose the hero to another hero to force him to become like this other hero. In other words, the goal of contrast counsels is to change the position of the hero: he must change from inactive to active, occasionally from active to inactive (=die). But the narration itself put into the mouth of the “adviser” is also built on the principle of the agon of two opponents. The invective character of the “contrasts” (abuse, curses) makes them like the epirrheme of parabasis and like the duels in the _Iliad_ which consist of boasting, reviling, and pre-battle abuse.

At one time these exhortations arose from duels between two heroes (two animals, two things), the subjective-objective carriers of action and inaction, later of victory and defeat, life and death. The boasting of the victor (life), who reviled the defeated (death), turned (as with a revolution of a wheel) into its opposite, and the defeated (inactive, dead) hero became the victor (active, alive). Such a “turn” took place in the acts of the word, the Logos, and of action—in double “abuse.” The entreaties of the victim being put to death were accompanied by cursing the enemy. In parabasis the boasting author presents himself as a sacrificial victim in the abstract sense; he asks (prays) the gods and people for victory, he reviles his opponent, he has a weakness for abuse and obscenity. But one must not disregard the animal form taken by the parabatic author-chorus: it is not a man, but a group of birds, beasts, insects, etc.

In Middle Comedy, which already lacks parabasis, such a “victim” was the old man who was “badgered” and “hunted;” in the context of mockery he was beaten, showered with abuse and curses, driven to death, while he prayed, lamented, “suffered.” The transitional form between Old and Middle Comedy is found in the Greek novel. Here gods “act” and heroes “suffer.” But this is in the plot of the novel as a whole. In its conclusion the hero comes to the temple and recounts before the god everything that he “did and suffered;” then he places his story on the altar and leaves it forever in the temple. The Greek novel is based on very ancient material. Here the “narration” has a subjective-objective character; it does not distinguish between who narrates and what is told, and to whom. Here the listener is a god; the story takes the form of a prayer addressed to a god—a listener and viewer “before the face” of whom the events unfold. The story is conducted in first person; it is a personal story about the narrator himself, like any prayer. Its contents are action and inaction, deeds and suffering. These two contrasting elements of activity and passivity make up the essence of ancient story-myth, whether communicated in verbal or ritual form. In such a myth the narrator is identical to his story; he himself is exhausted by the active and passive states in the struggle with opposing forces. It is well known that this is the basis of all epics; their heroes do nothing but wage war or “endure” until they can triumph again; usually the story about them artificially stops here. But the Greek novel preserves more traces of something more ancient. The story is a sacrifice placed on the altar. This image shows unequivocally that the story is like a sacrificial animal, though the narrator is already made human and subjective. But in the myths that lie at the base of the Greek novel the sacrificial animal was the hero himself, who acted and suffered, who prayed, lamented, and cursed. Just such heroes in zoomorphic form are shown by Old Comedy, in the parabasis of which these heroes show up as the collective, choral author, who prays, curses, and tells about himself in the first person. In tragedy as well the hero is collective, zoomorphic, and
represents a suffering sacrificial animal. But he is especially like this in palliata and in
epic—in the scenes of single combat, where one tells about himself, boasting and cursing,
while the other prays and laments,—and in the “counsels” with their story, prayer, and
imprecation.

The story-myth has its stable features. Its basic feature is that it is not independent, but
acts only as one of the parts of a bi- or trinomial which has elements of prayer and
imprecation as well. Further, it has the form of speech, direct speech about the narrator
himself; its contents are action and inaction, deeds and suffering.

With the separation of the active and passive principles, the story takes on a dual
character: the story-action becomes separated from the story-suffering, and the subject of
the story from its object. Direct speech begins to excrete within itself an indirect story
“about” what was done and suffered, which are understood as “feat” and “suffering.” Let
me stress the words “within itself.” When the unity of subject and object is shattered the
object takes an indirect position that is in fact within the subjective, with the result—as is
seen in Classical narration—that within direct narration one finds a story “about”
someone. For the most part within this very “I-story”, in the active “I” there lies a passive
“I” which has become the object of the narration. This creates the double system of
Classical narration, at first inseparable, when the subject “I” is still present, but contains
within itself, in indirect position, an object “I”. The form of such an original narration is
direct speech; at first the topic of the narration is the subject of the story itself. Its
contents are deeds and suffering.

At first every such direct speech is itself composed of two parts representing the
divided subject-object “I”: the narrator (author) and the topic of the story (the plot). One
of these is active, the other passive. And what is being narrated about here is also
something passive (suffering undeserved offence, inaction, grief, prayer in vain) which
becomes active (heroic feats, battles, invective, vengeance). With time the structure of
such a speech spreads to the structure of the work as a whole. In some cases this leads to
the paired antithesis of melos-recitative, of poetry-prose with two opposite functions
leading to a unity of meaning. In other instances (“contrasts”) such speeches begin to take
on the significance of an activizing call to action of the passive, inactive hero. This
phenomenon is always alive in Classical literature: what was once a cell or a unit in
folklore later, after conceptual “rebirth,” comes to life through one insignificant part and
transmits its entire function to the work it ends up in or to which it has spread.

Speech is the first form of story and therefore remains so long in narration. Rather it is
not yet narration, but only its substitute. And drama appears before everything else in
folklore not because of the primacy of ritual, but because it is a pre-narrative form, a
visual demonstration which requires neither story nor action; it is organized by entrances
and exits, agones and speeches. Why is it that drama flourishes in Greece? Because
Greece cannot yet narrate. The first birth of drama could not take place in Rome. But in
Seneca it had its second birth, as Greek tragedy translated from image to concept.

With the division of subject and object, the story changes from an internal binomial to
an external binomial; furthermore one part is direct speech, the other indirect, which with
the later stabilization of concepts will produce narration paired with an anarrative element.

I have to make an arbitrary terminological distinction between story and narration; for the moment I will use “story” to refer to the image-based binomial of speech that reborn in concept will produce narration in one of its members. In fact, so long as there are no concepts, story is a verbal “picture,” devoid of time, a “likeness” of reality, a visual demonstration of something. At this stage drama and pre-narrative subject-object speech cannot be distinguished from each other. Examples can be found in palliata. On stage is an old man who looks behind the door of a room in which his son is carousing with a hetaira. Here the old man is a viewer of the spectacle shown to him by his slave. He “views.” He can say to his son “I see you carousing” with the accusative-infinitive construction; the subject actively views and speaks; the object is passively viewed. This is the first story and the first kernel of scenic drama, the only difference being that the subject-object narrator both speaks about what he sees and is himself seen, the object of a story. But “viewing” is fundamental because visual impressions play an important role; phenomena are perceived in their external, outside form, “appearing,” immobile, as if devoid of time. Ritual, which for the moment appears in place of story, is based on the same visual showing. Everyone knew that Adonis died, but the ritual showed this dying every time in the form of concrete death before the eyes of the community, dying in presence, visibly, since there was no concept of multiplicity. The story was not a generalization, but a concrete image, communicated directly in its visual form.

Greek literature is full of personal stories, direct speech. So it is in Homer, in the historians; lyric and rhetoric grew as genres out of direct speech, personal story; the novel makes direct speech into literary stylization. On the other hand, indirect speech occupies an important place in Roman writers, especially in the historians, where it obviously acts as a substitute for earlier direct speech.

Indirect speech is an interesting model of the appearance of concepts, because its form demonstrates the birth of narration.

In direct speech the subject—which is also the object—communicates directly both itself and not-itself, while it still does not have a separate object of the story. Indirect speech does not have one either. Indirect speech also gives a story unmediated by a third person (the author, the narrator), though it already has not one, but two subjects. But the essence of such a story is the fact that its logical subject has the function of an object, clearly showing the process by which the object of the story arises out of the narrator himself. Such a construction of thought typical only for the ancients is represented in the accusativus cum infinitivo. This construction is required precisely by narrative sentences, because the accusative with the infinitive is a narration. It encompasses two persons, one speaking, the other “spoken,” one active, the other passive. This second person, the passive one who functions as an object, is not independent; it depends on the state of the verbal subject. This governing verb points up its subjective nature, i.e., that it is thought, feeling, word, or normative idea. On it depends the object, which is itself at the same time the logical subject of another verb, in the infinitive mood. In other words one member of this construction is active and has personal features, the other is in a passive position, in a verb not of action, but of state, unmarked for tense, person, and number, with an atemporal and impersonal function, flat and immobile. Later the first member in the
function of the subject is cut off from the second member in the function of the object and becomes in the story the authorial function as opposed to the object of the story.

Aside from the construction of the accusative with infinitive, indirect speech uses the conjunction ὅσα, ut (“like,” “as if,” “that”) for narration. The history of this construction is interesting. From the category of an image of something illusory (“as if”) it becomes in conceptual thought a logical category of time, goal, degree, cause and effect; it organizes comparisons and narrations.

Indirect speech is binomial, like simile. What in Homeric simile is the passive described member is here the logical subject in the position of the object; the “as if” which in simile compares the authentic to the seeming in narration lends the exposition the feeling of illusion, of unreliability. We say, “he said that…;” the man of Classical times said “he said, as if…”. The active explaining member of the simile corresponds in indirect speech to the active governing verb. All this shows that indirect story (“narration”) and simile are two forms of one and the same conceptual transformation of the image-based binomial subject-object “fiction.” In both cases that which is told about or that with which something is compared are equally unreliable (“seeming”). The picture of a simile or a narrative story is not something authentic, but only μῦθος, “fiction,” and it is no coincidence that the Greeks called all stories λόγιον. A story is what does not exist in reality, its likeness, “image,” “truthful history,” a conscious invention.

An indirect story which takes on the function of narration by an author eventually becomes completely separated from personal narration and is transferred to the role of anarrative exposition. Nevertheless, it continues to be accompanied by a story, for the most part by a personal one. Of course I always bear in mind the fact that the Classical literary tradition reflects social consciousness only much later, after it has become fully stabilized in everyday life.

Anyone who does not understand the dual nature of the Classical manner of narration will neither understand nor be able to explain the peculiar structure of Classical literary genres. It is fundamental to this method of narration that “one thing” is always told by means of “another.” And this “other” is narration. The historian sets forth facts, on the one hand documenting them, on the other adding narration. In epic the exposition of facts is given through narration which lies out of context (“insertions”). Tragedy shows action which is immediately commented on by the narrations of the chorus, which have no relation to the plot. In the choral lyrics of Pindar every ode has small narrative “inserts,” and Hieron3 or Arkesilas4 cannot be understood without narration about a mythical hero. Concept is built by means of the image. Concept is not a stage of the image that follows the image. Concept is a form of the image itself.

The same thing is always told about twice, by two methods of exposition: one concrete (image), the other abstract (conceptual). The image sphere no longer appears independently, self-sufficiently; its function has changed, and its content acts as the form for new abstract meanings. In certain images such figurality gives rise to metaphor, i.e. one and the same image contains a dual meaning—both concrete and abstract. In the structure of narrative figurality has an even more ancient form—the same appositive form that metaphor had in the beginning; it is not one image with two meanings, but a binomial in which image and concept are presented in sequence, separately, but
indissolubly: the thought was expressed by both of them at the same time. If one had to speak of X, one spoke of Y, intending to characterize X by Y. In epic the mythical hero is not internally characterized; his qualities are described by means of likening to another hero (for example, Achilles is likened to Meleager) or by means of contrast to another hero (“counsels”: don’t be like someone, or rather be not like someone, but like this ...), or by means of comparison to someone or something else. In the choral ode, when Hieron of Syracuse has to be characterized, the singer speaks of the mythical Ixion, who has no relation to the tyrant of Syracuse in the plot at all. When the living are praised in ode, the dead are praised. But if a tragedian wants to show Medea’s state, he speaks of Circe, only the fate of Medea is revealed in the action itself, while Circe’s fate is sung by the chorus.

In some cases what happens in the action is compared to what is contained in the story (choral lyric, tragedy), in others what is contained in the story is compared to something in action (Homeric simile). Sometimes myth is assimilated through the real (epic), sometimes the real is perceived through myth (tragedy, lyric).

The distinction singen-sagen does not stand up to criticism because singing itself (like story itself) contains these two elements—narrative and descriptive. The same can be said of choral lyric, where one finds prayer, narration, praise, and aphorism. In themselves singing or telling do not explain the essence of the question.

Classical narration does not yet have its own proper function. It is used for something else, it acts entirely for a semantic goal which lies beyond its bounds. It either illustrates something, or it instructs, or it acts as a comparison, a simile, a contrast. It is not an “insert” in the descriptions of Homer and Hesiod, an entertaining “anecdote” in Herodotus and Plutarch. Every story in the Symposium or in the novels serves a purpose in the plot as a whole, although it seems to be thematically unrelated. Thought as a whole is presented in parts, as in Hesiod various components of the Works create the unity of the composition, or by indirect means—as direct speech is presented in an indirect construction. Plato’s Symposium is dedicated to Eros, who is not present as a character, but is present indirectly, in the story about Eros, and in the figure of Socrates, the incarnation of the idea of Eros.

The dependent function of narration, its indirectness (if one can put it this way) is particularly evident in parables (fables). Here there is a binomial construction: story plus edification. In the fable, as in the simile, we find two apparently independent series: in one member the narration, in another its moral. Fable would be simile if these two members were connected by the conjunction “like.”

If we take any Homeric simile, for example:

...like a cloud of starlings or jackdaws flies
Crying destruction when they see coming
A hawk, which brings death to small birds

and remove from the simile the “like”, replacing it by a moral, we get the fable (parable): “The weak fear even the sight of the strong.” And this very picture applied to the Achaeans running from the Danaians becomes a simile. Why? In the first place, because of the introduction of the construction “like...so...”. But secondly because it is applied to something else, not to jackdaws, but to the Achaeans.
In both cases one and the same story changes the thought that lies behind it, depending on the semantic function not of the story, but of the whole thought expressed through it. It has no independent role. And therefore in the entire Classical period there is no genre of story as independent and functioning separately outside the anarrative fabric.

In the narrative binomial the abstract is presented by means of the concrete. The Classical parable in particular is an example of the abstract in the concrete, i.e. of a concept expressed in an image. It is a metaphor in narrative form.

Every parable is figurative speech. In later forms of the fable its figurality becomes allegory. But all Classical narration is just as metaphorical. The Classical story is always connected with an anarrative element; while this element or the entire context of the story may still not be a direct moral as in parable or allegory, it will always contain some form of purely conceptual thought (description, reasoning, argumentation, etc). One can still see that the narration of Classical literatures, like all forms of figurative speech, is image in the function of concept. But its peculiarity lies in the fact that it is part of a system in which image and concept are separate, and one is expressed by the other; conjoined they produce a single common meaning.

4

Conceptual thought changes the image-based verbal-rhythmic binomial. The division into two worlds, this world and the other world, introduces two different dimensions not only in space, but also in time. Two new categories appear: near and far; they are both spatial (this side and that side) and temporal (this time and that time). The rhythmic-verbal binomial forms take on a duality of content: both their parts, preserving the connection between them, begin to be distinguished from one another in their function as relating to each of the two worlds, two realms, two kinds of behavior, two kinds of beings. One verbal part reflects everything near, everything that is here, continuing; the other, everything opposite. They are connected by the fact that one of them takes on the meaning of authenticity, the other of the appearance of the authentic, and one is made like the other, later likened to it or contrasted, still later, compared. The “appearing” retains the meaning of everything that has only an external likeness to “reality” and only “seems” visually, consequently the meaning of “invention” and even “deception.” It is located not here but “there,” although it appropriates all the existing external features of this world; it is related to the “far”, the non-enduring, the finished.

Narration appears when the past is separated from the present, this world from the other. It becomes an imitation-illusion of that which takes place on earth, everyday real in form, with a special space and a special time, situated “far away,” beyond the boundaries of the earth.

The past reflects the idea of a removed and frozen time (“once upon a time in a far away land…”). As long as there is no sense of duration, there is no narration; I mean as long as there is no sense of changing time, which gives shading to events. Everything that has to be shown takes place right before one’s eyes. Thus in Middle Comedy feasts, birth, sex, and dreams are exhibited before the eyes of the audience.

The archaic story begins to appear from atemporality, which later takes on the character of stylization. One such form is “framing”; another, the visionary picture. “Framing” represents static time, a kind of praesens atemporale (if one can put it this
way), the amorphous heart of time that envelops moving plots in the form of personal “Ich-erzählungen”. Furthermore, time in Classical narration has a special ancient character, still approximating certain spatial features. It is rather “aspect” than time. It can be progressive, but it can also be fixed, “ready,” no matter whether it is finished or even unfinished and incomplete. The past and the future differ very little in ancient narration; both intrude into the present like physical bodies, immobile, finished, “solid,” almost spatial. The praezens is first felt in the form of a static “slice” of time, in the form of a petrified “present,” present not only “now”, but also “here.” The future or the past in their finished forms of aspectual time can open this present up as one opens a curtain.

Based on such a perception of time are such ancient forms of Classical narration as visions and revelations, which antedate by far various revelations of the Eastern peoples. These visionary stories are purely visual, which testifies to the emergence of story from visual showing. In visionary stories the major narration (in the present tense) is suddenly interrupted by the creation in the form of a personal story of a picture of the future “seen” with his own eyes by the hero of the narration. Such is Odysseus’ vision “revealed” to him by Athena. The sleeping Odysseus is transported by the Phaeacians to Ithaca; when he wakes up, he does not recognize his homeland, which is covered by fog. But Athena assures him of her unchanging favor. “Wait,” she says, “I will show you the soil of Ithaca.”9 Right after this she begins to describe in words the harbor of Ithaca, the cave of the nymphs, the sacred olive grove, the mountain of Nerion. “So saying,” the song continues, “the goddess moved the fog aside and showed the land.”10 Odysseus, rejoicing, rushes to kiss his native soil. After this episode the main narration continues again.

The future that Athena “reveals” (in the literal sense of “moving the air aside”) is here not temporal but spatial. The term for “showing” (δείκνυμι) used in the song is identical to mystical terminology: the purely visual “visions” were “shown” in the mysteries as well. But in Middle Comedy the same kind of visionary pictures were also important. All this reveals the path from “showing” to narration. In narration such visual pictures are already endowed with a certain plot movement, though in their thematics they may be foreign to the general context of the system of words and actions in which they are found. Such is the revelation of Theoclymenus in the Odyssey. In the middle of the brazen feast of suitors a vision is suddenly revealed to him: he sees a mansion covered with blood and filled with shades of the dead, sees that the sun has left the heavens and destroying darkness has come.11 In the middle of the present suddenly the future appears, taking on a special narrative function, of something that has yet to take place somewhere, sometime, with someone; nevertheless this future coexists perfectly well with the present, and its different spatial situation coexists with the space in which the events of the story take place. Athena’s revelation is more ancient than Theoclymenus’; it is still not prophetic, but a literal spatial “uncovering.” Later “visual” becomes a synonym of “prophetic” and visionary pictures take on the significance of prophetic visions. But this meaning is secondary, brought on by the desire of conceptual thought to justify somehow the presence of the future in the present, of another space in this space. In conceptual thought prophecy explained another feature of such visions as well as their figurality.

When a visual picture suddenly appears in the middle of the action of palliata, it does not signify intrusion of the future. It signifies only what it shows visually. But in verbal expression such a picture takes on a meaning that illustrates the narration. This meaning
is silent, because the pictures are silent. It is silent and speaks, taking on silent meaning. Inserting itself into the narration, the vision interprets and figuralizes its theme; it gives rise to the conceptual conclusion that is suggested by the “picture,” just as the image silently suggests the new figurative meaning in any metaphor (for example, “quiet harbor” = peaceful life). By this I mean that visionary showing grows into narration and becomes one of its component parts, takes on the conceptual function of figurative speech, later of allegory and symbolism.

No less archaic are the “visions of the past” that grow into story. The stories of the messenger in tragedy or of the heroes of Lucian or of Er in Plato’s Republic are examples not of visions in story, but of vision-story itself. All of these characters come from the other world and tell about what they have seen with their own eyes (in Greek “story” is διήγησις, “tell” διάγω = “lead through,” “pass through.”) These are Classical models of ancient narration with its semantics of appearance in the world and coming to life. It is based entirely upon the witness of someone who has seen. Its theme is the other world. It has two scenarios: the scenario of exit and the scenario of entrance; and it has two times: the past described in the present and the present itself. In Theoclymenus the future is the picture that appears now, in the present; in Er the past coincides with the exit—exit downwards, under the earth. The theme of his story is death. Likewise the messenger comes from “there,” from far away, and speaks “here,” in the present, about what happened “there” in the past. And his theme is also death. Conceptual thought, while it preserves such a structure intact, does not understand its contents and employs all possible means to change it. Thus in one of Juvenal’s satires the composition of the narration is as follows: Juvenal sets out for a walk in the country with Umbricius; there they descend into a valley, and Umbricius begins his story. The conditions of archaic narration are here modernized: exit downwards is changed into a walk with a “descent” into a valley. Similar “framing” of the story can be found frequently in Plato; as a stylistic tradition it is preserved in Christian literature (“Octavius” of Minucius Felix) and even later, in the European novella.

The genetic connection between story and departures for distant places with gazing at fantastic “miracles,” with marveling, can be detected in the fact that the most ancient narrations spoke about journeys to nonexistent lands beyond the seas, to lands of fantastic peoples. The miracles of the “other” land, the “underworld” land (χθών) turned into stories about faraway and unusual lands, about utopian kingdoms, about unheard-of fields and gardens situated “nowhere.” Such are the narrations of ancient logography; they have no time, no developing action. But such too are narrations in epic; such are the type of utopian narration in the form of narration-mirage. Their origin has been preserved in the Odyssey. In form this poem is everyday-realistic (corresponding completely to the everyday sphere of ecphrases and extended similes in the Iliad!), but in content it is magical. We call it “fairytale.”

In the Odyssey one finds elements that will be fully revealed in Middle Comedy: imitation characters, phantom cities and inhabitants, pretenders, deceivers, the Phaeacian mirage, visions in “appearance” like reality that are visionary “pictures.”
The magical nature of the *Odyssey* is in its “miracles,” the illusory subjective world that began to appear to man, a world that imitates reality: in the new consciousness of people mythicism became a “representation” (ἐικών) of reality, something that was “like,” “similar to” it. Travels to distant lands beyond the sea, phantom people and cities, marvelous adventures, the charms of enchantresses, fantastic beings—all this is discovered in later “true stories” and in the “portrayals” of miraculous lands, miraculous pictures and miraculous visions of folk theater. It is here, in the heart of the “*Ich-erzählung*” that the visual “seeming” world springs from “picture” and “mirage.” The “apparent” world is perceived through the object, which lies far beyond the bounds of the subject. First ecphrasis and vision (verbal “pictures,” “the unliving as living”) appear, then narration.

The “*Ich-erzählung*” of the *Odyssey* wraps the magical showing in a purely subjective external cloak. Everything about the “miraculous” adventures of the hero is effectively unfolded out of his I in the form of personal narration. As soon as this “magical” part ends, the story becomes indirect speech. Mystification of the hero, disguises, fights with impudent pretenders, substitutions, deceit—all these are motifs of later everyday-realistic comedy clothed here as well in the everyday. Folktale, as is well known, is always everyday-realistic. This element of the real is related to its mythical plot just as the realistic part of ecphrases and similes is to their mythic part. Particularly interesting are mystifications, of which there are so many in the *Odyssey*. Even in his talk with Athena Odysseus pretends to be someone else. Thus conceptual thought explains the mythological “appearance” that accompanies every “authentic” hero. In simile appearance is “likened” to the authentic; in metaphor the authentic is “transferred” to the appearance; but mystification more naively and more directly wraps one and the same phenomenon now in mirage, now in truth.

In the *Odyssey* not only the mirages of cities and future events are of interest. Also significant are the “true stories” of lands, events, peoples, and himself told by Odysseus or his enemies. In these true stories everything is appearance, and in them there is not one word of truth. Odysseus pretends to be a nonexistent character and hides himself behind this lie. Such story-mirage imitating reality is often found in the Homeric hymns as well: Aphrodite makes up a whole story about herself, imaginary from beginning to end, and pretends not to be who she is; Demeter is disguised as someone else and tells untruths about herself; Dionysus pretends not to be himself; the young Hermes mystifies the gods and spins a clever lie about himself. The “true stories” are told by gods and heroes about themselves in the form of an “*Ich-erzählung*”, realistic in form. In the archaic hymn to Demeter the story about the abduction of Persephone is built on a mirage: in a marvelous meadow the maiden wants to pick a flower—a “wonder” (θαῦμα), but no sooner does she touch the illusory lure than the flower vanishes, the earth opens up, and Hades carries the maiden under the earth.

Conceptual thought already interpreted all these narration-mirages as comic, as parodic stories. Such are the imaginary ecphrases and prologues of Middle Comedy, so too are the “true stories” in Lucian or Plautus. In part the palliata prologuists transfer (verbally, of course) the location of the action to various cities, set off for other places and return…without moving an inch. In these balagan “true stories” there is an interesting parallel to “visions”: the prologuist deals freely with space and time, revealing the future and the past in the present and other places in the location of the action. But here we have
not pictures (like the vision of Ithaca) but a story. Its narrative character is created precisely by the presence of several times and a dual spatial backdrop. Both, however, still preserve here the archaic features of a literal “transferral” of place and time, as if they were things rather than length and duration. The inability to make time and space agree can be detected in the vision of Ithaca as well. But that is somewhat different. Athena first describes Ithaca as if it were really already visible. Only after such a description is the curtain drawn to reveal Ithaca. In this episode Athena acts as a prologuist, who first talks about the performance, then shows the performance. In every balagan act there is such a “speaker” who then turns into a “shower.” This apparent absurdity can be explained by the fact that the point was not the logical sequence of action and its verbal accompaniment, but only the presence of “speech” and “showing” from which the unified story was composed.

Unlike our story, the Classical story had a defined structural position in the composition of any work. It never began or finished a work. Its place was in the middle of the main narrative composition, inside its anarrative part. This was required by the origin of the story in the semantics of the Logos, the luminary hidden in the depths of the earth and appearing “here” (the fog parted, the story-vision appeared). The story incarnating the Logos had to be found, “discovered.” As god was situated in the middle of a temple, inside, between its front and back parts, so situated in the middle of the verbal work was the Logos. But its place was simultaneously in two planes: in the underworld death (the dying Logos) and in “seen” life (the reviving Logos). Here too one can trace the semantics, on the one hand, of the “external”, “outside”, and, on the other, of the meaning “inside” (cp. the external ugliness of Socrates, inside whom there was wisdom and beauty).

Hence the enclosed Classical compositions with the story inside. Take the composition of Plato’s *Symposium*. In it the main story about the symposium at Agathon’s is encased in several layers. Apollodorus’ friend asks about a feast at Apollodorus’. He then quotes his conversation with Glaucus; Glaucus quotes Phoenix; Phoenix, Aristodemus. The whole story is traceable at least to a third (if not a fourth) reteller. Its construction in general is accusative with infinitive, within which one finds direct speech. If we add to this the speech of Socrates, who relates in indirect-direct construction the speech of Diotima, we see the whole compositional structure. Its folkloric character is revealed by comparing it with narrative compositions of other ancient peoples (the stories of Sheherezade, Indian parables, etc.) Often such a composition of stories “wrapped” inside one another has an atemporal “frame” filled with narrations one inside the other (Heliodorus’ novel stylizes this device). Such a “revealing” of the Logos was analogous to drawing the curtain on the stage of the balagan (or the holy part of the temple), or of a box with idols, or to the statuary silenus inside which there was shining beauty (*Symposium*): showing takes the place of story.

But a story within a story could also take the form of narration “in a circle”, from one narrator to another (*skólía*, narration in turn in the *Odyssey*) or the form of answering questions (*stichomythia*, which organizes connected narration, particularly in Sophocles).

Lastly, in every speech, not only in oratory, is inside, in the middle of the basic trinomial construction (prologue—story—epilogue).

Narration ceases to be logos and “picture” when its former cognitive essence changes. Only then does it acquire its own peculiarities and begin to “be.” While still remaining
imaginal, it becomes conceptual. Several times appear in it, at least two. In an narrative description only one moment is shown (present or past) in the form of enumerations, visually presented similes, while narration has several forms of time. Description only establishes the fact, it stops time, no matter what movement it describes. Thus the description of the choral dance on Achilles’ shield shows a “picture,” a scene. Narration does not fit into the picture, because it has time that does not stand still, but moves. It contains at least two acts, connected by sequence in time.

In the archaic story the author is neither at the same time nor in the same place as the object of his story. Later this natural (from the point of view of genesis) mental phenomenon becomes the object of conscious stylization in authorial “digressions” and “interpolations” (in Apuleius and others).

The question of time is connected to the question of multiplicity [kratnost’], the number, the quantity of temporal filling, but also the ability to generalize. Every “showing,” every establishment of fact happens once. Thus the chorus of tragedy, located in amorphous time and outside real space, i.e. with no independent function, tells about the past that happened once—about Circe. 17 This Circe has no connection at all with Medea in the plot of Euripides’ tragedy. But both of them are forms of one and the same thing: past (Circe) and present (Medea). Circe in the words of the chorus is a single distant case; Medea is wrapped up in the active forces of events. In tragedy the sphere of progressive thought (Medea) is figured through the archaic (Circe), as in Pindar Arkesilas is figured through Pelops. 18 In narration there is as yet no generalization. In order to generalize the Greek had to place in series something given and another thing that happened somewhere, sometime, to someone. The ancient story presents only a single case; it achieves generalization by the figurality of unique and completely concrete phenomena, later through separate didactic appendages (fable). Hesiod in the Works and Days teaches his brother, tells him fables and myths, but his didactics lack generalization. Everything in the present is figured for the Greeks by the past. They approach multiple action through double action, generalization through concrete single action.

Dramatic structure preserves all the formants of future narration: prologues, showing, speeches, exits and entrances, melos and recitative, invective and entreaty, messenger’s stories, etc. Furthermore, before the appearance of narration, before the ability to recreate temporal duration and spatial perspective, the narrative function in drama was performed by a thing: a cart which brought in and “showed” the heroes killed offstage; this cart substituted for the second time, second space, and second action. This cart was also the rudimentary stage.

Narration is not built on exits and entrances; it extends time into the past and distances itself from the setting, which shows the typical difference between spatial mythological thought and abstract conceptual thought. What in the earlier composition of myth was literal and concrete—speech in turns around a circle, concealing the “true”, 19 all this in narration became the logical sequence of the plot and conscious, entertaining enveloping of the main theme in a preparatory “beginning” and concluding “ending.” Thus the flat spatial structure of ritual or myth became the formal-logical cause-and-effect structure of the theme: beginning of the story—narrative center—end of the story.

In ritual or myth time is unidimensional. Every bouphonia, Thargêlia, wine-drinking, and gruel-feast and so on and so forth was conceived of as completed and finished once and for all. Every year, however, it was repeated in action, visually, in the present which
signified the past as well. “Long ago” was not out of touch with “today” and “us.” It was
flatly and atemporally recreated in the words and actions of those who performed the
ritual.

Narration still cannot completely separate past from present. In its archaic forms it was
only beginning to do this. But it starts with a more ancient perception of time, with the
past on the basis of which it carves out a clearly defined present.

In the most ancient narrations the present is still presented through the past. When
Sappho prays Aphrodite to appear in the immediate present she recreates her former
appearances;20 and everything that we would say in the present in the grip of strong
emotion a Greek would express by introducing the “center” of time that could be called
present-past. Later this phenomenon takes the form of narrative historical present
(praesens historicum), in which a given past is presented “as if” present.

The purely Classical type of narration—recollections—is also presented as a form of
the past in the present. The Classical world, however, knows no memoirs in our modern
sense of diary or notes on a flowing, continuing present: “the past” for the Greeks was
understood as applying only to the dead.

For narration to appear, the active principle had to separate from the passive. In ritual
and myth a thing could be both an active character and the instrument of action. In
bouphonias the knife played the major role, but it was thought of as an active killer as
well as an object in the hands of a killer. Narration distinguishes the active principle
(subject) from the passive (object). Narration does not simply present coexisting people,
things, and actions changed into their opposites. It has an agent which performs an action
with the object of the action: someone does something with someone or with something.
To this end at least two characters are introduced and endowed with a certain kind of
conduct which gives some result. This, however, is the minimum of conditions.

Homeric simile contains a picture, but no narration. But one need only introduce a
difference in time for this picture to turn into a story. In itself no “picture” can portray
two actions occurring at different times without using several portrayals; the Greeks, who
did not understand perspective, substituted flat tiers for sequence and distance and
portrayed movement by means of figures lined up in different poses one row over
another.

Narration is created by conceptual thought. Conceptual thought leads to proposition of
goal, cause, condition, which moves the plot forward and fills it with connections with
real processes, presents dependence and leads to certain results. A “picture” cannot
portray the ideas “if,” “when,” “so that,” “because,” etc; speech, however, creates with
these expressions a logically developed story.

Nevertheless, as I already mentioned, it is not this necessary condition that creates the
peculiarity of narration. Its originality lies in the fact that its whole texture lies in a
different plane of time and space (and therefore of thematics) than the second part of the
tale. Genetically they both derive from the same semantics, but in their conceptual
recasting they are completely different. In narration, as opposed to the anarrative part, the
time is the past, the place—far away, the theme—ancient. All of this creates the false
impression of an “interpolation” or an “episode.” Usually in the middle of smooth
narration a story intrudes about something that happened in a distant time in a distant
place with some distant person—or with the narrator himself, when he was very young,
or with a hero whose glory has long since passed. Such narrations are for the most part
everyday-realistic. Such is the story of Phoenix in the middle of the portrayal of the wrath of Achilles: in novelistic (that is everyday and entertaining) form there is a narration about the days of the old narrator’s youth, about distant events at the ends of the earth. Of course if we begin to analyze such a narration it will turn out to be a variant of the history of Achilles himself (the wrath of the father is the wrath of the hero; in both cases the object of wrath is the taking away of a girl; both myths are attached to Phthia; the curse of Phoenix and the curse of Achilles, both deprived of descendants and happiness); it is precisely this semantic equality, however, that accentuates the difference brought on by the conceptual “second birth” of the narrative, the result of which is narration.

The story appears not by chance, but as a result of moving time and space apart. It appears where space and time are no longer flat enough. In the story singularity, simple one-time action (the absence of generalization), and concreteness have a conceptual function; they act as a medium for the concept. Time here is continuous, causality leads to effects, space is extended. Narration reflects the appearance of the subjective world, separated from the objective both in time and in space.

Narration is conceptual myth. But myth was everything: thought, thing, action, being, word; it was the sole form of perceiving the world both as a whole and in each separate part. Narration is only a story. And a story “about,” and not a myth itself in its subject and object. True, narration retains the entire former inventory of myth in the form of things, living creatures, connections, motifs. But here they have already become characters, scenarios, plot; they are no longer “object” (spatial) and “visible” nature, inseparable from man. Myth, which was self-sufficient, became an object of representation; it began to be recreated as something secondary, something created by the subjective, illusory sphere, and from an authentic category it turned into an “image,” a “fiction,” merely imitating reality.

There never were and never could have been myth-narrations. This is why they have not come down to us in direct form. Such myth-stories are found only in textbooks of mythology; if their connected plot line was created by ancient authors (to say nothing of Apollodorus), it was because by then narration had already been functioning a long time.

The conceptual story, still wholly founded on mythological ideas, relieved itself of things and actions, even of direct speech. It lost the supremacy and the omnipresence that myth had. It acquired an indirect meaning and a rhythmic-verbal form tending more and more toward the pure word free of “music” elements. The structural place of narrative, as well as its composition, was preserved for a long time. It remained inside, in the middle of anarrrative exposition, and for the most part had the form of a binomial with an internal opposition. As far as the content of narration is concerned, it moved away from the literal meanings of myth and gave them a conceptual, abstract, or figurative interpretation, full of everyday or distant pseudo-historic thematics. Unlike myth, narration strengthened the compositional line and allowed it to predominate over the contents. Thus story became more and more fabulized and novelized.

It acquired new functions as well. By nature inauthentic, helped assimilate documentary fact (Herodotus), helped legitimize the present by appealing to the past (Homeric “contrasts”), moved events closer by introducing the distant past (narrations and tragedies), instructed (Hesiod, fables), revealed (prophecies), and finally simply entertained by telling a story (novel, Hellenic myth, Apuleius, Aristides).
Originating in metaphor, Classical narration was only one part of a general anarrative context. It did not function independently in the form of separate stories like, for example, the stories of the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. It does not develop such independence even in the Classical period. First it was a “static story” which stood still in the midst of epithets and attributive descriptions. It is found inside song, never coinciding with the main contents of the song, but only acting as one insignificant part, connected only thematically (“à propos”) to the contents. Such stories within choral melic were invariably mythological.

Later on there were ecphrases, similes, visiones, all manner of story-mirages. They already contain portrayals of certain move-ments and even small differences in time, but these are shown in presence, as tiers like balconies at the opera, without the backstage corridors of time. Finally there are two times and two spaces, the acquisition of dependent functions, mediation.

Inconsistency of theme, time, and scenario with the main subject is characteristic of ancient narration. Its Classical cognitive role was to allow realization of “authenticity,” while it was still “image.” But from the historical point of view narration moved apart the boundaries of space, introduced the background of time, overcame archaic staticness, and extended the principle of mimesis.

The mythological image, having lost its literal meanings, could no longer be apprehended without transposition into concept. Formally continuing to be preserved, it changed its function. The imaginal became conceptual. This process took place in narration in two ways: on the one hand, narrative was composed of two members, one image-based, the other conceptual; on the other hand, the imaginal member itself was subjected to conceptual reinterpretation and turned into narration.

Needless to say, the two parts of narrative exposition often had much in common, and often one of them spilled over into the other. As a rule, the anarrative part crowded out the narrative part. Take, for example, the beginning of Classical literature, Homer or Herodotus, with their harmonious balance between narrative and descriptive elements, then choral lyric or rhetoric, where narration occupies only a small place reserved for it in the midst of the other, anarrative parts which have flourished; and then the final stage, in which business prose is separated from narration, which has been crowded out of the bounds of Classical genres. Then it will be obvious that the tendency was to division of genres and styles, on the one hand, and to their conceptual recreation, on the other.

This is the path followed by narration as well. It withers as a part of an internal binomial of narrative, moves from poetic to prose genres, then—already in the Hellenic period—takes the form of a short narrative myth or a long narrative “dramaticon.” Now it is prose, but prose that might be called conceptual poetry. It is prosaic lyric, prosaic-lyric narration.
Even in deep antiquity mythological ideas gave rise to special myths and acts which portrayed the shining of the sun and its temporary obscuring. Such acts were basically visual: part of the community portrayed “shining beauty,” while the other part watched the performance. Anarrative images, represented in the form of practically immobile “personae”—i.e. things, masks, or people impersonating things—had neither plot nor action. Their essence lay only in the “appearance” or “departure” of incarnated luminaries. The instant of shining, or “miracle” evoked “phainómenon,” that is luminescence, light—they marveled at the wonder. Incarnations of light had their “inverse,” their “likeness” in the form of “shadow”—shades, darkness, fog, clouds, etc.

Mythological visual presentations, connected with the semantics of shining and darkening, played an immense constructive role in later conceptual reworkings of ritual and myth; they were the imaginal base of epic and balagan.

Homer is full of visual images. It is here that we come across the first visionary “pictures.” They contain no prophecy, but they do have static portrayals of suddenly “appearing” shining light, which drives away the darkness. It is significant that such pictures often turn up inside similes:

As when in the sky the stars shine around the shining moon
Distinctly, when the air is windless,
And all the lookouts and headland peaks
And forests appear, and the endless air breaks open,
All stars are seen…

Here the stars are said to “appear” (φαίνετο); in the same way the Trojan campfires “appear” (φαίνετο); in both cases the subject is shining. Such a simile, however, essentially represents a vision, but a vision in the visual sense, a panorama: it presents a “showing,” a picture of the sudden appearance of light. In this visionary simile it is significant that the compared part [tenor] (the Trojan campfire) and the comparing part [vehicle] (the stars) are semantically identical: both are the light of fire.

The same can be said of similes like the following:

Like a deadly star appears from the clouds
All shining, then again it goes into the shadowy clouds,
So Hector would now appear among the first
And now among the last giving orders; all in bronze
He flashed like the lightning of his father, aegis-bearing Zeus.\(^3\)

The original says “as from behind clouds appears \((\alphaναφα\text{ινε}ται)\) the all-shining destroying star, now again clothes itself in shady cloud…so Hector, all in copper, shone \((\lambda\text{μφε})\) like the lightning of Zeus….” Here the shining of the star is identified with fiery light—Hector—just as unequivocally as in the first simile.

Not only light, but also darkness “appears” suddenly. One of the similes says “Like the darkness of Erebus appears \((\phi\text{α\text{ινε}ται})\) from clouds during the heat of an unpleasant wind, so appeared \((\phi\text{α\text{ινε}ται})\) along with the clouds coppery Ares, walking in the wide sky.”\(^4\)

The light sometimes suddenly “appears,” sometimes grows dim behind a black cloud. But these generalized concepts of “light” and “cloud” here in the fabric of the poem itself turn out to be concrete persons of gods and heroes. Zeus covers a mountain with cloud and sends down lightning; Apollo, Poseidon, and other gods cover heroes in cloud and fog; as Odysseus enters the city Athena pours over him divine darkness. Athena herself hides under the helmet of death-Hades to avoid being seen by Ares. Cloud is vanishing light, death temporarily “concealing” the luminary-heroes. Thus it is said of Ares, the incarnation of death, that he goes along with clouds to the sky; and this is said precisely in a comparison of Ares to the darkness of clouds.

Dressed in armor forged by the fiery god, Achilles begins to emit fiery light. Around his head shines a golden cloud, from which fire proceeds. Light from his head reaches the sky, just as at sunset tower fires are lit and “from a height the flaming light appears to sight (‘to be seen’) of the local residents.”\(^5\) People are terrified when they see the “terrible and inextinguishable blazing fire”\(^6\) around Achilles’ head. Such are his shield and helmet as well:

\[
\text{…he took his shield,} \\
\text{Forth from which came a brightness as of the moon,} \\
\text{As when on the sea a brightness shines to sailors} \\
\text{Of a burning fire, which burns high on a mountain} \\
\text{In a lonely pen…} \\
\text{Even so from Achilles’ shield a brightness went into the air,} \\
\text{From the shield beautiful and well-wrought…} \\
\text{…like a star flashed} \\
\text{The horse-tailed helmet…} \(^7\)
\]

The death of the hero is depicted as the setting of a luminary, as a darkening.

When the body of the dead Patroclus is placed on the bier, Hera commands the sun to descend into the streams of Ocean and set.
Darkness and light as mythological images contrast with the concepts darkness and light: some heroes appear in darkness, others in sunlight.

So they fought like fire, nor would one ever have said
The sun or the moon were safe,
In such thick air were the heroes covered in battle.
Other armies...
Fought under free air the sharp rays
Of the sun fell, no cloud appeared over the whole
Earth and the mountains.

Light sometimes is “concealed,” sometimes “shows” itself, “appears,” becomes “visible.”
This appearing light is “miracle,” “wonder,” “a wonder to behold.” In fact wonder or miracle, that which was not visible (nevidal’). It is a visual category; miracle is always “revealed to sight” like a light picture.

Athena drove the divine cloud of mist from their eyes,
And a good bit of light appeared from both sides…
They pointed out Hector, good at the war-cry, and the others…

The same kind of “miracle” and “vision” is revealed to Odysseus among the waves:

And then the wind ceased, and there was windless calm,
And he caught sight of the land,
Quickly glancing ahead, raised up on a great wave.

The unexpected “showing” is accompanied by “watching.” Hera suddenly “sees” Zeus on Mount Ida; he too unexpectedly “sees” his spouse. The eyes of Zeus, which personify lights (in the Classical languages “eyes” and “rays,” “light” are synonyms, φαέα, ἀνγαῖ, lumina) “watch,” “see:” sitting on a mountain Zeus sees Hector; he stands up and sees the flight of the army; he sees the defeat from the mountain, watches single combat from a height, sits and gazes, etc. Achilles looks at “shining” things; Athena “shows” herself to the hero, but remains “unseen” for others.

The visual, luminous “marvel” evokes “wonder,” because mythological images are always subjective-objective and active-passive. When Athena suddenly appears in the form of a star, the “viewers” are seized by “wonder;” when Priam unexpectedly, unnoticed by anyone, falls at Achilles feet, the latter “sees” and “marvels,” as people “marvel” when they “see” in their homes an unexpected stranger. When Odysseus tells about the miracle with the dragon, he says that those present “marveled.” It was not in vain that Poseidon sat as a “spy” on the very top of a mountain: from a height “appeared”
both Ida and Troy. He “marvels,” i.e. “watches;” his “marveling” corresponds to the glance of the “shining eyes” (cp. “bright eyes”) of Zeus, who looks down at the same time as Poseidon.

Odysseus “marvels” the same way, seeing the rooms in Alcinous’ house—“a wonder to behold.” The house of the Phaeacian king is itself described in the form of an ecphrasis, as a “wonder” revealed before his eyes. Odysseus stood and “looked.” But this is a picture like the arrival of Priam in Achilles’ house. Odysseus arrives concealed by fog and falls at the feet of the queen; the fog is dispersed, Odysseus “shows himself,” “and then the onlookers silently marveled.”

But all of these “miracles,” panoramas, and views have another aspect as well—as mirage, “likeness,” phantom, and deception. This is the aspect of darkness, clouds, fog. Poseidon appears in the role of “spy;” Hera spies on Zeus and Thetis and sees something “secret.” Athena tempts and deceives Pandarus, “convincing the fool’s soul.” Apollo, making himself “like” Agenor, covers the youth with fog and saves him from Achilles; thus he “seduced Peleides with cleverness.” The entire second book of the Iliad consists of imaginary actions, futile battles, retreats, shame, hopelessness, “evil deceit.” It is in the “phantom” book that the figure of the fool Thersites appears, the bearer of ugliness, invective, and laughter. The connection between cult fools and deception and imaginary actions is here demonstrated.

In Homer it is not tricksters, but the supreme gods who seduce, deceive, and take imaginary forms. Athena in the Odyssey takes the deceptive form of people; in the Iliad she is “likened” to a messenger. Also “similar” to mortals is Poseidon. Apollo now “looks like” a youth, now creates the “shade” of Aeneus which is “like” the original. Hermes makes himself like a youth; Ares is “like” a hero, “similar” to a mortal. All of this reveals in Homer’s characters the personification of light and darkness in preconceptual perception.

Exactly the same kind of visual images functioned in Classical popular theater, which came directly out of the acts of pre-cult folklore. Here they are not so much visual images as spectacles based on showing in action, rather than verbal “showing”, and acts of “watching.” I am speaking of balagan acts, which could be called illusion.

Such acts-scenes were called mimes: they came from mimesis, that is from playing the imaginary as the real.

Mime was made up of parody, ludification (“tricking,” in the sense of deceiving concrete people), mockery, teasing, but also purely light “showing” of pictures of “shining” or death—showing “miracles.” The very term “miracle,” “wonder” —θαύμα—came to mean “balagan” and “trick.”

Archaic mime was as yet neither comic nor serious. Conjurers, acrobats, jugglers, and prestidigitators performed visual functions. Their deception was deception of the eyes, but not of the soul. Only with the separation of cosmic elements did mimes divide into two types: one jesting and the other based on light, on visual “illusion.”

Mimicry, the basis of “mime” as mimesis, at first was not for comic purposes, but with the function of laughter it took on the character of buffoonery.
Before imitating and ludifying people, they imitated and deceived nature. Conjurers and buffoons acted as pretend elements and pretend animals. No matter what famous names they might later have as charlatans and magicians, they represented faceless “pseudos”, whose purpose was to imitate fire, water, air, and the other elements. Thus, for example, the pupil of the famous “miracle worker” Xenophon—Cratisthenes of Phlius could create fire, deprive people of reason (like Athena!), create visual deceptions and phantoms— in short, create “in nature” everything introduced by literary plot from Homer through palliata to Lucian.

Here we immediately run up against a peculiarity of Classical mime: the remarkable analogy to forms found in Classical philosophy and even in Classical mystery. Those elements which in Classical philosophy become important as primary elements and “principles” act as the immediate object of imitation in balagan. “Creation of miracles,” theurgy, is the business not only of balagan, but also of the ancient philosophers. In Homer too we see gods performing visual “miracles,” gods who incarnate elements; archaic philosophers “in nature” portrayed themselves as theurges and healers. When we meet them again in ancient balagan, they are not merely everyday conjurers and charlatans; in them the stage version of mimesis is a pretend form of the cosmic elements light, water, fire, and air in the form of “personae”; in other words, they are false theurges, false prophets, false gods, false messiahs, and false demiurges. This “parodic” line finds literary expression in ancient comedy; but in Lucian too this aspect of mime again comes to life. In balagan such roles of conjurers and buffoons who mimicked lightning, thunder, and animals were laughing “likenesses” of the supreme gods.

Alongside foolery and conjuring, balagan contained guessing riddles. They were called griphs; their purpose was to “conceal” and “reveal” the meaning. These verbal tricks were performed by buffoons who publicly posed the riddles and gave their answers then and there. They acted up and mimicked people, imitating cosmic forces; these buffoons complemented the “charlatans” who fooled the people with “miracles” and the jugglers who juggled shiny objects.

Balagan poseurs, buffoons, and charlatans were called aretalogists, ethologists, dikelists, phlyaxes. Of course balagan aretalogy had nothing in common with the teaching of ethics. Aretalogy was a comic mimesis—posing; aretalogists portrayed the grimaces of those they mimicked, and Cicero was right in defining their trade as “nimia imitatio” (“exaggerated imitation”). These clowns really were “imitators,” “pretenders,” mimists. All such clowns were imitators. Their tricks were deceptions, apparent miracles, and they “fooling” created mirages and visual deceptions. In the Hellenistic period, when many dramatic genres had changed into narrative genres, “aretalogy” was used to refer to stories about “miracles,” but miracles already in the conceptual sense. Such a pseudo was the ethologist as well.

Both balagan terms are perfect examples of the semantic difference between image and concept. So long as “ethos” and “arete” are mythological images, they mean something concrete, spatial, external. In Homer “arete” expresses an external quality not only of man or god, but also of animals, even inanimate objects. Dogs and horses, eyes and ears, places and things have their “arete.” Judging by some Homeric usages of this term, it was a synonym of “external appearance,” “outside,” “external physical form;” for example, Penelope says of her looks, which have lost their beauty as a result of her spiritual suffering.
three designations of Penelope’s “looks” the latter two are synonymical and the first “arete” attaches to them with no sign of semantic distinction, which could not happen in the Classical languages if the three terms did not differ only in slight shadings of meaning. It is telling that the last description of external appearance can be applied not only to man, but also to the sky, to forests (“external appearance”); this same term used adverbially means “like,” which again shows its similarity to “external form,” “appearance.” “Arete” next to it therefore means a certain external quality, the “external form” that is visible to sight. In conceptual understanding the external quality becomes internal, moral. Thus, for example, in the Odyssey queen Arete is still the daughter of Rhexenor (“breaker of men” or “husband-breaker”), i.e. of a plunderer; in the poem she is already presented as a “virtuous” queen.

Such is the meaning of the term “ethos” as well. It is known that it was first connected with the word “nomos,” signifying together a certain place, country, land. But “nomos” took the path of the meaning “pasture,” conceptually “law,” and “harmony, melody;” while “ethos” as an image began with the meanings “cattle-shed,” “den,” “home” (“refuge”) and ended with the conceptual meaning “habit.” At first beasts and animals have “ethos”—horses, pigs, fish, then people as well: stables and barns, dwellings. In the sense of “habit” the term at first is again applied to animals; then it already begins to be opposed to the concept “nomos”-“law.” It is interesting that Hesiod says in the Works that Zeus gave people as opposed to animals “nomos:” people have Dięk (the principle of truth, law, and justice), while animals, deprived of Dięk, eat one another. In fact this opposition to “law” is “ethos” something negative, “wild.”

The ηθεια of animals and fish were not represented in the heavens; everything connected with the images of “dwelling,” “place,” “beast’s lair” refers to the earth, the underground, the lower world. The beast’s lair, the abode of fish—these are not buildings but earth and caves, the bottom of the sea, something “lower,” lying below.

The term “ethology” has often led scholarship astray. It became commonplace to think that mime portrayed pictures of manners and even satire of morals. “Ethology” was understood in the sense of the study of manners and morality. In fact “mime” and “ethology” were synonyms and had nothing to do with “morality.” Before our very eyes Middle and New Comedy began to grow out of ethos, and balagan shows like the Atellan were built on mascque-ethos which were completely devoid of ethicism. When Aristotle speaks of he already has in mind “morals” in the conceptual sense; but in Aristotle too drama is viewed as mimesis of manners, passions, and actions, though all these terms for him are abstract (conceptual).

The balagan aretalogist posed and imitated, because his mimesis had to do with external habits and the exterior of his objects. The ethologist, on the other hand, acted the clown and portrayed the most obscene and cynical things; such a clown was interested only in the base and himself represented the “baseness” mythologically—“the base” in personified form, in persona. Thus the fixed balagan types “eiron,” “alazon,” and “bόmolόkhos” were formed. The eiron (pre-tender) “concealed” behind pretend naiveté and outrageousness his “essence”; the alazon (“braggart”), on the contrary ascribed to himself, “revealed” in himself what he did not possess; the bόmolόkhos (“toady,” “sycophant”) was a variant of the first two masks.
At first *ethos* meant a pretend “likeness” of the “high”; this was exactly “low” in the pre-ethical visual understanding. Later conceptual “ethos” turned into “morals”; but since it came from the conjunction of ethos and low, it began to be understood as low or base. This is the way we see it: the Classical character is treated hubristically, comedically, and in opposition to concepts of the high.

Narrow concretization and hubristic interpretation of “the low” made the “persona” (face-mask) everyday-realistic, and it began to circulate in the form of the “base character”. Hence the legend in scholarship about the connection between mime and depiction of morals, though in fact ethology, like aretalogy, was itself one of the forms of spectacle mime.

The various forms of mime had different names; thus the Laconic name of mime was δέικηλου, of the mimist—δεικηλίστης (δίκηλου and δικηλίστης, δεικηλίκτης). As the root of this term shows, the essence of such mime was “showing.” Doric evidence is particularly valuable, since Doria is the cradle of drama; but even outside it dikelist had their variants in the mimists and special clowns Plutarch calls “doers of miracles (tricks)”, in the low theurges, jugglers, specialists in fooling and visual deception—in mirages. Ancient glossaries explain that δέικηλου means μιμήματα (likenesses, imitations) and εἰκάσματα (similarities, likenesses, images). In both cases we have to do with “imitation,” mimesis of the imaginary pretending to be authentic, with the creation of phantom similarities to things, elements, and people. But this very “imitation,” mimesis, has to be understood in the balagan sense as “spectacle”—as a visual “showing” and “watching,” as creation of visual “similarity” and visual “likenesses,” i.e. of shades, mirages, and deceptions. Thus we have before us mime, the act of imitation, portraying pretend miracles and fake authenticity, the act of prestidigitation. The dikelist performed tricks and produced “base” ethos, later—“morals” interpreted as base. Plutarch explains that the Spartans called mimists dikelists (dikelicts).

Showing light “miracles” and tricks characteristic of balagan had their serious “authentic” parallel in the world of things, in everyday reality, in mystery. The visual nature of all kinds of “showing,” “revelation,” “unlocking,” “vision,” and “opening” sprang from the visual nature of “beauty,” which was now hidden, now revealed, like Socrates’ Silenus and his variations. We know of these many galleries, stone and wooden figures, chests with imagines, sigillaria (dolls exchanged by the Romans) and many more that show the incarnation in figures and masks of the change from life to death. Small chests, aedicula, statuettes were opened to “show” the shining god (“beauty,” i.e. light), then closed, having a “deceptive” form on the outside. As in the Homeric a panorama, light was now concealed by darkness, now suddenly revealed.

The terms for mime δέικηλου and δεικηλίστης remind us of mystery as well. Creuzer cites many examples to show the mysterial significance of the term “show” (δεικνυμι, ἀποδεικνυμι). Judging by the Classical sources, such “showings” and “presentations” constituted the active reproduction of divine passions: some participants
of the mysteries visually portrayed the god and his sacred actions (suffering), while the others “watched.”

We know Herodotus’ description of the passions of Osiris. Speaking of the nocturnal mysteries of Sais Herodotus uses the same term \( \text{δεικηλον (δεικηλον των παθεων)} \) and adds that such “showings” were called mysteries by the Egyptians.\(^{34}\)

The visual nature of the Classical mysteries (at Eleusis, for example) is well known. After passing through the visual horrors of the underworld, doors “opened” to the myst and a \( \text{visio} \) appeared, consisting of shining sacred garments, streams of bright light, in the middle of which the priest “appeared”. These doors played an important role. In many mysteries the whole point was the “opening” of these doors and the “showing” of light; the initiants stood before them, knocked at them, prayed for them to open, argued and even fought (in the more ancient times) with the “guard”, exchanged words with him. There is evidence that the Eleusinian myst wandering through the frightening passages from darkness to light “watched” and “looked at” monsters and other kinds of terrifying depictions and pictures along the way before reaching the kingdom of light.\(^{35}\) The highest, final form of initiation into the mysteries was \( \text{epopteia} \) (“watching,” “looking”); this act of visual perception of light later acquired conceptual significance as “contemplation,” i.e. looking at the spiritual. Thus the myst who had gone through the third, highest stage of mystical initiation was called \( \text{epo\'ptes} \) (“watcher,” “looker”). One hardly need add that visual mysteries are more ancient than ethical ones and that “revealing” is more ancient that “revelation”\(^{36}\)

In Homer one can still find scenes in which there is nothing mysterial, but “epopteia” of a sort is already present. Such is the scene in book 21 of the Iliad. Priam orders the gates of Troy be opened to let in the Trojan army to save it from inevitable death. But this is no more than rationalization of a myth to explain an archaic episode. The original would have it thus: “they (the guards) opened the gates and pushed aside the bars, and the opened gates gave (literally prepared, made with a strong shading of activity)—gave light, Apollo jumped out towards them.” In this scene the gates themselves are practically made animate, and the light rushing through the gates is represented in the form of a god, shining Apollo, who “jumps out” toward them. All this functions as salvation from death, incarnated in the terrible Achilles.

The mime-scenes called \( \text{k\'moi} \), which were connected with the origins of comedy, were the same, though in a completely different way. They consisted in the fact that in them a procession of tipsy merrymakers came to a hetaira’s doors and prayed the doors (and not the hetaira!) to throw off their locks and let one of them over the threshold; such songs were accompanied by knocking on the door, by entreaties, by invective and threats. On one hand, these were authentic lamentations and serenades, on the other—performances that were “watched”; but in both cases they were mimes, scene-acts.

Very many such panoramas, pictures of the beauty of light and “watching,” “showings,” “peeking,” all kinds of illusion are found in Middle Comedy (palliata). Here we find mirages, fooling, visual deception, “miracles,” tricks. Here too an important role is played by doors, cracks in doors, gates through which people look or “spy” or to which people come with entreaties and curses. All of these scenes conceptually rationalize the ancient illusional mime-“showing”. The same forms of illusion lie at the root of tragedy, about which I will speak separately later.
The ancient Classical philosopher Parmenides received a revelation of the truth in an anabasis to heavenly heights, the theurge Empedocles learned the “truth” directly from the gods, the theurge of the Hellenistic period Apollonius of Tyana worked “miracles” and healed the sick. Classical philosopher-cosmologists continued the mythological (image) tradition: they incarnated in themselves the creation of the cosmos that they were studying. The creators of Classical genres traditionally personified those very genres, because no amount of conceptual thought could completely eliminate the subjective-objective mythological image that lay behind the Classical concept.

The oldest Greek philosophers lived their lives [experienced themselves] as god-healers, as messiahs (soters), as real demiurges; they were worshipped, they had cults established to them.

Greek pre-formal-logical philosophy, and this we must not forget, posed questions about the origins of the cosmos, i.e. questions of conceptual cosmogony. But why was it interested namely in the birth of the universe? The answer is clear: because the universe was thought of as having died—in water, or for the most part in fire—and only then having begun to be created again. Scientific conceptual Classical philosophy (or as the Greeks themselves called it the study of nature) presented mythological ideas about the cosmos; the theory of the periodic death and rebirth of nature derived from popular forms of cosmogony, from eschatological and cosmogonic images. First they were purely visual and light-based, not ethical and not philosophical. These images are visionary. Thanks to the fact that Parmenides’ poem has reached us with its beginning intact, we can even say that the most ancient Greek philosophy was apocalyptic: “the truth” was given by divinity in the form of “revelation on the mount.”

Miracles, the light of the truth and the illusoriness of the imaginary likeness of the truth—this is the cluster of images which became the object of “showing” in both mysteries and mime, the object of theory in philosophy. But the philosophers themselves, the authors of speculative theories still continued to feel like theurges and bearers of the “light of truth,” prophets and divinely inspired priests of thought (especially Heraclitus), formerly as gods.

But alongside, in balagan, their function was performed by clowns, jugglers, and prestidigitators, in comedy by the wonder-working slave, the “philosophizing slave.”

A single complex of images, which later split apart with the appearance of concept, formed the basis of the “literary mask” of Socrates in philosophy, religion, and drama. Here is a figure in which mystery, philosophy, and mime are combined! Socrates, the incarnation of “truth” and “deception,” is at the same time a folk philosopher, a real philosopher, and a character in philosophical mime, the mask of a balagan buffoon, the incarnation of mystical ideas, and the hero of ancient comedy.

No matter how “folk,” no matter how mixed his balagan characteristics may be, the fullest and most authentic portrait of him is found in Plato’s Symposium. From the point of view of semantics, the whole Symposium is constructed on the idea of division into two—division that has different variations in philosophy and balagan.

In its thematics Plato’s Symposium discusses two contrasting Eroses—higher (“heavenly”) Eros and lower (“hubristic”) Eros. This main theme falls into several variants which are put into the mouths of different characters in the dialogue. Thus the physician Erixymachus speaks of Eros-creator and Eros-destroyer, Aristophanes about
people cut in two, Socrates about death and resurrection, Diotima about body and soul, Alcibiades about ugliness and beauty, about the double silenus. But the theme as a whole, the theme of “truth-phantom” \((\text{ἀληθής - εἴδωλον})\), is incarnated by Plato in the figure of Socrates; in the character of Socrates what Diotima says (a character personifying “the truth”) and what her opposite Alcibiades says (personification of “illusoriness”) are made equivalent. Socrates is both hubrist and heavenly wisdom, creation.

On the outside Socrates is ugly and “concealed” \((\text{sokrat-sokryt}^{37})\); he “pretends,” corresponding to the nature of the balagan dissimulator, the \(\text{eirōn}\). But in “revealed,” open form he has inside him a shining divinity.

Everything Socrates relates in the dialogue in Diotima’s words is clothed in mystical form: Diotima seems to initiate Socrates like a mystes into the secret meaning of mysteries and “leads” him by degrees from simple physical sensation to higher contemplation—to \(\text{epopteía}\). While in Alcibiades, the bearer of imaginary beauty, the division of the world into two parts is shown by means of the image of the popular clay silenus, Diotima, the bearer of true beauty, uses for the same thought the metaphor of mystical “rising upwards” (like the philosopher Parmenides, who uses this image mythologically, not metaphorically). The visual nature of “initiation into mysteries” is preserved in Diotima as well: comprehension of “true” beauty she understands as “contemplation” of visual beauty, as epoptics, though already understood metaphorically. This shows the difference between the epochs of thought of Parmenides and Plato: Parmenides rides up to the heights of heaven literally, while for Plato “rising” is a metaphor.

The two epochs can be seen in Socrates as well. He is a double silenus and a double Eros; in him two natures are combined—mysterial and hubristic. The comicality (in the Classical sense) of this figure lies in the fact that it is taken from satyr-drama, that it is a hubrist-silenus. But this mythological silenus, this mythological Eros became a conceptual, metaphorical character. Its philosophical aspect consists in the fact that only Socrates’ exterior (“ethos”) is ugly, inside him is the heavenly Eros; he has already become the dual philosophical personification of deceptive “appearance” (of reality) and “concealed” essence (of the ideal world).

The opposition of imaginary and authentic, of phantom and seen, of external ugliness and internal beauty, formed the soul both of mystery (philosophy) and of mime. In its preliterary state they are still not separated, representing two coexisting biune aspects. Conceptual thought draws a line between them; but in the \(\text{Symposium}\), which underwent this division into two separate genres long before, there is still a hint of the former unity of comic mime and serious mime. These two sides of one and the same image correspond in the \(\text{Symposium}\) to comedy and tragedy.

Tragedy is represented here by Agathon, the tragedian; comedy, by the author of comedy, Aristophanes. The beginning of the \(\text{Symposium}\) is the victory of the tragedian Agathon; the end, the arrival of the comasts, i.e. the drunk \(\text{kōmos}\) that was considered the main element of comedy. In this case the unbridled elemental “low” bacchism of the comasts who burst in is opposed as a “comic” version to the strict formal tasting of wine accompanied by praises of Eros raised by the symposiasts. Likewise “comic” are the intermezzoi inserted by Plato into the pauses between speeches; these intermezzo scenes are as low as the speeches are lofty.
At the beginning of the *Symposium* the door to Agathon’s house is closed; it is opened only for the chosen. But at the end this “door” is wide open, and idlers burst in right from the street indiscriminately. This opposition of the comasts’ coarse drunkenness to Agathon’s guests’ inspired intoxication stresses Bacchism in its two forms. Externally clothed in the “comic,” the entire *Symposium* is in essence mysterial. As a whole it derives from Dionysia, from the mysteries of Bacchus-Eros: we know that in mysteries the crowned *mýstai* conduct similar *symposia* (collective wine-drinking), and such *symposia* also take place on the Elysian fields, where the dead sit to dine and drink wine.\(^\text{38}\)

It is therefore natural that at the end of the *Symposium* there is a discussion that seems to have nothing to do with the plot about the unity of comedy and tragedy. By the time of this discussion all the main characters of the *Symposium* have gone home. Only three people remain, which trinomial incarnates the idea of the unity of tragedy and comedy: Agathon, the tragedian; Aristophanes, the comedian; and Socrates, the philosopher, who unites these two opposites. These three characters say that “the creator of tragedy should also be the creator of comedy.”

And if Socrates acts both as a model of true wisdom in philosophy and as a deceiver and cheat in mime and comedy, this is because he personifies both these different genres, and not at all because his character is “taken from life.”

5

Was mime authentic stage performance? Hardly. We have two kinds of information about it. It was either low balagan spectacle or a non-staged form of literary dialogue, a narrative “scene.” This is because mime is by nature pre-conceptual. When art appeared under the influence of conceptual thought, mime became the foundation of literary drama and began to undergo all change and growth with it. When mime in its independent form became the object of literary reworking, its visual, light, imaginal character was forgotten. It could no longer satisfy the viewer with its primitive “showing”, its “one time action” and its complete absence of generalization. It became literary and thereby its mythological images were translated into concepts. As early as the 5th century Sophron makes mime into a show of morals, a short scene, in form a dialogue, but in fact a peculiar kind of story no longer suited to the stage. Thus narrative mime appeared. This strange Classical genre we now call mime; in fact, this is the only genre we call mime. Such transition from dramatic genres to narrative, such “reappearance” of genres we find only in the Classical period, when prosaicizing thought is only beginning to appear and “dissolve” the rhythmic system of song, to “eliminate” showing visually, to “translate” direct forms of action (mimicking) into the indirect forms of story “about” action. But this is not the most important thing. Most important is that the scene, once played out for real, turns into a scene that is “as if” played out. The entire external form of mime is preserved.

Thus the distinguishing feature of narrative mime is that it is a story, and not a drama, though its form is dialogic and it has, like drama, its mise-en-scène, a completely defined setting and specific participants (characters). Its whole character is “as if” for the stage, i.e. it is a scene in form, designed, however, only for reading. A real scene is designed for recreation before an audience (in Aristotle—δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾽ ἀπαγγέλιας\(^\text{39}\)),
while here, on the contrary, the presence of a definite setting where the events are “as if”
played out does not prevent the events being communicated by telling (ἀπαγγέλια).

Such scenes continue to remain static and “point-like”; they are truly “pulled” from
life, because behind them and next to them there is nothing. Within them there is no plot
system. They fix one theme, one moment of time. They have neither beginning nor end,
know no connection between phenomena. Usually their theme is not events, but
something without temporal continuity or the flow of consequences—a conversation
about someone, a sudden impression or affect, a fleeting action. And in narrative form
mime continues to preserve its former features, which take on the character of a stylistic
tradition: time in them is unidimensional and short, different slices of life are recreated in
it visually, without depth of background and without analysis. Narrative mime still does
not tell stories; it shows, although in illusory form. Why did poets and philosophers turn
to such an underdeveloped and dramatic genre as the short scene for narrative?

The point is that narration in the narrow sense was highly specialized in the Classical
period. It was a short history, never independent, always an insert. It was only a part in a
larger system of exposition. Meanwhile drama was the original form for the expression of
broad thought. Along the way, when ancient comedy and tragedy were too crystallized in
their special material and the independent story had not yet been born, narrative mime
appeared. It was extremely well suited for everyday description in its areto-ethological
aspect, and in its contours. Meanwhile its other aspect, that shared by mystery and
cosmology, was continued conceptually in philosophical mime.

Thus two strands of mime can be traced in Classical literature. First, the everyday
mimes of Sophron, perhaps even earlier, of Epicharmus, then the Hellenistic mimes of
Theocritus and Herodas. In Theocritus, furthermore, they can be divided into country
mimes (“idylls”) and city mimes. Secondly, the philosophical mimes of Plato and Lucian;
in Lucian philosophical mime goes side by side with everyday mime.

In Xenophon and Plato the dialogues are for the most part connected with Socrates
and therefore date from the 5th century, when Sophron lived as well. The figure of
Socrates speaks for itself. Its fullest expression is found in the symposia of Plato and
Xenophon. In both places Socrates represents Eros. In Xenophon there are a number of
features more ancient than in Plato: the setting of balagan performances, pantomime,
buffoonery, Socrates’ obvious role as a buffoon, who calls himself not only a specialist in
affairs of the heart, but also a pimp, and the professional buffoon complains that he
evokes more laughter than the buffoon himself. But still Plato’s Symposium is much more
archaic on the whole than Xenophon’s.

In it all the characters—as in mime and Old Comedy—are real, historical people.
However, they have one thing in common: all are dead.

(Apparently Old Comedy also made fun of the dead, but not of the living: such is the
cult meaning, the resurrecting meaning of invective.)

In Plato’s Symposium events are narratively moved into the distant past and ascribed
to the dead, who not only make speeches, but even compete against each other in making
speeches. The setting is a feast, the theme of the speeches love.

One cannot overlook, however, the fact that the beginning of the Symposium is full of
allusions to saturnalia: the host Agathon proposes that the slaves look after the table
themselves without any instructions from their master, as if the slaves were masters
themselves and the masters their guests. The comparison of Socrates to satyrs and sileni
undoubtedly continues this image. The arrival of the drunk comasts and the whole picture of disorder, noise, and the intrusion of the crowd of merrymakers from the street—all this fills out at the end what was hinted at in the beginning.

In essence this Socrates—silenus-satyr-hubrist—was the main character in satyricon. The main function of such an eiron-charlatan was connected with wine, low Bacchism, and low fertility. Saturnalias were days of eating and drinking, days of buffoons and hubrists, who were then killed. It was in Middle Comedy hubrists exchanged roles with authentic characters and slaves became false masters, buffoons—pretend kings. Exactly as in palliata the hubrist took possession of another man’s woman, pretended to marry her and to feast, then, like the “old man” of comedy, died amidst the drunken merrymaking, to the music and dancing of the symposiasts, who made fun of him.

The feasting slaves who usurped the function of masters could be characters of saturnic mime. Such an example is provided by Plautus’ “Stichus.” Here the major action is the feast of the slaves, which takes place right on stage; the slaves drink and engage in debauchery, while their masters couple with their wives somewhere off-stage.

A remarkable example of such saturnic mime is provided by Plato’s Symposium. Its beginning is saturnalia, its ending—komos; its whole setting is not everyday-realistic but saturnic, Bacchic, and the roots of “feast” philosophy (wine and the theme of eros) lie in Bacchism-saturnism. The same kind of “symposium” is described by Lucian in ultra-hubristic form, in a form directly related to saturnalia (“Kronia”).

In Plato Diotima talks about mystical Eros using the terms “birth,” “birth pains,” and the figure of Socrates is compared to a silenus and a satyr, a base “glutton” from satyricon. Likewise in Plautus the “sublime” Eros of the masters takes place off-stage, while the hubristic eros of the slaves is shown on stage. Like archaic mime, palliata, this drama of Amor, consisted of two levels: higher—the love of the beautiful young couple (heavenly Eros in the Symposium) and lower—the love of ugly old men, rogues, and slaves (Eros-hubrist of the Symposium). The birth, eros, feasts that Plato speaks of mysteriously are “shown” visually on stage by Plautus.

All this suggests that in genre Plato’s Symposium could be descended from the saturnine mime, in which two Eroses among the characters, a real one and an imaginary one, could be played by two slaves during the Saturnalia. Socrates, the incarnation of these two forces, with his foolish-satirical and wise-satirical nature, blurred the boundary between the sublime and the vulgar.

Using the mask of Socrates led to two tracks. As a buffoon he appears in The Clouds. As a sage he turns up in philosophical dialogues. Behind the tragic and comic masks remains satyricon, the drama of satyrs, in which the elevated and the vulgar were still mixed.

In the 5th century the leading genre is drama. In the 4th century the transition from drama to story takes place, but for Greece this is the final century. The growth of concepts makes old drama seem outdated. The formation of ethics had its highest expression in tragedy, in the conceptual thought of the philosophers and rhetors; this process of formation changes. “Polis” comedy and cult tragedy become outmoded. The 4th and particularly the 3rd centuries see the appearance and flourishing of formal logic.
Argumentative prose appears at the expense of poetry, which dies out. An interesting phenomenon occurs: poetry is prosaicized in the formal sense, getting down from the “chariot” and becoming the “pedestrian word.” No doubt this is a result of the need for discursive forms.

Plato’s dialogues are not only “philosophy with characters,” not only “mime-stories;” his Symposium is also a “satyricon-story,” the antecedent, in a sense, of Hellenic bucolic (like is always found in different forms, never in like forms!). At the same time Plato did not yet have the method of prosaic conceptual exposition, as Lucian did later. In Plato one can witness the formation of conceptual prose in Greece. It was created not by speculation about business and not by choosing “prosaic” (business, scientific) themes, not by changing image ideas into “dry” concepts. The ancient abstraction was built on concrete myths, and it was an abstraction of image concreteness. Concepts in Plato are concepts that have already arisen from the image, but they are still constructed by the image and based on the image; they are not an independent logical category, independent of image concreteness. In Plato one cannot dissect the contents of concepts without dissecting its myths and images. The difference between Plato and Xenophon (I am talking about the Symposium) is that Xenophon only tells a certain story about Socrates, while in Plato all the mythic image components of the story act as material for philosophical concepts. Nevertheless these “concepts of the image” cannot be called metaphors. They are not figurative speech, not a system of two meanings, but a single conceptual meaning in the form of image, usually mythological. Plato’s Eros is the universal ethical principle. What could Plato give up? The moral concept of Eros or its definition in image? Neither. The method of Platonic thought is distinguished precisely by this absence of alternatives. It consists of constructing the “abstract” directly on the concrete. In this regard the reliability of myth, mime, and all archaic forms of image in Plato is astounding; it is, however, equal to the novelty of abstraction, which had not existed before Plato.

How should we define Plato’s Symposium? Like his other dialogues it is philosophy in characters, philosophy in drama, narrative philosophy. In this case it is a new form—narrative—of understanding ethics. We must not forget the scenic reminiscences in this dialogue—they are very strong. Again the same connection of ethics with theater in its three “Greek” forms—satyricon, tragedy, and comedy! I stress again: they are incarnated in the personae of Socrates, Agathon, and Aristophanes, the three main characters who remain in the story to the end.

The narrative character of the Symposium shows that it is a prosaicized drama. In the first place, there is distancing in time. At the very beginning the narrator stresses the distant past in which the events described take place. Thus the characters described have long been dead! Yet still they are not literary characters, but real historical people. The composition of the Symposium is wholly narrative. It consists of a common frame, which is a triply indirect story, completely constructed of indirect speech (accusative with infinitive). In this indirect story “Ich-erzählungen” are “wrapped.” The sequence of direct stories following one after the other gives them the form of a dialogue. After every speech, before the next one begins, a live scene is presented as an intermezzo; these are characterized by three features: comicality, everyday reality, and lowness that breaks the high tone of the speeches. Nevertheless, as in drama, the action begins with the “entrance” of Socrates and is revealed semantically in the “entrance” of Alcibiades; the
action ends with the “exit” of the main character Socrates. The distribution of characters in the Symposium is semantic; in particular, the dialogue ends as in comedy with a general disorderly komos. As I said, the three semantically most important characters remain on stage, but the order of their “exit” is significant: it reveals Plato’s thought, which is typical for a Greek. In giving semantic significance to the ordered distribution of parts and characters, the Greek invests the part closest to the continuing story with the greatest significance (we on the other hand call it the “last” part). So it is in the Symposium. Of the three semantically significant participants in the dialogue who remain on stage to the end, the first to leave the action, to fall asleep, is Aristophanes; second, towards morning, is the host of the feast, Agathon; and the last to “exit” is Socrates.

The semantic center of the composition is Diotima’s story. And it again is “wrapped” inside the whole dialogue like an authentic narration. But this story of Diotima, which represents direct speech, is delivered in the direct speech of Socrates and divided into two parts—the dialogue between Diotima and Socrates and Diotima’s story.

This internal narration is related outside the main plot action of the Symposium, having the form of a kind of “insertion” or “digression.” It is an exception to the common setting, taking place who knows where and who knows when, at an undefined time long ago. Who is Diotima? A literary character? No. Plato passes her off as a real personality, without, however, giving her any real features. Diotima carries with her the mystical theme; she has a significant name, “honored by Zeus,” and she is “wise,” “having saved the Athenians from the plague for ten years.” Her earthly, one might even say conceptual corresponding character from the dialogue is the physician Erixymachus, full of importance and dignity. And her opposite is the politician Alcibiades, representative of the Athenian “golden youth” and of everything imaginary—external beauty, vanity, thoughtlessness, everything “superficial” and “ephemeral.”

Posing the ethical problem in the Symposium is connected, as in tragedy, with its genesis in staged scene. But in mime and comedy ethics became spectacle, in tragedy—religious. Diotima’s story shows the mystical path of ethics from “visible” physical beauty to higher internal “contemplation” of spiritual beauty—from spectacle to contemplation. This path was traveled by ethics beginning with Hesiod and lyric, through tragedy, to Plato—Socrates, who examines morality conceptually, from the position of logic, as a consistent theory of virtue that completes higher knowledge and higher wisdom. Such wisdom-virtue, though purely speculative, is nevertheless incarnated in a living “example,” the single-concrete physical image of the man Socrates.

Ethics thus begins from ethology and aretalogy, two types of balagan spectacle that had nothing in common with ethics. As it often happens, before it existed ethics was in other ideological forms and was therefore not yet called “ethics.” By specificity we usually mean qualitative isolation; in fact ethics was not isolated qualitatively and originated in things that seem to have nothing in common with it.

Along the lines of clowning and hubrism a peculiar Classical genre began to take shape, one that it would be wrong to call philosophy, ethics, rhetoric, or narrative drama. It combined mime, balagan, tricks, deceptive wisdom, mirages, and cosmology “inside-out.”
A century after Plato, Menippus appears, uniting in his person author-philosopher and what Socrates had been—a character of philosophy. We are not in Athens, but in Syria. The 3rd century belongs to Hellenism, a new age, and Syria is the birthplace of Lucian, who will appear in 500 years. Behind Menippus stand Aristotle and Theophrastus, who have already created the theory of “characters;” Middle Comedy, with its “ethos” and its new “morals” is gone. In the meanwhile aretalogy and ethology have turned into conceptually understood theory and practice of the everyday behavior of individual people endowed by nature with standard vices, or occasionally with virtues connected, however, with the principle of the “miraculous.” There are, furthermore, several third centuries, which differ in content—Greek, Eastern, and Roman. Aretalogy, together with its twin theurgy, has managed in the meantime to produce the miracles of Apollonius of Tyana. Philostratus describes them in Greek for Rome.

Cynic philosophy continues Greek traditions outside Greece as well. Every Cynic turns out to be a cynic. Diogenes is the son of a counterfeiter, a “dog.” Menippus is a slave and a moneylender who commits suicide in a fit of greed. Menippus was connected with “descents into the underworld.”

While legend may not make Menippus into a buffoon and a clown, it does endow him with slave origins and make him a moneylender by profession. Palliata meets philosophy again. To this we must add that the death of the hubrist is complemented in Menippus by the buffoonery common in his works and the motifs of *katábasis*.

Menippus, like Socrates, is an obscure character, excessively legendary and, I would even say, “character-like.” This is the mask of a sage and a fool. Like Socrates, he is both the subject and the object of depiction—the author and the author’s theme. The mixture of verse and prose ascribed to him is very archaic. It links Menippus with satira, returning him to the cluster of satyro-satyrico-saturnic images which cannot be separated from the motifs of the Socratic *Symposium*.

What Socrates was for the narrations of Plato, Menippus was to Lucian. Whether he is present or not in a given dialogue, Lucian is shot through with “menippea”.

No one is as convenient for showing one of the peculiarities of Greek literature as Lucian. A real writer of a later age, author of works belonging to a great variety of genres, he is wholly permeated by mime and belongs to mime as if he were himself playing the role of aretalogist, ethologist, and theurge. The peculiarity of Greek literature is that its authors, impersonal and nameless though they may be, write their names and take on individuality; they always follow the canon of the genre and see themselves as a component of genre. I have already had occasion to point out that in Greece biographical legends about authors contain features of the genres themselves, in the sense of their origin or composition. This observation can be developed further. Classical literature identifies the genre and the author who works in it. More than that: such a semantic identification is made by the author himself. And this is because Greek literature is the first literature and behind every author there is a subjective-objective “I” which recreates in words and actions both itself and what is outside itself. The process of separating the author from his work went as follows: first the author and the genre are mixed; then the author traditionally associates himself with the main character of the given genre, as if continuing to be inseparable from it. We recall Aeschylus, who was author, main actor, and *didáskalos* of his own works. The same character composed and performed the
composition. This means that in the past the same person was both author and character. Here I would again like to mention the characters of Old Comedy and philosophical mime. They were living, real people. Living? No, no longer living—already dead.

All of Lucian is distinguished by “balagan-philosophy” perceived conceptually. Of course I am talking about his peculiar genre, and not ideas or stylistic individuality. Furthermore, I do not wish to conceal that I consider questions of stylistic individuality of Classical writers moot when we have before us only one representative of the genre, while his models or circle are lost. One cannot approach these questions until one has established the genre canon to which the author subscribes.

Lucian was considered a “writer of all themes.” He is, however, well-defined and whole in his genre. This of course changes our perception and evaluation of Lucian, freeing him from unbearable modernization and returning him to Classical style.

Though Lucian is only the author of his works, he is also the hidden main character in them. The aretalogist no longer speaks about himself; the author speaks “about him.” But taking another as his object, the author portrays him as if he himself continued to be the aretalogist.

Lucian’s treatment of philosophers and rhetors as objects of mockery is understandable: all satura, all mime from which Lucian is derived came from the image system which was later cast in the system of philosophy and rhetoric. And if “philosophy in characters” existed even for Plato, it was even more appropriate for Lucian with his “hubristic philosophy:” it was not ideas as principles that Lucian perceived, but ideas in the persona of people. His characters are real people, but they are dead. His main “hero” is Menippus.

Ethos has long since attracted the interest of the rhetors. The terms “sophist” and “mime” have become synonyms. The sophists were beggars, did ethology, declaimed, mixed with fools. Concepts filled the old images with new contents, but behind the images extended old traditions, which encountered lowered ideas of miracle, conduct, mirage. Lucian sometimes followed philosophy and rhetoric, remaining true to Socrates-Menippus, sometimes recreated the hubristic sphere. His dialogues are old “scenes,” mimes without action; of course this is already stylization.

Lucian’s main “hero” is the charlatan. His main genre is parody, but not at all satire, and not in our contemporary sense of literary ridicule, in the Classical sense—as the other side of the serious and “authentic,” as mimesis. Lucian provides parody of the gods, as well as parody of philosophers. Lucian renovates the ethology of ancient balagan and parodies aretalogy in the new sense of stories about miracles. His ethos is low or base “custom” in its hubristic manifestations; his theurgic-aretalogical side is manifested in the exposure of aretalogists and theurges.

Much has been said and written about Lucian’s religious satire. This is wrong. His “religious satire” has a cult character. It comes from the Olympian line of the Iliad, through invective hymns and comedy, through iambics and the obscenities of fertility cults to the Greeks’ customary parody of everything sacred. Here too underlying everything is mime as part of the “comic in the larger sense,” about which I will speak later. Behind Lucian was Rhinthon with his hilaro-tragedy, “which meant phlyax-drama.” Phlyax and the dikels translated everything tragic into comic. Ancient scholars say that Roman satire came from Rhinthon (Lucilius, to whom I would add here Horace and Juvenal); Roman satire still rested on the Old Comedy of Cratinus and
Eupolis. But it is also interesting that they consider Rhinthon a Pythagorean. These two lines, the philosophical and farcical, ran side by side in both legend and practice.

“Tragic,” as the fragments and titles of Rhinthon’s plays show, does not necessarily mean literary tragedy. It included myths, and myths meant hilarotragedy and phlyax rather than the structure or genre or style of tragedies: myths, myths with gods and heroes as characters.

This sphere is inseparable from the mysterious, as we see in Old Comedy and philosophical mime. Mysterial parody in Lucian goes along with parody of sacred sayings, of myth, of cult legend.

Lucian’s philosophical parody was more than just mockery of self-styled philosophers. Its “menippian” forms included the earlier visiones and apocalypses: ascension and flights to the heavens, descents into the underworld, scenarios in the afterlife, fantastic locations, characters like Charon, gods, heroes, and the dead. But all of this is equally close to Old Comedy and philosophy.

The old mime made up of doubles, mirages, visual “miracles” and all kinds of “appearance” and “pretending”, flavored in the comedic line with charlatanism and mimicry (imitation of the true) was richly expressed in Lucian. It can be felt in everything, but particularly in such parodies as “The False Prophet,” “The Death of Peregrinus,” “True Stories,” “The Lover of Lies,” “How to Write History,” etc. On one hand, these are mimes, which portray in the hubristic variant the passions and adventures of gods-demiurges with their vices, whose representatives were once the great Parmenideses, Heraclituses, Empedocleses; in Nigrinuses, Peregrinuses, and Alexanders these gods, prophets, philosophers, and messiahs appear in their imaginary form. On the other hand, there are here mimes based on showing false miracles, i.e. tricks and deceptions. We must mention that areta-logy takes at this time the meaning of “stories about miracles” in the conceptual sense: “miracle” not as a visual image, but as a supernatural phenomenon, usually a miraculous cure or salvation from death. In Classical aretology, only gods or supernatural beings like prophets, clairvoyants, miraculous healers and other “divine men” could be such “miracle workers.” In this connection “aretē” begins to be understood as “valor” of a divine sort.

In Lucian “miracles” and “miracle-workers” have just such an aretalogical character of the Roman age; but behind this Roman aretalogy is the ancient aretalogy of Greek mimes. The element of falsehood which clothes all of Lucian’s parodies is also already conceptual; it has turned into moral falsehood, but it too is transformed from visual deception and visual ethos. Lucian’s false stories about the other world are related to imaginary journeys to nonexistent lands as in palliata with its deceptive descriptions of imaginary lands, unpainted pictures, and never-made exotic journeys. Nevertheless this is not simply an amusing joke. Such “true histories” were also rooted in the comic reflection of heavenly anábasis like Parmenides or underworld katábasis like those of messengers and “messages” from the other world.

The narrational element has already become stabilized in Lucian. His dialogues have lost all stage quality, and mime can be detected in its genetic features, but not in direct active form. In Lucian all settings are mirage, all interpretations deceptive. His characters are charlatans, philopseudos, religious and philosophical tricksters who pass themselves off as miracle-workers and sages; in most cases they are the dead. While the Odyssey and ancient logography were narrative θαῦμα (“wondrous wonder”), Lucian’s whole genre
is hubristic “deception” and “confusion.” The element of ludification is also strong in it. Lucian’s philosophers and charlatans make fun of the crowd, misleading it, “mocking” and “confusing” it and robbing it mercilessly like the slaves in palliata; but the point is that these very philosophers and charlatans are mocked by Lucian. He is aretalogist and ethologist. Like a puppeteer in a puppet theater or a prologuist and Barker in balagan, he “shows” his selection of funny figures, behind which one can see his strings and his fingers. He is a real dikelist in genre, but one with sublime literary talent.

Lucian’s characters are masks. These people are always greedy, base, guided by unbounded gluttony, they are vain and endlessly mercenary, repulsive, but most of all they are rogues. As in hagiography, here too one can find reflected some scraps of historicity, but judging history by them would be as funny as Lucian’s dialogues are.

The parody of gods, sages, sacred legend, and myth called ethology in short and aretalogy in the new sense of the word should have produced one more response (as musicians say, a repetition of the melody in another voice), a purely everyday-real one. And in fact he does have “Hetairas’ Conversations,” executed very literarily, but cynical in content, as in balagan. This is the line of “ethos” understood ethologically, like in mime, like in balagan.

Ethos and character are external and imaginary, always wrong. Who was endowed with them? The coward and glutton, the braggart and the scholarly-charlatan, the old man, the parasite, the warrior. These are the men. The women are hetairas. In youth she is sold, in old age she sells the young herself. As a young woman she may be romantic and “noble.” The old woman is all drunkenness and unquenchable thirst for profit and baseness. Just such hetairas are found in Lucian, their mamas are “madames”; their lovers are pugnacious soldiers, their tender admirers, their impudent clients.

In Lucian the image tradition has a conceptual character. If you like, the salt of Lucian is in his turning mythical and mythological reality into phantasmagoria with the sharply defined realism of the 2nd century A.D. These realistic features contemporary with Lucian are found not in the reflection of events and not in a characterization of the age; Lucian’s work is modern in its finished formal-logical thought, which makes his thought logical and consistent, causal, and his Atticist language skillfully “literary”, finished, normative. The dissonance between the ancient image and the concept, which has been liberated from the image, is much sharper in Lucian that in the naive, funny dissonances of Aristophanes. While still submitting to the canons of the genre, Lucian already breaks with the dependence of the concept on the image in all his style. He cuts himself off from ideas which not long before were matters of faith, but which for him have become superstition. His cold absence of faith and deflation of everything that was considered sublime or serious in tradition can be historically explained by the complete dying out of all traces of image in concept—a phenomenon usually called rationalization. However Heraclides Ponticus or Ptolemy or other minds of the Hellenic age “rationalized” myth euhemeristically, that is seriously, passionately, struggling with mental survivals in themselves and those around them; myth for them was dangerous, a real target, influential among their contemporaries. And they struggled with sacred legend from the positions of the same cult I spoke about above as a two-sided phenomenon, one that embraced both religion and parody of religion. The rationalism of the euhemerists was only half conceptual; its other half was completely different. Lucian is already beyond image aberrations. He laughs at everything image-based thought created, as an outsider,
almost Offenbach-like. His gods and heroes play in 2nd century AD dress, speak its language, think in concepts—and this is riotously funny. In fact they are guilty of nothing but this transposition of the dead plusquamperfect into Lucian’s living praesens.

Concepts, which have become completely detached from the image, but have not yet extended their bounds in the direction of formal logic, are adequate to themselves in the age of Lucian. Everything reworked by them has features of business prose, a certain dryness, excessive completeness. By this I mean not Roman culture, but the post-Greek culture to which the Syrian Lucian belongs. In the 2nd century AD this post-Greek culture undergoes a short and peculiar renaissance that I would call the last, conclusive stage in the appearance of the Classical (Greek) conceptual process: in the Classical period it went no further. This is the stage in which Greek thought breaks with the image and begins to create conceptual discursive prose—historiography, science, biographical literature, third sophistry. Only now, when the mythological image was separated from concept and ceased to be a component of conceptual thought, did writers turn to figurative speech and begin to load their own conceptual speeches with it. Just as setting could only appear when man became separated from nature, so the image, distanced from the concept, became a kind of “scenic” category. It is introduced, resorted to artificially; writers are not afraid of overloading their swollen overdressed speech which is in essence completely conceptual (which distinguishes it from Gorgias'). In this context Lucian is a true “Hellene”, looking back like all Atticists. He renovates the good old mime with its wealth of images on a new conceptual foundation. And this is the only difference between Lucian’s parody and ancient parody. In spite of the fact that Rome by this time already knows satire, Lucian follows the old Greek path, without any generalization.

We know neither Socrates nor Menippus by their own works, speeches, or fragments. We know both through Plato, Menippus through Varro and Lucian. In both cases the source is perceived through later thought, the source is philosophical, and it happens in the age of the appearance of concepts. Even Roman translations and imitations of Greek, for all their formal similarity to the originals, show the radical difference between concepts that are beginning to appear and those that have already appeared. We cannot judge Socrates and Menippus from the works of Plato and Lucian. But another difference is perceptible—between the accounts of Plato and Lucian. Plato creates a philosophical discussion with the resources of old folk drama, which he turns into narrative prose. It is rich in deep semantic connections with folk religion, with ancient dramatic traditions, with the oldest ideas of folk and scientific philosophy. The Symposium makes so strong an impression on us because the material in it exceeds by far Plato’s today; it contains so many connections, it is so polysemantic and extends so far into the depths of purely Greek folk images that it seems an inaccessible enigma. But its charm is what characterizes any art: in the proportion between the fullness of the past and complete novelty. In Plato everything is new: the philosophical character of drama in prose, dialogical narration, image-based concepts, the literary theory of cognition. Plato gives birth to the content of conceptual philosophy, and to all of its components, and to its new forms, creating at the same time the first literary story. A great man, he arrives with his
own personal passport, which he promptly takes away. He is continued by his complete opposite—Aristotle, who takes Plato’s result, but rejects his method.

Aristotle marks the age of finished concepts. In him formal logic works out its basic laws. Concept no longer rests on image.

In fact later Classical philosophy no longer creates new methods of thought, but only varies its contents. Its path has already been cut: the further formalization (“development”) of concepts. I would call these ages of translation. One can translate not only from Greek to Roman. The 3rd century AD without realizing it translates the old image-based philosophy into the language of concepts, and Roman eclectics finishes the job.

When Lucian appears philosophy is no longer a creative science, but a subject of enlightenment prepared for consumption long ago. By this time it turns into rhetoric, or rather into a peculiar literary-intellectual literature that cannot become art. This is the Greek renaissance, which differs from the Italian in that it renews itself. Again philosophy goes through the schools and public halls, returning to mass spectacle forms. Again philosophers perform and become actors. But now they cultivate not a low, but a high style, even a lofty style as if they were trying to prove to history that tragedy was once born of mime as was comedy. In later ages it happened many times: they revealed with minute precision ancient features of phenomena that remained inaccessible to the archaeologist.

In the chaos of the 2nd century, amidst the numerous high-flown phrases, oratorial costumes, schools, Sophistic squabbles, cheap charlatanism, and reexamination of philosophical systems, Lucian appeared, the same Lucian who in the 19th century will be used to find the boundaries between rhetoric, philosophy, Cynicism, and Stoicism, and in the 20th to find the socio-political causes of “frequent significant transitions.”

Lucian’s return to ancient tradition and desire to renew the comic philosophical form can be explained by the context of the 2nd century AD. Behind Lucian’s dialogues there are no more immediate folk images. When we analyze them we run up against the Menippean canon; Lucian may have had other literary models as well, but they were literary. For him philosophy is no longer a gnoseological system, it too is literature. In this respect there can be no comparison between Plato and Lucian. The forms of their consciousness cannot be compared to either. As I already said, Lucian thinks conceptually. In everything else he is a stylizer and “renewer.”

It is no coincidence that the ancient world connected Lucian’s name with the peculiarly Classical genre of hubristic novel. Stories about roguery and rogues, which were common among the people and which formed the basis for the entire picaresque genre of future court literature, could by all rights be related to Lucian as well. All such novels were to a certain extent life-description, the fore-runner of biography. Such were not so much descriptions of manners as they were ethological, in the balagan sense. “Life-descriptions” were customary for famous buffoons, parasites, merry-makers, charlatans, and other mime “heroes;” many traces of this genre can be found in Athenaeus. Strictly speaking Socrates too is given only a mimological biography; true, it is crossed with philosophy-ethics. In Socrates one can see particularly well that is δείκηλον τῶν παθῶν—“representation of passions.” On one hand, these are folk presentations in which the main character makes a fool of somebody (as in later puppet or
street theater); on the other hand, it is the mysterial portrayal of passions and suffering. By the 4th century BC both mimes take the form of a story “about” a real person, in the Hellenistic age—about a literary character. Thus the Greek novel became a “dramatic story,” called both “drama” and “dramaticon;” it was a “story about what the hero suffered and accomplished.” This “high” cult novel was long accompanied by a hubristic novel. From the 1st century BC with the “Milesian Fables” the hubristic novel was composed in the form of separate narrations connected by a”frame;” this is shown by many analogies which have survived to our day. Mime is recognizable here in the general ethological coloring: only the base and the low are brought out. The frame too derived from mime; usually it consisted of a single static motif in which, like in the belly of the Trojan horse, a whole series of stories was enclosed. As early as Plato’s Symposium the frame is a separate “scene,” not just one motif; this scene, deprived of action, performed the function of opening and denouement of the static theme—praise in honor of Eros. In the later so-called novel the structure is rethought conceptually. Though as before the connected sequential plot remains foreign to Classical thought, it substitutes for it a cause-and-effect frame and turns the scenes into episodes. This is also the way the hubristic novel composes narration. I mean not only the Cynic Satyricon of Petronius, but also “Lucius or the Ass” ascribed to Lucian. The connection of this “novel” to Plautus’ “mime about the ass” (Asinaria) I think is beyond doubt. The point is not the plot itself, but its mysterial-farcical nature. In fact this mysterial aspect is expressed alongside the Cynical in Apuleius; only the cynical-farcical side is shown in Lucius. The name Lucian draws with it all ethologico-aretalogical and cognitive motifs as if he were really a character in his genre.

But aside from philosophical mime, there was also the everyday mime. It passed by Plato—Menippus—Lucian, through Sophron to Theocritus and Herodas. Although both writers lived in the same 3rd century BC, the difference between them is so great that one ceases to believe in chronology. But the difference between Herodas and Theocritus is like that between Lucian and Plato. Herodas takes a long stabilized tradition from a specific genre, whose model—Sophron—we have practically lost. And Theocritus preserves valuable connections with all the riches of folk and literary traditions; this valuable material is even more significant, because Theocritus is both an archaizer and a stylizer. Theocritus has two types of scene-dialogues—country and city dialogues. Bucolic derives from the Sicilian tradition through Stesichorus, singer of the passions of the shepherd Daphnis, the local god of dying and resurrected nature. According to the ancient scholars, the model for Theocritus’ city dialogues and scenes was Sophron. Most interesting for us is the connection between mime and lyric and drama in Theocritus. In my work on Sappho, I showed in detail the Theocritan renaissance in ancient Greek lyric. Such idylls as “Helen,” “The Lover,” “Conversation,” “Achilles’ Epithalamium” resurrected the most archaic features of lyrical topoi, in particular the agrarian nature of all its assumptions (personified nature with its fertility—“love,” matriarchal male characters, etc.). In “Helen” I tried to show Sappho from myth. But what in Sappho’s songs one has to pick out as separate threads is presented by Theocritus
in “Helen” as a whole fabric; his epithalamia, which are an excellent analogy to Sappho’s, show directly without any reconstruction that behind the wedding he understood the “sacred marriage” of the gods, i.e. personified nature. The tragic love of Daphnis and shepherds like him belongs to this circle of images, along the line of Adonis motifs; the characters of bucolic are Thyrsis, Battus, Corydon, Menalca—is agrarian—shepherd variants of Daphnis. The ancient world itself spoke of the mysterious character of bucolic characters and bucolic, which were connected with the cult of animal-vegetable Artemis.

If we examine the circle of themes and characters in Theocritus’ idylls, it will become clear that the motifs do not go beyond the bounds of one and the same theme, broad as it may be in form. These are variations on the passion of Daphnis conceived sentimentally and rationalistically from a typically Hellenistic point of view. The bearer of such passions is a bucolic; the passion of such an “idyllic” shepherd can be unhappy or sometimes happy. Rationalization of myth, brought on by its conceptual perception, creates a descent of characters from Aphrodite and Adonis (in the ecphrasis of idyll 15), through the marrying Helen, Achilles, and Daiedamia to earthly shepherds and shepherdesses. The city theme appears rarely in Theocritus. If everyday mime can be felt in “Adoniazusai,” its role is no more than in any “frame”; in the center of this idyll is the death of Aphrodite’s beloved. We do not know what Sophron’s mime “Women who Took the Moon” was like, but in Theocritus’ second idyll the basic theme is not magic, but unhappy love. A special branch of “serenades” also speaks of Cyclops’ unrequited love. The irrefutable relation of Theocritus’ idyll to lyric is seen not so much in the love theme itself as in its tragic treatment. We do not know where this constant sad motif comes from in “joyful Greek lyric.” Love is the conceptual form of mythological creative force; unsuccessful love is the conceptual reworking of fertility-death, incarnated in Adonis and Daphnises.

Not only the thematics, not only the characters are agrarian in Theocritus, coming into contact with agrarian cults and agrarian mysteries. Peculiar to Theocritus is the agrarian setting of his idylls. While Plato’s settings are simply “landscape” or a table, while in Lucian they have various settings from the underworld to “nowhere”, Theocritus’ scenes for the most part take place in vegetable nature, in field and grove. Where the character is Cyclops, the location reminds us of satyricon. The pictures of harvest and agricultural festivals unfold right in the fields.

Theocritus’ scenes have their own peculiar structure, the agon. Two characters compete in singing, while a third judges them and gives a prize. Some agoners take the form of regularly alternating dialogue of a line or less—stichomythia. There is also the structure of “komos”—a monologue at the window or door of the beloved with complaints about love denied and threats customary in such love laments.

In Theocritus’ idylls one can see a number of elements characteristic of drama: agon, dialogue-stichomythia, komos, traits of satyricon, the central motif of Eros. This leads to comparison with palliata and with Plato’s Symposium. In palliata Eros is always happy; its heroes are the incarnation of eros in vegetable metaphors, in the form of the hero Blooming and the heroine Spring in their various modifications, which associates them with the heroes and heroines of folk lyric—Erinna, Kalyke, Eriphonis, Menalca—is agrarian—shepherd variants of Daphnis, Daphnis, and many others. Nevertheless, while kômos plays an important part in palliata, the traces of satyricon in it are effaced. In the foreground of the Symposium one finds
Eros and traits of satyricon and kômos. The lament at the closed door is very characteristic. It is mysterial, marking the transition from death to the light of rebirth; it can be found in lyric, and in palliata (rarely in Old Comedy), and in bucolic idyll. Beneath it lies *epopteia*, mime with a visual act at a closed and opened door.

When I speak of elements of satyricon in idyll, I mean not only caves, mountains, and nymphs, but also satyr-like characters. When the shepherd has the name Tityros (Doric “goat”), i.e. Satyr, one need not doubt that this and others of Theocritus’ “shepherds” represent the conceptual form of mythological “satyrs.” Love and song, playing the shepherd’s pipe, this is what roughly defines the satyrs in one or two features. All these idyll shepherds love and sing; that’s about all one can say about them. Myth makes “poetesses” of the incarnations of Spring, “singers” and “poets” of the beloved-flowers. Perhaps the whole bucolic genre was thought of by image thought as the creation of Daphnis, as epos was as a creation of Orpheus, Mouseios, or the Muses themselves. In the Classical period every genre has its “inventor;” in him is incarnated the given genre, and the contents of the genre and the biography of the “inventor” coincide. Hence the feature of which I will speak: every lyric poet put on the imaginary mask of a character of the very genre he was working in. Apparently putting on the mask of a literary character played in drama was a much later phenomenon. It was preceded by the standard role of the living participant in ritual or the imagined hero of myth, as we will see in lyric and Old Comedy. This explains another peculiarity: ancient authors usually worked in only one genre, the varied forms of which did not exceed certain semantic bounds. Even Theocritus (even Lucian!) remains faithful to this tradition. On a certain level he is himself Daphnis, but a conceptual Daphnis. Thus while declaring his love to a boy he uses the usual bucolic cliches, and when he tells about punishing cruel lovers he speaks as if for himself.

In the context of the bucolic scene and stylized cult song, several of Theocritus’ city scenes stand out. His idyll 2 shows the internal connections which unite eros lyric with eros novel, or rather shows the way through “lyric” mimetic song (mimodia) to conceptual dramaticon, i.e. narrative “drama”. In my work on Sappho I presented the idea that every ancient lyric song is woven into the fabric of a certain lyric ritual preserved in the form of a certain kind of performance, dress, timing, etc. By mimodia, mimology, and mime I do not mean, as Reich does, concrete forms of song or prose of folk “realistic” theater as opposed to the “idealism” of high Greek art. *Mimodia* as sung mime and mimology as a genre of mime are acceptable terms, but by mime we must understand not the concrete genre like Roman pantomime, but the ancient spectacle presentation, which remained in preliterary form in low theater, in balagan. As to “realism” and “idealism,” it was precisely in low theater that the sources of later dramatic theories of “purification” and “illusion” were found. Above I have said enough of the fact that *mîmos* “mime” is inseparable from *mîmēma* “likeness,” *mîmēsîs* “imitation” in the sense of “copy,” “make a likeness, portray the object from the outside.” In this general sense “mime” meant “imitative action,” by its very nature “illusional,” a visual deception; its catharsis was also associated with light, with vision, pre-ethical, pre-idealistic, and prerealist.
Thus Theocritus’ second idyll is lower than lyric or novel. Daphnis is not in it; Delphis is. What a transparent name! Delphic Apollo could substitute for himself, easily changing into Apollo Daphnis, “laurel.” I mean that Delphis is not different from Daphnis. This idyll differs from the usual bucolics in that it is completely transformed conceptually. Here Daphnis differs from Delphic roughly as dramaticon about Daphnis (Longus’ “Laurel and Green” (“Daphnis and Chlöe”)) differs from any later “novel” with plant-heroes. The moon, heroine of Sappho’s erotic songs, has turned into the goddess of love charms, Selena, and separated itself from the woman-heroine, who resorts to a love charm with a prayer to the moon, Selena. The sorceress-moon has become an earthly woman-sorceress. Eros, who in idyll becomes an earthly youth who falls in love with women, at the same time takes on the parallel form of the motif itself of the passion of love. The dramatic scene becomes a flowing story; only two “acts” remain, forming the base of the two parts of the idyll, the act of magic and the act of the lovers’ meeting on the bed of love. One of these acts, which were once independent and short, becomes the causal introduction to the other.

The scene of the lovers’ meeting, which lays the foundation for the future dramaticon, even compositionally contains in its central part a direct speech story. In the middle of this “Ich-erzählung” there is a small “kômos”: Delphic lies to the heroine that he was going to crown himself with white poplar and come to her with three or four friends, bringing with him “the apples of Dionysus,” and if he had not been received and there was a lock on the door he would have “given himself to the axe and the torch.” This typical “serenade” takes in Theocritus the form of a deception—a purely conceptual form in which he clothes the traditional image topos, which has lost here both its literal meaning and any compositional sense. Nevertheless, the presence of a “door lament” in this erotic idyll returns us to the other kômoi of Theocritus. This type of mimodia, like narration, traveled the path from “episode” in a work of another genre to an independent separate genre of lyric.

The Dionysian character of both palliata and the Symposium, with its marked—already spiritual—Bacchism is echoed in the kômos of the 2nd idyll: Dionysus’ apple—the “apple of eros” well known in Greek life, a white poplar with its branches—is a Bacchic attribute. But both of them are both mystical and dramatic divinities. The prayer before the “closed” door ends with “opening”—or with death on the threshold; through the open door shining beauty is “seen,” or its variant—Eros with his creation of new life. Palliata shows both. Diotima, only the latter. But her mystery of Eros in the Symposium is completely analogous to the balagan form of the double silenus, ugly in closed form, shining with beauty when open; true, before the doors of the silenus there are no suppliants...The kômoi and the comasts in the Symposium are the third form of Dionysian, an everyday cult form; it is full of Eros contents.

The conceptual-philosophical conception of Plato, which sprang from the ancient images, still had to be expressed by means of those images in the 4th century BC. Theocritus, in spite of using poetic texture, is much more “prosaic” than Plato. His images have become a literary tradition, and he perceives them conceptually. He turns the ancient connection between kômos and eros into a typical city lovers’ meeting, during which a cultured youth makes up a “serenade” story of his imaginary love for the girl who is in love with him. This pol-ished youth can no longer be recognized as Eros, and...
the languorous but clever girl can no longer be recognized as the goddess of fertility, of night charms, and of death (“suffering”), Selena herself. Theocritus’ character “burns” in the metaphorical sense, conceptually, “burning with passion,” “heating up,” and even “melting”; the hero speaks of the “fire” of passion abstractly too, though too insistently; at last Cypris saves this hero “from the fire” (of love), and Eros “often lights (in him) a fire more flaming than that of Hephaestus Liparos (“shining”). Eros’ torch can be felt in these ancient images; it is no accident that the hero threatens in the “kômos” to kill himself with a torch. In dramaticon the heroes who bear Eros begin to “die in fire” in the literal sense. But what function does this central image perform in Theocritus? Here it is only a metaphor. In spite of his constant reference to myth and mythological image, the Hellenist makes myth a simple requirement of style, without realizing that this very requirement results from the inability to create something new that would go beyond the bounds of the ancient form.

Conceptual thought, after all, had only recently broken with the image; but, separated from the image, it became unstable. Concept still uses the image, but externally, as an external support, without which it cannot stand on its own. Myth in Theocritus is an indispensable element of narration—a narrative topic. And mythological image in Theocritus is pure metaphor, conceptual in essence, but still using the old external form. The literary significance of such metaphors is still arbitrary: they help neither to reveal nor to deepen the images, they can be multiplied or reduced without harming the story. Their function is ornamental, which is in line with the aesthetics of the Hellenes. Apparently this was the logical stage in the history of conceptual thought which broke with the mythological-concrete contents of the image and began to perceive the image outside of its former contents only in its constructive function. Formal logic with its abstraction emptied myth and “rationalized,” i.e., turned images into concepts. The result was a “secular” narrative and a number of metaphors. Tradition, however, forces myth to be preserved in untouched form, and this form is none other than yesterday’s content. Theocritus marks the stage at which concepts still could not oppose anything more perfect than stylization to the mythological image—a strict preservation of only the formal side of the same image. The mythological image no longer played a constructive internal role in the concept.

I have already mentioned that the “Adoniazusai” contain a mysterious element. It would be more correct to say that the idyll 15 consists of two “acts” like idyll 2.

The first part of idyll 15 is an everyday scene. It is peculiar, however, in that it shows “movement,” leading its heroines into the street, into the crowd, into the crush, to the Ptolemaic palace. By breaking up static space—setting—and time (three different moments), Theocritus solves the problem of narrative mime in a new “Hellenistic” way.

The everyday scene is much older than Theocritus, Herodas, and even Sophron himself. Thus Pherecrates, who represents prearistophanic comedy, already had a play which tells of how the heroine visits a friend, the innkeeper Glyke, who serves her. Such a scene reminds us very much of Herodas, particularly his first choliambus, but of the beginning of the “Adoniazusai” as well. I do not know about the predecessors of Hellenistic mime, but in Theocritus and Herodas there is a certain topos
of mistresses swearing at their clumsy slave-girls, threats of punishment, or pictures of punishment of male and female slaves. Everyday mime is strongly colored with hubris. The characters are deprived of all nobility, and its emotions are transient and base; Theocritus’ “ladies” are much baser than his shepherds and shepherdesses. As far as Herodas is concerned, the interiors he shows of houses, courts, schools, or shops are full of social-moral stench.

It is clear that behind the reflection of reality here there lies a certain genre tradition. Really, why should it be that in some scenes the slaves are shown utopially, while in others they are like animals? Only because for one and the same social phenomenon there were two lines of representation—high and low.

Everyday mime took the hubristic track, from balagan and comedy, from iamb and choliambus, to Aristides, Lucius, and Lucian. Where farce showed itself mystery was hidden; where mystery came to the foreground farce was hidden.

In Theocritus’ second idyll cult act precedes the everyday. In the 15th vice versa.

The second part of the “Adoniazusai” depicts the cult lament by Aphrodite of her dead beloved Adonis. This is a cult drama, but Adonis is a drawing in fabric, Aphrodite, an actress. No one takes the disguised singer for the goddess and the portrait for the god. But everyone knows that the singer and the drawing represent gods. Imaginal mime has become conceptual drama.

Of interest in this part is the mysterial ecphrasis of the woven “picture” with Adonis reclining on a luxurious couch. Its visionary—I mean visual—character is felt in the descriptive exclamation of the Syracusan woman. Adonis lies “as if” alive. Praxinoa describes him as follows: “Mistress of Athens! What weavers have woven him! What artists have so carefully painted the drawing! He stands as if real and breathes as if real! Alive, not woven!” This is a visual spectacle. It imitates the truth. Such a weaving with a portrait drawn on is a marvel, and a spectacle (we must remember that the oldest ecphrases in the Iliad and the Odyssey pertain to woven pictures). I have no doubt that deep beneath Hellenistic cult drama lay the mysterial “showing” of the passion of Adonis—. I have no doubt because Herodotus tells about the mysteries of such a god, Osiris, and calls the mysterial representation of his death . I will not attempt to determine which of the two prenarrative forms is more ancient—that in action or that in things, but both at any rate were based on “showing,” on the “visual.” And Praxinoa actually adds, “He (Adonis) lies on a silver couch as if seen” ( ). I would compare this passage with the Roman ritual of “putting out” the dead “for show.” The one who has died is “seen” and called out, and thereby is returned to “light,” i.e. to life. Adonis lies , as if seen by the eyes. This quality of “putting out for show,” visuality, epideicticity of the dead god emphasizes the mystery of death and coming to life of the nature divinity. Beholding and viewing are as much a part of spectacle as of mystery and cult.

But here in the 15th idyll we encounter a “spectacle of death” rather than a “spectacle of beauty;” just such pictures of death are found in tragedy, but not in comedy.

In Plato, Lucian, Herodas, and Theocritus in the middle of the scenes one finds narrations which seem to diverge from the plot, but which are in fact the most ancient plot base of the scenes. The same is true here. The singer describes what birds and plants, what valuable things and tasty dishes await Adonis’ awakening. In other words, all nature
awaits him, but all the art of cooking as well. Eroses fly around. Eagles of ebony, of gold and ivory bear Zeus his young wine-pourer. Here are green bowers and two beds, of Cypris and Adonis, where the union of the lovers will take place. And tomorrow at dawn, the singer sings, the women will carry Adonis to the sea in deep mourning and sing of his passions, which precede—and this is my addition, his joyful return to life: we have a δείκηλον τῶν παθεῶν.

Every image in this narrative song leads us to Sapphic motifs and almost coincides with a number of their fragments: feasts of the gods, eroses, divine wine-servers, birds, sacred gardens and groves,—and in the middle Aphrodite celebrating her sacred marriage [hieros gamos] to Adonis—all of this is the sphere of archaic lyric, and it is no accident it is sung by a “woman,” the cult Sappho.

Feasts of the gods, Eros and eroses… Eros was conceived at such a “feast:” there is a narration of this in the Symposium, which is dedicated to Eros. Why does Eros bring with him motifs of feasts, gardens, wine, kômoi? Because beneath the conceptual “gardens,” “feasts,” “serenade,” “drunken procession” lies the image of the mythological eros of vegetation, of the grapevine, and of everything that surrounds Adonis in his pre-causal and non-generalized form as an immediate concrete given. Because, in other words, the Platonic concepts or the concepts of the second idyll are a new cognitive form of the same mythical images that are read by Plato or Theocritus in categories of causal connections and generalizations. In the descriptions of cult scenes Theocritus renounces conceptual perception and preserves the image with great precision. But in novelism he liberates himself from repeating the original sources because this process takes place naturally for him. It does not occur to him that the meeting and bed of Simaetha and Delphis is a repetition of the bed of Aphrodite and Adonis: the difference between these two scenes is the same as the difference between concept and image. Losing its original meaning, the eros of Adonis turned into the motif of love and his resurrection into a lover’s rendezvous. The gods, losing their cult contents, became a handsome youth and a maiden. I have not put it precisely enough. I should have put it thus: conceptual thought, when it comes into contact with the ancient image, begins to perceive it logically, i.e. causally, abstractly, and generally, and then the image of Aphrodite changes by itself into the concept of a beautiful woman burning with passion who unites with her lover on a real bed. The gods lost their cult contents, the bed became real, the young pair became citizens. We are accustomed to saying that in the Hellenistic age religion became weaker. Of course, one should put it differently: it was logical for religion to become weaker, since the conceptual perception of religion had to lead to the “secularization” of images and generalization that inevitably led to realism [bytovizm], this first form of unique-concrete abstraction. If scholarship has accepted that the mythic image was for its time the only possible form of assimilating myth, then we must say that in the first class society, concept was the only possible form of the mythic image. But I will be asked, where did I get the idea that the meeting of Simaetha and Delphis is the conceptual transformation of the meeting of Aphrodite and Adonis rather than a “realistic sketch”? I will answer as I always have. Everyday reality is perceived the same way and in the same conceptual categories as the old ideological heritage. It began to appear in art—it, and not religion—because this very “everyday reality” was the result of a new understanding of reality, and not something independent of consciousness. Classical “everyday life” in art is a conventional transitional category which corresponds to a certain insignificant and
superficial, narrowly conceived part of the surrounding world. It was the conceptual form of the ancient illusory tradition (on the one hand) of the conceptual reinterpretation of myth, image, religion, and on the other hand—the perception of reality from the point of view of generalized concreteness. Therefore it makes no difference whether the author took his material from reality or from tradition—the two coincided. The Greeks’ developing “everyday reality” cannot be identified with some Flemish everyday reality translated long ago from reality to illusory reflection. The Greeks were still only forming the concept of everyday reality. To put it paradoxically, everyday reality first appeared in Greece.

12

Visuality is as much a part of spectacle as it is of mystery and cult. True, but we must also add ecphrasis. In the picture of Adonis lying on a silver bed the conjunction has a double ecphrastic meaning—both comparative and demonstrative (deictic). Adonis is as if alive, as if breathing rather than woven and drawn; he seems to stand before our eyes. Yet he is after all woven and drawn. He is dead and does not breathe; he is lying, not standing.

Ecphrasis portrays the dead “as if” alive; its reality is seeming, and it is no more than a “marvel,” i.e. a phantom. The visionary character is the same in ecphrasis and mystery, but they differ in semantic content. The mystical vision is not a phantom. The mystery, from the point of view of faith, really makes the dead person alive. The essence of every mystery consists in the fact that it is secret. The Classical world knew only one secret—the secret of death, which “invisibly” turned into life. Death was incarnated in god and the dead, but any living initiate, myst, could become a dead man by mysteriously dying and being resurrected. In later state religion mysteries were separated into a closed system, but in essence their elements were always present in pre-cult and cult ceremonies. What lies at the base of the “Adoniasai” was parodied later by Old Comedy. The Baptae of Eupolis and Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae show the hubristic aspect of the women who conduct the mysteries of the goddess of fertility. But these Old Comedies had in mind the ancient cult forms as well; the matriarchal man is subjected to such mockery as we meet again only in palliata or in Petronius’ novel. The women who celebrate the Adonia are already modernized by Theocritus’ consciousness, and in the two men who meet two women in the crowd we can no longer recognize our old male characters. And these women are not celebrating the Adonia at all. They are only “watching.” They are the “spectators” of the Adonia, like the characters of palliata who spy through open doors or cracks at tableaux vivants. It is in this sense that Adonis lies “as if on view,” “like one shown.”

This spectacle, epideictic form of Adonia makes them less mystery than popular, if pre-cult mime, at the base of which lies “showing” and “marvel.” The first, realistic part suits the second, illusionary just as in palliata, where the balagan base brings with it both of these elements. Sophron had the same kind of mime about the women who celebrated the Isthmia (the manuscripts have “celebrated,” but Walkenauer thought that a letter had been lost and corrected θεμένων to θεωμένων, which means “watching,” i.e. according to Walkenauer they were those who “watched the Isthmia.” A later
grammarian who described the contents of the “Adoniazusai” traced this idyll to the “Isthmiazusai” of Sophron.

I also think that Sophron depicted the “viewers” of the Isthmia. But what is important is the existence of a certain cycle of dramatic scenes in which the characters were women performing a cult ritual. Contrary to our expectations, the exposition in such scenes was comic and (everyday) realistic. This alone shows that cult was paro-died in cult. Marvel and of the passions of a divinity turned into mirage, spectacle, and “showing” (show).

The illusion which lay at the root of mime eventually gave rise to various forms. A predominant role was played by “visuality,” which in turn led to a special mimological ecphrasis.

In Herodas, who was true to the iambic-Sophronic tradition, mime continues to be a narrative scene. His characters for the most part are women. The language of his mimes, written in the meter of Hipponax, is not colloquial but archaic; the dialect is Ionic. Herodas is very different from Theocritus in the hubrism of his mimes. This so called “everyday reality” is very specific. The heroes are morally dirty, the thematics base. Dens of iniquity, base instincts, cynical habits, and undisguised moral shamelessness are presented by Herodas as “everyday reality.” But even here, amidst all this cynicism, the 4th mime is on a “high” theme. It gives a developed ecphrasis: women are watching initiations in the temple of Asclepius, describing them in their exclamations. The basic impression of the women, the basic motif of the whole scene is the lifelikeness of sculpture. It seems to the women that if the girl looking at the apple does not get it immediately, she will die; it seems to them that the goose is about to make noise; it seems that the statue of Batala is alive, the body of the youth warm, the bull may attack, the people are natural. The purely cult beginning and end of the dialogue should also be pointed out. It is in the temple, among sacrifices that the women “watch” the cult “marvel.” The epideictic character of such a scene is indisputable. Sophron’s “Isthmiazusai” and Theocritus’ “Adoniazusai” show that Herodas’ 4th mime belongs to the same cult-spectacle cycle as these mimes. But Epicharmus too had a scene “Phaiora” (viewers, worshippers, sacred messengers) in which these characters also “watched” the Delphic sacrificial gifts and spoke of each separately. We may assume that “contemplation” of the shining “vision” was at the center of mysterial acts. I have already discussed the shining divinity inside the silenus, the shining panorama of the rayok and the tableaux vivants of palliata, mysterial doors, which opened to reveal divine beauty. I would say that the circle of spectacle-epideictic images had two standard forms. One of them is the motif of attempting to open closed doors; they prayed for the door to open; the positive case was followed by “contemplation” of beauty; the negative by a spectacle of death. The other, later form is contemplation, watching beauty or death from the side.

Evidently mime recreated both of these forms in dialogic-dramatic form. This is shown by the mimes of Sophron, Theocritus, and Herodas, and by the scenes of Epicharmus.

But I would also like to point out a third variant of mime which communicates the image of “seeming,” “phantom,” and “marvel”—dream visions. In Herodas the form of such a “dream” is monologue, as if part of a dialogue; first comes the topos of everyday realistic mime—the coarse awakening of slaves, in the middle—narration, at the end—an autobiographical reference. The dream itself is a kind of “vision” which is set in a holy
place, with a god playing the role of arbiter. Later such a “Dream Vision” appears again in Lucian, and again it is autobiographical; here the monologue of mime has turned into a personal story.

In Theocritus’ and Herodas’ mimes there is no action; they fix one short theme and one or two short moments of time. In place of the missing background they present a space moved close; in place of a story, the immediate recreation of a conversation between two or less often three characters.

The visual character of mime is reconstructed even in such late refined literary mimes as those of the Hellenistic period. Behind some lies pure illusion, behind others visual deception (trick). But both show the epideictic character of mime. When man could not narrate, the only form of portrayal was the direct showing of a concrete object. Exposition, deprived of background, was presented on the flat frontmost piece of space, behind which there was a wall (scena, proscenium). Human thought could not gain mastery over the object depicted; it helplessly made it into a panorama, first in the form of a living, speaking picture, then in the form of a drawing. What is mime, scene, idyll? They are living, talking pictures, or pictures that show and are shown.

Conceptual thought makes the concrete object, the panorama into a logical object of depiction. Later it “stretches” and extends time and space, creating a background for both, i.e. a prerequisite for the appearance of such concepts as “event” as something that “happens” as a process in time and in dimensional space. Then it distributes events in a certain causal order, linking them as cause and effect, purpose, and condition. Thus showing becomes story.

Later the process of conceptual mediation begins. Not only does the object of showing become the theme of story, but also the very way the concrete object was shown—the form in which the spectacle took place—becomes the theme of story, the characters that were shown, etc. All mime as a whole became the basis for conceptual “plot” of late Classical drama. In the Hellenistic age drama is replaced by conceptual literary forms of depiction, first and foremost of narration. Only in Rome will the new tragedy appear—literary, conceptual, it will break with the old ethico-religious tragedy. In the 3rd century of Hellenism narration is built on mime as a dramatic form; now mime is neither picture nor drama, but a form of story. In Herodas’ mimiambs and Theocritus’ idylls the plot is not the plot of mime, it is mime as a whole, perceived and recreated conceptually. Mime itself begins to become the object of indirect transmission, and through mime, “by means of” mime narration appears. The deeper conceptual thought goes, the more it is mediated and the farther it moves from object concreteness. Complex conceptual thought derives every concrete fact from a generalized-intellectual fact, making it in its turn intellectual material “by means” of which abstraction can become even deeper. Hellenistic rationalization lays the foundation for the processes of mediation. This too it still does concretely, beginning to create the narrative fabric by depriving mime of its scenic form and lending it the character of narrative “moment” that has both behind and after it a series of events endowed with causal connections and unfolding in time and space. By novelizing the dramatic form, Theocritus’ and Herodas’ thought lays the foundation for the “prozaicization” of drama (though still in verse) that two centuries later will lead to drama in prose, to the so called dramaticon, i.e. to the “Greek novel” which represents a prosaic synthesis of eros drama and eros lyric from Sappho to Theocritus.

24 May 1951
5
Excursus on Philosophy

1

Concept as a form of the image was formed at the same time in Classical literature and Classical philosophy. Between these two domains, however, there was a radical difference. Art sprang from mimesis, philosophy, from contemplation—from “mental viewing.” The universe created by art was “as if” a second cosmos, formed materially of rhythm, word, marble, bronze, stone or wood. But the world comprehended by speculation turned into theory.

There was no philosophy in the modern sense in Greece until formal logic became stabilized, and this happened after the downfall of Classical Greece, in the age of Hellenism. Greek science, though created by theoretical thought, is not yet an abstract discipline, not speculation; it is basically a conceptual mythologem at root. This is why links with tradition can be found in the figures of theurges and in the fact that the philosophers cultivate the genre of mime, and in the philosophizing slave of palliata, and in the philosophical and mysterial parody of Old Comedy.

The relationship between image and concept determined Classical philosophy, meanwhile. Its entire Classical period is founded on genres coinciding with poetry and poetic genres. Furthermore, it is balanced in essence with mime and comedy. Epic, lyric, and drama are so close to philosophy that distinction between the genres can sometimes be achieved only artificially. At first they are parallel. But the more abstract concept becomes, the more theoretical thought is separated from artistic.

Cosmogony still belongs equally to both ideologies. Here we have pure epic and the first explanations of the creation of the world. This is the realm of the mythological image.

Under the influence of the first concepts poems and gnomes (aphorisms) appear which go back to “popular philosophy,” i.e. cosmogonic and eschatological folklore, divination, theogony, sayings and “folk wisdom.” Concept, which is still far from being born, has to be built on the image and speak through the image. It cannot yet make logical arguments. Because of its dependence on concrete representations the concept still has no ethical or gnoseological purpose. The only forms of ancient philosophy are cosmology and ontology. In them the concepts which are being born ask questions about the origins of worlds, about “being” and the first elements. In these archaic philosophical pre-Attic systems one can already see clearly the change in the function of the image. Now we no longer feel the metaphorical nature of “the truth of existence” or “nonexistence as a phantom of existence,” but the appearance of this idea is as much a result of the appearance of concepts as is the whole illusory side of metaphor.

The philosophers of Miletus and Elea already seem to us the founders of finished “professional” systems of thought. This is true insofar as they have behind them a long history of the formation of anonymous philosophical thought. But on the other hand these early philosophers are themselves still very archaic. The spirit of antiquity is still very strong in Parmenides; at least the concepts he works out still look like mythological
images. Thus he presents his system in the form of a verse poem; according to its plot, Parmenides ascends in a chariot to the goddess Dike (*i.e.* to the truth), to the governor and gatekeeper of the world, who “opens” [reveals] to him the teaching of “truth” and “doxa” (that which appears or seems). However, these same images, exactly the mythological images of ascent to a heavenly mountain, of the heavenly gatekeeper Dike (whose role is transferred three centuries later in Plato to Diotima, and still later, in the Stoics, to Wisdom), images of revelation, in which the philosophical system is cast, and of the teaching itself of “seeming,” and “authentic”—these very mythological images are used by Parmenides to construct abstract concepts, and he thinks in them through mythological images. For him the two worlds are already defined, the object of cognition is separated from cognition, “truth” and “doxa” are generalized. But he still does not use all the means of conceptual thought. Within this very teaching of the authenticity of the “other world” and the illusion of “this world” which has as its intellectual content abstract concepts, there are still many traditional ideas which have their origins in mythology and have a mythological form. These very ascents to heaven or descents into the underworld are parodied in popular comedy; it was not the intention of the authors of the comedies themselves, but ancient comedy is a parody of just such folk, pre-Parmenides cosmogonies; the genre is the “double” of philosophy. As a prophetic and visionary genre Classical popular philosophy is inseparable from popular (folk) comedy. In both cases the first subject is revelations-prophecies and prophets. In comedy they are pseudo-messiahs. In philosophy they are mythic Dikes or Phlias or illusory Diotimas or Sibyls, or real Parmenideses, Empedocleses, Heraclituses. This affects both the self-perception of the oldest philosophers and the systems they constructed. Parmenides, like the singers of epic and lyric, did not feel his own authorship. We do not see Parmenides. The whole poem is ascribed to divine revelation. Parmenides is still passive, while Dike is active. Parmenides only listens and remembers.

In spite of the clearly expressed apodeictic nature of Heraclitus’ and Empedocles’ presentations, both are earthly forms of the divinities they represent. Empedocles experiences himself directly as an incarnation of a god. Like Parmenides, he has heard his cosmology from a god. The “divinity” of philosophers, which becomes more and more conceptual with time, eventually takes on figurative meaning (“the divine Plato”).

Both the Milesian and the Eleatic schools represent the world as dual. It is characteristic that they begin precisely from the problem of the basic features of the structure of the world and the origins of the Universe: what theogonic folklore presented in the form of mythological images the Milesians and Eleatics translated into the language of the appearing concepts. The duality of “external form” and “essence,” phantom and authenticity lived as parody in comedy. In early Greek philosophy this ability of phantom to take on the “external form” of the authentic turned into “non-being” and “seeming” identified with the real world. “Being” on the other hand was cleansed of real features. It began to be understood as something passive lying outside reality, a non-real “eternal;” while “non-being” or “seeming” was understood as the moving, varied everyday real “phenomenon” (*i.e.* what is shown, what appears externally).
In epic “pictoriality” the perception of time was absent; in philosophy it already plays an important role, but with a negative value.¹ Time as the concrete increase or decrease of separate phenomena is attributed to inconstancy and acts as its sign. Time and space, liberated from their former “object-ness,” closure and delimitation, are understood by philosophy in the form of the variety of phenomena. And both time and space come unstuck and go beyond the bounds of their former physicality and begin to take on a new abstract function: the variety of phenomena, the changeability of phenomena, the beginnings of appearance, enlargement and reduction, the ends of death still expressed in mythological form are in fact understood causally, as a product of time and space.

Thus “phenomenon” is a category of everyday reality opposed (even inimical) to “being”. In Greek “phenomenon” is τὸ φαινόμενον, i.e. “shining,” “appearing” in the visual sense, “showing itself.” It is the same term Homer used to describe the “appearance” of light or luminaries or a god that suddenly “showed themselves” from out of the darkness of clouds or fog, the term for a “vision” unexpectedly “revealed” to view.² Like all Classical concepts, the word is metaphorical; in its meaning as concept, as a philosophical concept, it communicates the mythological image of “shining” in the sense of something passing, temporary, endowed only with “temporality” and “seeming,” therefore unstable. “Phenomenon” is thought of in time and in space as an opposition to “being,” which does not appear and disappear, does not occupy space. I will not dwell here at length on the role of the “phenomenon”—τὸ φαινόμενον in comedy; I will only say that there it is the visual mirages, the miraculous vision, the “tableaux vivants”, the shining, gleaming “spectacles” seen by the audience. In astronomy τὸ φαινόμενον means “the stars” (“shining”), but it is not hard to see their semantic link to “visions” in the sense of “apparitions” and visions, and transparent “seeming” objects or events.³

Being (τὸ ὄν) and non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν), though contrasted, are attached to one another by the negation that makes nonbeing “nonbeing being”. In Russian it does not work; but in Greek “nonbeing” has no term of its own and is designated as “being”, but with the negative particle and the article (τὸ μὴ ὄν). This connection between nonbeing and being paved the way for the peculiar Greek monism, which never attained a complete division of the two worlds, but never eliminated their opposition.

Non-being imitates, copies being without having its essence. But they are gnoseologically different as well. Being is identified with speculation, non-being with sensation. But speculation is metaphorical. “Reason” itself is thought of concretely, as a divine “first principle,” as a “cause” and “first cause” in flesh, in material—hyloistically. Mental understanding is thus an act by which material reason concretely enters into concrete “elements” of a subject. Of course such thinking in concrete images was necessary as the only possible form for the appearance of abstraction. What was important was the new function of the images, the desire to give the contents of the former images an abstract sense.

The features (attributions) which described both worlds grew out of the semantic variants of the former mythological images of “essence” and “appearance.” Empedocles says that everything is made of elements, like a picture of paints; but what is important is the combination—which paint (element) is there more of, which less. And as in painting,
trees, people, animals, birds, fish, and gods have a “similar appearance” \((\epsilon \iota \delta \epsilon \alpha \ \alpha \lambda \iota \gamma \kappa \alpha \iota)\), i.e. they are an image made like reality, so the real world is a result of a certain mixture of elements. For Empedocles the external “visible” world subject to the decomposition and combination of elements is the same as a picture created entirely by paints—an “image” “similar in appearance” to the real. It is easy to see why the theory of art is later worked out in philosophy (imitation, illusion, catharsis, etc): philosophical thought and artistic thought had a common gnoseological base.

In Greek philosophy “appearance” is also characterized as visual. Non-being is “seen” \((\tau \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron)\), “appearing” \((\tau \omicron \ \phi \alpha \iota \nu \omicron \omicron \mu \omicron \nu \omicron)\), “sensed” (affective—\(\tau \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron \ \omicron\)), “limited” or “bounded” \((\pi \epsilon \rho \alpha \zeta)\). “Essence” is defined by the opposite of these features: it is invisible, eternal, speculative, unbounded.

The opposition of the features shows both where they came from and their nature. They appear from the heart of the same bifurcation and opposition that were characteristic of mythological image in its transition to concept. Thought did not go beyond dichotomy and antithesis. Non-being is given a series of features, each of which splits and becomes an antithesis, like warmth-cold, thinness-thickness, etc. Behind these conceptual features lie the mythological images of winter-summer, heaven-underworld, warmth-cold, etc. Even in conceptual form they remain static, monolithic, summary and schematic. Thickness and external thinness of physical “particles” (e.g. atoms and the atomistic theory), the division and unification of the “elements” (“primary elements”) of the cosmos are a conceptual form of the mythological “sparagmos” (division) and “genesis” (unifying) of the mythic cosmos. In Empedocles these primitive physical concepts present a remarkably telling picture: Love and Hate divide the world into parts (Hate) and then unite it into one (Love). By means of a pure myth Empedocles achieves conceptual generalization. This he does by giving the mythological images in his system the function of concepts: the cosmic “sparagmos” and “genesis” are the form of a content that turns them into “disintegration” and “unification” of elements of the real cosmos.

Thick and cut, hard and soft, warm and cold grow as concepts out of paired mythological antitheses. The Pythagoreans still have such antithetical pairs as light-darkness, rest-movement, male-female, right-left, bounded-unbounded, good-bad. Originally such antipodal images had neither ethical nor any other qualitative contents (cp. in myth the portrayal of good and evil in the form of two cities, two rivers, or two countries). When individual images take on the function of “features” of the object, they begin to become abstract and generalized, but the concrete meaning of the object still does not disappear, but remains beside the new abstract meaning. The structure of paired opposition also remains.

3

The Classical languages had many terms for “image” but not one for “concept.” The “external appearance” without the “essence” of the object is called \(\epsilon \iota \kappa \acute{\omega} \nu, \epsilon \iota \delta \omicron\) or \(\iota \delta \epsilon \alpha (\text{imago, forma, figura, species})\). All of these meant “image”, but \(\iota \delta \epsilon \alpha, \epsilon \iota \delta \omicron, \text{species} \) were used when one wanted to refer to “concept.” Thus \(\iota \delta \epsilon \alpha \) and \(\text{forma} (“\text{idea}” \) and “form”) were used alike to signify “image,” “idea,” and “outer form,” “external
appearance”—in other words “idea” originally corresponded to a formal feature of the object. This terminology alone should be enough to prevent us from modernizing the interpretation of Plato’s “ideas” and Aristotle’s “forms.” On the contrary, in later Greek philosophy the “appearance” of things, *εἰδος*, takes on the meaning of “idea” in the sense of “essence”: it expresses the basic quality, the former “property,” the main feature of the thing. Separated from reality the “image” in Greek philosophy is double. In Parmenides it is a phantom and non-being. In Plato it is being and essence. But, paradoxical as it may be, there is hardly any difference between the theories of Plato and Parmenides. The distinctive feature of every “appearance” and “image” is its opposition to the “authentic,” i.e. to that existence which is true, eternal, unchanging, immobile. Parmenides (like Xenophanes) divides the world into the true and the seeming; Plato does the same. For both of them being and non-being correspond to ideal and real, the speculative (τὸ νοητὸν) and the sensory (τὸ αἰσθητὸν). In Plato the opposition of being and the “idea” of being, of soul and body, is even more emphasized, furthermore body corresponds to phantom “image,” and therefore to death, while soul corresponds to eternally “being” (“the body of the dead,” he says, “is an image, while being is what is called the soul”). And this is logical. Consciousness, beginning with the primitive division into “thing” and “appearance” still understands “appearance” as a phantom. In the 6th century Parmenides could not have “ideas,” because “idea” is a form of abstract concept. It is a different matter for Plato in the 4th century, when Classical Greece is already leaving the historical arena and beginning the transition to Hellenism with its new social consciousness, in which concepts will be predominant. Plato divides the world not so much into “thing” and “appearance” as into concrete and speculative. Thus for Parmenides “phantom” is physical, but “truth” is also concrete. The speculative (that which is graspable by the mind) is also concrete because of the concrete nature of the mind itself and of understanding itself. In archaic Greek philosophy “mind” has dimensions like air, water, fire, like all “primary elements” and “principles.” It has already lost its purely mythological image nature, but has yet to become a pure concept: “mind” is god. The same can be said for mental “understanding.” Even in Classical Greece, long before Stoicism, “idea” was understood as “image” (εἰδολον), impressed in the soul; such an “image” was like a physical likeness (“phantom”), which emanated from the authentic object into the eyes and/or the soul of man (Xenophon’s Symposion). Later Classical philosophy develops and grounds this theory of physical, dimensional “imprints” and “stamps” on the mind or soul from the external cover of things. We would call all such theories materialistic, though in fact they are completely created by the mythological concept of “image.” “Imagination” (φαντασία) is a term of the same order. Its nature is purely visual and also phantom; it is related to the “external” world and not the internal, to “appearance” and “showing,” to those “external” impressions that enter into the soul physically, concretely. The meaning of imaginary and mirage remains in “imagination” for a long time (cp. R. “fantazer,” “fantazirovat’”). For the Greeks this term derives from “empty deception,” “phantom,” even “apparition” (φαντασμα), for the Romans from “image” (imago) and “imaginary” (imaginarius). We must add that even the concept of speculation has for the Classical period a concrete character; in the language of epic, the terms “think,” “perceive,” “understand” are still synonyms of “watch” and are accompanied by visual images (“understand with the eyes,” “think,
seeing” etc.). Even Plato speaks of intellect as a spatial object (“bodiless in appearance”). Further, the speculative, preserves the meaning of “spectacle” in the abstract, intellectual sense (cp. R. umozren’e).

I opposed “truth” and “doxa” in Parmenides and Plato. In Parmenides, I said, their concreteness can still be fully felt: his “truth” is a goddess. Plato is a different matter. His “ideas” are things taken speculatively, without real concreteness. They show a specific, Classical step in the formation of general (abstract) concepts.

Plato’s ideas of things are separated from the things and live independently, outside of things, outside of existence. Modernists wrongly see in them our contemporary ideas and call the Classical system of Plato idealism, like German Idealism. Platonic “ideas” represent typological Classical “images” and “proto-images” separated from objects, but images that have become concepts, i.e. Classical general concepts that took on the form of independent “ideas.”

In Plato’s formulation “table” or “bed” is a single idea, while there are in existence many tables and beds, and they are all different from each other. But the idea has a super-sensible existence, and it is created by divinity, while the real multiplicity of objects is created by the hands of craftsmen, whose “tables” and “beds” lack “authenticity.” Art, Plato teaches, is mimesis not of the divine essence of things, not of the “idea” and not of the “authenticity,” but of that “seeming” real world that is itself imaginary.

Plato’s “ideas,” which appeared in post-Classical Greece, show how abstractions began from the isolation of concepts from the objects they defined. Now authenticity signifies what in reality does not exist; by the 4th century, the real is finally identified with evil, with a negative tradition behind it in ontology and ethics, as well as gnoseology. At the same time conceptual processes are developing which separate the properties of phenomena from the phenomena themselves.

Unlike Parmenides, Plato makes the “image” authentic, but this image already has the character of a general concept, an “idea.” Plato’s thought moves by means of concepts; for it “image” is not a mirage, but “being,” completely separated from the world of phenomena. Therefore “mimesis” moves ahead in Plato. It represents a secondary illusion, “imitation of imitation,” creating a “cast” not of authenticity, but only of its reflection. In this respect Plato is like Tolstoy: great artists and aesthetes, they both deny art. Plato removes the literary image even farther from the “truth” than it would have followed from previous philosophy. His “mimesis” is a simple imitation of that reality which is itself like a shadow and a mirage.

In the course of re-organizing images and concepts, the ideas of illusion were completely transformed in Plato. In the division into real and ideal, concrete and speculative, primacy remains with the abstract. The phantom no longer imitates the authentic; the authentic imitates the ideal, in effect it imitates the abstract, for the Platonic realm of “ideas” must be understood not in the sense of that which is unattainable and perfect, i.e. not only through its content, but also as the realm of the abstract, free of all matter.

I have selected Parmenides and Plato, whose ontology is characteristic for Greek philosophy at its two chronological ends. The difference between the two great metaphysicians lies only in their individual systems of cognition. One and the same ontology can hardly break out of the images in Parmenides; in Plato it is expressed in concepts.
The third stage between them is Socrates. Also of interest is the line of the atomists, which lies outside the main stream of Classical philosophy. In the atomists we again encounter “image” and “authenticity,” but they perform the function of concepts, and of concepts related to physics, including optics. They take atoms for the immutable principles of life; in their view all phenomena (including psychic phenomena) and all objects consist of indivisible, eternal, uniform atoms, the proportions between which create different objects and phenomena. Consequently the principle thought of the atomists we now call “materialists” and of “idealists” of Parmenides’ persuasion is the same; only for the atomists “being” and “elements” are multiple. According to the atomistic theory, reflections separate from (or “flow from”) real objects; these reflections are the “images” encountered by our organs of sense perception. As the very terms έικόνες, εἴδωλα, imagines, effigiae show, the atomists rely on the old idea of “image” and “likeness” as an imaginary authenticity which “copies” real authenticity. In fact, by “image” of the object the atomists understand such a “reflection” which is itself physical and consists of atoms, but lighter ones than those of the object itself. The “image” corresponds precisely to the object, though it is not the authentic object, but only its “likeness,” i.e. its physical, material “appearance.” I must say that “phantoms,” “images” of objects (εἴδωλα) and Platonic “ideas” (εἴδεα) are close not only in terminology. Speculative things in the form of independent “ideas,” or the “doxa” of Parmenides, or reality “appearing” in the form of a “likeness” or “image” of being—all these are not very far from the “physicalized” (if we can put it that way) “phantoms” and “images” of objects in the atomistic theory of “reflection.”

If this theory proved tenacious in the Classical world, then it was because it rested on traditional ideas. One can follow the effects of its views all the way to Rome. But the theory of “reflection” outlasted other forms of the same ideas because the atomists made the images into concepts, the same concepts that rational physics grew out of. From then on all Classical systems of conceptual physics (especially optics) began to imitate and work out the same theory.

Socrates is interesting and new in his empiricism. Along with the Sophists he so hated, he pulled the heavens down to the social earth. He and the Sophists were the first champions of concept. As the founders of formal logic, which broke with traditional dialectical logic, they could be considered the forerunners of Aristotle.

If we take Sophistic philosophy gnoseologically, it will become clear that it is a stage in the development of separate formal-logical concepts which have yet to reach the level of general concepts (it is no accident that Antisthenes did not recognize general concepts!). The Sophists emphasized the absence of mental normativity and therefore proposed the subjectivism of concepts, i.e. their arbitrariness. The ontologists already denied the reliability of sense cognition; it was the contribution of the Sophists to undertake the analysis of concepts themselves seriously, thereby clearing the methodological way for later philosophers, beginning with Socrates. In Sophistic philosophy one can clearly see the beginnings of judging, which begins by developing naked logization, the mechanics of constructing formal-logical processes devoid of essence. They study verbalmental tricks and teach argumentation, the basis of which
consists in the purely external construction of judgments, then deductions as a formal chain of judgments.

Socrates, on the other hand, strove for the non-arbitrary and the objective, and this historically leads him from the Sophists to Plato. It is in Socrates that the sphere of the “ideal” begins to take on the character not of a model, but of an abstraction that he derives from the empirical and returns to the empirical. Both the Sophists and Socrates are a reaction to the metaphysics of the ancient philosophers. Representatives of the new way of thinking, formal-logical thought, the Sophists and Socrates break with the dialectics of the Milesians and the Eleatics.

Socrates was attempting to construct general concepts. But the way he chose to get to them is significant for the history of cognition. Socrates still had not mastered abstract processes, still was at the beginning of their formation, and he constructed the abstract through the visible and concrete, the general through the particular (problems and illustrations of human behavior, the citation of myths, famous “examples,” and other concrete material). This was the road from the image to the separation of features, which were narrowed down and made precise, the way of empirical generalization. No less famous is Socrates’ “midwife” method; it was deductive in essence, heuristic in methodology. Socrates constructed general concepts through the concrete, purely empirical example. He asked his interlocutor questions, “leading” him to the answers and forcing him “in torment” to recognize what he would like to deny. This was the methodology of “discoveries,” heuristics.

We are used to saying that the Greeks are rationalists. But it is funny to think that they are rationalists in their national essence (as the Eastern peoples are mystical by nature). Only a philistine could think this, the learned philistine who seriously believes in “the fantasy of the Greek people, who created myths” and in “the utilitarian, practical, sober mind of the Roman, who could not create myths, but who invented the aqueduct.”

The Greeks were rationalists because as a result of historical laws they were the first to work out logical processes. The Romans “already” do not have to do this, the Eastern peoples “still” have to reach this point. We must not forget the laws of phylogeny, which apply in sociology as well as in biology. Historically it fell to the lot of the Greeks to be the first to form logical concepts, and this was their great function; other peoples no longer needed to repeat this function.

Socrates proved unrepeatable in philosophy, as Old Comedy or tragedy were in later literature—these were genres which recorded the appearance of concepts; such phenomena of “first birth” are very powerful and original, but they are so original that they can never be repeated again. Socrates is a rationalist for historical reasons. He is completely occupied with the formal-logical substantiation of what before him was proved by means of dialectic images, still only on the way to concepts.

The dual world for Socrates takes place wholly in the logical sphere. “The seeming” (doxa) is for him a subjective and unreliable opinion, and what had been “existing” in ontology changes for him into objective cognition. Thus in Socrates cosmology becomes logic.

His “epagogical” method consists in deriving one thought from another with the object of finding a general concept. For this he resorts for the most part to excluding false individual concepts. “General” for him is a chain of “particulars.” Only through the concrete “particular” can he reach the “general,” moving through formal logic, discourse,
judgement—not “from” the particular to the general (not inductively), but “through” consistent logical passage through all the steps of particular concepts, from one to another, beginning with the general, summary concept, examining and discarding what is not necessary, defining feature after feature until he reaches the deductive result which contains for him the general def-inition of the concept. This passage through the links of thought is dressed by Socrates in leading questions. I have already pointed out that this wandering representative of unwritten philosophy is a folk type. His balagan quips bring together in him all his folkloric features. Socrates presents philosophy in question and answer form, anticipating the dialogues of Plato, but also continuing the dramatic, balagan line of verbal agones, riddles-solutions, and all kinds of griphs. Socrates is still close to the trickster; his questions resemble riddles, because he knows his intent in advance and carefully hides it, forcing his interlocutor to follow him, leading him astray and deceiving him. In the end his interlocutor makes a fool of himself, recognizing what he had denied and accepting what he did not want to accept. In this respect Socrates does the same thing to his interlocutor as the slave in palliata does to his master.

The agon of riddles and solutions, of questions and answers was the “popular” form of future metaphors. In Socrates this traditional form passes by metaphoristics. Metaphoristics are already overcome. The question-riddles serve the purpose of logization. But it remains characteristic that all of the first formal-logical, discursive deductions are built of riddle-questions and answer-solutions born in balagan. And this is no accident. In Greece logical concepts rest on images, arise from them and are their new, abstract form.

In Socrates they are seen not only in heuristics. His “example”—the particular case from which he pushes off—is a new transformed form of the former “picture.” The Socratic “example” continues to be anarbitrary. It gives one particular case which does not unfold in time. General concepts are formed by means of “deduction” or “drawing out” from empirical concrete “particularity” which is not at all a premise or an experiment. Its role is that of a genealogical “beginning” from which thought starts to “come out;” it sprang from “showing,” from the image system by means of which concept was created. The purely human subject, the only thing Socrates is interested in (unlike the hyloists and Plato), testifies to the mental epoch characterized by the appearance of logical concepts. The Sophists and Socrates were interested not in the concrete contents of “that which is,” not in one or another cosmological construction, but in logic, the theory and practice of cognition, the sphere of human “wisdom,” which is identified with virtue and divinity: for him ethics is gnoseology and religion is the domain of human cognition. Socrates’ main problem is the truth; his main goal is to find the correct definition for truth and separate it from its phantom likenesses. The cosmological image, therefore, took on for him the character of a gnoseological concept.

For Socrates correct formation of the concept meant finding the “truth”; correct concepts became the same thing as correct world-order was for the cosmologist philosophers. The object of his denunciations were the imaginary likenesses of truth—incorrectly formulated logical concepts.
Socrates is undoubtedly the predecessor of Aristotle, the father of scientific, finished, maximally formal-logical thought. But an interesting interim period lies between Aristotle and Socrates. In the 4th century, characterized by the working out of judgment, it was not only philosophers who engaged in logic. The so-called orators did as well, whether they wanted to or not. This Greek rhetoric is a peculiar and unrepeatable phenomenon! We explain it incorrectly by analogy to our contemporary parliamentary or judicial eloquence. The Greek rhetors were like poets and philosophers, but of a kind whose works are written on the one hand and theoretical and “speculative” on the other. They were writers and logizers, and the fact that they “pronounce” their works in one case or another is merely a question of professional application of these works. The Greek rhetors were writers and logizers whose genre was specially designed to sound orally, though written, and to be applied practically, though it is pure theory.

It has long been known that the Greek rhetors are interested in character sketches, “ethos,” that they are teachers of morals, and basically teachers. The entire texture of their genre is dramatic. Who are they? Actors in their pronouncing function, in declamation, dress, expression, gesticulation, in all their “epideictic” nature, even in the setting of their performance (agonistics, theater, halls, Hellenic holidays, squares). As “epideictists” they are “showers” who have long had something in common with balagan rayoshniki. They are “ethologists,” formerly the buffoons that were called ethologists or tricksters in balagan. Then they became ethologists in the sense of teachers of morals and composers of character sketches. They develop the theory of characters and “morals,” but still do not know the general concept of “morality.” Later they are pronouncers, saying their speeches orally. They are prosecutors, lawyers, publicists, pedagogues, writers, philosophers, politicians. They are specialists in literary theory and eloquence, poets in prose, and especially in business prose.

It is clear that they are not what they were once and not what they would become later. They are distinguished on the one hand by their practical function, on the other by the personal element, the subjective element that makes their appearance possible only after the Sophists. They are everyday poets and philosophers who do not mix with the poets of art and the philosophers of science. In ancient Greece art and science were making their preliminary way in folklore, ethics, and religion. Rhetoric has its own path in everyday life, and it is even called practice. This happens because in Classical Greece everyday life is already separated from cult: the two worlds, the sacred and the profane, are divided and delimited. But behind this division religion was still everyday life and everyday life was the basis of all image ideas. This is why one can find so many sides of rhetoric that border on drama, balagan, figural arts, ethics, and philosophy.

In the form in which we find rhetoric in the 4th century, it is business prose, written poetically, pronounced orally. From the formal side this prose comes from the folk peculiarities of puppet theater, but of course with a complete change of linguistic function. In Gorgias the folk style of oral speech already takes on a purely metaphorical character. The famous oratorical “period” with isocola, antitheses, figures comes out of aphorism and mythological metaphors, from rhythmic folkloric speech with its agonistic oppositions, repetitions, identities, images. In the reworking of concepts all this image system takes on sometimes an indirect function, sometimes a purely formal, ornamental function that occasionally even verges on the comic.
The orators of the 4th century make this image system, which was still formal in Gorgias in the 5th century, into a tool of conceptual thought. Isocrates’ periods, isocola, parisonis, antitheses and figures function as a medium of extremely logized argumentation: he makes each thought into a closed link—a rounded period—which can be broken up into an equal quantity of internal parts (πάρσοι), with two equivalent oppositions, and moves from link to link by a long discursive chain of judgments subordinated to a single purpose and leading him to a conclusion that is firmly argumented in detail all along the way. Nevertheless, in spite of all the mental novelty of Isocrates, in spite of his mental centralization, the “atomism” of Isocrates’ “round” period, with its closed independence, its internal completeness, is striking. Isocrates’ periods are feudal fiefs, independent concentrations of thought, and his metaphors and figures, the euphony of his rhythms, the avoidance of clusters of vowels or consonants, all act as a medium for a discursively thought-out logic that is very consistent and calm.

Proof is the soul of the Greek orators of the 4th-3rd centuries. Whether they are pronouncing gushing praises, court speeches, or political philippics, whether they are for Macedonia or against it, for the Attic or the Gorgian school, only one thing is equally important to them—proof. They prove. Judgments, conclusions, deductions carefully work out a chain of proofs and establish the truth of their premises. They require isocola and antitheses for defense and refutation of the judgments cited, periods and rhythms for well-formed conclusions.

The age of constructing formal-logical processes reaches its fullest expression in Aristotle, the theoretician of syllogism. It is no coincidence that the causality, discursivity, and logization of Aristotelian thought finds such sympathy in medieval scholasticism: they are linked by analysis and the well-formed mental mathematics of thought that was historically inevitable for Aristotle, lifeless (and thereby useful) for the scholastics.

But Aristotle’s syllogism is not a bare abstraction born only of pure logic. It too is merely a new abstract form of the former mythological image. Syllogisms usually consist of three members: two premises and a conclusion—two judgments and a result. In reality, beneath syllogism lies comparison; the two parts of syllogism, united by a single common concept (I—man is mortal, II—I am a man), have something in common (man), which conditions the result of the whole mental conclusion (I am mortal). In everyday image folklore every agon is like this: two parts have similar features, and the third is the arbiter between these two. Let us say that Battus is a poet, Menalcas is a poet; Corydon is their judge. However, in syllogism the images have become judgments, flat statement—consequence, conclusion. In the image proposition the third part represents the flat presence of the first two parts (for example, in the structure of strophe, antistrophe, epode). But such an ancient image proposition frozen, for example, in aphorism, takes on a new character in the rhetorical “period” which is built on judgment. What is new here is not only the replacement of images by concepts, but the fact that the flat series of images has taken on a new mental composition—namely from premises to consequence, in logical sequence. The period in itself and images in themselves remained in syllogism in the form of its structure, but its formal-logical essence made them the formants of a deductive mental conclusion.9

The theory of proof reached its apogee in Aristotle. These are no longer the lively proofs of the orators—Liciuses, Antiphons, Isocrates, Demosthenes—full of practical,
concrete contents. Aristotle’s proofs are purely logical conclusions, the basis of formal logic, i.e. “logical operations independent of the content of thought” (Radlov\(^{10}\)). Aristotle for the first time in history breaks with the old ontology, replacing it with natural history; in logic he is already abstract.

If we look back from Aristotle to Socrates, we can see that the earlier philosopher built the abstract by means of the concrete, and his “examples” served as a form in which he presented concepts. The Greeks of the 5th century could derive the general from the particular only by means of an image based story, an example, digressions, an original empirical “case.” Thus Herodotus builds his documentation on folktale. Thus the orators in absolutely all cases introduce a special διήγησις, a narration that takes center stage in their argumentation. What once acted as “showing” or “picture” became in conceptual thought a medium of argumentation. This was the path taken by abstraction: the concrete, taking on a logical function, became the constructive principle of formal logic.

Concrete in abstract form, Classical concept does not break with concrete image even when it becomes an abstraction.
6
Old Comedy

The comic genre is universal for the Classical world. It includes the majority of poetic forms and belletristic prose. Comedy itself became a genre relatively late, but it itself as a genre was dependent on the understanding of “comic” that was broader and less restricted than the drama of laughter. But even in the narrow sense ancient comedy is universal for the Classical period. It is interpenetrated by lyric and philosophy (cosmology) and contains three different types of comedy: Old, Middle, and New in Greece, and modifications of these comedies in Rome. No other Classical genre has so many varieties.

The Classical comic scheme was a cognitive category. The biune world had two tracks of phenomena of which one parodied the other, continually and in everything. I have already mentioned this. The sun was accompanied by shadow, heaven by earth, “essence” by phantom, and the “whole” was attained only through the presence of these two different principles. Speaking in Classical terms, this second sphere is hubristic. We call it parodic in our language. And this would be correct if our word “parody” did not smack of abstraction, intention, and literariness. Classical parody was completely different. It was the hubristic aspect of the serious, turning the authentic “inside out” in all its details and invariably accompanying everything real as a part of the binomial. What was sacred had its own accompaniment in its own “shadow” and “inside-out”. This entire huge world-view sphere, reversed and adversative, can be designated as the destructive and imaginary sphere in which all forms correspond with the external forms of the authentic, but without their true essence.

When comedy appeared, parody turned into comedy. When satire appeared, parody turned into satire. But it was not absolutely essential (unlike our parody) for it to be cast in comic forms. Other forms of more particular antinomies were also possible. Dramatic comedy is only one of the derivatives of parody. There is no difference, however, between the concepts “parodic” and “comic,” since for the Classical mind both are the same reality “inside-out.”

Of course I am not talking about the 5th century and especially later when even writers try to make fun of their living contemporaries. But tragedians do not do this. It follows that certain genres gave certain mandates for the expression and form of certain authorial views. There was never a law that said that comedy could only engage in mockery. The genre in which mockery was possible and necessary began to be called comedic for its traditional function, and only later was “comic” attached to comedy. I mean the traditional function that was conditioned by the appearance of concept.

Before concept was born as a new form of the image, parody was the hubristic aspect of cult, ritual, myth, without the function of mockery. This element of the parodic became the foundation for scenic spectacles.
Unlike later European literature, Classical literature always contains a “mixture” of two styles—in genres, in one and the same work, in its parts. These two styles can be compared with two layers simultaneously, the serious and the comic, in the spheres of ritual, fine arts, and drama (A. Dieterich).

Semantically I am talking about the positive and negative potential embodied in the mythological images of cosmos-construction and cosmos-destruction, of which the forms are very varied. Their oldest embodiment is animals, and they are the natural elements as well. Every animal is represented as dual—in its birth and in its death, shining and being extinguished. We know its later forms well, when it has already separated into the “pure” passive (suffering) animal and the “impure” or “dishonorable” active (attacking) animal.

The mythological variants (in Poetics I called them mythological metaphors) that express these two images are many. But their essence is one: the peripeteia of the transition from pure animal to impure (death) or from impure to pure (renewed birth). Such a peripeteia is not ethical, but spectacle, and “purity” is understood by myth in the form of “brightness.”

In myth and ritual the luminary god was invariably connected with the images of catharsis, which were ascribed to the god of light and “purity” Apollo. The peculiarity of pre-conceptual, pre-cause-and-effect thought can be seen in the absence of ethical or logical justification for this catharsis: the purifying animal contained in itself the transition from “victim” to “persecutor,” from “pollution” (darkness) to “purity;” dying dark, it was reborn as pure and light. Ethics, which sprang from concepts, separated these two opposites and filled them with logical contents; since that time the separate concepts of redemption, the expiatory victim, the “scapegoat” and “lamb” have appeared; among these one is the bearer of impurity [nechestej], the other the bearer of purity, the former is active, the latter suffering.

The ritual portrayal of catharsis became the foundation of Classical drama. As a result the action and melic parts have become covered with archaic forms of narrative; the content of catharsis has changed conceptually.

In Poetics I emphasized strongly the systemic quality of the Classical plot and the Classical ritual. By systemic I meant its anticausal construction, which was made up of images from various historical epochs piled up (“strung together”) one on another or set out in a row without any logical sequentality and without any centralizing unity. Now I would like to add the following. The Classical plot is systemic, it is true. This very conglomerate is a kind of system. It is brought on by the peculiarity of thought that knows nothing of generalization. Only figurality later breaks the principle of the conglomerate. It is precisely the peculiarity of metaphor that it transforms the image again, turning it into a concept, but at the same time extinguishing, deleting its old mythological meaning. Metaphor is image in form, but concept in content.

Before figurality the image knows no qualitative change. The top surface layer of semantics (“stadiality”), conditioned by the social changes in primitive society, changes its form slightly, but does not influence the nature of the mythological image. Therefore the “hero” lives in the plot with the “god,” the “animal,” the “plant,” etc., though all these variants of one and the same character are nothing more than different mythological doubles.
Classical drama too is conglomerate. It contains all “stages” of the mythological image, and is complicated by the fact that subsequent concepts make its entire makeup figurative.

Cathartic images are always binomial: the line of the “pure” is accompanied by the line of the “impure”. What may arbitrarily be called the positive principle is expressed in many ways in epic and lyric, in tragedy and philosophy. But the negative sphere is less varied in its archaic forms and unusually true to itself: it remains comic in the Classical sense everywhere and in everything. This is why I began by saying that for the Classical world the category of the comic as the basic manifestation of the principle of parody is universal (especially for ancient Greece).

Neither old nor new balagan contains tragedy. It is always comic. But in the Classical period its comedy is of a special kind. It is the hubristic presentation of the serious, with which it appears. This unrepeatable peculiarity of Classical drama disappeared with the Classical period. Satyricon, mime, mythological travesty, and hilaro-tragedy, in which elements of laughter were combined with serious elements, would have been unthinkable in later periods when there were literary dramatic genres separate from each other. Mime and satyricon later detached from themselves tragic drama. The hubristic element of laughter seems primordial and almost insuperable in them.

Only in the 5th century does the “comic” create comedy. Satyricon acts as a transition to comedy. Undoubtedly it is older than all other forms of comedy, if only because it is not yet comedy. The choral, collective-impersonal characters, the pre-human animal-vegetal characters, as well as the mythological plot and amorphous genre all show how ancient the satyricon is. The age of satyricon is also shown by the absence of plot movement, by the predominance of an elementary theme over the development of thought, by the absence of characterization, by the primitive prepolis scenarios, by the general coloring of joke which has not yet become a comedic genre. With time this preconceptual drama dies out forever. The development of social forms of life and culture makes satyricon a simple tradition, an appendage to a more topical variant of satyricon itself—tragedy. But individual features of the archaic drama find their way into art again, in genres far from satyricon. Thus the “natural” scenario turns up in lyric from Stesichorus to Theocritus, and Heracles, one of the basic figures of satyricon, appears both in tragedy and in comedy.

The comic sphere in Homer has nothing in common with the comedic, though it consists of invective and laughter; it coincides with the sphere of the gods. The Homeric “comic” is completely analogous to the laughter and mockery of all cult parody, including the cults of fertility goddesses; it contains preconceptual travesty which still lacks elements of mockery. But the epic sphere too is accompanied by its hubristic double. Like lyric and drama, it is first dual in itself, and later separates itself from its “shadow” in the form of the comic and parodic epic. In time lyric will precipitate out its anacreontea and hubristic “Archilochuses,” “Sappho,” “Phaon.” The greatest tragedians—Phrynichus, Agathon, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides end up in parody. But why were there no parodies of comedy and comedians? They were even more appropriate material for mockery. But the real hubristic was never the object of mockery. Invective and “comic”
were directed only at the “serious” and “authentic,” for the most part at the mystical. In *The Frogs* Dionysus—a cheap jester—plays the fool during the mysteries of Dionysus himself. In *The Thesmophoriazusae* shameful situations take place amidst the celebration of the mysteries dedicated in the serious sphere to the same thing that comically creates the shame.

Radermacher put it well: “In the Classical world there were certain days when the most sacred had to be shown in a comic light” and the gods appeared as fools. The heart of the “comic” was thus made up of iambics. But iambics are made up not only of invective and obscenity, laughter and buffoonery. No less important a feature was debasing everything lofty, hence its Cynicism—the themes of “the belly” and shameful desires, lust, base motives. Hipponax, Timoecreon of Rhodes, Catullus, Archilochus, and Anacreon were the creators of Cynicism in iambics. And they cynically revealed this Cynicism in themselves, which was older than any indirect invective. These singers of the base, who brought shame on themselves and other real people, were the verse parallel to the ethologists in mime.

But when I speak of lyric as a variant of the Classical “comic” I mean more than just iambics. All Classical lyric as a whole is an organic part of this “comic,” later of comedy. Furthermore, I mean not only the lyrics of Archilochus or Hipponax, but for the most part of Sappho and Pindar.

The comic, which paralleled the real, was characterized by all kinds of “au contraire” and “anti.” Hubrism was triumphant here. Catharsis took on the features of pollution, whose bearer triumphed over the sacred.

It was just this comic sphere that was still not separated from the positive. Hence began the folk theater, hence began the future Middle Comedy.

One subsection of “the comic” accompanied cosmogonies, another, lyric. Furthermore, none of these terms are satisfactory, since they all refer to separate and already stabilized results of the process I am talking about. It is hard to speak in the language of formal-logical concepts of a historical process that was manifested in many connections, presenting at the same time combined meanings and their expression in multiple forms.

The comic which accompanied cosmogonies organized Old Comedy. I have often shown that Greek comedy parodied philosophy. Philosophy and comedy are united in Greece by their common derivation from the original undivided unity. Old Comedy, following cosmogony, was built on utopias, anadoses and descents into the underworld, theogonies that explained the origin of the universe. Much can be said about this. Epicharmus and Menander, Menippus and Lucian, Theophrastus and his antecedents, even Plato himself and Socrates speak on their own about the parallelism between the two spheres—the philosophical and the comedic; Plato, Socrates, Lucian (Menippus) lead us from Old to Middle Comedy through mime. If in Old Comedy Socrates acts as a comic character, and in Lucian philosophers do, then this is all in line with the primordial tie between philosophy and comedy—mime.

But most significant is that philosophy and the comedy that parodied it alike arose from ideas of the authentic and the seeming. Folk theater—balagan and literary mime as well as Middle Comedy (palliata for the Romans) reveal the same basis as philosophy. Both reveal the same division of all phenomena into “essence” and its empty reflection.
As far as lyric is concerned, it has many features that link it to comedy taken broadly, in all three of its comedic variants. The *dramatis personae*, for example, is the same. The heroine Spring acts in the Middle Comedy almost directly in the form of the beautiful hetaira Flora or her variants; she is the same in Sappho and in Ibycus—the terrible power of love, Spring herself, in Stesichorus it is Spring in the form of a girl in love. The same is true of the hero—Eros. In Middle Comedy he appears as the main hero, as in lyric. But comedy has other characters as well: the old man in love, the beggar rogue, the pharmakos-hubrist (Hipponax, the slave and pimp in Middle Comedy). Comedy and lyric share plot motifs—the passions of Eros, marriages, hymeneias, entreaties and complaints, persecution, invective, abuse. Furthermore, these are not so much separate plot motifs as parts of structures. The elements of feasts, marriages, complaints, sufferings cannot be called merely motifs. In comedy all these elements act as fixed parts of the structure, and therefore there is reason to think that the same was true of lyric. The scattered fragments of Greek lyric that have come down to us comprise only a fraction of the whole lyric system, like the three forms of comedy comprise only a part of the whole comedic system. In Attic Old Comedy the structure contains agonides, sacrifices, parabases, sacred marriages; Middle Comedy (palliata) gives this structure “lyric” forms, but it retains its force. Lyric reveals the same elements. In the choral lyric of Alcman the agon is prominent. Sacred marriages play a predominant role in Sappho. Parabatic elements can be found in iambic and hymnic. Sacrifice in lyric takes the form of the passions of a personified animal, the bearer of eros (I called this the “lyric” form in the structure of the Middle Comedy). The basic plot in lyric as in Middle Comedy was the passions of Eros and Pseudo-Eros, abuse and death of the opponent; the images of spring-winter and flowering-wilting are presented in parallel. The only difference is that comedy presents such a plot in complete form, conceptually, i.e. in the form of a logical plot with a rationalizing interpretation (New Comedy modernizes this conceptual rationalization even further, taking it to the level of realism), while lyric brings us fragments of images, still not strung together into a consistent logical plot.

Archaic lyric, like comedy, is a variant of the same cosmology that appears in epic form as well. This interpenetration of genres (an unrepeatable peculiarity of Greek literature!) provides irrefutable proof that the same mythological imagery took on various genre forms, depending on how the development of concepts was progressing. Our modern literary genres can never serve as an analogy to the Classical genres: Classical literature did not have defined literary types (such as the novel, the narrative poem, the drama, the short story, the poem), which can be derived from their literary predecessors, but not from mythological semantics or directly from mythologems. Individual Greek works may have derived from other individual works, but the genre as a whole was based not on its predecessor, but on mythological semantics: within the concepts lay mythological images, while in Roman literature the process by which the traditional images were only being reworked by independently functioning concepts was already beginning.

But I return to lyric, a genre which derived from sung cosmology. Lyric originally sang of the birth, death, and reviving of nature, and therefore one must speak of the cosmic figure of the lyric author. The demiurge, incarnator and creator of nature, himself the creating and “tormented tormentor” Eros—this is the basis of the lyric singer. He is (as I have already said of Lucian) always equal to his genre.
In the beginning Hipponax, Sappho, Anacreon, Ibycus, Timocreon themselves in person were their own characters, the bearers of the motifs of separation (wilting) or the blossoming of spring, of flora (the Florence of comedy), of the tormented tormentor Eros, of beautiful or unsuccessful love, of flowers, feasts, marriages, or even of unbridled dirty types, slanderers, cynical old men, beggars, freaks. This shows great antiquity. But with time, beginning with Archilochus and Alcaeus, these characters become a lyric mask, appearing in an indirect position: instead of Archilochus himself—Lycambeš, instead of Anacreon himself—Artemon, instead of Alcaeus—Myrsilus or Pittacus. The progress of conceptual thought can be seen in this process of chipping off “I” from “it” and in the objectivization of the subject principle. Mime, having turned into plot, is played out itself on stage like an object of depiction. Logos becomes the object of a narration. Sappho becomes the singer of heroines like herself. Behind all iambics stretches the legend of their enemies, who, persecuted by mockery, have hanged themselves. But on the stage of palliata this persecution of enemies takes place, this very ritual of mockery. The death of the hanged pharmakos becomes an iambic motif, one which appears to be real.

The entire action part which once accompanied lyric like palliata remained in everyday lyric ritual: feasts (which have now become the setting in which songs are sung), flowers, music, dance, the special dress of singers, verse agones, sacrifices, holiday rituals. All of these elements are present in Middle and Old Comedy, partially they remain in New Comedy as well. And as to the cosmogonic line of Old Comedy, it has been preserved in the narrative scheme of choral songs, especially in Pindar.

The passions of Amor-Venus later became the Roman elegy. Ovid and Propertius predictably introduced into elegy a huge dose of naturalistic Cynicism. The Roman elegiac poets logically revived the “military” element as well. For them love is a real military campaign. Long before the Roman elegy, songs of Aphrodite-Telesilla, of military Spring (Mars), later of Eros with his bow and arrows became the basis for comedic stories of the love of a warrior, a cowardly braggart, stories where the hero was the hubristic Mars and the heroine the hubristic Venus. In the Eros utopia of Tibullus there is an agricultural paradise, fidelity, bliss, which recall the themes of Sappho. The agrarian nature of the Roman elegy and the role of Ceres in it, as well as the “Georgics” of Vergil and bucolic eclogues—to say nothing of Theocritus, all derive from the satirical “bucolic mime” and the agricultural hubristic utopias of Old Comedy. Komos is an organic part of both lyric and comedy. The youth and the hetaira are characters in both. But there are two images of the hetaira. One is iambic, appears in Middle Comedy, and reaches fulfillment in Rome (Plautus, Catullus, Ovid, Horace, Propertius); its antiquity is shown by folklore. The other image belongs to the “noble hetaira” (Menander), the touching courtesan (Roman elegiacs). Furthermore, one should speak separately of Roman lyric. After all it (like all Roman literature) differs from Greek in its conceptualism [poniatizm]. Martial, the poet-cynics of the Augustan age, and Juvenal represent a traditional phenomenon, but one that is completely new in essence.

Classical lyric is connected with comedy by their common cathartic element. Before ethics “purification” was understood concretely, as a physical act. This was a lustral, luminary image. The archaic hubrist-pharmakos, who celebrated his triumph in the comic sphere, was represented as the bearer of physical pollution—darkness, impurity, the violation of the physically positive.
In lyric lustral motifs are still connected with Apollo. They can be found in all iambic. They live in the legend which ascribes to Archilochus and Hipponax such powers of mockery that their opponents were forced to hang themselves. In the same Hipponax one often finds the theme of the Thargelia, the festival of lustral Apollo; the center of the Thargelia was the death of the scapegoat, the pharmakos, which was flogged, stoned, and killed by hanging, throwing from a cliff, driving out beyond the city boundary, or in some other shameful manner. A number of these fragments speak of pharmakoi, purification of the city, flogging. Hipponax either beats Bupalus about the eyes or Hipponax himself appears in the role of pharmakos (“he ordered Hipponax to be thrown out and stoned”). The Thargelia and the cliff of Leucas figure in Anacreon as well, that typical comedic “old man.” But Sappho too, throwing herself into the sea from the cliff of Leucas presents the image of a typically hubristic death of the “scapegoat,” I have already shown her aspect of “old woman in love,” the correlate of Anacreon, the “old man in love” (whom legend made love Sappho).

Catharsis is the basis of comedy as well. Invective of a lustral character, from the wagons, was even called “purifying.” Its presence in comedy is shown by the figure of the hubrist who always bears the features of gluttony, drunkenness, foul language, coarsely expressed cynicism. Old and Middle Comedies place such characters in the center. Iambic is also full of them. Hipponax and Timocreon are typical hubrists. The type of the old men in love also belongs to this circle. The drunk Anacreon, who supposedly has hundreds of thousands of mistresses and is in a state of eternal lust, is a grotesque, “comic” figure; this is Eros the hubrist in his aspect of “old man.” Such is the old man in palliata as well. On the other hand, the eternally drunk old woman who is in love and acts young is a type in Old Comedy. She has much in common with the hubristic old woman of lyric, who is abused and shamefully slandered by Archilochus, Anacreon, Horace, Catullus, the elegiasts and satirists of Rome.

In lyric and comedy the central figure appeared doubled. The purifying sacrifice, the piaculum, also looked like an active pollution, the míaasma. The motifs of “pity” and suffering create laments, complaints, mourning, cries, pitiful shouts and moans. Such lamentational songs of self-flagellation run all through lyric and drama, which cannot, in this respect, be separated. Alongside the laments come the motifs of hubrism. This duality remained in mime. In mime there is always a character who is mocked, and there is another character who mocks. The characters of Classical comedy are also doubled. In the palliata the young couple is the suffering principle, lacking comism, while the slave, the old man, the eiron are comic characters. In the parabasis of Old Comedy the author is both the attacker of others and the victim of others’ attacks. Complaining of suffering unjustly, Aristophanes in the parabasis of the Wasps calls himself the “ averter of ills” (άλεξίκακον) and the “purifier of the country” (καθαρτήν τῆς χώρας)—two terms from cult catharsis.
cities have the form of mythological beings, but at the same time the praises of cities and victors are sung, of cities in the form of “heroes” dead and living. In Alcaeus, Theognis, and Solon the “polis” theme takes the form of songs about polis affairs and people—what we call the “political” theme, from the same word “polis.” Elegy was the lyric genre whose semantic tradition organized ancient political comedy as well, based in its invective-obscene parts on iamb.

While palliata was lyrico-comedy which introduced lyric themes as characters and New Comedy was the later intensification of the lyric theme, Old Comedy was dominated by lyric polis rather than by lyric eros. In Middle and New Comedy traces of the characters who preceded people remain: these were two antagonist houses, or two cities, or two countries. In Aristophanes the war and peace between two cities also derives from the “polis” tradition which is buried, however, in the general “political” theme. Lyric has in this respect very interesting standard motifs of “rebellion of cities” and “storm,” which are variants of each other. I will speak of them in connection with tragedy. Here I will only point out that such motifs are found in Archilochus, Anacreon, Theognis, particularly in Alcaeus, in part in Sappho, and they are revived in Horace and Vergil true to traditions. In Aristophanes one encounters open rebellion of women and also Whirlwind as one of the original divinities. Storms (accompanied in lyric by shipwrecks) play a constructive role in the plots of palliata, and particularly of New Comedy. Both of these motifs, rebellion and storm, originally went along with and marked the end of the world in mythologems. In the conceptual lyric of Horace cities and places, which had been living “girlfriends” in Sappho, turn into the varied geographical names of the Roman Empire.

When I speak of lyric, I have in mind not the genre in its form and peculiarities, but all its semantic formants. Everything shows that there was once a single melic system with a coherent thematics, from which a circle of separate motifs distributed among many genres remained, a system inseparably linked with a comic double; this comic accompaniment retained the frozen separate parts and their connection, which disintegrated in later lyric. One must not forget that Greek lyric entered into tragedy and comedy and narrowly lyric genres, though as a whole it never went beyond the amorphous state and never became a well-defined literary type, as it did later in Rome. It is characteristic that Greek lyric, like comedy, had no tragic aspect. The torments it described were only the torments of Eros, which led to comedy. Lyric even later preserved a *dramatis personae* that coincided with that of comedy. These were the lyric “authors”: Sappho’s spring, who is also the old woman in love, Alcaeus’s wine, Anacreon’s old man in love, Hipponax’ pharmakos, Timocreon’s glutton and hubrist, etc. I do not know who among them lived, who was invented; but even if any of them really existed, in the lyric literary genre they wore a traditional “lyric mask,” i.e. chose a certain defined theme and presented themselves as a certain defined character, which traditionally underwent the given circle of states.

While I spoke of the former single system of lyric themes with their coherent circle of motifs, I still have not mentioned the following themes which lyric and comedy have in common. First of all, the theme of the old polis which became young and new. Such a theme has been preserved in the “Founding of Cities” and “Genealogies” which lay the foundation for the epinikia, hymns (“Hymn to Apollo”), Sapphic myths, and polis lyric on one hand; on the other hand it also remained in the structure of Old Comedy. Dike, the
Horae, Peace (Sappho, Pindar) ruled in such a renewed city, and comedy parodied this “city” in its pseudo-utopias. Second, both lyric and comedy contain the theme of eros (the passion of Amor or Dionysus), either of evil eros (Archilochus, Sappho), or in the form of marriage and feasts (Sappho, comedy). But even such themes as agon and komos were characteristic of both comedy and lyric. The songs of Alcman and Pindar were built on agon, while komos, which became an organic part of comedy, created prosodies, lamentations, and serenades in lyric. The same can be said of entreaties and curses (hymns, iambcs, parabases, entreaties in Middle Comedy). A large set of lyric themes entered tragedy as well, but I will speak of this separately. When one studies Classical lyric, one must examine it entire, as a whole, not by individual poets, as is usually done. The methodology of such a study must not be identical to that we use when we study modern poetry through its separate poets. Rome already draws the boundary here, as the first epoch of personal lyric composition.

If one is to speak of Greek comedy from the point of lyric, one may say that Greek comedy is lyric organized into plot action, in which the lyric “authors” are turned into the dramatis personae. In fact, the “I” motif of Greek lyric still did not contain the lyric personality. In choral lyric the “I” is evoked by the subjective-objective character of the cosmos-collective as it sings of itself. As far as monody is concerned, its “I” too is presented as a still incomplete first person, as in gnomic, where this “I” can be called lacking in subject activity. The elegiast looks on from the side at purely external events, complains or is indignant; elegy, like iamb, requires people and events which lie outside the internal world of the author.

Characteristic for the melic poets is the singing of love in epithalamia, hymeneias, and choral songs—not their own love, but the love of gods and “heroes.” These crying Arignotas and melancholy Atlhises20 are still profoundly objective. It is a long time before one begins to find in songs not the love of Aphrodite for Adonis, but of human for human. But first “one’s own” feeling is defined by means of mythological repetition. People are still represented as conceptually-interpreted gods, and it is only instead of gods that people love. The mythological motifs are conceptually translated into the themes of “man.”

The lyric author still speaks for a god, and therefore speaks about himself. His personality, as Sappho demonstrates, grows out of the theme: one and the same subject-object image, in transition to concept, creates both the author as a separate entity and what the author sings about. This, by the way, explains the presence in the Classical period of such a strange genre as the epitaphs (epigrams) in which the dead man speaks in first person about himself. In these epitaphs the author and the dead man are not yet separated, and therefore in the Classical funerary lyric there is no defined conceptual author. Although the lyric poets were real people, the role of their personality was suppressed by the lyric mask. If we take such conceptual lyric poets as Tibullus or Propertius, even they can be seen to preserve the tradition of the two masks of the double Amor—the mask now of the sublime θεράπων of love, now of the base “obscene” hubrist.

In comedy the Tibulluses and Propertiuses still act not as personalities, but as masks or roles. Here they are the “old men” and “youths” for the most part, though in various incarnations.
If Tibulluses wrote in the manner of traditional lyric, adapting themselves to the mask of the θεράπτων, Archilochus and Alcaeus did not yet stylize themselves, remaining faithful to the form they followed. Farther back in time the Sapphic mask functioned without a real author Sappho.

It is a long time before the authorial “I” has personal significance. In post-Classical literature, especially in Apuleius and Petronius, “I” represents a phenomenon of literary style, an attempt to present the story “as if” in first person, but understanding the illusion of this device perfectly well. In itself the Roman novel is a conceptual form of hubristic comedy and hubristic lyric which have become narrative prose.

Drama followed the same path, from the passions of the god Dionysus to the acting of the professional actor—from image to concept.

In comedy the basic hero or god was the comic Dionysus, but in balagan—mime, satyricon—it was Heracles. In Cratinus and Aristophanes the passion god Dionysus acts the role of the fool. In Aristophanes he shares this role of fool with Heracles. In The Frogs he disguises himself not only as Heracles, but also as his own slave. Mime, which lay the foundation for palliata, can be clearly seen here as well: the same exchange, changing clothes, hoaxes, the doubling of roles and the transition from slave to god, from god to slave. Heracles is a real god, Dionysus an imaginary one; he is a pseudo-Heracles. In the second half of the comedy the role of the “pseudo” is played by Euripides, of the “authentic” by Aeschylus. The mocking of the mysteries underscores the hubrism of this parody even more. That modern scholars judge literary criticism in Aristophanes by The Frogs is laughable: Aeschylus is here depicted as a false messiah, not as Shakespeare.

It is not so much the names of various gods and heroes that are important as their function as expressed in the mask. The tragic and comic Dionysus is characteristic for Attica, but for the Doric tradition it is Heracles. From the point of view of theatrical ritual, Heracles is as much older than Dionysus as the folk theater is older than the age of Cleisthenes.

And here again it is not Heracles himself who is important, but his function, his mask. The mask, the external appearance of the actor, his costume from head to toe represented the legacy of mythological images with their mythological semantics. The conceptual content of the stage drama did not destroy their significance. For the Classical world it is characteristic that all the image props (in the literal sense) remained unchanged in drama, though in tragedy they no longer had any relation to the essence of the ideas.

Mask in tragedy and mask in comedy were based on completely different principles. In tragedy the mask is a living component of the genre. It emphasizes the ugliness of the character and contributes to the general tendency of debasing and “hubrization.” It expresses the absence of generalization, which also shows in the “types” of the masks, in that they are “given” as groups (masks of age, masks of sex, masks of roughly sketched characters). What is a mask essentially? It is an impersonal collective, the face of facelessness, characterized by two or three external static features. It is required in tragedy, but in comedy, based on the principle of dissonance and incongruity, on the rift between pseudo-real and real, image and concept, the mask acquires constructive significance. We must not forget, however,
that the ancient mask belongs not to the category of “character,” but to the real. If an actor wears a mask, then it means that a real member of the collective is performing in the form of the actor. This is the way it is in comedy. Every actor with a mask over his own (non-functioning!) face depicts someone “else,” not himself, but a specific person with a specific name. In Old Comedy this is done by a professional who artificially takes on the role of another person. In palliata not only does a professional act, but his role is also purely literary, behind it there is not a man of the real world, but a “character,” an invented and generalized person.

In low theater, however, we see either mythical heroes like Heracles or immediately real people. Jugglers, tricksters, buffoons, and acrobats do not pretend to be anybody. They are impersonal, anonymous, multiple, and separate. They are like masks as people; like masks they express a constant function limited to two or three features,—something preliterary, “living,” not “characters in a play.” One can compare them to the everyday singers, who sang certain “odii” (songs) during different kinds of work. Who were they? Not authors and not performers, but people who themselves worked and sang. The content of such songs, however, was not work at all. They sang of the dying fertility gods, and each person who worked and sang was identified with what he sang of.

Such a “lyric mask” was the lyric poet as well. Only he openly performed both roles, without concealing that the characters of his poems were he himself and his living, real contemporaries. But while remaining real the lyric author did not cease to be a mask. The peculiarity of Classical thought consists in the fact that for it “someone” is “no-one.” When it dwells on an individual phenomenon, it does not perceive its proper distinctiveness; it has yet to master the riches of abstraction. Every object turns to it the side of narrow unity and a series of minor external features; the difference between objects is so insignificant that it can be characterized by a summary mask. Classical thought cannot analyze, and therefore cannot synthesize. The method of idealization, which is indicative of Classical thought, was created by this inability to see the particular in the separate, the unity of different things in the general.

Such role-masks formed the constructive basis of comedy. With the appearance of concepts, however, lyric and drama took different paths. The lyric mask, having produced a certain type of “authors” and certain themes for songs, took the path of metaphorization of its motif; as I have already said, the basic song image began to turn into theme, author, addressee, motifs, and metaphors (similes, parallelisms, etc). In comedy these continue to be personae, “beings,” roles. Thus what in lyric is the motif of “wilting” or “cold,” “separation,” “spurned passion” etc. in comedy is “old men” and “old women”; and the motifs of “dawn” etc. in lyric are “youths” in comedy.

The biography-masks of lyric “authors” present an ancient mythological pantheon over which the lyric motifs were laid. Comedy presents precisely this “character” layer of lyric. It does not cultivate metaphors, similes, narrations, separate motifs, but continues to show characters visually, to mock characters, to turn events inside out using characters. It knows neither characters nor ideas, no matter how much we may cry about the ideas of Aristophanes. Any Lysistrata or Praxagora had the same mythological past as Sappho, Corinna, Erinna, Praxilla, and many others. In my work on Sappho I showed that lyric “poetesses” and the heroines of comedy turned out to be identical.
The difference between Old, Middle, and New Comedy is the difference in the kinds of thought that formed each of these genres which are semantically the same, but which went along three branches of mythological metaphors. Old Comedy reflects the early period of the appearance of concepts. Of course I do not mean to say that Epicharmus, Eupolis, and Aristophanes were not capable of thinking in concepts. But the genre they created belonged not so much to them as to an earlier tradition. Whatever Classical genre we choose, it is always more archaic than its author.

The question always arises: why was Old Comedy completely unrepeatable? In response people point to the political freedom in 5th century Athens which later disappeared, resulting in the disappearance of political comedy-satire. I disagree. Political satire based on conceptual generalization appeared only in Rome, even there in the “Silver” age. The unrepeatable uniqueness of Old Comedy lies in its ancient thought system which created this comedy. In later European literature only what could find a response in developed conceptual thought was continued. Neither Homer nor Aristophanes could have European followers, because their way of thinking had vanished forever into the past, historically unrepeatable. Vergil could be resurrected; Homer could not. One could continue Menander and Plautus, but Eupolis, Magnes, Cratinus, or Aristophanes did not fit conceptual norms.

The basic peculiarity of Old Comedy was that its main character was the author himself. This is why it is archaic, and this is its unrepeatable and main peculiarity.

Of course I mean parabasis, but in the broader sense. Parabasis not only moves comedy apart, showing who acts in it, but it also forces us to recognize the author behind all the characters. The peculiarity of the parabasis itself lies in the fact that it is choral. Thus the author is choral, like Ibycus, Alcman, and Stesichorus! He reveals a collective rather than a solo form. I can say without hesitation that the main character of Old Comedy is the author, whose nature is still single-multiple, subjective-objective. The chorus is the author. The author is the chorus.

What is depicted in parabasis? Nothing is depicted. Parabasis is not a scene and not a picture. It is not the bearer of action or epideictic (ἐπίδειξις=“showing”). It is entirely lyrical. The author-chorus only sings and “presents an introduction,” true, in a certain attitude: facing the audience after moving into the orchestra.

Parabatic songs had a stable structure, which clearly reveals the original binomial symbiosis of poetry and prose. Furthermore, in parabasis, as in other examples of Classical archaic lyric, poetry and prose were not yet like later poetic and prosaic genres. First the two elements of poetry and prose were found in the genre that subsequently came closer to poetry, later they survived in later Classical prose.

The structure of parabatic songs consisted of two antagonistic parts—both in contents and performance. Each of these parts in turn was divided into two principles opposed in rhythm and meaning—songs (ode, antode) and tale (epirrheme, antepirrheme). But as with every Classical genre, one can say that Old Comedy structure contains its former semantics. The structure of parabasis reveals an agon that unites the two contrasting parts of song-tale into one whole. The subject-object chorus-author incorporated its opposite as well, its opponent in rhythm, execution, and content.

In rhythm parabasis is divided into a melic and a recitative part (anapest systems and trochaic tetrameter). In content it consists of requests directed at the audience, complaints
about rivals, prayers to the gods, and defamation of opponents or of major political figures. One may say that the author-chorus has a special role of supplicant, who not only prays, asks, complains, laments, but also himself ludifies and mocks others. He performs elegiac and iambic functions at the same time. His theme is himself in relation to himself and to his antagonists.

If we take the parabasis in comparison to the tragic suppliant chorus—which is also in the role of main character—we immediately notice the analogy with parabasis and iamb. Aeschylus’ suppliant chorus, the *Suppliant Maidens*, in its first big parodos sings the ancient ἀριθμός, which consists of entreaty and curse: the chorus wishes for its persecutor to die in a storm at sea, just as Archilochus and Horace wished the same on their enemies, just as the authors of parabasis wished a mild “death” (a flop) on their rivals. Only in this archaic tragedy does the persecutor in the course of the action arrive on stage and attack his victims, while in the iambics and the parabasis the “persecution” has already turned into a plot motif.

It is not hard to see the former address-entreaty behind the parabatic chorus’s address to the audience. The chorus complained and cried, like the Suppliants, like a *piaculum*, like a purification victim; at the same time it too “persecuted” and “attacked,” turning from a victim to a destroyer. But what is this chorus which pronounces entreaties and invectives? Its dress shows that it is made up of animals, birds, insects, clouds. They, of course, cannot have a generalized social form of “people;” these are not concepts of clouds, wasps, birds, but mythological images of clouds, wasps, birds—that is, personified beings which are still fantastic, both nature and living creatures together.

Along with such a chorus-author we see in Old Comedy a series of individual characters. Their relation to the choral principle is like the relation of the iambic trimeter to the melic (or to the trochaic tetrameter): one system is of trimeter and conceptual, the other is melic and image-based. The individual characters of Old Comedy differ from the choral characters only in that they are already conceptually reworked; rather, conceptual thought has made them individual, separating them from the impersonal chorus. The antagonism between two halves of the chorus meanwhile began to be duplicated in the antagonism of two personal roles. The principle of opposition by age appeared: one role belonged to an old man, another to a youth. But the essence of the image behind these roles derives from the mythological “cities” (polis, peoples) which were either involved in agon or at “peace” in utopian bliss. Both are present not in motifs and plots, but in characters: the old men grow younger, feast, celebrate marriages, hubristically triumphing in their wrongness. In the kingdom of the hubristic Eirene-whore and sotescoundrels victory remains with the Dikeopolis, the unjust “Just cities,” the “pseudos.”

Parabasis shows that the main hubrist in Old Comedy is the author himself. He is never compared to a youth in his basic function. His role is that of old man, people, polis; of course it is a “comic” polis-people, i.e. the figure of the imaginary savior, the imaginary wise man, the imaginary benefactor. In essence it is the author himself who through the duration of the whole comedy sings his cynical little songs, shames and ludifies his contemporaries, praises himself and brags. The youth never celebrates a final and conclusive marriage. The old man himself dances an obscene dance at his own wedding or embraces hetairai, and along with him, in his place the chorus-author does the same. Old Comedy differs sharply from Middle Comedy in this role of the author. In palliata the old man suffers defeat, the youth is tormented, and the hubrist-slave emerges
victorious. The author of Old Comedy has a role that is more archaic in its summarity: in the form of the main character, the old man, he is cynical and victorious like the slave in palliata, and in the parabasis he worries and complains like the youth in palliata. It is clear that once his female complement could only be a hubristic old woman, not a young hetaira. In fact, of all the Classical comedies only in Old Comedy do we find the old woman eros. This is a purely iambic image, which figures in fragments of lyric from Archilochus to the Roman period (as I have already said). In Pherecrates’s “Old Women” the main characters were in fact old women; according to the pattern of all Old Comedy these old women were reborn as young women. Doubtless hubristic eros played a central role in such a comedy. This is demonstrated by the former dominance in Old Comedy of the characters of old people as well, not only old men, but also old women. Without social ground, however, the motif of old women in love in Old Comedy turned into something peripheral and secondary.

Old and Middle Comedy had no ideological purpose. If it is non-sensical to make Aristophanes into an amusing and entertaining character, it is equally nonsensical to make him into a politician, agitator, and ideologist. The political motifs of Old Comedy do not make it a political genre. Cratinus, Eupolis, and Aristophanes created political parody, but not satire. The difference is immense. Parody is a “shadow” of a serious genre, its “external appearance” devoid of content. In place of content parody presents a hubristic “on the contrary,” i.e. emptiness and contentlessness, concealed by formal likeness to what it “imitates,” what it “mocks.” And it mocks individual people, not ideas at all; we are led astray by the fact that parody ludifies significant characters—priests, politicians, philosophers, military leaders. Satire, on the other hand, is always ideological; by satirizing individual people, it always means a phenomenon in general. Satire is a result of generalizing thought, and it is no accident that it does not appear in Greece.

To seek ideas in Aristophanes’ comedies means not to understand the main peculiarity of Old Comedy and to demand “ideological content” and “socio-political purpose” of Classical parody.

Ancient art had no other way to depict a braggart or charlatan than in the form of important contemporaries whom it traditionally “parodied” or “played” (ludified, invected). The bragging warrior could only be depicted in the form of Cleon and Lamachus. The charlatan had to wear the mask of Socrates and bear his name. But when our scholars begin to discuss Aristophanes’ or Eupolis’ hatred of their contemporary political regime based on the figures of Cleon, Lamachus, Hyperbolus, Alcibiades, and Pericles, they reveal their complete lack of understanding of the very nature of ancient comedy. In some cases a man gets into the women’s mysteries of the Thracian goddess, and the comedian gives him the name of Alcibiades (Eupolis’ Baptae); this creates the impression of historicity in connection with the charge of blasphemy against Alcibiades. But in other cases a man gets into the women’s mysteries of Demeter, and the comedian makes him an “agent” of Euripides (Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae). The same type of the buffoon of comedy varies slightly, giving him the name now of a famous politician, now of a famous tragedian with a few of his superficial features. This is exactly what distinguishes parody from satire: it deals only
with given concrete characters and events without generalizing them at all. Parody has no background. Parody spreads its hubrism no farther than the concrete person it names, and the nature of the hubrism is so narrow and specific that it would be completely antihistorical to ascribe to it features of satirical generalizing thought (“ideological tendency”). Where there is not generalization there can be no public purpose. Old Comedy deals exclusively with specific people, but not with phenomena. Therefore there is no social element in Old Comedy.

Like the Sophists, Aristophanes approached the concept through the image. Everything he depicted had to have a name and a definite given concreteness. The more historical and real one character or another was, the more visible it was, the better suited it was to figure in Old Comedy. The human personality, the character of a person did not interest Aristophanes yet. He did not see them. “Character” is a generalization, the beginning of generalization that will appear a century later. Who now can consider the Socrates of The Clouds from the point of view of philosophy or find in the Lamachus of the Acharnians traces of Greek strategy or in The Birds the history of ancient city building? But it is equally ridiculous to seek in these parodies the ideology of major, middle, and small landowners and to recreate Aristophanes’ political platform based on Cleons, Pisthetaeruses, and Strepsiades. There is no doubt that Aristophanes had a definite ideology, i.e. views, tastes, interests, sympathies and antipathies. But having an ideology and being an ideologist are two different things. I am sure that Aristophanes liked the theater of Euripides and respected Socrates, gladly visited the court and public meetings, was on the side of those who fought, wanted wealth and did not want to live outside Athens, saw the humorous sides of the landowners—major, middle, and small. But if we painstakingly gather up all these little bits from his comedies and find some sum of his private view of things, will this show us Aristophanes as an ideologist of a certain layer of a certain class? And if it does, what does it do for us?

The gallery of separate characters and odd motifs in Old Comedy shows a certain parataxis of thought, “point-like” thought, the absence of the discursive process. Phenomena are perceived in the form of separate, almost immobile concrete specifics (konkretnost’), even in the form of figures, and independent events, which are not linked by the sequence of cause and effect; they are short, one like another, isolated and frontal, there is no more to them than what they show. Allegorism is the greatest slander of Classical Greece. Old Comedy says nothing more than it shows, more important, nothing more than who it shows. Background and backstage are foreign to it. It knows neither depth nor generalization. All of its epideictics take place immediately before the eyes of the audience. Laughter and obscenity are its native elements.

Structurally the main character of Old Comedy is the author himself. I do not mean to suggest that Aristophanes is a primitive man or a primitive mind that cannot distinguish subject from object and think “logically.” I understand that Aristophanes was one of the smartest and wittiest men of his age, and we are unfortunately in no condition to appreciate the full force of his wit. But Aristophanes’ logic, though very powerful, is as different from our logic as the Classical period is different from ours. That industry in our day is very far from the technique of slaves’ hands is clear to all. But for some reason in the sphere of consciousness it is usual to identify us and ancient people; any attempt to approach this problem historically meets sharp resistance. But I would like to point out something else. The proportions between private ideology and its expression in art are
different in every period. More than once I have had to defend the idea that in Greek genres, no matter how “personal” in form, the conscious side of the author’s personality was hardly ever reflected, and it did not attempt to be reflected and could not be.

Making a speech in the parabasis, the author separated himself from his characters perfectly well. Now he was already present in them in another way—through the stream of wit and “foolishness”, in that he laughed at and mocked every mask and laughed along with it. Old Comedy, however, is the most archaic genre in Greece—much more archaic than the Homeric epic. It is still all epideictic, all visual exposition, in scattered individual characters, the central role of the author-chorus, the foul language and showing of filth, foul-actions of the author himself, and the ludified living characters. The archaic nature of Old Comedy is shown in the fact that here literary comedy is still leavened with everyday life, which intrudes immediately into it as in balagan: _οἱ παρόντες_—these are not simply spectators, already separated from the stage, but “present,” standing around or sitting, co-participants in the hubristic act, these Cleons, Euripideses, Alcibiadeses, Timons, in part performing masked on stage, in part the objects of invective among the public. In palliata the playing space is already completely separated from the audience space, in Old Comedy it is not. This allows us to speak about Aristophanes’ conservatism and to see in Old Comedy a realistic genre. But this is a mistake. Ludification is not realism. The archaic nature of the genre is not the conservatism of the author.

Both are explained by the historical course of events. Old Comedy was the first form of literary comedy, the first in the whole world. It was the first since the time of balagan to make living people into literary characters. This fact is extremely interesting and significant, much more significant than the question of which group of landowners Aristophanes was the ideologist of.

Great changes in creative thought had to take place in order for a real live person to turn into a literary character. It did not happen overnight. Such a change took place approximately in the same forms that story appeared in. For this to happen the object of depiction had to be completely separated from the depictor; not only did it have to be separated, it had to take on a new qualitative peculiarity that it did not have before. A person took on such a quality when he changed from a concrete-physical category into a logical category, the “concept” of the person and the conceptual “image” of a person. Thus an actor imitating a dead man during the funeral performed a certain ritual without putting on a dramatic performance. So long as he was thought of as a physical “likeness” of some person, he only repeated him, imitating precisely his manners, looks, clothes. This was the same dead man, only alive—a living double of the dead. It is different when the actor “as if” coincides with the person he portrayed: he really was not him and had nothing in common with him, but “likened himself to” him. The person the actor recreated consciously was no longer resurrected in him physically and authentically; instead he took on purely illusory existence.

Thus a living person turned into an object of depiction, a literary character, The immediate verbal-active recreation of this person among others, some of whom passively
watched those who acted, made him a character of drama as opposed to a narrative character.

First—in Old Comedy—the depiction of real people took place in spectacle form, in characters presented immediately and visibly, as if the character of the comedy really were the real person who was “represented.” It was still not generalized at all and did not stray from its living model in the sense of appearance, name, profession. Nevertheless, such realism was very archaic. It was explained by an inability to distance oneself from the concrete. The more complicated the system of consciousness, the richer the “design” of mental constructions, the greater the distancing from concrete nature, the more independent the interpretation. On the other hand, when individual concepts first appeared thought was still “chained” to the living concrete, was only with difficulty abstracted from it towards mental creation, still followed the visible and the sensible, the unique and the empirically given. Through a specific person, through his name, his occupation, his appearance, thought is directed to the concept “of” a person, regardless of his name, of whether he likes pirozhki or soup, has a hetaira, or holds a certain post. The Classical comic sphere is very concrete, shallow, and narrow, and it consists only of particulars. Such is the character of Old and Middle Comedy. On one hand, here the mask dominates, because people are perceived summarily, without distinctive features; on the other hand, each person is taken individually, as a concrete given devoid of generalization. Everything external in the person is noticed, so to say, the least important—what is inessential and does not have a leading psychological or social significance. Man is shown in resultative actions and only in the external features of appearance and behavior—standard, shallow, narrowly concrete, like, for example, striving for satiating his body or for dishonest gains, etc. Hubrism colors this excessively narrow concretization with the “base”: a low style, base motivations, base characters. Such realism naturally turns into naturalism, since the comic sphere leaves no room—purely cognitively—for ideals or any kind of romanticism. The distance between the empirically present concrete fact and the concept of this fact is still very small.

While palliata (and apparently Middle Comedy as well) is created when the subjective-objective “spectacle” is transformed into an object of depiction, into a plot played by stage actors, Old Comedy is to a significant degree “spectacle,” leaving on stage living real types, even though they are played by actors in the actual theater. In this respect Old Comedy is not yet completely literary comedy like, for example, palliata or Menander. Characteristically, in it there is not yet a prologuist, which there is, however, in Menander and Plautus. The author has not yet become prologuist, i.e. an actor on stage; he performs in person, as a pre-character, pre-literarily, like the Cleons and Socrateses in balagan. Thus the role of the author in Old Comedy retained its archaic features longer than the roles of other characters. And as the parabasis, in spite of its disconnection from the main plot of the comedy, remained the semantic center there, so the author, in spite of his absence among the characters of comedy, remained the main character in it. In this respect the author of Old Comedy reveals the only analogy to the lyric author, who is also still a living, real, and completely concrete person, who has not yet become a literary character (like Sappho in Catullus or, I think, Sulpicia\textsuperscript{32}). Apparently parabasis with the author as the central figure went into the center of comedy as mime into palliata, as narration into exposition. But parabasis has no relation to the action of comedy, it does not reveal the basic idea, does not coordinate the episodes and
characters. But most important, it itself is neither an object of mockery, nor a plot, nor an
episode of comedy. Parabasis is a piece of preconceptual material that has remained
without being logically needed or semantically justified in the middle of the composition
of Old Comedy, a composition that already bears the features of conceptual reworking,
while in later Middle Comedy the mime in it became a constructive plot.

But what are the results of conceptual reworking in Old Comedy? First of all thematic
novelty: the “polis” theme has become “political,” though very nomenclature-oriented,
expressed in invective against “political” figures or in the caricatured portrayal of
“polities.” It is also shown in the role of the author, who can use the archaic structure of
the parabasis and of the whole comedy, filling it with contemporary themes. For example,
he turns the triumph of the hubristic “miasma” into conceptual “injustice,” “perfidy” that
he suffers not as a “purifying sacrificial victim,” but as a conceptual “purifier of the
country,” i.e. an exposé of villains.

The conceptual reworking is also shown in the transition from “the contemporary”
immediately present in balagan to a form of the first literary generalization, i.e. to plot
and character. The law court was often imitated in parodies, but it was the real court,
taken from life; even the judges hubristically portrayed themselves, and priests performed
blasphemous services, and kings played slaves. But in The Wasps we see “literary,”
abstract pictures of the courtroom, depicting only those separate features which were
particularly in contrast with the conceptual logic of things.

In Sophocles a realistically portrayed Deianira tells about a monster who loves her, in
Euripides Madness is a character, in Aeschylus the daughters of Ocean fly on stage. Therefore the problem is not that Peace descends to earth or that a beetle ascends to heaven. The problem is only that Aristophanes confronts the mythological meaning with the conceptual, and the tragedians remove this contrast. Old Comedy is still at the juncture of two ways of thinking, and this is why it is different. In Middle and New Comedy “comism” is no longer based on the incongruity of mythic and realistic.

But in Old Comedy this incongruity distinguishes the entire genre. Not only does it
give a comic effect to myth and “politics,” it also creates the grotesque. Fantastic
characters and situations are present in Old Comedy because it consciously uses the
concept to knock down mythological image. Old Comedy has characters that in Homeric
similes took the form of natural elements and animals compared to heroes. Fish, wasps,
birds, clouds, beasts, asses—these are the components of similes applied to heroes, but
they are also heroes-choruses in Old Comedy; furthermore it is in comedy that they have
the archaic mythological character of hero-animals and hero-elements; in Homer they are
only comparative concepts applied to heroes. We see that in Homer concepts act as a new
form for assimilation of mythological images and represent in this respect the first stage
of reworking of the image into the concept. Old Comedy acts differently. It mixes two
different spheres, and the result is the fantastic. When in Aeschylus Darius comes out of
the underworld it is not funny, but when Solon (in Cratinus) or Pericles (in Eupolis) come out of Hades it is funny. There is nothing fantastic in the fact that Homer’s Achaean are compared to wasps, but Aristophanes’ Athenians compared to wasps or in the form of wasps are fantastic and grotesque. Why? Because in Homer and in tragedy there is no conceptually realistic background, while in Old Comedy it is marked, and everything that obviously does not correspond to it contributes to the fantastic or the humorous. Thus in Eupolis the appearance of the demagogue Hyperbole as a slave is
very comical, while in Euripides the appearance of the queen Andromache as a slave is very tragic. Here we can add something else. Tragedy presents the depiction of social-moral incongruity which shocks the audience. Old Comedy portrays a purely external contrast based on absurd situations and thereby amuses.

In creating fantastic and humorous, grotesque and burlesque, Old Comedy cultivates mythological travesty. Plato’s *Long Night* has not been preserved, but judging by Aristophanes’ *Frogs* or Cratinus’ *Dionisalexander* (plus vase paintings), the comedy of the marriage between Zeus and Alcmene evoked laughter by placing the gods (the sphere of mythological images) in the situation of people (the conceptual sphere); while Plautus’ *Amphitryon* with the same plot builds comedy on the intrigue resulting from the similarity of characters, no matter whether the characters are gods or men (stabilized conceptual thought).

In Old Comedy the so-called grotesque is merely antireal phantasmagoria—something that seems to be authentic, but in reality is consciously imaginary. Aristophanes’ knights, farmers, judges, politicians and Sophists represent not real people at all, but the same wasps, frogs, fish, birds, the same clouds. However, the wit lies in the fact that the wasps, the frogs, the birds, and the clouds are also “pseudo:” in Old Comedy people too are merely “as if” people, and animals only “as if” animals. What in Homer was a reliable object of comparison is a comic fiction in Old Comedy, and its unlikeness is emphasized. Literary illusion, which makes the imaginary seem like the real (“like,” “as if”) in Old Comedy is still simulation, purely external as in comic balagan spectacles.

Above I mentioned the “point-like” nature of separate motifs and characters in Old Comedy. It really does not have continuous development of plot and continuous course of action, just like Hesiod’s *Works and Days* where there is no continuous narration. Thought, which has not yet mastered the process of cause and effect and is indifferent to psychological argumentation wends its way from episode to episode, from one concrete particular to another, without noticing the sum of its parts and the unnecessary duplications. The attempt of scholarship to show the semantic unity in the structure of Old Comedy is predictable. But it is not worth the effort to attempt to show the formal unity of this structure. It is useless to try to prove that the agon comes before or after the parabasis, that the sacrifice precedes the agon or concludes it, because their distribution plays no consistent role. It is obvious that the action in Old Comedy does not develop. It has no tension, does not move forward, does not reach a peak and fall. The structure of Old Comedy is not conceptual or causal, in spite of the fact that it is full of causal content. Hence, again, the comism of Old Comedy. The sentence of Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* (apparently like the sentence of Sophocles and Euripides in Phrynichus’ *Muses*) was handed down according to all the norms of conceptual judgment; however, the passing of the sentence by Dionysus, in the underworld with Pluto, made the entire competition a comic one (as in Phrynichus, where the muses were the judges at such a competition). Thus the structural katabases came into humorous conflict with the content. But the comic force of dissonance was even more audible when the agon was between a bird and a logically reasoning man in Aristophanes’ *Birds*, though the motif of leaving Athenian society for solitude (Phrynichus*) or in search of a better “politic” (Aristophanes), was completely founded.

The same must be said for the heroes of Old Comedy. The plural-individual chorus fell apart into chorus, author, and characters. These characters, however, were not
internally connected to one another, nor were they connected to the chorus or the author. They were separate parts of the former mixed impersonal chorus, which preserved impersonality and archaic static quality in spite of the wealth of external movement in the scenes of agon and “sharing of parts.” I called them “point-like.” They are more like homogeneous, whole, unchanging atoms as they were thought of by the ancient atomists: each such atom was separated from others like it and moved independently in space, sometimes touching another atom, sometimes moving away from it. The same thought created individual concepts of things and phenomena deprived of internal connection both in philosophy and in art. People and nature were thought of as schematically monolithic, without particular qualitative distinctions, without being made up internally of different components, without parts that contradicted each other and continuously changed and became their opposites, parts that had a great quantity of shades, shadings and undertones. People and nature still sang in unison, wore masks, and were painted in monochromes, with no half-tones. This was true even in the second half of the 5th century.
In modern literature tragedy (drama) can choose any subject and any conflict. Classical tragedy had definite limits. It had to be based on myth and on the conflict of two opposing ethical principles, in the vast majority of cases showing the downfall of the subjective principle, identified ethically with impurity. Greek tragedy emphasizes the role of the objective principle, against which the will of man is dashed; it acts against man, whether he is right or wrong in the subjective sphere, and has the form of inevitability and predestination—fate. Thus the ethical conflict in Greek tragedy is unique; this ethical system is such that it takes into consideration the actions of the hero only in relation to what is objective. Such an ethical system is so archaic that in it things personal and human are not debated at all.

The basic tragic collision changes only in Euripides, and in content, not in form. In Euripides the conflict of the objective and the subjective leads as before to the downfall of the subjective, but it is physical downfall; moral superiority is on the side of the subjective. In this Euripides is a predecessor of palliata: in the comedy of the cloak the personal principle triumphs.

Nevertheless Greek tragedy is distinguished from later European drama in more than its plot and basic conflict. Its uniqueness lies in its obligatory structure—structure and not only composition. Each part of tragedy has its specific position; they follow one after another in a canonized traditional order: this is their composition. The structure is how the tragedy is built, independently of the order in which the separate parts are distributed. If it acted only as the skeleton of tragedy, its role would not be so decisive: but it constructs the material and determines its qualities.

The structure of Aeschylus’ Seven is very archaic. Although the conflict of the tragedy is concentrated on Eteocles and Polynices, on stage we have the regularly alternating lines of the messenger and Eteocles; Polynices does not appear on stage. Likewise the event that comprises the plot of the tragedy—the Argive attack—is not on stage; nor are the “seven” leaders themselves, nor their arrival, nor the elements of siege and battle, to say nothing of the meeting of the brother-enemies. Action is absent from the tragedy, neither is there any plot movement. Formally The Seven consists of the seven stories of the messenger against the background of the chorus’ prayers and seven responses of Eteocles, accompanied by the exclamations of the chorus (which consist all seven times of the same number of lines). It is again the messenger who recounts the duel of the two
brothers, which also takes place outside the action on stage. And then these two brothers’
two sisters lament the “murdered murderers.”

It is completely obvious that the formal side of the tragedy does not embrace its
ideological meaning, or rather it still can neither comprehend nor express it. A huge
amount of space in tragedy is taken up by elements that will in time move into the
background: the role of the messenger, or verbal exposition (description), of the standard
alternating dialogues between the same two characters, and of the choral prayers.

The principle of pairing and symmetry fundamental to every tragedy gives the two
brothers in The Seven two sisters. One of the brothers, however, is not on the stage, but
the “eyewitness of events,” the messenger is constantly present. The “events” that he
“witnesses” are death. Seven times he comes to Eteocles, and each “coming” is
accompanied by a story. But these seven stories of the messenger-witness are very
peculiar. Each one of them is an ecphrasis. The messenger describes the leaders seven
times by the same scheme: first he gives a description of the leader himself, then of the
picture on his shield. The ancient character of such descriptions cannot be doubted. Here
moving events and motivations are replaced by flat, atemporal descriptions of separate
figures; but there is no story that reveals actions and causes—the story takes the form of
“showing.” The stable method of ecphrasis, by means of which the human personality
was described, connects the “witnessing” of the messenger with the kingdom of death,
with mirage. The witness sees a vision with his eyes and then announces it. So it is in
myth. Concept reads the mythological image causally, “rationalistically.” Mirage is
represented as art; the picture on the shield is described. While the shield of Homer’s
Achilles is openly a cosmos, the shields of the seven leaders are only attributes of heroes.
They are, however, given great semantic significance, or they would not take up so many
central positions.

If concepts had been created after images died off, mythological images would not be
present inside every concept, would not stick out of them, would not dominate them with
their meaning that is no longer needed. Every tragedy was constructed economically,
calculated for a definite space of time. In tragedy as nowhere else every scene, every
expression is thought out and significant. Why should the same method of describing the
pictures on the shields be repeated seven times? There can be only one answer: the
pictures on the shields are constructively necessary. For what? They take the place of
later “indirect characterization” of the characters used consistently in European drama.
Greek tragedy does not yet know of such characterization. It uses description of purely
external features of the characters who are not present on stage. Thus Tydeus makes
noise, rages, blasphemes, “screams like a dragon,” shakes the mane of his helmet, strains
forward; Capaneus the giant’s main features are bragging and audacity; a third knight
drives wild horses; Hippomedon appears with a loud cry; Parthenopaeus (son-virgin or
virgin’s son) has a virginal appearance (conceptually: the appearance of a virginal
youth); Amphiaraurus is “the most sensible, the best in courage,” as to Polynoeics’
characterization, it is given only in the indirect account of his curses.

The pictures on the shields perform the function of characterizing the heroes. Achilles
is not characterized by his shield at all; it shows the great skill of Hephaestus, the creator
of the shield, but this shield could be carried by any hero. The same can be said of
Heracles’ shield. But the shields of the “seven leaders” are completely different. Each
one is characterized by the picture wrought on his shield. Tydeus’ has a “sky blazing with
stars;”8 in the middle of the shield is a shining full moon—“the elder of the stars, the eye of night.”9 Capaneus’ shield has a naked man, a fire-bearer with a blazing torch in his hand and the golden inscription “I will burn the city down.”10 The third leader has wrought on his shield a hoplite clambering up the steps of a ladder onto the enemy wall to destroy it;11 his cry, like Capaneus’, is depicted in an inscription which says that Ares himself could not throw him from these tower walls.12 Hippomedon’s shield is decorated with a ring of serpents, among which was the figure of Typhon belching black smoke from his fire-breathing mouth, “the scattering sister (smoke is feminine in Gk) of fire;”13 Typhon, filled with Ares, let out warlike cries, casting horror with his eyes, in a warlike frenzy like a possessed bacchant.14 Parthenopaeus had a shield with a beaten sphinx (the Greeks’ “sphinx” was a virgin girl, which is why it is connected to a virgin-like hero), leading the Cadmean who can send the greatest number of arrows into the city.15

That the pictures on the shields are duplicates of the heroes and, thus, their characterization is particularly obvious from the shields of Amphiaras and Polyneices. The pious Amphiaras has no picture on his shield. On the other hand the impious Polyneices, the main villain, carries a shield with a “deceitful sign,”16 namely Dike leading into his father’s house.17 Thus the very presence of “signs” on the shield turns out to be a negative feature.

Each impious man characterized by the messenger is opposed to a virtuous man designated by Eteocles for a duel with the impious one. Thus as he answers the messenger in regularly alternating lines Eteocles reveals the meaning of the pictures the messenger describes in the form of ecphrasis. The night sky on Tydeus’ shield predicts the hubristic shameful death of Tydeus himself, whose eyes will be covered by the night of death, Eteocles designates as his opponent Melanippus, who “honors the throne of Shame,”18 whom “Dike will send to the mother-parent (i.e. the city) to remove the enemy spear.”19 The picture of fire on the shield of the blasphemer Capaneus, for whom Zeus’ thunderbolts were no more than noon-time heat, foretells the fiery lightning—authentic lightning—“no longer like the noontime heat of the sun:”20 it will melt Capaneus’ audacity in its flame. The trustworthy and true bulwark of the city will be Polyphontes (“killer of many”). The chorus pronounces a curse for the destruction of Capaneus by lightning.

The semantics of the shield is particularly revealed when Eteocles designates an opponent for Hippomedon. While the latter’s shield showed the fire-breathing Typhon, the defender of the city, the flawless Hyperbius, has a shield with the unshakeable seated Zeus with a flaming arrow in his hand; and just as Zeus defeated Typhon (in myth), so on the shield Zeus will become the savior of Hyperbius. The chorus cries out, “I believe that Zeus’ opponent, who has on his shield the unpleasant likeness of the underworld divinity—an evil likeness for mortals and for the long-living gods—will lay down (“throw down”) his head at the gates.”21 Hippomedon is called in these words the opponent of Zeus, but not of Hyperbius: a remnant of the idea that the shields themselves fight, not their bearers. This explains why the pictures on the shields characterize their owners.

The opponent designated for Parthenopaeus is Actor, who is incapable of bringing harm on the city by bringing into it a deadly beast (i.e. a sphinx), “the likeness of the one who carries it;”22 here too the picture is likened to its owner.
Finally, Dike on Polyneices’ shield is understood by Eteocles as vengeance for the impious, and he himself goes out to duel with his brother. The chorus begs him to stay; fratricide, it says, is “miasma,” impurity;23 there are enough Thebans to fight with the Argives—“this is purifying blood.”24 These very terms are enough to show that Polyneices and the “seven leaders” are represented as hubrists, pharmakoi, scapegoats, purifying animals.

Each picture on the shields shows this central image in a few object mythological metaphors: Tydeus is the night of the sky with the moon, “the eye of night,”25 Capaneus is the night fire of a torch, Adrastus—destruction, Hippomedon—titanomachy, Parthenopaeus—a deadly monster, Polyneices—the capture of a town. All six pictures are negative; only one positive hero lacks a “sign”, Amphaiaurus, but he too is drawn into the evil deeds of the other six. These “seven,” as the very number shows, present the image of death, of destruction; each one of the seven corresponds to a “gate” of seven-gated Thebes. Seven leaders are seven gates, and the city that the impious leaders hope to take by force is these seven “gates”—Thebes. In this myth the city presents the image of the kingdom of the dead, the underworld. The battle takes place at the gates, and the participants in battles at such “entrances” and “doors” are not living people, but the dead. This is why the chorus significantly entreats Eteocles, “may you not follow these roads to the seven gates!”26

2

The action of every Greek drama always takes place in front of “entrances.” For the most part, they are the doors of houses. A number of tragedies have scenes with entrance beneath the earth in a relatively direct form; then these are not “houses,” but tombs. For the Classical period such a motif is very characteristic: someone comes to the door, to the gates, to a window and prays to be let in or for the window, door, or gates to open.27 This motif became the basis for many lyric songs and dramas. Such are the “door laments,” laments at the window, such in large part is the palliata, in which there is not only the element of “arrival” and entreaty, but also a second action—the opening of the doors or gates and the “appearance” of a panorama. So it is in drama. But, as is well known, the same is true of mystery, of visionary genres, of balagan. Kroll correctly pointed out that in mysteries a door or window opens before the myst, with the world of the gods inside, behind the door.28 This is εποπτικά, opening and revelation [otkryvan’ë i otkroven’ë], the highest form of mystery, which consisted of beholding with one’s own eyes and contemplation. It organizes not only mystery, but also “spectacle” in balagan and in theater.

The connection between drama and mystery has been discussed for a long time, beginning with Dieterich;29 but here I have in mind not what they have in common with cult forms, much less the influence or borrowing of mystical forms into tragedy, but the substratum of visionary performances that precipitated into balagan, into everyday life (aedicula, double clay sileni), in mystery, in the temple, and in drama. Let me stress that I mean here not only the external mystical forms, but revelation, with which the Classical theater was connected, tragedy in particular.

Exits, entrances, entreaties act in tragedy as constructive elements, composing its structure, i.e. its organic framework. While in lyric serenade is a song of entrance and
entreaty for an exit (show yourself, come out, open the door or the window) and the alba is a song of exit (dawn has come, farewell), in tragedy parodos is the entrance of the chorus which organizes the beginning of the action and the exodos is the exit of the chorus which organizes the end of the action. The soloists are also “entering” and “exiting”; their “appearances” comprise with their exits the structural essence of drama. The mythological significance of such entrances and exits is well known: even Iamblichus in his “Life of Pythagoras” interpreted entrance and arrival as the idea of god and exit as the idea of death.

In drama entrances and exits take place into the house and out of the house, not only onto and off of the stage. In comedy (in palliata) there are two house-antagonists. In tragedy it is not house-buildings but house-families that are at odds; quarrels between houses and the founding of new house-lines are the basic motifs of tragedy. But there one can still sense the traces of presentations in which the “earth” and “city” were thought of as beings. Thus many tragedies begin with an address to the city, to the earth, to the country, later—to the inhabitants of the city: this is the most ancient pre-human character in tragedy, judging by the chorus, it was zoomorphic. In The Seven it is not two houses that quarrel, but two brothers of one house; but the seven brothers “arrive” at the seven gates. Such, however, is the general plot of the tragedy The Seven, but in its structure it is the messenger who enters and exits and on whom the entire action of this tragedy is based. He exits, sees, enters, and communicates what he has seen; his every speech is an ecphrasis, a story about a “picture,” about something “seen,” about what the Greeks called θέαμα or θαυμα. In this archaic tragedy the messenger retains his central constructive role as much as the chorus in The Suppliants retains the ancient role of the choral character. Here the messenger performs his original role of ἐπόπτης or, as he calls himself, καθόπτης (καθόπτης), the character specially designated to “watch;” of course in Aeschylus this “watcher” already performs the purely realistic function of a “witness,” who reports to the king on what he has seen. Nevertheless, aside from ecphrasis his speeches are characterized by similes. Of course similes in the mouth of a slave are not very likely. But they are easily explained as a formant of the former “likenesses,” the ἐικόνες that were a variant of the ecphrasis. Thus the messenger compares all seven leaders to lions, and Tydeus to a dragon and a heated horse when it is bridled and hears the war trumpet. In his speech about Capaneus he recounts that the latter compares Zeus’ lightning to noontime rays. In the story about the third leader the comparison of the hero to a heated horse conceptually turns into the image of the hero driving heated horses in circles. In the corresponding part of the description of Hippomedon we have a lacuna, but Eteocles compares this hero to a dragon as well. The messenger compares the reason of Amphiaraus to a field that yields fruit in the form of good decisions; this simile is conceptually turned into a metaphor (“he reaps the harvest from the deep furrow of wisdom, from which prudent decisions grow”). Eteocles continues this image: “the field of destruction yields fruit in death.”

Ecphrases and of the messenger are a verbal showing of what he has seen “there,” at the seven gates, where he “exited” and from where he “appeared.” Every messenger in tragedy comes from afar and tells how the death of the hero took place; but the messenger in The Seven depicts the image of the seven leaders at the seven gates—a different, more archaic form of return from death, “witnessing” and “showing”. In
mystery “the miraculous” was “shown.” The special term that designated this main mysteries act at the same time means “consecrate” (theater), “dedicate,” “represent,” “show.” The theater is wholly based on showing what can be “seen;” the messenger recreates in words what he himself has seen.

Entreaty accompanies arrival at the closed doors in mystery, in lyric, and in drama. The branch of entreaty was hung on the doors of a house or a temple. Such ritual hiketeria and prayer for life runs all through tragedy. In some cases it is prayer at an altar, in others for purification, even more often (like in The Seven) for protection. Entreaty can be connected with the entrance of the person who prays—like, for example, the children with olive branches in Oedipus. Aeschylus’ suppliants, who come from afar, pray at the entrance to the city to be accepted, let into a foreign land; Euripides’ suppliants, the mothers of the seven fallen leaders, also come from afar and pray for their dead sons to be accepted by the earth—for them to be buried in a foreign land. What Euripides leaves untouched in the ancient plot Aeschylus reworks conceptually. If we analyze the motifs of entreaty in tragedy, it will turn out that people always pray before death, and they pray to be saved, to be granted life; letting in, accepting—either freeing or burial all meant “saving” and “rebirth” in myth. Conceptual understanding puts new meaning into these images. In mystery, in lyric, and in folk drama the lament at the doors, the entrance at night, the entreaty to be received, to open the doors, to be let in has an immediate mythological form. In tragedy these forms are varied conceptually. With the exception of such archaic structures as that of The Seven, entreaty in tragedy takes the form of supplication, that is entreaty of the sacrificial animal, the purifying victim, and it is connected with the basic idea of tragedy, with catharsis. In The Seven the entreaty of the chorus for the salvation of the city is conceptually separated from the action at the seven gates. But if we read the image as it is given by mythological semantics in the structure of The Seven, the chorus itself, incarnating the city, prays at the seven gates for its salvation. This is also shown by the circumstance that the chorus in The Seven is made up of women, girls. Yet it is completely impossible for the main characters, Eteocles and the seven leaders, not to have a male collective correlate in the chorus: as a rule the soloist and the chorus are united, and one cannot have a women’s chorus with a male protagonist. This is explained by the fact that “city” in Greek is feminine in gender (polis), and at the end of the tragedy the brother-enemies are lamented by their two sisters Antigone and Ismene. The structure of the stichomythia between the two sisters is extremely archaic. It is built on polarity and parallelism of lines, on the image of the “murdered murderer,” on undivided active-passive incarnated in the two sisters of two brothers. Antigone and Ismene, characters in Sophocles’ tragedy (like Electra and Chrysothemis) were in myth characters overlaid later by the figure of Eteocles and of Polynices, who is not shown on stage. But with the two girls there remained the chorus of girls. This is the ancient active-passive image of the “city,” besieged, lamenting, praying for salvation, but at the same time it is seven-gated death.

Seven heroes swore to take the seven-gated (feminine) city by force. This is the theme that is varied in [Aeschylus’] The Suppliants, but in its women’s aspect, as rape.
Thus seven raging men kill a bull and touch its blood, “the bull’s murder,”33 with their hands, swearing either to take the city or to defile the earth with their own death and murder. Their “iron-souled spirit breathes, flaming with courage like lions who see Ares.”34 After the oath the seven leaders lead seven army divisions to the seven gates of the city.

All of this the audience learns not from the action and not from the prologue, but from the messenger, “the day-seeing eye” which reliably communicates all it sees. Most important for tragedy is the visual communication of the messenger who has come from beyond the boundaries of the city.

The attacking army is called a “wave on dry land,” and the cavalry running ahead “flows,” thunders, makes noise like “irresistible water rushing in the mountains;”35 “the wave” of men “splashes” against the city. The terms of noise, cry, roar that usually describe waves and water accompany the images of water in which the appearance of the army of raging men is described. Images of frenzied horses, the usual animal incarnations of the sea in myth and cult, are presented as well. The army attacking roars, the arms clang loudly, shouts stand over the city walls. Compared to waves and stormy water, the army of attackers is thought of as a flood that pours over the walls, a sea that rages over the city. At the same time Eteocles is called the helmsman of the ship; he compares himself to a sailor, the city to a ship, the attack of the enemy to the waves against which they have to sail though weakened.36 And the chorus says “a wave of troubles, like the sea, is coming. One falls, another rises up, thrice gaping, and splashes against the stern of the city.”37 This “wave of Cocytus” in Eteocles’ words is the fate that has come to the line of Laius, hateful to Apollo—the wave of death running with favorable winds, exceedingly quickly.38

This death “received by lot” is incarnated in the attack of the enemies, which is depicted in the form of a raging sea or a flood, but also as a fire. The city burns, defiled by smoke—the raging Ares blows on it. All is enveloped in flame.

The picture of fire and flood is completed in the songs of the chorus by widespread destruction, murder, pillaging. The image of war grows into the usual eschatological picture of confusion, wailing, defiled piety, fratricide. “The empty calls the empty,”39 a rumble goes through the city, “the bloody scream of suckling children sounds;”40 “every fruit falling on the earth brings pain.”41 War is depicted as a world catastrophe in which even nature takes part; only in eschatologies cosmic misfortune is accompanied by moral misfortune (the destruction of piety, fratricide, quarrels). The entire beginning of The Seven is explained by the chorus as a quarrel: misfortune began with a raging quarrel and ended with hatred. The trophy at the seven gates is the trophy of destruction.

Questions of war are not the business of tragedy as questions of peace were, for example, for Old Comedy. But lyric is still close to the united circle of themes of peace, with its elements of utopia (Sappho, Pindar), and war (Tyrtaeus, Callinus). Lyric presents pictures now of spring and blooming well-being, now of drought and withering, winter. Nevertheless, the image of cosmic “war,” namely of cosmic war, with its motifs of destruction, disharmony, and discord runs unchanged through all Classical lyric. The usual “everyday” form of such a metaphor is rebellion, the uprising of a city, violence; in relation to nature the mythological metaphor looks like floods, fires, storms, tornadoes, downpours. The rebellion of nature is a theme of lyric, with its motifs of shipwreck, downpours and storms (Archilochus, Alcaeus, Anacreon); in Alcaeus and Theognis the
rebellion of nature—like in Hesiod—corresponds to the rebellion of the city. It is exactly rebellion, and not war, that tragedy is interested in. It is interested not in the intervention of Thebes, but in Polyneices’ rebellion, and this rebellion is inseparable on its ethical side from the physical flood and fire it is identified with by the chorus.

In the folk calendar we can see the connection between the weather and rebellion, in folk astronomy the connection between heavenly bodies and the ways of men. In Homer similes with storms, whirlwinds, downpours, and fires are not accompanied by any moralization.

But beginning with Hesiod questions of the weather become questions of ethics. Conceptual thought makes the object into a quality.

The Roman poets do not know the concrete basis for their abstractions at all. They understand this concrete basis in the form of a poetic tradition, continue it and develop it, strengthen it, but, in essence, turn all the mythological images into concepts. Vergil and Horace develop lavishly the motifs of the end of the world; their pictures of the end of the world in the form of floods, declining morals, fires, eclipsed stars, whirlwinds present fuller and more complete pictures of eschatology than Hesiod or Alcaeus or Homer and Aeschylus. Yet the phenomena in these two cases are completely different. The Greeks cannot think of ethics except through eschatology. The Romans pass ethics by, recreating eschatological imagery again, but they understand it as a traditional poetic form.

Above I spoke of the mysterial elements in Greek tragedy. Its laments, prayers, deaths, and pollution are connected with that side of the “gates” in which they are enclosed. Destructive themes form the soul of tragedy. Among people this means mistakes, blindness, ignorance, among the elements—rebellion, quarrels, and storms, the end of the world, catastrophes of “houses” and “cities,” of water and fire. In tragedy as in philosophy the destructive force is ascribed to evil Eros; in tragedy as in lyric Eros is understood in the form of insuperable destruction. The circle of ideas is the same in both cases, but the conceptual movement is different. In lyric motifs of unrequited love, of fated torment, fading, and separation predominate. In tragedy as in philosophy Eros represents quarrel and impure passion, curse, Hades, all dissolution and destruction. The usual forms of such an “evil Eros” are the destructive powers of water (downpours, floods), air (whirlwinds, storms), earth (earthquakes), and most of all fire: in philosophy they are primary elements; in tragedy they are metaphors, plot motifs, and characters. In fact, before Roman poetry Eros means not “love,” but the death of nature, i.e. torment, winter and cold, sunset, the fall of the luminary, separation and disharmony. Where Eros is there is suffering. In palliata the subjective-objective is tormented itself and torments, but the whole novel is built on this image, as are all Greek love stories and the songs of Archilochus, Ibycus, and the “poetesses.”

As a character, Eros is the oldest hero of drama, a pre-Dionysus. In his direct form he is the hero of palliata, Amor. In the form of immediate personification of death he is Adrastus or Adrastus’ horse, Arion, or Melanippus, Dionysus’ companion in dramatic cult. The Bacchic form of Eros is Dionysus; the form of fire is Heracles.

The time has passed when Dionysus was considered the creator of tragedy, but it is equally extreme to consider that this god had no relation to the genesis of tragedy. Greek tragedy was connected not only to Dionysus, but to other gods as well, because it sprang from a circle of images which was incarnated by many divinities. The names of the gods were not significant. Ion, in part Alcestis bear traces of the cult of Apollo.
Hippolytus of the cult of Aphrodite, which is older than the later Dionysus. Yet when Dionysus acts directly in *The Bacchae* he is older than himself, older than the Dionysus to whom later tragedy will be officially ascribed. I have no doubt that Dionysus-Bacchus was the hero of paliata as well and that Plautus’ *Bacchides* did not go far beyond Euripides’ *Bacchae*. I have often said that the most archaic forms of stage art can be found in Euripides. Above I have mentioned the Dionysian character of Plato’s two Eroses, the image con-nection between the *Symposium* and Eros Saturnalia. Dionysus and Eros, I said, were equally mysterial and dramatic gods. Diotima in Plato’s *Symposium* introduces Socrates to the mysteries of Eros in which epoptic (watching beauty that gives birth and is born) is the highest degree of initiation. Eros has two natures—one destructive and one constructive. In mystery it is a creator, in tragedy a destroyer. In a number of tragedies its force controls the entire action, and I am not afraid to suppose that at one time Eros was the hero of *The Women of Trachis, Antigone, Ion, Medea, and Hippolytus*. The chorus of *The Seven* calls the whole complex of misfortunes brought on by the tragic enmity of the brothers “the power of evil Eros.” And the action of Aeschylus’ *Seven* is also moved by Eros.42

Sophocles’ Antigone is an incarnation of Eros still in female form. Such an Eros represents pre-love, or rather love in its mythological significance, i.e. death.43 The theme of this tragedy is the tomb of a dead man, for which Antigone becomes dead and after her all the characters. The death of Antigone under the earth is the mythological image of the death of the earth, of a woman in the underworld. Her fiancé Haimon (“bloody”) is possibly her paredros, a variant of Hades. But “Eros undefeatable in battle”44 does not govern the love of the bride and groom Antigone and Haimon—there is no mention of this; Eros in the tragedy governs the “consanguine hatred of men.”45 Enmity is the power of Classical love in its meaning of death. And this is why the stone hole under the earth where Antigone is buried alive is called Antigone’s tomb (“O tomb! O marriage chamber!”46). Her burial is depicted as a wedding; but now Hades and not Haimon is her husband, leading her alive to the shores of Acheron. And the chorus calls her tomb the wedding chamber. Tragedy, following myth, stresses that Antigone is buried alive; thus Iphigenia at Aulis goes alive to death, and this death is her marriage, only not with Achilles, but with Hades.

Eros is the image representation of enmity and hatred, the quarrel of blood relatives, the destruction of houses, clans, tribes. Later, in the Greek novel, Eros will be the persecutor of lovers, the cause of enmity, vengeance, persecution.

As in *Antigone* it brings on “consanguine hatred of men” in *The Seven*. Eros always has a victim, the sacrificial animal that is the image of death. Behind the scenes in *The Seven* there is such an active-passive victim in the form of the murdered murderers. But on stage it is the Theban girls who lament, entreat, mourn, and their image in solo (dual) form is incarnated by Antigone and Ismene. The motif of “entreaty” runs through all the songs of the chorus, and this “prayer” must be compared to the prayers of the hubrist-pharmakos, the “old man” in paliata. In paliata Amor suffers and causes others to suffer, like the murdered murderers in *The Seven*. But the chorus only suffers, only prays; the two sisters of the two murdered murderers only lament. The single active-passive role of
Eros is divided in the tragedy between the chorus and the soloist: the hero dies, the chorus prays and mourns, while in the palliata the persecuted and shamed “old man” prays.

It is usually pointed out that death is not shown on the tragic stage, and therefore the theory of the connection between tragedy and the cult of the dead is supposedly incorrect. Yes, tragedy is older than the cult. But death is its basic theme in the image of destruction and prayers of lament, and also in showing panoramas of the dead. But the fact is that in tragedy there is no concept of death, instead there is the mythological image of death; this image represents death in the form of a living person “departing” alive into the underworld, “exiled,” “in slavery” etc. In the archaic theater the element of Eros was represented by Heracles. His nature too is dual, constructive and destructive, still pre-ethical. Heracles is connected with the end of the world and with salvation. Like death, he is “gluttonous;” like a messiah, he is a “purifier.” Heracles is an even more ancient cathartic god than Apollo, with whom he doubles in Euripides’ Alcestis. He fights with beasts of prey and monsters, cleaning the land physically, not ethically. He fights Death with his fists. As the image of fire he burns from a fiery cloak and in the fire of a bonfire. Yet in Sophocles’ Women of Trachis this image is shot through with the image of Eros. As “evil Eros,” as the power of world destruction Heracles performs in Euripides’ Madness of Heracles.

The two Heracles, two Eroses, two Erises in Hesiod, two Socrates in Plato—these represent in their biunity an image more ancient than their later division into two different names and beings, with one positive and the other negative. The two Heracles and two Eroses correspond to Dike and Hubris, the same two principles, but in female form. Their ethical contents made them sharply opposed to one another. Nevertheless in The Seven one can sense the biune Dike. It is revealed in the last songs of the two half-choruses. This division of the chorus into two is characteristic at the conclusion of the tragedy. One semichorus corresponds to Polyneices and Antigone, the other to Eteocles and Ismene. The first semichorus, disregarding the punishment and morals of the city, sets off to lament, accompany, and bury Polyneices. The second is together with the city and Eteocles; after the gods averted misfortune from the city the second semichorus wants neither to subject the city to destruction nor to “flood it beneath the foreign wave of men.” But the point is that the first semichorus, which goes to bury Polyneices in spite of the interdiction of the city, considers that the misfortune has occurred for the whole house of Laius, and thus Polyneices’ fate should not be separated from the fate of Eteocles. As far as the command of the city to throw out Polyneices unburied for the dogs to eat is concerned, to this the semichorus answers that the city understands righteousness—τὰ δίκαια—different ways in different situations. Thus there is not one, but two truths here: the truth (in the language of myth) of impiety, of Polyneices, and the truth of piety, of Eteocles. Mythologically, the pre-ethical image is clear: the enmity and the duel of the brothers is a flood of the city; the fate of the house is the wave of Cocytus; Polyneices, a “foreign wave;” Eteocles, the helmsman of the city-ship. The evil Eros of which the chorus speaks is shipwreck, the flood of death.

The second semichorus is with the truth recognized by the city. This is the truth of Creon in the future. Two Dikes clash in Sophocles’ Antigone, in Philoctetes, and in Oedipus. Four different points of view are expressed by four different parts of the chorus in Agamemnon: some want to go help the king as he cries out, being killed off stage,
others prefer to wait, still others do not know what to decide, and the last group calls for sober thought. But nowhere are these many-faced Dikes as archaic in their pre-conceptual nature as in The Seven, where they are still not ideas, but personae. Equally archaic here is the image of fate, ethically central in all tragedies. I have quoted Eteocles’ words, when he resigned himself to fighting a duel with his own brother. In his words the waters of death—the wave of Cocytus—merges in image with the “fate” of the house. Amidst the terminology of images which mention water all the time fate itself is represented as the water of a river beyond the grave. Here it is clear that “fate” is equivalent in meaning to “underworld,” death. Death hovers over the heroes of tragedy. But the problem each time is who should die, for what, and how. In mythological thought “lot,” “portion” is understood completely objectively as a definite “part” of something, as a “piece” (μοῖρα, μέρος, μόρσιμον). The lot of life or the lot of death is received by every participant in eschatology during the division of moira, pieces of the cosmic animal. All of Aeschylus’ Prometheus is built on the mythological image of incorrect division, where Prometheus, Zeus’ helper in fighting the Titans, is cheated. The mythological image of division of “parts” later took on ethical meaning of the fate that falls to one’s lot, i.e. the meaning not so much of “lot” as of Fate with a capital F. Myth, however, sometimes overcomes ethics, as for example, in Sophocles’ Ajax, where the tragic collision is in that Achilles’ armor, a physical object, is given to Odysseus instead of Ajax; this determines Ajax’ fate.

In The Seven the image of the heroes’ fate grows into ethical fate. But Eteocles still says: “How shall we gratify further the deadly fate?”—understanding by it the “wave of Cocytus,” the fateful “lot” of the clan. Before saying this he expresses himself even more mythologically: “the black curse of my dear father, inimical to me, sits next to me tearless, dry-eyed, counting the first profit of the last portion (μόρος).” In Greek μόρος means “fate,” “lot,” but with a definite connotation of death. As a persona Moros in myth is considered the son of the night (Hesiod). The fateful misfortune in the house of Oedipus is understood as a deadly lot, as a concrete “profit” of a Curse. “The first profit of the last portion” recalls the understanding of “first” and “last” in myth, which can be seen in palliata. Eteocles and Polyneices, both “sharp-hearted,” organized a division of property, hoping to receive equal “portions,”—so the chorus says. But “division” and “fate” in Greek are the same word. What will the brothers get from such a division? The chorus answers: unfortunate, receiving as their lot a portion of grief (moira in its dual meaning of portion-piece and portion-fate), they will have “under their bodies the bottomless wealth of the earth” (“ploutos” in the meaning of underworld plenty and goods in the form of property that the brothers wanted to get). From the division of moiras the brothers will receive death. The conceptual “portion of property” in myth means the “portion of death.”

But such was the “lot” of the patricide Oedipus: “having sown the sacred furrow of his mother,” he gave birth to a “bloody root.” Mythologically it is the root of a plant, conceptually, it is the base of all future misfortune.

The main idea of tragedies, however, is that the death of the protagonist, received in the form of “fate” in the eschatological division of moirai, is always a redemptive death, death of a purifying sacrificial victim. Oedipus dies, but Thebes is saved by him from the monster. Eteocles and Polyneices kill each other, but the city is saved.
The plot of *The Seven*, as is well known, is repeated in *The Phoenician Maidens* of Euripides. The later forms are more complete and usually present the archaic character more clearly. In Euripides Polyneices demands a piece, a portion of land; he is “deprived of moira.” Here ἀμοιροπόσιος means “cheated of his share” in the literal meaning of his “piece of land.” “So you will have the greater part?” Polyneices asks his brother, “I again ask you for the scepter and a part of the land!” In Euripides “wealth” already means money, but the argument about it (“grievous wealth,” “wealth is low and loves evil in its soul”) shows that the pre-Aeschylean myth spoke of the “bottomless wealth of the earth” that in Aeschylus both murdered brothers receive. In Euripides the theme of the “salvation of the city” is even more insistently revealed than in Aeschylus, and to this end the separate motif of the expiatory sacrifice of Menelaus is introduced. The fact that in Euripides Eteocles is the villain and Polyneices in the right curiously destroys Aeschylus’ interpretation of the attack as impious. But the fact is that Aeschylus is closer to myth than Euripides: the name Eteocles means “glorious year,” while the name Polyneices means “great hatred.” Eteocles incarnates the “year;” this is the king for a year and the god of the year changed by death. In the conflict of the two brothers myth presents in images the change of seasons, the old and the new, the struggle of life and death. The city, the house, the land are understood by this myth in the form of moirai, “lots,” both allotments and fate.

In Euripides the chorus is still of women, of girls, but it is made up of Phoenicians, not Thebans. Why? It is obvious that it no longer represents Thebes here: the motif of “saving the city” is borne in Euripides not by the chorus, but by Eteocles, who speaks as much about it as Aeschylus’ Theban women do. Nevertheless, the chorus of Phoenician girls here is well thought out.

The point is that the beginning of the myth about the Labdacids is the abduction of Europa, a Phoenician girl-country. From Phoenicia Zeus in the form of a bull carries Europa to Crete. The beloved of the bull is not a woman, of course, but a cow, like the cow Io, the double of Europa. Furthermore, myth says that Cadmus, Europa’s brother, was ordered by Apollo to follow a cow and found a city where it stopped. This he did. The cow showed him the spot where Cadmus founded Thebes.

Cadmus is the founder of the “house” of the Labdacids. In mythological image Thebes is inseparable from the Phoenician woman-cow, and the battle for the “lot” of Theban land is a battle for this cosmic cow or polis, the girl. The chorus of Phoenician girls is the original, most ancient character of this mythological plot, which already has no logical connection to the conceptual plot of Euripides.

Thebes is a cow represented in myth by a chorus of cow-maidens. But the animal characters are not surprising in the drama of a “goat’s song.” If the heroes of Euripides’ *Seven* are “like” lions, dragons, wild horses and are “bull-killers” who make an oath by ablutions with bull’s blood, the heroes of *The Phoenician Maidens* are unambiguous boars and lions. Euripides’ chorus explains its presence in the drama by saying that it was sent from Phoenicia to Apollo for sacred service; it says that Ares has “enflamed burning blood” against Thebes—further on the chorus repeats that “around the city blazes a thick cloud of shields, the sign of a bloody battle.” In the original these words have a particular meaning which is hard to translate into conceptual language. The metaphors of
fire, battle, and blood coincide, while the word “bloody” (φοίνικος) is phonetically the same as the “purple” from which “Phoenicia” is derived (φοινίξ), and also “palm,” the vegetable form of Apollo; the base of “bloody” and “red” falls together with the base “murder” (φόνος). Thus if we translate all these metaphors into scientific language, we can say that the connection between the Phoenician women and Apollo and the Labdacids is explained by their common image semantics of fire and battle. Phoenicia, after all, is the birthplace of the blazing Apollo, a double of Ares (cp. The Iliad). The Phoenician women are the image of the polis-girl (not only Athena incarnates this image!) during fire-battle, at the moment of death, the death that ends in salvation.

This explains not only the original function of the chorus of girls in The Seven, but also the role of the image of “polis” in the tragedy and the relation between image and concept. In myth “polis” could have no “political” meaning. If it took on such meaning in the conceptual consciousness of the tragedians, it was only because its structure was given by the image that organized the concept, and its content was filled with a new social sense. Again and again I emphasize that every Greek concept is dual in its significance, as opposed to later concepts: always in its new, socially conditioned meaning there lies the still valid meaning of the mythological image: they are harmonically united in metaphorization. War is no longer fire, girls are no longer a city, this would not be a Greek tragedy. The metaphors of Greek tragedy and, say, Shakespeare differ sharply. While in Greek tragedy metaphor is the only possible form of concept, in Shakespeare it is a stylistic tradition, even if it is still true to a Classical outlook that has long since perished.

I do not know how clearly I have formulated my idea about the eschatological basis of tragedy. I would like to show that cosmic destruction and construction are the image base of Greek tragedy, but that the image of the cosmos is presented in it in many forms, in the variant complexes of the city, house, clan, and sacrificial animal (the agon of animal dike and hubris).

In Euripides the original eschatologism is preserved in the plot of The Madness of Heracles. While Heracles is in the “underworld,” Lycus (“wolf”) raises a “rebellion” in the city. A typical personification of hubris, Lycus is impious, bloodthirsty, deprived of any human emotions. Having murdered the king’s family, he now goes after Heracles’ little children. But out of the underworld appears Heracles, the rightful king of Thebes. The bearer of pollution, the hubrist, rebel usurper Lycus gets his just punishment: off stage, inside the house, Heracles kills him. The plot would seem to be finished, but it is only beginning. Without making any conceptual sense, the role of Lycus is transferred to Heracles. It turns out that Hera is sending insanity upon him, during which Heracles does the same thing Lycus was trying to do—he kills the little children, his own, that is, something even more awful and bloodthirsty than the imagined deed of Lycus.

I said, “Hera sends madness.” This is what we say, this is what later translators say, people of modern thought. It is possible that this is the way Euripides understood it as well. But to show this thought he depicted not a conceptually described psychic illness, but introduced Madness, a mythological living being who inhabits the unsuspecting
Heracles. Of course the image of “madness” (“possession by rage”) is eschatologically parallel to the “rebellion of a city” and “descent into the underworld.” But madness as the central theme of the tragedy is very peculiar here. It is a woman and bears the name Lytta, which means “madness,” “fury.” How is such madness manifested? In Heracles’ insanity? No, in the destruction of the house, in earthquake and storm, in the attack on Heracles, in the murder of the little children at the altar of Zeus. Heracles’ madness is most peculiar: it consists in the murder of children and a woman, a murder that just before should have been a rite of purification and began at the sacrificial altar amidst cult ceremonies. This sacrificial purifying slaughter of innocent children is accompanied by Heracles’ wild dance and bloody laughter; there is no air in his chest, his eyes are filled with blood, he foams at the mouth. The chorus describes Heracles’ and Lytta’s fury as wild Bacchism. Lytta says of the raging Heracles that he is like a bull in his fury.

Thus Heracles is not simply insane, he is possessed, driven to a Bacchic state. But two kinds of Bacchism were possible, as Euripides himself shows in The Bacchae: true “sacred” Bacchism (that of Dionysus and his maenads) and Bacchism imaginary in essence, impious (that of the Theban women, Pentheus, Agave and her sisters). It is the latter dark and evil Bacchism that seizes Heracles the infanticide. In the Classical period we often come across the motif of wild orgiasm, with dancing and laughter of the impious, who perform the murder of the innocent victim. The parallels between the mad Heracles and Pentheus are striking. While Heracles looks like a bull, Dionysus appears to Pentheus as a bull; and Pentheus, like Heracles, is possessed by evil madness which makes him perform blasphemy, the only difference being that he himself becomes the victim of sparagmos by his own mad mother. In both Heracles and Pentheus madness is accompanied by earthquake and destruction, their houses burn down. But the most striking similarity is in the motif of illusoriness. Pentheus falls into a world of the imaginary and mirage; furthermore what he sees in his madness turns out to be more reliable than the former deceptions of his healthy but impious reason. One must not think that Pentheus is deceived because he is insane and the perceptions of the insane are always mistaken. No, here the point is that in his insanity Pentheus sees things as they are in reality and as they correspond to the myth of Dionysus-Pentheus.

For Heracles the illusory world is even more intense than for Pentheus. Before murdering the innocent children Heracles begins to make long imaginary travels through various countries without moving. He lies down on the floor, eats, rests from his journey, then undresses and begins what seems to be a fight, then declares himself the winner. He seeks even before this a chariot, arms himself with a club and a bow, and draws the bow to shoot arrows at his children. In essence he commits imaginary infanticide, but Euripides understands the myth conceptually. Rationalization is an obligatory form of conceptuality.

In my work on palliata I deal in detail with illusory journeys, imaginary and real ecphrases, mirages and “tableaux vivants.” Illusory journeys are journeys to the kingdom of the shades, to the illusory world of death. Heracles’ journey extraordinarily closely repeats the journeys of palliata. There is no doubt that balagan prepared the way not only for comedy, but for tragedy as well. The visual trick did not have anything to do with ethics or entertainment.

Other motifs of “illusion” of a purely visual “showing” and “watching”, opening and closing, panoramas, pictures of death, gazing-eyes, etc. are also connected to Heracles,
the hero of low balagan theater. Heracles, the “bacchant of Hades” sometimes “covers” his eyes, sometimes removes the “covers” from them, and “eyes” in myth always mean “rays.” Heracles’ father begs him to take from his eyes the cover he threw on as a sign of mourning; and Theseus asks, “show your eyes to your friends” (δεικνυόντας—the mysterious term for “showing”). No darkness, says Theseus, has a black cloud that could cover your misfortune. Arise, uncover your head, look at us. But Heracles answers: why uncover it to the sun? And he himself asks his friend if he has seen the “agon of his children,” i.e. the fight before they were killed by Heracles. Yes, says Theseus, he saw it, and it was foul to see.

There are other illusion topoi in this play as well. After murdering his children Heracles goes to sleep. But the doors of the house open. Before the chorus is the panorama of death; the dead children are laid out and beside them the father “sleeps a sleep from the murder of the children.” This is seen by the chorus and Amphitryon. The question “Do you see? Do you see?” comes up in this scene as well as when Heracles, whom the “watchers” are afraid to disturb, awakes. Later I will discuss such “pictures” and show how they are structurally typical. The terms of “watching,” the images of sleep-awakening, opened doors and the showing of dead bodies will be found in every tragedy. These are the remains of the visual mime that formed the basis of the later agricultural plot that Euripides used.

In this plot Heracles was not distinct from Lycus. Like Busiris, he could swallow people, children, be gluttonous as in satyricon. In some cases a savior and purifier, in the pre-Euripidean myth he is hubrist, pharmakos, the purifying principle. His bloody acts are stopped by Athena. When Lytta bursts into Heracles’ house, the royal chambers shake with the earthquake of Tartarus, “like the one Athena once sent upon the giant Enceladus”; the chorus is talking about the Gigantomachy. Thus Athena throws a huge rock at Heracles, and he stops the bloodshed and falls into a heavy sleep. In these motifs Heracles, the helper of the gods in the war with the giants, himself performs the role of the hubrist, the chthonic monster, with whom the light gods fought, especially Athena, in a cosmic battle, the Gigantomachy. Athena who throws a huge rock which shakes the earth, Athena whose Gigantomachy the chorus recalls at the earthquake remains in Euripides an ancient image which has taken on a new conceptual-metaphoric meaning. This same ancient mythological image explains the chorus of old men in Euripides, and the motif of old age, which can be so clearly seen in the tragedy; the chthonic myth communicates the image of death as “old age,” incarnated in the chorus and in Amphitryon. But its other expression is “impiety.” Euripides’ plot says that while Heracles descended into Hades, he was apparently considered the fake “dead king;” meanwhile rebellion and usurpation take place in the city, the destruction of legality, the bearer of whom is the impious Lycus, the fake “living king.” His godlessness is revealed in the fact that he wants to burn the family of Heracles on a fire next to the altar. He considers mercy and fear of the gods empty superstition. Finally, he does not believe in the divine descent of Heracles and in his feats, he does not believe in the possibility of Heracles’ return from the underworld. And the “arrival”—the arrival from death—of the real king is in the words of the chorus punishment for Lycus’ impiety. Heracles’ anodos signifies a turning back of the evils to the opposite direction of good: Hubris is replaced by Dike, Lycus punished, “the new king has departed, the old one is in power, having quit the lake of Acheron.” Not only Lycus, however, is godless; so too in his pessimism
is Heracles’ old father Amphitryon: he, a mortal, accuses Zeus of cruelty. But this is still not all. Even Theseus, the incarnation of faithfulness, truth, and legality, is godless.

The central image of the tragedy, the destruction of divine law and punishment, is expressed in Lytta, the daughter of night and the blood of Heaven. She swoops down and overflows worse than a sea moaning with waves, worse than earthquake and thunderbolts; she strikes Heracles in the chest, topples and destroys his house, kills the children. And the chorus describes her rage as the shaking of the house by a storm, as the fall of the roof, as the underground shaking of the halls. Lytta inhabits Heracles’ house, Lytta inhabits Heracles’ soul: Heracles is this house.

The storm, the earthquake, the underground shaking of the dwelling all show that Heracles’ “house” is represented as surrounding nature, as the cosmos, of which Heracles himself is the incarnation in mythological image. Rebellion on earth is the same thing as storm in the heavens and earthquake on the earth. Everything is full of cries, roaring, moaning. All falls destroyed. This is the moment of the end of the world, the fall of Dike and the triumph of Hubris. In some cases a city perishes, in others a fire starts, in still others a house is destroyed.

The Madness of Heracles ends with Theseus “leading” Heracles off and giving him “part” of his house and land. This “part” is Heracles’ “lot.”

The world fire, incarnated in Heracles, makes Heracles fiery, furious, raging. This feature, perceived conceptually by Sophocles, forced him to portray Heracles in the Women of Trachis in the form of “heated” Eros. As the element of raging, all-destroying “madness” of nature—fire, water, air—Heracles has his female correspondence in Lytta of the “sparkling glance.” She acts as a natural element, as a raging sea, moaning waves, like lightning, like the quaking earth. The images of water in the tragedy force their way through the concepts of people and their states. Thus Heracles’ insanity is metaphorically compared to water, Heracles and his children to a ship and small boats, Heracles’ fate to the sea. Like Aeschylus’ Seven, Euripides’ Madness of Heracles reveals in its melic images mythological ideas that appear as concepts in the iambics and the plot.

The tragedians still know nothing of abstraction and real generalization; tragedy, however, carries within it features that sound to us like generalizations. The fact is that the object of Greek tragedy is not man and not a personal theme, not fractions of actions or thought. The hero of tragedy, no matter how narrow the scope of his actions and experiences in themselves, is always significant in all his actions, thoughts, and feelings, because he incarnates the immensely significant element of the cosmos. In Ibsen’s Ghosts the sick world of one person is portrayed, but Euripides’ Madness of Heracles is not about the derangement of some man, but about breakdown of the laws of the world and of moral balance on earth. Here again there is no Shakespearian generalization, but neither Heracles’ insanity, nor Lycus’ usurpation, nor the infanticide, though they are concrete events, is related to the private world of man, much less to the world of reality; they are related to ethics in its religious sense, to typically Greek ethics, which springs from mythological cosmism.

The Madness of Heracles is very close to Sophocles’ Ajax: both have the derangement of the heroes brought on by the anger of a goddess (Hera for Heracles, Athena for Ajax);
in both cases this is a phenomenon of the microcosmos, not of the human psyche. Heracles’ madness is the cosmic destructive element, the rebellion of a city, fire, the fall of the chambers, storm and flood. Ajax’ madness is of the same order.

His drama consists in the fact that the Atreidai deprived him of his “lot,” his “portion.” Ancient tragedy poses the question of the “portion” pre-fatally, understanding fate as a part of a thing, a “piece,” in this case, a piece of the dead Achilles—his armor. Seeking vengeance for the dishonor done him, Ajax intends to subject the Atreidai to a shameful death, but Athena sends madness upon him, and he takes a flock of sheep for the Hellene army and two sheep for Menelaus and Agamemnon. Having killed the animals, still covered in their blood, Ajax comes to himself and understands that he is the object of ridicule. In spite of the entreaties of Tecmessa, his mistress and the mother of his son, in spite of the persuasion of his friends, Ajax commits suicide. But then the Atreidai forbid his burial. Just like Polynoeices in Aeschylus’ Seven, Ajax is doubly “deprived of his lot:” he is deprived of his “piece” and of a tomb (ταφής ἄμοιρος)—“deprived of moira.”

“Tell my old father of my sorrows and my fate,” 69 Ajax says before his suicide, addressing the sun. And his fate is “an evil moira of boundless suffering.” 70 At his request the sun, when it sees Ajax’ native land, is to hold the golden reins and tell everything to his father. Ajax himself addresses Thanatos (death) directly as he “exits” to him. Nature takes part in his affairs.

But Ajax ends the same way as Polynoeices: his body receives burial. One could say that both these tragedies, The Seven and Ajax, represent, in essence, the story of the death of the living hero, the story of the body of a dead man, the story of burial. Is not Antigone the story of the death of a living heroine, like Iphigenia at Aulis or Alcestis or the entire Oresteia? I will remind the reader of Euripides’ Suppliants, the entire plot of which speaks about the burial of the seven leaders. Almost every tragedy is the drama of bodies which do not receive burial, but which as the result of complex actions are finally buried. This is the only way conceptual thinking could make sense of the staged myths in which the image of the death of the hero at the moment of transition from life to the underworld was depicted. And the events which happen to Ajax over the course of the entire tragedy occur not simply during some “neutral” period of time, but on a certain day, on a fateful day preordained by a divinity (so the righteous man suffers at the hands of the unrighteous “in the last days,” i.e., at the end of the world)—on a day when Ajax must receive either death or salvation. The hero receives death. This is in the full sense of the word “fate,” “lot,” one of the two possible pans of the eschatological scale. Such an element of two possible “lots,” such a parting of two possible ways was communicated by myth in the image of the horizon, of the border, of gates and doors. The dead man asks for the doors to be opened; he stands, prays, laments. In Ajax as well this element is present, although Sophocles has given it a conceptual, rational interpretation. Thus when Ajax has already decided to kill himself, he does not simply appear on stage, but stands at the door and knocks at it with exclamations about death. The chorus pronounces the sacramental term, “Open up!” 71 And Tecmessa repeats the same term, “I am opening.” 72 The door opens, Ajax “enters.”

This motif is not as episodic as it appears in conceptual reworking. The tragedy opens with Odysseus, who is keeping track of where Ajax is: “inside or not inside” the tent. 73 Athena sees Odysseus “peek inside the door” and tells him that Ajax is inside the tent,
covered with sweat (in Greek poetry “sweat” almost always has a sinister meaning), holding the “sword of murder” in his hand.74

As far as this scene may be from palliata, one can sense the character of the original panorama here in tragedy as well. Mystery turns the “doors” into the mystery of the “other world.” In balagan, from which all Classical stage acts began, standing at the doors, peeking through the crack, and watching the panorama signify the visual, pre-ethical, pre-religious, pre-cult “watching” that turns darkness into shining light or light into darkness.

What is the insane deed of Ajax? Why did he take animals for people and kill an entire flock? Tragedy answers: Athena threw an illusion at his eyes. And he took one thing for another. This happened just like in palliata, where the characters do nothing but fall victim to visual deceptions. Illusion can be seen in the plots of palliata and tragedy. Odysseus’ exclamation in Ajax remains as an echo of the balagan performances of the mirage of death-life: “I see that we are only phantoms, or an empty shade, though we may live!”75 Any deceived hero of palliata could make the same exclamation. And it is Jupiter himself that deceives people here when he takes the form of Amphitryon; Ajax is deceived by Athena when she makes him take the flock for an army.

The motif of “visuality” is very important in tragedy. Here there is much discussion of the fact that Ajax has covered his head as a sign of mourning. The play on “covering” and “opening-uncovering” is conceptually reworked by Sophocles rationalistically. But the image here is different, pre-conceptual. Mystery is based on the closing and opening of doors. Balagan hides and reveals objects, making this a trick. Tragedy requires the dead to be covered and the living to become “seen;” death is unseen.76

Ajax, having decided on suicide, covers himself. Once he has committed suicide he lies “not seen at all.”77 I have discussed this term “seen” above, when I was talking about Theocritus’ Adonis on a silver death bed, where he lies “as if seen.” Ajax cannot be “seen” because he is dead. But Sophocles conceptually rationalizes this mythological image. He makes Tecmessa “hide” Ajax’ bloody face, mutilated by the sword “under a cover.” Nevertheless, when Teucer, Ajax’ brother, sees the body of the suicide, he exclaims, “O, of all sights I have seen with my eyes this is the hardest!”78 And further he calls this spectacle “strange to see.”79 But this is how we have to translate it into our conceptual language; apparently this is the way Sophocles understood this part conceptually as well. However, he communicates his concept by means of the mythological image, and his Teucer says, “O unseen sight!” Here “un” is not only a negation, but something sinister, bad, unfortunate (δυσθε ατος), and “sight” means “eye” (ομα). A literal translation would be impossible (“evil-seen eye” in the sense of “eye seeing misfortune”). Teucer wants the body to be “uncovered” so that he can “see”; this image is conceptually explained by Sophocles as Teucer’s desire to “see all the evil.” But the language of image speaks without any “so that” or “in order to;” Teucer asks to “open” the covers and “see” Ajax because a “seen” and “opened” Ajax is Ajax “alive.”

What in Aeschylus’ Seven took the form of ecphrasis and battles at the seven gates in Sophocles’ Ajax has the character of mirage, opening and closing of doors or covers, spectacle of death “inside” the tent or the covers.
In Ajax the motif of laughter and mockery that links tragedy to palliata is very strong. But in palliata the mockery of “the old man” evokes the laughter of the audience, but in Ajax this laughter brought on by mockery remains within the plot. Ajax is moved by anger at the Atreidai, by hatred for his rival Odysseus; but after Athena brings deception upon him and forces him to slay the animals, one offence is added to another, and the fear of becoming an object of ridicule brings this Classical rational Don Quixote to suicide. The two motifs come side by side in tragedy—the motif of defamation and the motif of laughter. Hubris is the main theme in Ajax. It can be seen in the form of the cursing of the hero, and here Ajax is the passive, suffering victim. His honor is defamed. Athena, the Atreidai, and Odysseus are his persecutors. Offending Ajax in life, they mock his body as well. At the end of the tragedy Athena no longer appears, but Odysseus convinces Agamemnon to allow the dead man burial, but the living Ajax hates Athena and Odysseus as much as the Atreidai. Nevertheless, the passive victim of the hubrists, Ajax himself the incarnation of a most active hubrism. He is a blasphemer, who offends Athena, a bloody avenger and murderer of innocent animals. Even if it is a delusion brought on by Athena, were it not for the deception, he would have killed the best men of Hellas. Even the chorus, even his friends and relatives call him terrible, night, violent, difficult, stubborn, inflamed; Menelaus gives him the epithet “flaming hubrist;” Ajax himself considers Técmenessá stupid to want to change his “temper” (has here the connotation of bad temper, a sum of stubborn, fixed traits, wilfulness). Many of the hero’s epithets are identical to those of the god of war Ares; in myth “war” was always connected in image with “flaming fire,” with “anger,” “horror,” “indomitability,” “madness,” “violence,” and it represented death. Ajax was just such a character. Mythologically he can hardly be distinguished from the fiery Heracles in his madness, in his mad delusion, brought on by Hera, when he killed his innocent children and wife. But Euripides presents the plot with all the archaic features, and Lytta runs onto the stage, herself the incarnation of madness, and attacks Heracles, while in Sophocles the hero is conceptually shown as “ill,” afflicted by a “divine possession” and only a “lytta-like illness” (80). Killing innocent animals, the indomitable and terrible Ajax, who obeys no one and is not subordinate to the gods, mad, “night,” with his “bad temper” and “bad name” (as if derived from the exclamations of mourning “ai-ai”) incarnates the mythological image of death, the active-passive death that kills others and one-self, kills and dies. This explains the central motif of suicide, which is rare for tragedy; Ajax is the tragedy of suicide of the hero. Of course Sophocles rationalizes the mythological image, but Classical rationalization never tries to overcome the image; and it could not overcome it, because the Classical concept is the same image, only read by abstract thought. That is why Sophocles leaves the details of the image. Thus the “night” Ajax commits a mad murder at night, for Madness is a child of Night and the bloody Heaven. Ajax’ son has the name Eurýsaces, i.e. “wide shield.” In myth the epithet “wide” is always borne by the incarnations of the underworld (“wide-treading,” “wide gates” etc); the wide, spacious kingdom is death. As to the shield, Achilles’ shield speaks of cosmic semantics, that of Heracles as well; the shields of the “seven leaders” show their negative significance, since they depict murder and are found in the hands of hubrist. The tool of war and death, all armor has a chthonic significance in myth, and it is no accident that the beginning of the plot in Ajax centers around the motif of the “dead man’s armor,” the armor of Achilles. In every Classical tragedy one can always find
behind the conceptual characters the mythological-image character-things. In *Ajax* there is the dead armor, death in the form of armor. Thus, deprived of his honorary armor Ajax has a son with the “weapon” name of “shield”! Sophocles cannot bring himself to leave this detail out, but he gives it a conceptual significance. He makes Ajax take his young son in his hands, give him the name of “wide shield,” and hand over to him his “seven-bull indestructible shield;” to prevent the judges from handing over the weapons of Ajax to the offenders, let his shield be passed on to his son, and let the other arms be buried with Ajax. Thus we have the weapons of a dead man in the beginning of the tragedy, and the weapons buried with a dead man in the conclusion. The father gives the son his “portion.” The judgment of the Atreidai gave the father himself hubris.

9

The image expression of death, hubris takes various forms in the tragedy. All the characters are hubrists, all are offenders and breakers of divine regulations. Ajax is profaned, Ajax, the “flaming hubrist,” blasphemes and commits sacrilege. Menelaus and Agamemnon are villains and offenders; even the chorus, even Odysseus accuses them of hubris. But Odysseus is also a hubrist himself, and both he and the Atreidai are the victims of Ajax’ hubris. The peculiar Greek term signifying any “breaking” or desecration of divine laws fills the speeches in *Ajax*; it is used sometimes by one, sometimes by another hero in respect to each other. But the motif of hubris is connected to the motif of laughter. Sophocles understands it conceptually, as the motif of the Atreidai’s mockery of the insane, unlucky warrior Ajax. But the mythological image of such mocking-laughter is different from laughter in the conceptual sense. Here Euripides is again more archaic. Here Heracles “laughs” a bloody laugh when he commits infanticide, and there is no mockery. Laughter should also accompany Ajax’ murder of the innocent victims—death and laughter are found side by side in myth as images identical in meaning—laughter-hubris, wild, bloody laughter (cp. such laughter of the suitors in *The Odyssey*). For Sophocles laughter takes on a causal significance: the Atreidai will laugh at Ajax because he has been deceived. Laughter and hubris are separated by Sophocles, and laughter in the meaning of “ridicule” becomes an element of “defamation,” while in myth hubris is the laughter of death. Ajax cries out, “Alas, laughter! How I am defamed!” The enemies, he says, are ridiculing me; the Atreidai are happy and laugh at the misfortunes of Ajax, Tecmessa repeats; if he could see (were alive) they would not dare laugh. And the chorus sings that Odysseus is mocking, laughing at Ajax’ sufferings with a great laughter; Menelaus laughs at the misfortune of the dead man. Ajax’ madness and death are accompanied by hubris-laughter. When his body is buried, Dike begins to reign in place of Hubris. Sophocles rationalizes this image, putting the following reasoning into the mouth of Odysseus: neither Zeus, nor the Erinyes, nor Dike will allow a corpse to be desecrated without punishment, therefore it is more sensible to bury it. Thus ends the “agon of the great quarrel,” death, characterized by the chorus as the “ceasing of the eroses” of Ajax, of his passions.

Ajax suffers the fate of a pharmakos. Animal imagery, which always accompanies thing imagery and cosmic imagery, lies untouched in the tragedy. The active-passive Ajax both kills animals and is himself an animal. Having become in Sophocles a conceptual “offender” and “enemy,” Odysseus in myth “hunts” Ajax. But concept is not
independent; it grows out of image, and therefore Sophocles’ Odysseus “hunts the beast,” i.e. Ajax, “follows his tracks,” “chases him with dogs.” The image has already become concept, and therefore it cannot be found in the plot or in the characterization of the heroes as it was in myth. But it is found unaltered in the language, in terminology.

As a pharmakos Ajax is the bearer of pollution, and therefore his death should be a purification. And this is what we see: “the great duel of the argument” ends with reconciliation, but reconciliation not with the living Ajax, but with a dead one, in the form of funeral honors which correspond to divine establishment. As he sets off for the underworld, for the “meadows on the banks,” for “ablution” in the waters beyond the grave (conceptually: dying) Ajax says that he is thereby “cleansed of his pollution,” Sophocles here introduces the construction of goal-oriented thought: Ajax wants “for” the purification by death to release him from the “hard anger” of Athena. The mythological image of physical pollution, of “dirt” (ὕματα) is understood by Sophocles as the conceptual “defamation of honor.” But Ajax is defiled because he himself is a defiler and defilement. The new ethical meaning of the tragedy struggles with this original image, but cannot overcome it, inasmuch as it too is locked in the very fabric of the same ethical concepts.

The hunt for Ajax by his enemy and “persecutor,” his hunter Odysseus, who follows the “tracks” of his victim clearly shows the zoomorphic nature of Ajax in myth. In Sophocles the animal image takes on the conceptual function of a metaphor. But we must not forget that in the plot as well, in its very center lie animal passions. Conceptually this is deception, but the central tone of all of *Ajax* is based on the drama of animal slaughter with its passions, laments, and punishment. The form of this slaughter is also characteristic: Ajax cut off the tongue and head of one sheep, then threw it down from a height; he tied another to a post and whipped it to death. Both forms are typical for catharsis: this is the slaughter of pharmakoi, “scape-goats,” propitiary sacrifices which purify pollution by their death. This is just how Ajax himself dies as well, the active-passive mythological “defiled defiler,” but Sophocles turns the physical images into abstract concepts, and “pollution” is transformed into “defamation.”

The two sheep Ajax kills are identified by him with the two Atreidai. This duality here is no accident. Behind every tragedy, as I have already said, lies a “great agon of quarrel” between two polar principles, first physical, then ethical. Before Dike and Hubris myth knew two Dikes, two Truths, two Lots, two Eroses, two Érides: one being was good, the other evil. Ethics could not allow good and evil to bear the same name. It separated them and opposed them. But tragedy, as a genre that reflects the appearance of ethics, inevitably preserved in its makeup the archaic “images” which preceded ethical “concepts.” And every tragedy in the final analysis is based on the image of the struggle of two truths. In the most ancient variants such “truths” still have no separate singular individuality. They take the form of light, then the form of chorus and soloist, two semichoruses, twins, two brothers or sisters. In Aeschylus’ *Seven* there are two semichoruses, two twins, and two sisters corresponding to the two truths of the city. Here in Ajax two Atreidai in the form of two sheep which are in the “great agon of quarrel” with Ajax (thus Heracles’ madness in *The Madness of Heracles* is called the “agon of Hera”); but in essence these two sheep of two truths are later replaced by the pair Athena-Odysseus, who are always semantically united. The “agon of the quarrel” which took
place within an element with one name, still undivided, in later myths became divided and opposed.

Who were these two pre-ethical truths? The principles of life and death in the image of construction and destruction of one and the same element-animal or element-thing. Tragedy derives from images of the destructive elements. It is raging waters, furious air, enraged fire. In *Ajax* as in *The Madness of Heracles* the entire peripeteia of insanity and the main action is explained by this pre-conceptual image system.

The whole scenario of the tragedy represents a boat with Ajax’ tent; the chorus consists of sailors, Ajax too is a sailor, the helmsman of the ship. Thus, beginning by sailing in, at the end Ajax sets off for “ablution” and the “meadows on the banks.” It is clear what these waters and “banks” are; but the “ship” too has unambiguous semantics in myth. The personification of waters beyond the grave, Ajax’ ship, the chorus of his friends, and Ajax himself in his insanity—all of these express death in image. Storm, murky waters, dirt, winter with its cold rains and icy wind—all these images of the physical world lie beneath the ethical concepts of the tragedy. Ajax’ insanity is called “a cold” by Tecmessa; in her words sung in melos—and melos always contains the layer of most ancient images—“Ajax lies dirty, ill with bad weather.” Of course in Sophocles we understand this image figuratively in the form of stormy misfortune from defamed honor, but the fact is that the figurative meaning of the concept sprang from the mythological image and is expressed in its terms. And this case is not unique. Ajax himself calls what has happened to him “a wave of a bloody sea storm that circles, coming from all sides.” He has perished for his impudence, for hubris; Agamemnon at the end of the tragedy speaks figuratively of Ajax when he cites the parable of the impudent sailor who forces the sailors to sail in a winter storm and who perishes from a foul-weather illness (both terms for “cold” are untranslatable in their meanings that are sometimes literal, sometimes figural). Thus the whole story of Ajax and his insanity is an impudent (in respect to the gods) sailing on a boat against the current, in a storm, in the severe cold of winter. Here is the “dirty winter” that Tecmessa uses to designate Ajax’ illness.

10

*Ajax* is related to *Philoctetes*. The only difference between them is the degree of ethical generalization. *Ajax* is foreign to us in its narrow concreteness, it remains a local Classical drama, while *Philoctetes* through its generalization outlasts its age and speaks to us to this day with its moral protest and passions of suffering.

Sophocles’ causal, logically developing plot grows out of mythological images which have much in common with the composition of *Ajax*. Here too spectacle images act as formants for ethical concepts. Here too the action begins as in *Ajax* with spying on and tracking a victim, but in *Ajax* Athena directs the spying and deceiving Odysseus, in *Philoctetes* Odysseus directs Neoptolemus. The male double of Athena, Odysseus leads the young Neoptolemus to deception, making him “spy out” where Philoctetes is. The whole scene is based on “watching;” Odysseus, showing him Philoctetes’ dwelling, orders Neoptolemus to “watch” carefully, and Neoptolemus “sees” the empty dwelling of Philoctetes. As in *Ajax* the tragedy opens with the secret reconnaissance of two enemies, one active and the other passive; one of them “watches” and informs the other of what he
has seen, while the other only “listens;” in both cases the object of the “watching” is a
dwelling, a house, in *Ajax* it is a tent on a boat (“scena”), in *Philoctetes*, a cave. Are Ajax
and Philoctetes within or not within the house? This is what interests the two watchers. In
*Philoctetes* the dwelling is characterized by its two doors (dipylon), *i.e.*, entrances; this
cave of Philoctetes is continually described as two-doored. Neoptolemus informs not only
Odysseus, but also the chorus of what he has seen. He “shows” the chorus Philoctetes and
suggests that it “look,” in secret, of course: “if you want to see, look bravely.” While
looking for Philoctetes’ dwelling, Neoptolemus looks for the path that might lead to the
cave and cannot find it for a long time. When the chorus of sailors (as in *Ajax*) wants to
see Philoctetes, it can do this very easily. The pre-conceptual meaning, however, requires
that the “witness” Neoptolemus “inform” a listener standing off to the side of what he has
“seen.” And therefore the chorus answers—aburdly from the point of view of conceptual
“common sense,” that it is content with the “eye” of Neoptolemus; and the chorus itself
does not look into Philoctetes’ cave, but asks questions of the spying Neoptolemus. And
what is it interested in? What is the site of the cave like, does it have a beaten path, and is
it inside or outside? Neoptolemus answers, “You see this dwelling here with doors on
both sides, a stone den.” It is clear that the chorus is interested precisely in the entrance
and exit, the “doors” of the cave. Translators and commentators usually understand this
passage more conceptually than Sophocles. While for Sophocles this image of the “exit”
of Philoctetes and the role of the “doors” were incomprehensible and he explained the
questions of the chorus absurdly, as fear of a secret attack by Philoctetes, modern
scholars relate the question about the internal or external entrance to Philoctetes himself,
who is inside or outside the house. Neoptolemus’ answer describes the house, but not
Philoctetes. And only after this answer does the chorus ask Neoptolemus where
Philoctetes is,—a clearly illogical question, because Neoptolemus has no way of knowing
where the victim he himself is looking for is. But nevertheless Neoptolemus answers
correctly.

All of this passage has its basis in mythological image. Its essence is the purely visual
exposition of the object, in epideixis that replaced “story” by “showing.” I will repeat it
again here as well: drama is the ancient pre-narrative form of “watching” and “listening”
in unmediated action. In mystery the epoptes “watches” and “sees.” The object of his
“sight” is something inside, behind doors. Thus closed or opened doors of clay sileni
show one of the two—either the shining “inside” or the ugly “outside.”

A number of tragedies, as has been shown, have preserved this structure of expositions
in which the main character has not yet received any psychological characterization but is
“shown” purely visually. He was spied on, the “inside” of his dwelling peeked into,
observed. In palliata such expositions created many scenes and episodes, showing how
drama came from the dialogue of two characters—one who “sees” and the other who asks
about what he has seen. I think expositions of this sort are very important. Both
Sophocles’ tragedies, *Ajax* and *Philoctetes*, present examples of the archaic dialogue
between one character who “does not see” and “asks” and another who “sees” and
“answers.” In palliata the “answerer” is for the most part the rogue, “hypocrite,”
“ὑποκριτής” in both senses. But who is Odysseus in *Ajax*, and who is Neoptolemus in
*Philoctetes*? They too are deceivers and hypocrites.

Philoctetes’ dipylon, his “stone den” with two doors plays the role of a “house” into
which the characters “enter” and out of which they “exit” in Middle and New Comedy,
and which in mystery perform the sacrament of opening and closing, appearance and concealing—as objects are shown and hidden in a trick, as objects disappear and appear.

The lucky meeting of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, which ends one of the acts of the tragedy, leads into the act of “entering in” to the house. Neoptolemus unexpectedly says to Philoctetes, “Go in!” Philoctetes answers, “I will lead you in as well!” Sophocles resorts to the following motivation: if Philoctetes has an attack, he will need help. But this attack comes on stage, not inside the house.

When Philoctetes needs to reveal his fate, Neoptolemus calls him out of the cave: “come out,” he says to him, “leaving the rocky roof.” Such invocations and summons are rare in tragedy, but they are customary in comedy and in “laments at the doors” (serenades). Philoctetes appears, coming out of the cave, and says, “what again is this noise of shouting at the cave? Why are you summoning me (calling me out)?”

The tragedy Philoctetes, as I said, is based on deception as Ajax is on confusion. The basic action—the carrying off of Philoctetes and gaining control of his bow—takes place on the sly, by trickery and lying; Philoctetes’ deceitful enemies speak in whispers, use secret signs, conspire, spy, give reports like real spies, provoke the noble Philoctetes. Just as in palliata, in this tragedy a “spy” is disguised as a merchant to fool Philoctetes—to secretly spy out what he is doing and then report to Odysseus, the inventor of the intrigue, who strongly resembles the slave of palliata. Both Neoptolemus and the imaginary merchant are supposed to spy and tell about what they have seen. “What do you order me to do, if not to lie?” exclaims Neoptolemus, and Odysseus answers, “I say to you, you must take Philoctetes by deceit.” The device of “shameful deceptions” is expressed in Odysseus and in Neoptolemus and in the “spy” dressed as a merchant and sent to Philoctetes. This “spyer” acts as a messenger for Neoptolemus: he transmits Odysseus’ order either to bring Philoctetes or, in case of resistance, to cut off his head. This spy brings Philoctetes the news that he must be sent to Troy.

The fake merchant and Neoptolemus are supposed to be not only “witnesses,” but also “messengers” of the events. Such is Odysseus in Ajax as well. These archaic roles reveal why there absolutely has to be a messenger in every tragedy with the function of telling a “story” of what he has “witnessed.” Of course this function is at first purely visual, pre-narrative. The epoptes “sees with his own eyes” and before he “tells” about what he has seen he “shows” it verbally or in action to the character who participates with him in the mystery or the play. Thus in palliata the slave verbally depicts for the old man the picture he has seen, whether an existing or a nonexistent one. Thus the slave shows the old man or the youth a tableau vivant, whether authentic or staged. Thus in the archaic layers of tragedy one hero informs another of what he has seen with his own eyes or shows him his “vision;” for example Neoptolemus reveals to the chorus the “spectacle” of the sleeping Philoctetes. It is well known that in visionary literature such a “shower” is the prophet, in Plautus—the prologuist, in mystery—the priest, in balagan—the trickster, puppeteer, rayoshnik. This figure of the prologuist or the author who “reveals” some “spectacle” in front of the curtain, derives exactly from this, the act of “showing.” Conceptual thought forces the “shower” to recount the contents of the drama to the
viewer verbally—the medium of visual exposition, which became outdated the moment the image texture completely dissolved in concepts.

The prologuist as a phenomenon of the conceptual sphere is typical for Euripides, Menander, and Plautus; in Aeschylus and Sophocles his forms are more archaic, more like characters, they are present organically in the scenes and episodes of the tragedy. The more ancient the tragedy is, the more important to its construction is the role of the messenger. In Aeschylus’ *Seven* the messenger, along with the protagonist, carries the center of weight on stage, although he is absent from the plot. But he is always going off, watching, returning, and describing in ephrases. I compared him to the slave of palliata because he too informs his partner about the “pictures” he has seen. This “information” is static, as it is for the prologuist, anarrestive. When conceptual thought extends time and expands space, such a character of “witness” and “shower” turns into a messenger who comes from far off and “narrates” events that have taken place somewhere there, precisely not on stage, not here, but in another place at another time, not in the present.

The function of the messenger in tragedy is to announce death. Above I pointed out that the mythological image understood death visually, in the form of an empty phantom, only externally similar to life. Behind the archaic plots of tragedies one can disclose the image formants of a visual order, including the “visual” characters consisting of phantoms, likenesses, and fake essences. The seven ephrases in The Seven reveal, in effect, seven chthonic “not authentic” heroes, conceptually transformed by Aeschylus into heroes who are not ethically authentic. In *Ajax* the entire basic action that sets the plot moving is a phantom; the hero is governed by deception, the antagonists of the hero are an empty mirage. In *Philoctetes* not only is the spy a phantom likeness of a “merchant,” but Philoctetes himself in his pre-conceptual, pre-ethical nature preserves visual features. First of all, he is the incarnation of death, armed with a bow and arrows; he is taken to Troy, since his bow, his presence is the end of Troy. Where he is with his bow, there is death.

The image of an abandoned being, living alone on a wild deserted “island” is a customary image of death for myth. Philoctetes’ name itself is chthonic: in myth *Ktitsas* always means the “owning” underworld which “holds,” “owns” special underworld “riches” like Pluto; “*philoktetes*” in Greek means “loving to own” (in the sense of “already owning”); Philoctetes is an epithet of death, which signifies the same thing as Pluto. Philoctetes’ arrows are “ines-capable” (an epithet of death), “sending murder before them.” The temporary dwelling of Philoctetes is the island of Lemnos, and the mythological underworld was often represented as being on islands. For Sophocles this Lemnos is a real island in the Aegean sea, but in myth it plays another role. In myth Lemnos is where Hephaestus falls when he is thrown off of Olympus—the idea of the temporary death of the fire divinity. Lemnos, connected with the Cabeiri, is extremely archaic as an image; and in reality the “Lemnos inscription” is in a non-Greek language and points to very ancient culture and ancient ideas. In the Greek’s language of poetry “Lemnossian” meant “horrible,” “evil,” “criminal”: the women of Lemnos killed their fathers and husbands. In *Philoctetes* as well Lemnos is an image representation of the island of death. It is completely wild, uninhabited, “not stamped down for mortals and uninhabited.” There are no paths here. No one comes here of his own will: there is no harbor, nor is there possibility to live or trade. Sensible mortals do not put to shore here: one comes to Lemnos only against one’s will.
Here Philoctetes has been “shamefully left alone,” and here he is sick, smelling, “without friends, deserted, without kin, dead to the living.” Philoctetes exclaims as he is being taken away, “O hateful age! Why do you not allow me to go to Hades?” In another place he says, “I am no more—and I have died for you!” The image of the sleeping Philoctetes is a typological image of death; and the chorus calls him “eyeless” (conceptually—“unseeing”), “as if seeing Hades.” It is well known that “eye” mythologically signifies “light”; to see means to shine; the eyeless man sees death, and death itself is eyeless, unseen and unseeing.

Like death, Philoctetes is a hubrist. He has gone wild, lives like an animal in a den, drinks snow, strikes fire from the cliff, feeds on wild meat—myth depicts constructive fire as “culture” (Prometheus, the crafty Hephaestus) and destructive fire as “madness” (Heracles) or “wildness” (Cyclops). Philoctetes, like death in myth, is inflexible, impetuous, not subservient to anyone or subject to any persuasion. In myth one can gain control of death only by guile, as one can gain control of Philoctetes only by ruse. He is active-passive, himself both the hubrist and the victim of hubris. Illness is sent him by fate, by divinity, and his illness is dual—a rott ing, smelly body and a grumbling soul full of hatred for the Atreidai and Odysseus, the bearers of hubris.

The nature of the pharmakos can be seen in Philoctetes with his “wild blasphemy”—wild cries, moans, blasphemy—everything that prevents performance of sacrifice and libation to the gods. As a pharmakos Philoctetes must be ruled, or his head must be cut off. He himself is ready to throw himself from a cliff and break his neck, bloodying his head against the cliff; but Sophocles must make this image into a threat. And Philoctetes, like Ajax, is accompanied by the motif of laughter, only more muted; still he too says that his enemies, the Atreidai and Odysseus, are secretly laughing at him, that he lives in ridicule, suffering—defamed, and that somewhere on the sandy shore of the gray sea his enemy mocks him. Of course the expiatory suffering of Philoctetes-pollution brings victory to the Hellenes; but Philoctetes himself plays the role of the victim—first literally, then, in Sophocles, abstractly. Philoctetes “supplicates” Neoptolemus for salvation twice—once to be taken home and once to have the bow returned. In the two scenes of “supplication” Philoctetes, who calls himself a suppliant, begs, falls down with a prayer (the Greek terms of ritual prayers of entreaty must be investigated). Such scenes are typical for palliata: the old man is baited, shamed, mocked, and he “supplicates.” The supplicating Philoctetes, like the old man of palliata, presents in flesh the image of supplication.

Philoctetes preserves features of the animal sacrificial victim as well. Concept turned the hero into a hunter who hunts animals, a trapper. He hunts wild animals and birds and lives in a den with shaggy beasts, he keeps company with mountain animals and should himself become their prey. He is continually addressing them, the “winged animals,” the “tribes of animals.” Neoptolemus “hunts” him like an animal. In the words of Heracles, Philoctetes and Neoptolemus are “two lions fed together,” and they should remain together forever, protecting one another.

A cosmic animal in myth, Philoctetes in animal and thing form incarnates the destructive element of “arrows” of death-fire. Addressing animals and cliffs, he invokes
fire; he himself knocks fire out of the cliffs; mythologically he is the creator of fire. In Sophocles’ conceptual reworking, the myth is rationalized. The direct meaning of the image takes on the function of metaphor in the tragedy. Thus Philoctetes does not want to leave on Odysseus’ ship, and therefore he “will not go even if the lightning-thrower should burn him with the rays of lightning:”\(^{104}\) the connection between Philoctetes and the images of fire is preserved, but in oblique, passive, and conditional form. This is why Heracles appears in the form of *deus ex machina* in the tragedy, because Heracles too incarnates the destructive (“ill”) element of fire; this is why the action is ascribed to Lemnos, because Hephaestus, the god of fire, is connected with Lemnos; finally, this is why Philoctetes’ attribute, the bow, is simultaneously the bow of Heracles, or rather the fiery arrows of death. Lemnos itself is the toponymical image of fire-death, of Hephaestus fallen from the sky. Sophocles does not go so far as to call Lemnos fire, but he makes of this one image two concepts, separating them with the conjunction “and:” “O land of Lemnos and light made by Hephaestus!”\(^{105}\) At the end of the tragedy Philoctetes says farewell to Lemnos and asks to be sent off to where Great Moira will take him. Until this minute he has been *δύσμορος*, had a bad fate and was on Lemnos. Now he will receive a moira, leave Lemnos, and be calmed in spirit. Philoctetes’ pre-ethical and pre-religious—i.e. pre-conceptual, fate was in “Lemnos,” the “lot” forced upon him, “apportioned” to him by the Atreidai. Owning this lot, Philoctetes lived in “winter sadness,” conceptually in stormy sadness; the sea and the mountains repeated his moans, since he was in a “winter storm,” conceptually struck by misfortune (“stormed” by misfortune). He endured “divine suffering,” “a wild illness,” bled, poured sweat and an evil odor, fell into deep death-like sleep. The bow he owned once belonged to Heracles. Like fire with fiery arrows, this bow was connected with the fire of Heracles: Philoctetes received it for lighting this fire, and in memory of the bow must put his trophy armor on Heracles’ fire. Neoptolemus ardently begs Philoctetes for permission to “see” this bow, to touch it and “bow down to it as to a divinity.”\(^{106}\) The fiery, shining element—god in the form of a bow with “unescapable” arrows is what one “sees,” a visual picture, a spectacle (θέαν). On the other hand, Philoctetes’ torments were an evil spectacle, a “vision” of death. “I think,” exclaims Philoctetes, “that one cannot find another such spectacle for the eyes like my torments.”\(^{107}\) So long as he was death and a defiled defiler he was a phantom. This image, rationalized by Sophocles in concept, also took on the conditional character of a threat: Philoctetes exclaims that Odysseus is not taking with him a strong healthy man, but will kill without knowing a dead man, a shadow of smoke, an empty phantom (εἴδωλον). Philoctetes on Lemnos is not living, not an authentic hero, but a phantom, smoke, shade, dead. He is without “lot,” “without eyes,” “unsightly to look at.” But at the end of the tragedy he is on the verge of a transformation. Now a great fate awaits him. He will be “cured,” he will receive glory. Heracles effectively informs him of his own fate: first passions and ordeals, then immortality that all will “see” in his epiphany. But Philoctetes’ transformation will take place only when “the sun itself rises over Chryse,” where he was bitten by the snake, “and sets again.”\(^{108}\) His fate is connected to the fate of the sun rising over the Golden Island. Here the base is the physical concrete image out of which the concept of ethical transformation appears.
In Euripides one finds intact archaic features that have to be reconstructed in Sophocles. In his Helen, which is in the tradition of Stesichorus, there are two Helens and two Menelauses. One Helen is a phantom carried off by Paris to Troy; the war started because of this phantom. It is a perfect likeness of Helen, won in battle by Menelaus and kept in a cave. But the other Helen, the real one, lives with Theoclymenus, the Egyptian king, as his captive; she was brought to him in a cloud by Hermes out of the ether. Theoclymenus insistently presses Helen to marry him, but Menelaus, who washes ashore in Egypt after a shipwreck, abducts his wife from Theoclymenus and flees with her.

For a long time Menelaus does not believe that the real Helen is really his wife; he is sure that his real wife is the phantom that he has taken from Troy and who is on the shore guarded by his men. Helen is externally completely like this phantom made of ether, this “shadow” of herself. It is impossible to distinguish them, and Menelaus, who understands nothing, asks her, “How were you here and in Troy at the same time?” This situation, this question, this plot, and these characters correspond completely to palliata. “What, have I become one husband of two wives?” Menelaus is amazed. Yes, like Alcmenes in Plautus’ Amphitryon, he has a double marriage. But Helen, just like Alcmenes, has one authentic husband, Menelaus, and another fake one, Theoclymenus. This knot is unraveled as in palliata by an external event. A messenger tells Menelaus about the “miracle” (θαύμα). Helen, under guard at the cave, has ascended into the ether and disappeared. Euripides understands the “miracle” conceptually, as something unusual, but the substratum here, as in palliata, is visual illusion.

But for Theoclymenus the real Helen too has died: “I have vanished,” she says to him, “and I no longer exist!” (recall the same words of Philoctetes!) Here in the kingdom of gloomy Theoclymenus Helen is a victim who awaits death; she “supplicates” him, embracing his knees, and he calls her a Suppliant. But the basis of her supplication is deception.

The same alternation of phantom-authenticity holds true for Menelaus: he is to “die without dying.” He is both alive and dead. Alive, he is a shadow, and Helen laments him, dresses in mourning, buries the funeral offerings in the sea—Menelaus has supposedly drowned. But as in palliata, the dead hero is alive. In Euripides’ Helen we find the most archaic role of the messenger: the living Menelaus appears to Theoclymenus as a messenger of his own death. This is the function which is already reworked in the conceptual tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles; except for Euripides and Plautus, it remained only in the parodies of Lucian, which preserved the pre-ethical images untouched because of the genre.

In both Menelaus and Helen the proximity to palliata is unusual. In the tragedy there is a whole scene that takes place “at the doors:” Menelaus, who is dead in the plot, comes and wants to “enter” the “house,” but the old woman-“doorkeeper” will not let him in. Palliata is based on such scenes because the “lament at the doors” is organically connected with visionary situations and characters. The same is true in Euripides. The old woman-doorkeeper, unfriendly and gloomy, incarnates the death whose “doors” she guards. The dead man attempts to entreat her to “let him in” the doors. Their former single combat at the door is here weakened: the old woman pushes Menelaus away from the door.
Though she is authentic, Helen undergoes figural [image] death at Theoclymenus’.
The grave replaces the wedding bed for her here, as she herself says sitting by the grave.
She, like her “likeness,” has been brought here by a cloud of ether and made like a
phantom in everything. The lives of the real Helen and the fake one are indissoluble so
long as she is separated from Menelaus or—which is the same thing—at the bloodthirsty
Theoclymenus’. But at the very moment Helen and Menelaus are reunited the phantom of
Helen ascends into the ether. There is no more death, there is no more separation, there is
no more mirage.

Also analogous to palliata is the conversation in the presence of the king of the two
spouses who have recognized each other. All the words of this conversation have dual
meaning: one real for themselves, and another formal and imaginary for Theoclymenus.
This duality of meaning, brought on by the play of “essence” and the “imaginary,” later
leads to the metaphoricity of dramatic speech. In fact, it is in tragedy that the first poetic
metaphor is born, and it occurs exactly here, in the qualitatively new duality of image and
concept. There is also another scene close to palliata in Helen: the stichomythia during
which Menelaus cannot distinguish his true wife from the imaginary one. From the point
of view of form, the whole scene is visual. The husband and wife “look” at each other,
see “external likeness,” waver, and cannot understand who they see before them—
“likenesses” or the “authentic.” Menelaus asks his wife, “Who are you? Whose form do I
see?” Helen answers with a question, “And who are you? Both of us must be asked the
same thing.” Menelaus answers, “Never have I seen a figure more like,” and later adds,
“I see in you the best likeness of Helen.” “And I,” repeats Helen, “in you of
Menelaus.”

When Helen tells Menelaus that she is his wife Menelaus moves away and
does not let her touch his clothes. He takes his wife for a ghost. “O light-bearing Hecate!”
he addresses the goddess of night phantoms, “send me a favorable vision!” His wife
undeceives her husband, “you see before you not a night servant of Hecate!” Menelaus
cannot understand if he has two wives and who the one in the cave is. He is amazed,
“What is this, I reason well, but my eye is ill?” Helen insists, “Seeing me, does it not
seem to you you see your wife?” “The body is like,” answers Menelaus, “but I am not
sure.” “Look,” says Helen, “what could be more certain?” “Yes you are like,”
Menelaus wavers, “that I do not deny.” “Who can teach you better than your eyes?”
But Menelaus is confused by the fact that he has another Helen as well: “who could make
a seeing body?” “The ether,” responds the authentic Helen; her name alone was in
Troy, not her body.

It is interesting that this dialogue includes the recognition scene. If we take all such
scenes in tragedy, it will turn out that the main role here is played by ὁφθαλμος, the
“appearance” of the heroes, and “eyes” that “watch.” There is no doubt that behind the
rational “recognition” lay the visual images of pure “watching.” These are the archaic
images which still have no division into the “watcher” and the “object of watching.” Just
like in palliata, the characters watch each other visually, acausally: they see life or death,
the authentic or its likeness. The illusionary nature of Helen was not invented by
Euripides. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon the chorus still passes on Helen’s words about how
night mirages bring empty joy because something thus seen is empty, though it seems to
the one who sees it to be true, and it vanishes on the winged ways of sleep. She says
this about her own story. In balagan perhaps Menelaus too was a “spyer” who also came
to Theoclymenus and sought the “tracks” of Helen like Neoptolemus did Philoctetes; at any rate, Theoclymenus suspects him of this and takes him for a katóptēs, a spy.

Visual deception, well preserved in pâllia ta, is weakly covered in Euripides’ Helen by an indifferent ethism uncharacteristic for Euripides. Dike is incarnated in the prophetess Theonoe, who punishes Theoclymenus, the typical tragic hubrist. This very “prophetess,” however, is a visionary character who “reveals,” “shows” the future in its visual appearance. Her character is more archaic here than the conceptually reworked figures of prophets standard for tragedy: Teiresias, Talthybius, Calchas, Helenus. Like the prophets (“mantikoi”) of the parody of Lucian, Theonoe acts in an everyday way, without moralizing and punishing. Euripides’ Dike recalls the character of pâllia ta who is on the side of the lovers and does not give away their deceptions.

The whole tragedy, meanwhile, is based on deceptions, like a typical balagan show. In the center are the deceptions of the goddess Aphrodite. Then come the deceptions of Helen and Menelaus, as a result of which Theoclymenus is fooled. The basis of these deceptions is purely visual. Like in pâllia ta, visual deception must triumph here as well, because its object is death, this savage Egyptian king. He is taken in by a circuitous route, by cleverness, like Philoctetes; like Xerxes in Aeschylus’ Persians, Theoclymenus is a bloodthirsty impious man, the son of a virtuous, pious father. This is why the deception takes on a certain ethical coloring even in Euripides.

In the tragedians before Euripides the “two truths” have a completely conceptual character. In Euripides the two Helens or two Menelauses lack all ethism; as in pâllia ta, his “real” and “fake” wind the spring of interest that precedes the intrigue. If there were a single centralizing plot of the slave in Helen, the tragedy would become a comedy.

What the tragedians covered up—the elements of illusion—Euripides developed, and what the tragedians developed, Euripides covered up—the motif of fate, eschatology, the elements. The destruction of “the house,” of the kingdom, the city has turned in Euripides into a shipwreck. The later one moves towards Hellenism, the farther one gets from ethism, the more frequent the motif of shipwreck becomes in Classical literature—this externally realistic, but shallow surrogate of the former eschatological image. The role of the elements is just as insignificant in Helen. The ship still performs a semantic function, but the fake here is simply a reminiscence.

Euripides’ Helen is analogous in plot and characters to Iphigenia in Tauris, which is staged slightly differently. We find The Bacchae interesting in another way, in that it is the only tragedy that has come down to us which shows the passion of the god of the stage himself—Dionysus.

Dionysus’ cousin Pentheus does not want to recognize Dionysus as a god. He sees him as a charlatan. Without believing in either the orgies or the holy legend, Pentheus sees them as cock-and-bull stories his cousin uses to seduce the women of Thebes. Dionysus reveals his power: Pentheus cannot capture the god, but the god defeats him and forces him to be torn apart by his own mother.

There are two choruses in the tragedy: one which does not take part in the action, but which is visible on stage—the chorus of authentic maenads; the other is the semantic subject of the action, but is invisible, off stage—the chorus of fake maenads. The
authentic Bacchae praise Dionysus and celebrate his orgies, the fake ones are seized by Bacchism as if possessed by insanity through the god’s will. Pentheus too is seized by insanity, and he sneaks up to the women’s mysteries dressed as a woman; the Theban women, in the grips of an evil fury, tear Pentheus to pieces.

The analogy with palliata is even clearer in *The Bacchae* than in *Helen*. All of the characters here are doubled. All of them appear now in their authentic form, now in imaginary form. In the center of the tragedy a god makes a fool of the hero; the god deceives the hero, making him the object of ridicule. What Dionysus does with Pentheus leaves Jupiter’s tricks with Amphitryon far behind.

Pentheus’ role is purely hubristic. The chorus describes him as an animal, as the fruit of the underworld powers, as a monster. Pentheus lacks human features both in the indirect characterizations of him and in his direct actions. Dionysus brings madness upon him, but even before this he was in a state of madness, when he wanted to shackle a god and lock him in jail. Here, in his first madness, he already begins to see apparitions sent to him on purpose by Dionysus. Thus he mistakes a bull for the god—exactly like Ajax! He ties up the bull and keeps it in a stall, taking an empty “hope” for reality. He is in a wild state, like all the heroes of tragedy possessed by madness: sweat pours from him, his teeth chatter, his chest breathes heavily, he is seized by fury. Meanwhile Dionysus shakes Pentheus’ house and sets fire on the grave of Semele; Pentheus “imagines” that his house is burning, and here begins a scene in the style of palliata which is typical for tragedy as well—a mirage-scene full of imaginary actions. Pentheus orders the slaves to carry water into the house, rushes here and there, grabs a sword and runs out to catch Dionysus, who has escaped from prison, while in reality he is calmly sitting and “watching” like a real spectator. The servants carry water into the house, but “each slave doing this work strove in vain.” Pentheus runs out into the courtyard with his sword. There before him appears the phantom (φάσμα) of Dionysus made of “shining ether,” and this Pentheus stabs with his sword. Then the god, “mocking” Pentheus, adds another “outrage” as well: he destroys his house, toppling it to earth. Pentheus himself falls to earth at the same time as his house. As in *The Madness of Heracles* the deception of the hero is accompanied by an earthquake, the destruction of a house, and fire. Pentheus’ madness, like that of Heracles, is the end of the world. While in *The Bacchae* it appears in the form of punishment of impiety, in *The Madness of Heracles* this end of the world is the nature of Lytta (madness).

Pentheus’ second madness doubles the first. Pentheus sees double: two suns, two Dionysuses, two Thebes. Dionysus again appears to him as a bull. And in this scene there is again complete merging of the tragedy with palliata. The real things Pentheus sees appear to him imaginary, and he takes phantoms and deception for authentic. His “madness” now consists in the fact that he himself turns into a mirage. Disguised as a woman, he sets off for a place no men are allowed—the women’s mysteries. Pentheus is no longer Pentheus: this is only his “appearance.”

Dionysus is to Pentheus as the slave is to his master in palliata. He “fools” Pentheus, and the latter does not see things as they really are. Dionysus sends him to “spy” on the mysteries; he even calls him a “spy.” Pentheus climbs up a tree and “watching” what is happening below. In essence, he does the same thing Dionysus does when he destroys Pentheus’ house: he is off to the side “watching” what happens before him or beneath him. But Pentheus is a hubristic “spectator,” a theomachist and blasphemer; in this he
differs from the authentic essence of Dionysus. As a hubrist, Pentheus is a comic figure (in the Classical sense): he is a parody of a god. Thus Dionysus mockingly addresses him as a savior-god before Pentheus exits from the house—and these gods always “entered,” “appeared” with specific words in the cult of savior gods: “Come out of the house here in front, show yourself to me in the women’s dress of a maenad-bacchante!” In the original “show yourself” is designated by the form “let me see you,” “become visible” (δεικτεῖτε). This imaginary Bacchus in female form is the divinity in its hubristic aspect, which suffers death amidst laughter and defamation. Pentheus is an object of ridicule for Dionysus; disguised in shameful women’s clothes, he is to be led by Dionysus through the whole city for general amusement. This is the typological death of the pharmakos and the imaginary king of saturnalia, the beginning of which was the laughing procession through the whole city, and which ended with beheading and tearing to pieces. The story of Pentheus in short (I mean the original visual story) is that he “saw” what he should not have and in the wrong way, and that he himself has the wrong appearance. This is the visual underlying basis, the visual mimesis of the “pseudo.”

From data about the cult we know that Pentheus (lamenting) is a name of Dionysus himself. In The Bacchae Dionysus mockingly prophesies sorrow and passion for Pentheus, but in fact he himself is not far from his antagonist. And there are two Dionysuses: one real one, and one phantom made of pieces of ether, to deceive Hera. Thus Dionysus (like the heroine of Helen!) has two natures, one authentic and one imaginary; he both deceives and is used for deception. Dionysus pretends to be someone other than he is; that we are dealing here not with cult moralization, but with a pre-ethical visual image is shown by the fact that Dionysus appears in the form of a bull or a beautiful youth not only to Pentheus, but he also deceives his true bacchantes, convincing them he is a mortal.

It is not insignificant that Pentheus calls Dionysus a charlatan. Dionysus is a typical balagan trickster who performs “miracles” for a laugh—the nimia mira that palliata abounds in. But while he fools Pentheus, he himself shares his nature, or rather Dionysus had an aspect in myth in which he was Pentheus. Tragedy already must avoid such temptation, separating the negative Pentheus from the positive Dionysus. But reminiscences remain: Dionysus too was sometimes a phantom, and Dionysus was the object of ridicule—he quarrels with Pentheus because the latter made fun of his orgies. Pentheus is a hubrist, but the god himself is a hubrist, and he openly acknowledges this. When Pentheus says that Dionysus’ hubris “blazes like a fire” he is right, because in myth it is a matter not of everyday phenomena, but of cosmic phenomena which have taken everyday form. The interrelationship between Dionysus and the theomachist Pentheus is not even a microcosm, but a conceptually understood macrocosm.

Pentheus “spies on” the women’s mysteries, but this very “spying” represents a mystery. Its visionary essence is revealed in mysteries, in the sacral act of epoptic. But the motifs of profanation, laughter, disguise, mockery, “fooling” of Pentheus make the “spectacle” hubristic and the whole scene in the Classical sense a “parody” of mystery, i.e. its other “comic” aspect. We have before us a hubristic mystery like Aristophanes’
Thesmophoriazusae and Frogs, Eupolis’ Baptae and a number of other “parodies” that became comedy.

Pentheus incarnates the hubristic features of Dionysus, those that were “comic” in the Classical sense, and this does not contra-dict at all his “sorrowing” nature, on the contrary, it emphasizes it: where Dionysus appears as a phantom and a profander, he is an object of ridicule, a sacrificial victim who prays, laments, suffers, evoking pity. Pentheus, the wild-tempered despot becomes before his death a pitiful victim “praying” his mother for mercy. His role is lament.

But what does he “see” sitting on the top of the tree? He sees the same thing that happens to him: an animal torn to pieces and eaten by humans. When his body is being torn apart and his mother calls the others to feast on his head Pentheus himself becomes the object of Bacchic orgies and Bacchic mystery, only of a hubristic type: the bacchantes who tear him apart are imaginary, not real bacchantes, fooled by Dionysus and possessed by the same evil madness as Pentheus. Much can be said of Pentheus as a macrocosm; for example he is likened to the tree he sits on and with which he dies; this is a heavenly tree seized by the dancing chorus of bacchantes, bent like a bow from heaven to earth; also the fact that Pentheus, sitting right under the heaven and “looking” down mythologically incarnates not only the tree, but also the luminary whose eyes are rays (need we recall that Ajax “seeing Hades” was called “eyeless”). One thing is clear: the vegetable and luminary nature of Dionysus had two aspects, and the chthonic aspect (hubris) is separated out here into an independent being, Pentheus.

As a charlatan and an enchanter Dionysus is close to tricksters, theurges, and prestidigitators of balagan. Like the Jupiter of Plautus’ Amphitryon, he both plots the deception and appears in it as the main character. But the balagan play, like any other, (circus, for example), has a pre-ideological and pre-literary character; circus, balagan, all ludi in and before Rome, μῆμοι of Greece—all were pre-ideological and pre-literary theater. Euripides introduces conceptual motivation in the deceptions of Dionysus, showing them as a form of “punishment for” Pentheus’ outrages.

Dionysus is the god of the stage, true; but his stage character is mostly of a balagan nature, and he came to cult drama only through balagan. The value of Euripides’ Bacchae lies precisely in the fact that here the protagonist is the god Dionysus himself, in whose sanctuary, in whose cult, in the presence of whose priest tragedy is played out, and this god Dionysus turns out to be a typological balagan character. Now we should recall his theatrical proximity to Eros and Heracles, which I mentioned above. Heracles-Eros is distinct enough in the underlying basis of Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, but Heracles himself can easily be reconstructed as the protagonist of balagan plays; in Aristophanes’ Frogs Dionysus and Heracles are one. One could say that Heracles and Dionysus are distinguished only by their tribal character: the former is a Doric hero, the latter an Attic god who had previously been a hero as well (as such he appears in the archaic hymn of Eleatic women “with a bull’s leg”). From the point of view of semantics, Heracles is a more ancient form of Dionysus which remained in low theater; because of various political and religious causes Dionysus became the official divinity of the stage in Attica.
As far as Heracles is concerned, his folkloric nature remained dominant to the end, weakening the upper cult layer. Heracles stops short of entering ethical-religious theatricality. But the *Bacchae* shows that the pre-cult Dionysus also had his roots in folklore, which were later removed from tragedy. Here I mean the “fairytale” motifs in the story of the messenger about the bacchantes’ orgies: I used quotation marks because there were no fairy tales in ancient Greece, but the later fairy tale preserved the mythical “milk rivers” and “kisel’ banks.”

It is significant that the messenger-shepherd and his friends commit the same “sacrilege” for which Pentheus pays with his life, but are not punished: they make a blind, hide in it, and “spy” on the mysteries of the bacchantes. This is striking evidence that Pentheus is punished not because of conceptual motivation—for impiously committing something forbidden—but exclusively because it was required by myth. In Euripides’ image is already beginning to be separated from concept. What difference is there between the messenger’s actions and Pentheus’? The messenger is portrayed in the conceptual scheme, Pentheus in that of mythological image.

Thus the messenger doubles the behavior of Pentheus. Euripides could not have the dismembered Pentheus himself announce his death; to allow Menelaus to do this in *Helen*, Euripides had to make Menelaus’ death a fake from the point of view of conceptual logic.

The messenger and his friends “spied” from their hiding place on the full picture of Bacchic mysteries. The very motif of the hiding place corresponds fully to palliata, where the characters are always hiding and quietly, silently “spying.”

All nature takes part in the orgies of Dionysus—the mountains and the beasts—“nothing remained immobile.”¹³² The maenads tame some beasts, tear others apart, and drag still others around. They are governed not by rational laws, but by the laws of fairy tales: fire burns in their hair, children sit on their shoulders without falling, they turn everything upside down, snakes lick blood from their faces, and the children of beasts of prey suckle at their breasts. With their thyrsos the maenads draw water from cliffs, wine from the earth; it is enough for them to scratch the earth with their hands for milk to flow from it; “sweet streams of honey” flow from their ivy thyrsos. A utopian picture of endless plenty, of the limitless power of nature, appears before the viewer. In time fairy tales will appear out of this utopia, but here, in its roots, utopia is the “miracle” of which the messenger speaks. These are the mira of palliata, the ἡθομάτα that in Greek mean “miracles,” “tricks,” “balagan.”

Concealed in their hiding place, the shepherds spy on and see a “wonder to behold” ἡθομαί ἰδέωθαι. This is a real mystical picture, in mysteries—divine, in drama—pseudo-real, a real spectacle, ὅψις. Such mysteries of Dionysus running through the whole fabric of the drama we find only in one other drama—Aristophanes’ *Frogs*. I do not mean to suggest that *The Frogs* and *The Bacchae* have one plot, but both of these dramas, each in its own way, derive from hubristic mysteries. In *The Frogs* too there are two choruses, but one of them is made up of mysts, initiates in the mysteries of Dionysus, perhaps led by a hierophant, and the second chorus, which parallels the first, ...is of frogs, croaking in the underworld swamp. What connects these two choruses? The “Limnean” temple of Dionysus means “swampy,” and swamp is the habitat of frogs. This is why
frogs parody the mysteries of Dionysus and his mysts. But such is the pair of Dionysus and his servant Xanthius. They exchange roles, as in palliata; at the same time Dionysus pretends to be Heracles, deceiving the rulers of death. The action of *The Frogs* takes place in the other world: all of these “ships” and “sailings” in tragedy (*Ajax, Philoctetes, Helen*, and many others) here in comedy become Charon’s boat that takes people to Hades. In Hades the mystery takes place, in Hades the chorus of frogs and the chorus of mysts sing. In Hades a trial is in progress to determine who is worthy of resurrection, Aeschylus or Euripides. But before this scene is played Dionysus comes to the doors of the underworld, knocks, and argues with the doorkeeper. Hubristically parodying himself, Dionysus acts the part of a buffoon and clown who defecates right in front of the “gates.” There is no doubt that Euripides and Aeschylus also form a “pair” in which one, the “pseudo,” remains dead, and the other, the authentic one, comes to life. But a pseudo of what? And authentically who? It is no accident that they are connected with Dionysus: they have the role of stage mysts, of initiates in Bacchic acts. It is no accident that they are present in a parody of Bacchic mysteries and of the mysts of Dionysus. Aeschylus and Euripides are soloists in the chorus of initiates like Agave and her sisters among the Theban bacchantes. But what Pentheus is in *The Bacchae*, Euripides is in *The Frogs*—a pharmakos who is made fun of and torn to pieces in his buffoon form—or—or left dead forever in the underworld.

Tragedians could not depict their heroes as dead and set the action in the underworld. Conceptually rationalizing myths, they brought on stage *morituri*, i.e. those who were to die soon. The heroes of tragedy were characters who offered themselves as victims or went to their deaths more or less obligated to die. Euripides introduces a special motif of a struggle “for” the dead; while he does not make the dead take action themselves, he does make others act in their defense. The world of phantoms and mirages is a second substitute for the dead.

But comedy could depict action in the underworld and make the dead themselves heroes. Attic Old Comedy, playing on the dissonance of image and concept, did not resort to mirage.

The most “illusion” images in tragedy are preserved in Aeschylus, because he is still very archaic, and in Euripides, who liked to recreate deep antiquity. Only in Aeschylus do phantoms from beyond the grave appear as characters on stage—the shade of Darius in *The Persians*, the shade of Clytemnestra in *The Eumenides*. In Euripides’ *Hecuba* the shade of a dead man, Polydorus, reads the prologue. A phantom in the form of the prologuist is a semantically logical phenomenon. In medieval folk theater the prologuist portrayed a dead man, or rather death: he came out all in black with the appropriate mask on his face, in front of black draperies, and on stage, where now the prompter’s box is located, was Hades. In Classical theater as well, as I have shown above, the prologuist was the figure who stood in front of the audience with his back to the stage and “opened” the performance before its beginning. The prologuist was a “shower,” who pulled back the balagan “scena,” i.e. the curtain behind which the *tableau vivant* was located. In Greek Classical theater the “skena” became a *mise-en-scène* of many tragedies and was preserved as a term for the boards on which the performance took place.
In my study of the palliata I have already had occasion to speak of the balagan prologuist-tricksters, who played the main role in pre-literary comedy. The prologuist preceded both the author and the main character, the protagonist. We know that even Aeschylus was still both author and an actor in his own plays. The pre-literary author of a play is an active-passive character who creates the entire show as a whole. He turns the action and invents it in the framework of readymade forms and has it performed: such are folk theater and the circus. The most archaic material in this respect is found in Euripides. His prologuists are gods, because gods were thought of as the creators of the events shown on stage; gods were also characters in ancient folk plays. They are as it were composers of acts. They appear at the beginning or the end of a tragedy, descending right from heaven, and reveal the idea of the play. Only our contemporary modernizers could ascribe such a “device” to Euripides himself, even call it a bad “innovation” and reprimand the author….

The slave of palliata is a clever character who winds the spring of all the events. He is the composer and author of everything that happens. Often Old Comedy as well opens with a dialogue of slaves. In some tragedies where there is no prologue the play begins with the monologue of a slave, e.g. Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Sophocles’ Electra, Euripides’ Medea. We must not forget, furthermore, that the tragic chorus in the vast majority of cases is made up of slaves, and the appearance and songs of the chorus is the normative beginning of any tragedy. We need not mention that the “slave” incarnated death; not only in myth, but also in reality the slave was not considered human. As an incarnation of death the slave became a Classical demiurge; he is inventive, clever, indefeasible, all-powerful.

In Euripides the phantom is not only the prologuist, but also a major character—true, it appears in an unusual way, not as in Aeschylus. I am speaking of Alcestis. But first one should recall that the entire play is based on the purely mythological agon of life and death—the “debate” with Death of Apollo and the duel with death of Heracles—two variant forms of light and fire, two “shining” illusionary beings. Such is Alcestis as well. Before the eyes of the audience she dies and returns from death. Which is she, living or dead? Is it she herself or her “shade”? Both at the same time. As a living woman she appears to her husband. As a dead woman she is still under a cover and deprived of speech: she has two features of death—she does not speak and she does not see. Her husband does not guess that this is his wife, although she seems to him to be exactly his wife: “Woe is me,” Admetus says to Heracles, “Take away this woman from my eyes…for it seems to me, looking at her, that I see my wife. She disturbs my heart, from my eyes streams pour down….” Heracles forces Admetus to look at the woman. The “looking” scene coincides with the recognition scene.

Heracles “shows” the dead woman, “opens” her shroud. “Look at her,” he says to Admetus, after the latter has been standing next to her for a long time and even touched her, “does she not seem like your wife?” Now Admetus exclaims, “O gods, what shall I say? This is an unbelievable phantom! Do I see my wife in reality?” Heracles convinces Admetus that this is not the joke of a god, that he “sees his spouse” in this woman. “Look,” answers Admetus in stichomythia, “that she does not turn out to be an apparition of a dead person.” And further on: “But do I really see my wife whom I gave to be buried?” Convinced by Heracles’ words that she is the same one he never hoped to “see” again, Admetus turns with joy to the “eye” and form of his “most beloved
wife.” Heracles orders him to take Alcestis into the house: the whole scene takes place before the doors.

The visual character of such a scene is confirmed by analogies to Euripides’ two Iphigenias, Orestes, Hecuba, and Medea.

Euripides’ tragedy Orestes is original, fresh, and interesting. It begins with Orestes being brought in in a fit on a stretcher. He is tormented by the furies for matricide, and his fit completely repeats the scene in Philoctetes or The Madness of Heracles: the same madness, possession, deep sleep, the same avoidance of noise. The Argives condemn Orestes and Electra to a shameful death, but Pylades fills them with courage and advises them to attempt to murder Helen, to set fire to the city, to kill Hermione, the daughter of Helen and Menelaus. Orestes does this. But the gods have decided differently. Helen vanishes miraculously, Hermione is saved by her father. Apollo decides the fates of the characters: Orestes, purified, will receive an Argive kingdom and Hermione as a wife, Pylades will take Electra.

Orestes is interesting because it is a tragedy which blends with comedy, which is shown by the interpretation of the plot and the impressions of the ancients of this play. The scene of Orestes and the Phrygian coward whom Orestes chases with his sword is in the comic style.

Orestes’ madness, his “illness” sent upon him by underworld divinities is understood in this tragedy in the form of death. Electra even says of her brother, “I sit without sleep with an unfortunate dead man, for he is dead, save for a little breath.” And Menelaus when he sees Orestes exclaims, “O gods, what do I see? Whom of the dead do I see?” Orestes agrees with Menelaus, “You spoke correctly; in my misfortunes I do not live, though I see the light.” Menelaus is amazed at how wild Orestes has grown, how terrible the look in his eyes. “My body has vanished,” says Orestes, “only my name has not left me.”

The tragedy opens with a scene in which Electra, sitting near her brother, keeps lookout for the arrival of Menelaus, on whom she and Orestes have placed all their hopes. She is always “looking” at the road expecting to “see” her uncle. But Helen appears instead of Menelaus. Electra “shows” her her brother and herself. Then the chorus of Argive women, who are the same age as Electra, arrives. The scene of Electra with the chorus recalls Philoctetes: here too the chorus “looks at” the sick Orestes, whose whole body shakes. He comes to, but not for long. His eyes roll wildly, he “sees” things that do not really exist. A “vision” appears to Orestes. He points it out to his sister and asks if she sees the same thing. I have already spoken of the scene with Menelaus. In form it is stichomythis, but in content Menelaus’ “viewing” of the “dead” Orestes doubles the scene of Electra and the chorus. Of course, Euripides conceptually softens the mythical meaning of the images: he turns the apparitions and visions into hallucinations or dreams. “From what apparitions do you suffer (are you ill)?” Menelaus asks Orestes, and he learns that Orestes sees night visions of the Erinyes. Dream visions are the conceptual replacement of mirages, or rather, they are mirages understood conceptually; in the tragedians they figure instead of mythical apparitions and always perform a constructive function (For example, the dream of Atossa in Aeschylus’ Persians), like in the
Hellenistic novel, they are simply reminiscences of myths. Here in *Orestes* the apparitions do not appear in the form of characters, the dead father is not called to earth like Darius in *The Persians*. Nevertheless, here too Orestes and Electra address the shade of their murdered father, speak to it, swear to it, bring it their tears and their complaints: concept has turned the mythical image into a ritual scene.

When Electra learns of the forthcoming death of her brother and herself, she raises “women’s cries:” “Woe is me! For, seeing you before the grave, I raise moans, brother, before the pyre of the dead!” Seeing the last glance in Orestes’ eyes, she cries and moans.

These words, conceptually presented by Euripides, recreate the same scene of “looking at” the dead man, which appears so many times muted and reworked by concept in tragedy, but which was depicted in its pure image form by Theocritus in the ritual “watching” of the dead Adonis. This is why the vocabulary of such scenes is full of visual terms like “see,” “watch,” “view,” “gaze,” “eyes,” “appearance,” “look,” “glance.”

There is also a significant scene of agon at closed doors in *Orestes*. Menelaus comes and orders his servants to unlock the door of his house: “Let someone open the house! I am speaking to the servants—push back these gates!” But Orestes mockingly does not allow Menelaus to save his wife and daughter. “Hey you, Menelaus!” he cries, “Do not dare to touch these bolts with your hand! Or I will crush your head with the cornice…The bolts that hold you in your striving to come help are connected with bars so you cannot get into the house!”

Such agon at gates or doors cannot be called squabbles or altercations. When presented in direct form in the mysteries of the dead they take the form of real battle, single combat, the duel that is recreated in its original form by Aeschylus in his *Seven*. The battle character of such agon at closed doors is also shown in the fact that in the tragedians they almost always take the form of stichomythia; and while in Old Comedy verbal agon invariably leads to a fight, in tragedy stichomythia always serves the purpose of verbal agon.

In *Orestes* the scene being analyzed, the stichomythia, is of a violent nature. Orestes and Menelaus verbally attack each other, covering each other with abuse. The stichomythia, which changes from alternating lines to dialogical half-lines, takes the form of its most ancient variants; judging by Aeschylus, such “repeating” half-lines of two characters, each of whom pronounces half of a phrase, were laments. In Euripides the half-line stichomythia between Orestes and Menelaus has for its theme the murder of Hermione and the killing of Orestes.

The altercation of the two heroes takes the conceptual, seemingly realistic form of a quarrel and vengeance of two people. But this conceptual form grows out of the mythological image. Beneath the quarrel of people lies the fury of natural elements, for the most part of fire, which plays such an important role in the constructive texture of tragedy. Menelaus’ house is the image object of the “quarrel” and raging fire is represented in the image of raging flames and fire. Orestes, the incarnation of anger, raging fury, and vengeance, is seized by an unrestrained thirst for destruction (“I shall not tire of killing villains ever”). He rushes to set a fire in Menelaus’ house, to kill Helen,
to slaughter Hermione. The house is already enveloped in flames and smoke; Hermione
holds a sword ready at her throat. Menelaus, excited and upset, is the conceptual form of
the mythological “house” lit by torches and fire.

On the zoomorphic level Orestes and Electra are “two lions” (like Philoctetes and
Neoptolemus!). Many times Orestes has the epithet “matricidal dragon,” and in this sense
he is like the “dragon” Pentheus, who is also “matricidal,” only in the sense of a victim.
Orestes’ fire has to be compared with Pentheus’ fire and Heracles’ or rather Madness’s
fire, the destructive element of fire that seizes Pentheus, Heracles, and Orestes alike, the
mythological hypostases of “flame.” The many designations of Orestes’ illness in the
form of “lyssa” show that Orestes, like Heracles, incarnates Lytta; possibly Heracles is
the paredrus of his sister, Electra. It is no coincidence that Electra sets fire to the house
along with her brother; it is no coincidence that she too is “deprived of reason” when she
sees her brother’s insane eyes.

In Orestes there are “entreaties” customary for sacrifice. The role of the “entreators” is
played by Orestes and Electra; Orestes, a suppliant for his sister, “prays” at Helen’s knees
for their salvation from death. Stoning is a typical death of pharmakoi-hubrists to which
matricides are sentenced. Wanting to avoid such a shameful death, Orestes is ready to
hang himself or cut his own throat. For him (as for Ajax) there is one decisive day in
which his fate is to be fulfilled. But Ajax commits suicide on that day, while Orestes only
promises to cut his throat and Electra’s “that very day.” Such days “that look both ways,”
days that are borders and boundaries, are well known in many rituals: on one side lies
death, the old year, everything “old,” and on the other the birth of a young and new
life.151 It is exactly this image that is expressed in “doors” and “gates,” which are now
closed, now opening. In Philoctetes it is presented in the form of a dipylon, a two-gated
cave, with entrances from two opposite sides (cp. the faces of Janus and the image of any
“threshold”).

Orestes, the victim who suffers from Menelaus the hubrist’s rigidity and cruelty,
commits hubris himself. As the bearer of pollution (miasma) he must be put to death
shamefully. In myth he also must be mocked. In the rationalization of the myth by
Euripides it looks like this: someone has told Menelaus that Helen has not been killed,
“but has vanished, becoming invisible,” and Menelaus considers this “empty fable”
Orestes’ invention, worthy of “great laughter.”152 However, it is precisely the “empty
fable” that reflects mythological reality. Helen, as we know, was always accompanied by
a dual nature—authentic and fake—and at the decisive moment it turned out that it was
not Helen who died, but only her phantom, which “vanished unseen.” This is what made
Orestes’ “feat” funny, just like Ajax’ murder of two sheep instead of the Atreidai is
funny. So is Pentheus funny, when he stabs not Dionysus, but his phantom with a sword.

In Euripides’ Medea the cluster of mythological motifs is about the same as in The
Madness of Heracles or Orestes. Hubris is committed by Jason against Medea: after
bringing her from her distant homeland, which Medea betrayed for Jason, after bringing
children into the world with her, Jason plans to marry Creon’s daughter; and Creon is
preparing to exile Medea from Corinth. Medea is cursed. But it is not jealousy in the
European sense that determines her wild acts, but a reaction to the hubris of Jason, who
has mocked Medea, who but recently transgressed for him all the “established laws.” Jason is an oathbreaker and deceiver of a guest. In her quest for vengeance, Medea decides that she can hit Jason hardest by murdering his children and destroying his chosen bride. This is Euripides’ plot in short. Nevertheless, Euripides leaves the mythical end intact: after the infanticide and the treacherous murder of her rival Medea is carried off in the heavenly chariot of the Sun, drawn by winged dragons.

Medea’s violent, raging emotions are depicted in the tragedy as “mania,” as possession, fury, an “illness.” In spite of the fact that in the conceptual understanding of their tragic plots Medea and Ajax have nothing in common, both are characterized by the same mythological image. Medea too, like Ajax, is guarded and not let out of sight so that she cannot commit murder. Medea too has a “wild temper” (ήθος, about which Ajax speaks, is evil, inflexible willfulness) and the “dark nature of an unbridled mind.” Arrogant unbridledness (αιθάδεια) is a special feature of a difficult temper which cannot be suaged, severe wildness of emotions, a peculiar iron and cruel stubbornness. Such unbridledness and “temper” are features of Ajax, Philoctetes, and Medea. In mythological image wildness, gloominess, unassuageability, unbridledness usually characterize death; the Greek words introduce a coloring in image which is lost in modern translations; for example the common root in the concepts “hateful, gloomy,” “to hate,” and Styx, the river of death (στυγηρός).

Medea is not a Greek, but a “barbarian.” She has the character not of a civilized woman, but of a tigress burning with indomitable malice. She has a “wild temper,” the “state of a bull,” she is a “lioness,” an “infanticide, hateful lioness;” she is treacherous, an intriguer, she honors only Hecate, and her hard, savage anger can never pass until she is completely satiated with evil. The relationship between Medea and Jason is called by the familiar terms of “hatred” (νέικος) and “quarrel” (έπις) that figure in Greek philosophy and Greek cosmogonies the moment they mention the collapse of the “first elements” or the battle of the natural elements. Every Greek tragedy, no matter what its theme, always calls the central conflict “hatred” and “quarrel.”

Like the majority of the heroes of Greek tragedy, Medea incarnates the destructive element of fire-death. A variant form of Hecate, she is a magician and a master of enchantments and herbs, she can tame monsters, but she can also create intrigues and treachery. Eros pierced her with his “unavoidable arrows, forcing her to save the body” of Jason: this is the dark Eros-death that was sung of in Greek lyric, but in tragedy Eros is a cosmic force, the destructive side of light. Medea is the granddaughter of the Sun, she lives “at the farthest boundaries of the earth” (conceptually: she is a foreigner). Like fire-death she commits two horrible deeds: she kills her children and treacherously burns her rival. Mad Heracles also killed his children; he is also an incarnation of raging fire; but conceptually the motivation there is different, devoid of ethicism. Here in Medea the furious heroine does the same as Agave, but in the form of conscious vengeance. The innocent die, as Euripides loves to show; the “lambs” die.

Medea kills the children inside the locked house. When Jason comes the chorus tells him, “Open the doors, you will see the murder of your children.” A scene analogous to Orestes begins. The excited Jason tries to get into the house. He calls the servants and orders them to open the bolts, to free the clamps “so I can see the double grief” (the death of his two boys, cp. the scene in Hippolytus where Theseus orders the slaves to
break the bolts to fling the door open and see the spectacle of his dead son). Medea bars Theseus’ [Jason’s?] way: “why are you rushing and breaking down these doors,” she asks ironically, “why are you looking for the dead and for me, who have done this? Cease this labor! And if you need me, tell me what you need, but touch me not with your hand.”

These last words show that Jason tried to attack Medea: the remains of the former battle, replaced in Euripides by violent verbal abuse.

Medea’s second evil deed was to send her rival a rich robe and golden wreath soaked with a special poison: as soon as the costume was put on, the rival was enveloped in fire. A golden wreath is a fiery wreath. In myth images speak of the destruction of the fiery cosmos-woman. In Euripides the messenger tells a story about the death of Creon’s daughter in fire. His narration has a logical, conceptual character. Still light and visual images are preserved in the speech of the messenger. Thus the victim cannot take her eyes off the shining gifts: she often “looks” at them long and intently with her “eyes.” Dressing in the many-colored costume and decorating her locks with the golden wreath, she “fixed her hair in a sparkling mirror, smiling at the soulless likeness of her body.” But here a “spectacle terrible to see” is revealed: pale, in convulsions, the victim fell to the floor and her eyes began to roll wildly, foam gushed from her mouth. The “terrible spectacle” of fiery death has all the features that characterized the fit of Philoctetes, the madness of Heracles and Ajax, the possession of Orestes. But what for them is deep sleep is death for Creon’s daughter.

The colorful costume and golden wreath only “looked” beautiful. In reality this was not “beauty,” but painful destruction, death-fire. In the same way the body of the victim in the “sparkling mirror” had no soul, but was an empty “likeness” (εἰκών). Creon’s daughter “looks” in it and “sees” not herself, but her likeness. In Euripides the mythological image is rationalized. He says something else: Creon’s daughter is the incarnation of fire-death, and her deadly costume is a phantom, woven of death-bringing fire, and she in this costume is an empty likeness who knows neither marriage, nor beauty, nor childbearing. As contradictory as it may be to the conceptual meaning of the plot, Medea’s rival is also Medea, only in the aspect of death. Medea herself meanwhile is borne up in the sun chariot; contrary to all ethical logic, this murderess will have a new marriage, this infanticide will have new children.

The conceptual meaning of Medea had beneath it another meaning, that of the mythological image: the quarrel between two worlds, two women (“rivals”), the destruction of one in fire and the rebirth of the other in heaven.

This same image forms the basis of the conceptual plot of The Women of Trachis. In Sophocles the fiery, dying bearer of “illness” is Heracles, whose image unites features of destructive Eros and mad Heracles. Here, in Sophocles the heroine is a meek creature, the passive weapon of Eros, and the hero is a victim of his meek and loving wife. The magical fiery cloak catches fire and burns Heracles alive; he saves himself by…commanding that he be burned in a bonfire. The plot brought forward by Euripides of rivalry between two women and the vengeance of Medea is effaced in Sophocles, but the motif of the fiery gift takes the most important place in The Women of Trachis. In Sophocles’ tragedy the semantics of the cloak has a kind of open character. The cloak is
soaked in the blood of an animal monster—in the first place. Second, it fears fire, warmth, and the light of the sun and has to be kept in the darkness, in secret places. The poison with which it is impregnated destroys everything wherever a drop falls. Where a piece of wool soaked in it lies on the ground foam like wine boils up.

In the conceptual reworking of the tragedians the frenzied heroes shake, vomit foam, fall flat, change countenance, sweat, burn up or commit murder. In Sophocles the cloak of Heracles is the shroud of death, of animal, fiery, poisonous blood, of all-destroying bubbling foam, changing in appearance and color, untouchable, of bloody fire that fears heat and light and lies in the most hidden secret depths, this is the blood of a beast “in love” and taking vengeance, a weapon in the hands of a “loving” wife—an incarnation of Eros.

In The Women of Trachis there is one episode of guarding the sleep of the sick hero like in Philoctetes, Orestes, Heracles. Everywhere this scene is conducted by the chorus with a second soloist. And everywhere they say that the sleeping sufferer should not be awakened. In The Women of Trachis is is clear that “awakening” originally meant not a living hero, but a dead one submerged in “deep sleep.” He cannot be “awakened,” he has to “wake up” himself, and he invariably wakes up right here on stage. The only tragedy in which the hero is awakened is Rhesus.

Medea does not let Jason into the house where their dead children lie. Orestes does not let Menelaus in either. Nevertheless, I have often shown that in a number of tragedies death is presented in the form of “watching” the dead from the side, from a hiding place, or through a crack in the door. In just such a manner Deianira’s nurse “spies” on her committing suicide. Deianira “conceals” herself inside the house “so that someone couldn’t see her.” But the hidden nurse was on the watch with “a secret eye.” And she “sees” that Deianira has thrown herself on Heracles’ couch and intends to commit suicide. The faithful slave jumps up and runs to get Deianira’s son as fast as she can, but when they return they “see” the unfortunate one already pierced by the sword.

In this story the nurse performs the role of the messenger. This is understandable; the messenger gives an account of what he has seen himself with his own eyes. In Euripides’ Suppliants he even calls himself “spectator” and then communicates what he has “seen.” The spectator passively watches, seeing before him a picture of death. In the post-conceptual period he watches what happens on stage. However, no matter how highly we may value Classical tragedy, we should not ignore that it is concerned with murders, deaths, and killing, and that all of its protagonists are either murderers or murdered. The barbarous themes of Greek tragedy—these hacked up Lichases, little children with their throats cut by their fathers or their mothers, heads without bodies of Pentheuses, young girls burned with glory and pride in bonfires, Polydoruses killed and drowned for money, Antigones buried alive, all these human sacrifices, matricide, husband-murder, infanticide, etc., etc…the bloody barbarous themes of Greek tragedy can be explained by the fact that Greek visual theater—balagan—was a panorama concealed behind the curtain or behind a door of death, but death not of people, but of mythical beings who incarnated natural elements and the forces of nature. Images were more humane than concepts, because they belonged to pre-class society.
To finish with Euripides, I would like to discuss *Hecuba* and the two *Iphigenias*, but for the most part only a few separate visionary details that interest me.

*Hecuba*… In this twilight tragedy surrounded with deaths and horrors, the role of the phantom world is very important. The prologue of the murdered Polydorus, an apparition, already shows that “phantom” and “dead man” were thought of as an identity: a phantom was a dead man as a “soulless likeness of the body.” *Hecuba* suffers catastrophe after catastrophe. Having lost her children, her husband, her kingdom, Troy, she becomes a slave. Bent by grief and old age, decrepit, she continues to be the target of evil fate. Two last misfortunes await her. All she has left aside from the doomed Cassandra is her young son Polydorus and young daughter Polyxena; Polyxena is brought alive as a sacrifice for her dead fiancé Achilles, and Polydorus is treacherously killed and thrown into the sea without burial by Polymestor (“much-plotting,” “clever”—an epithet of death), Priam’s *xenos*, tempted by gold (when Troy fell Priam sent him gold with his son Polydorus for him to guard). One thing is left for Hecuba—revenge. She pretends that she wants to give Polymestor a treasure, draws him into the house with his two children, kills the children there with the help of the Trojan women, and blinds him. Hecuba is protected by Agamemnon, who allows this revenge to take place. Blinded, Polymestor is granted the gift of foresight and he prophesies for Agamemnon and Hecuba the death that awaits them. For his impudence Agamemnon orders his slaves to seize the blind man and throw him onto a uninhabited island.

Thus Polymestor ends the way Philoctetes begins. This figure incarnates the image of death. The motif of “treasure,” of “gold” leads us to the “wealth” that characterizes the underworld rulers. Treachery, perfidy, transgression of divine laws conceptually describe Polymestor, coming from the mythical image. Philoctetes will leave Lemnos, be cured, receive glory; Polymestor will be deprived of riches and children and will live blind on a lonely uninhabited island. Philoctetes undergoes transition from death to life, Polydorus from life to death.

In *Hecuba*, which is surrounded by death, as I have said, phantoms, dreams, and visions are preserved. The phantom of Achilles demanded the death of Polyxena. The phantom of Polydorus appears on stage. There is a similar phantom in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* as well, which is also dedicated to the underworld goddesses; in this tragedy the phantom of the murdered Clytemnestra appears on stage, and in the *Eumenides* the action opens with a picture of a group asleep. The analogy with the *Persians* jumps to mind, where the phantom of Darius comes right out of the tomb and where the dream of Atossa prophesies the conclusion of the tragedy. Thus Hecuba too always sees prophetic dreams, during which the shade of her murdered son appears to her: these are visions (ὀψείς) and apparitions (φάσματα). When the corpse is brought before his mother, the scene of “watching” typical for tragedy takes place. Vengeance on Polymestor is taken “inside” the house; here too we are dealing with opening doors behind which the victims lie, a “spectacle” of death.

It is significant that the ruined, actually murdered Polymestor appears in the role of messenger about himself, like Menelaus in *Helen* or the murdered Polydorus right here in *Hecuba*. Polymestor gives a speech in which he foretells the fate of his murderers Hecuba and Agamemnon. Here the future tense is prescribed by conceptual interpretation. In reality, in the mythological level death “reveals,” “shows” the murder of Agamemnon,
the new misfortunes of Hecuba. It is no coincidence that the Greek “prophets” are granted the gift of prophecy either in blindness or when they visit the underworld—in death.

In *Hecuba* the plot is gloomy because its main characters are incarnations of death. Hecuba (in Gk. Hekabe) is related to Hecate, “distant,” the divinity of death and apparitions, the night luminary. Polyxena, “much-hospitable,” and Polydorus, “much-giving” are epithet incarnations of the underworld gods. From the drama of the dead there grew a conceptual plot about people who became dead. The barbarous plots of Greek tragedy could never have existed if they were not built on mythical images. In Euripides’ time humans were not sacrificed and for murderers there were law courts.

Euripides based both his *Iphigenias* on motifs of human sacrifice. One of them, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, is similar in plot to *Helen*, only the role of Theoclymenus is taken here by Thoas and the role of the heroine’s husband Menelaus, by her brother, Orestes. Like Menelaus, Orestes lands by accident in a country where Hellenes are sacrificed. This bad luck turns out unexpectedly to be good luck: Orestes finds his sister as Menelaus found his wife. They deceive the local king and run to the ship, taking with them the statue of Artemis-Athena.

In the prologue Iphigenia goes inside the house, because she wants to make burial libations to her brother. She has seen a nocturnal vision: the earth shook, her parents’ house fell, and of all the destroyed parts only one pillar remained, taking the form of a man. Iphigenia interprets this dream as the death of Orestes: pillars (the supports of the house), she says, are the male descendants of the house, and in her dream she washed this pillar like a dead man. But Orestes and Pylades appear. They begin to spy out human tracks. This scene recalls the arrival of Odysseus and Neoptolemus at Philoctetes’, as well as the arrival of Athena and Odysseus at Ajax’.

“Look,” says Orestes to his friend, “take heed, lest there be a human track.” Pylades answers, “I am looking, observing, directing my eye everywhere.” They “see” before them the terrible house of the blood-thirsty goddess, in which the altar is drenched in human blood and the cornices are draped with the arms of those murdered. Orestes asks Pylades if he “sees” this, and adds that they must “look well, looking around with their eyes on all sides.” This scene of “spying” at the doors of the house of death has here too the typological form of stichomythia.

As much as Orestes desires to avoid the sacrificial knife and escape unnoticed, he is found by shepherds. One of them comes to Iphigenia, the priestess of the bloodthirsty goddess, with the news. He describes Orestes’ fit in the usual expressions: tormented by the Erinyes, Orestes is in a frenzy, vomits foam, shakes, moans, turns his head. With a cry he asks his friend, “Pylades, do you see this? Do you not see the dragon Hades, who wants to kill me, armed against me with terrible serpents?” All of this scene of Orestes’ apparitions is “spied on” by a shepherd.

It is impossible not to notice the similarity between all these falling, shaking, frenzied heroes of tragedy—not only Orestes—with falling houses, earthquakes, fragments of destroyed walls, cornices, and pillars. The heroes of tragedy in the state of attacks of “mania” and fits of “illness”—this is the conceptual reworking of mythological
eschatologies, the shattering of cosmoses and “houses.” Pentheus in the Bacchae and Orestes in Iphigenia in Tauris are striking examples of concepts created by images.

The further development of the plot is well known. Iphigenia thinks up a deceptive purification from the pollution brought on by the arrival of the matricide. As priestess, she orders that no one “watch” the ritual, which she will perform in the sea. Thanks to this lie, she manages to escape with Orestes and Pylades. Chase plays no part: Athena stops Thoas’ vengeance.

Iphigenia’s deception is typical for tragedy, and it can be generalized. As in palliata one finds mirage, fooling, and duping, so in tragedy there are deceptions of gods (for example, of Athena in Ajax or Rhesus) and the lies of positive characters are the conceptual reworking of “phantom” and “imaginary.” There are not always visions, dreams, visits of phantoms from the other world, likenesses of people; deception presents the same imaginary sphere, imitation of the real, but actually without its essence, with only an external similarity. In Euripides, who is close in time to Middle Comedy, there is more of this illusion element than in Aeschylus and Sophocles. The messenger in Iphigenia commits the same blasphemy as Pentheus and the messenger in the Bacchae: he “suspects/spies on” the purification ritual, “spies,” “watches” what is forbidden, and “sees” deception. Messengers often call what they see from the side “miracle.” Above I mentioned that in The Bacchae the messenger does unpunished the same thing Pentheus dies for: he spies on the orgies of the maenads. The messenger in Iphigenia in Tauris commits the same “blasphemy.” First he “suspects” the whole purification ritual of Iphigenia. Then he begins to “spy.” He himself is frightened by “seeing” what is not permitted, and he therefore sits quietly with his friends. Thus they quietly “watch” what happens until they “see” Iphigenia’s clever deception. The tragic messengers who “watch” from the side often call the pictures they “see” “miracles.” I have already examined the visual significance of this term. In Iphigenia in Tauris it is not the messenger, but Thoas who exclaims, “O miracle! What better name can I find you?” in response to the messenger’s words about Iphigenia’s salvation of the very Orestes she had just brought to sacrifice. In the mouth of Thoas the image “miracle” became a concept.

On the other hand, in Iphigenia at Aulis the messenger tells of how “suddenly one could see a miracle;” when Iphigenia should have been killed, she vanished no one knew where. At this time everybody “saw” by the will of the god an “unexpected phantom, which no one who had not seen it would believe in.” It was a deer, large and beautiful in “appearance,” which everyone “saw” (in the original “in appearance” means “in spectacle,” i.e. “in visual external appearance”). The blood of this deer was spilled on the altar of the god in place of Iphigenia’s. “I have come,” the messenger sent by Agamemnon concludes, “and tell this based on what I myself saw … The gods save those they love. On the same day I saw your child dying and seeing.” To see means to live; “seeing” is in opposition to “dying.” This is why Iphigenia “supplicates” her father on her knees in tears not to kill her: “for it is pleasant to see the light, and you will not force me to see what is beneath the earth,” and “most pleasant for men is to see this world, and not that below—not at all.” Thus there are two kinds of “watching.” One can “see” the
light and one can “see” the darkness. Tragedy reveals many examples of both. In the scenes at the doors, in the “witnessing” of the messengers there is usually discussion of the spectacle of death. But “light” shines wherever there is “miracle.”

I have already had occasion to point out that “door” meant the “horizon,” the “border” which opened on the opposing sides of light and darkness and in image represented the point of “boundary.” In this respect its semantics coincides completely with that of the “decisive day” that can be invisibly detected in every tragedy. On one and the same day Iphigenia both dies and remains alive. This mythological image of the alternation of light and darkness is understood rationalistically by the tragedians. Out of it is formed the concept of the “unity of time” which later becomes obligatory for tragedy along with the other unities. At any rate, the spatial image of the “door” has the same meaning as the temporal image of the “day.”

In *Iphigenia at Aulis* there is also a scene of “quarrel” between two brothers Agamemnon and Menelaus, in the form of a particularly ancient stichomythia—trochaic tetrameter. From the words addressed by Menelaus to the old slave, “I will quickly bloody your head with my scepter,” from his grabbing the letter by force we may conclude that the iambic stichomythia between the slave and Menelaus also took place in the form of a duel in action. Elements of single combat remained in the verbal duel between the two Atreidai as well: Agamemnon asks Menelaus why he is using force and commands him to “take his hands off the letter” (a weakening of the motif “take your hands off”). But Menelaus tears the seal off the letter and forcibly opens it. This episode begins with Agamemnon, who comes to investigate the noise made by the slave out of whose hands Menelaus grabbed the letter. “What is this?” he asks, “What is this noise at the doors and obscenity of words?” The scene, therefore, took place at the doors and was violent. In response to the accusation of using force Menelaus unexpectedly proposes that Agamemnon “look at him.” Agamemnon answers reasonably, “Do I, a son of Atreus, close my eyes for fear?” “You see this letter, the servant of abominable scribbling?” asks Menelaus. “I see it,” answers Agamemnon, “but first release it from your hands (take your hands off).” Agamemnon cannot imagine that Menelaus plans to rip the seal from the letter. But he “opened the letter to hurt” his brother.

The terms “close,” “open,” “see,” “watch” refer here to the letter and to Menelaus, but not to death. However, Menelaus is a coarse incarnation of death, of its violence and malice, and the letter in the plot is Menelaus’ weapon, which bears in the forms of a deception the murder of Iphigenia. What acted in myth as the usual expressions of the images “deception,” “board,” “evil king” in concept took on the character of amoral conduct, bad temper, the letter. While in myth Heracles fights with Cerberus at the gates of death, in the conceptual plot the hero argues with a scoundrel at the doors of a house.

The first song of the chorus in this tragedy is also interesting. It is rather unusual. The chorus of women of Chalcis tells that it has come from afar, left its homeland to follow their husbands who have sailed off with Agamemnon to win Helen. Their entire story is a poetic “catalog” of ships and helmsmen the women have “seen.” Visual terms figure in this song alone 12 times. Here they speak of an “untold spectacle—the look of a woman’s
eyes” of the “appearance of a bull-footed depiction of a stern.” The image substratum of this chorus is very archaic, but it is radically reinterpreted by Euripides. Like a messenger, this women’s chorus lists everything it has “seen” in its distant sea wanderings—all these boats, all the unusual leaders. Elements of ethnographic exaggeration, amazement at unusual foreign heroes are not completely effaced in this chorus. From the point of view of reality, the contents of this song do not stand up to criticism. The wives did not follow their husbands in the Trojan campaign, and entire collectives from Chalcis could not complete a journey by sea to see all the famous Achaean heroes. The motive for their arrival precisely at Aulis is also unreal: supposedly to look at the Achaean navy and its leaders. It is easier to propose something else: that the function of the most ancient chorus consisted in arriving from afar and telling about what it had “seen,” for the most part about a visual “miracle,” i.e. about something beautiful, radiant. But I will talk about the function of the chorus later.

If we turn from Euripides back to Sophocles and Aeschylus, these observations can be extended to almost all tragedies. The first song of the chorus in *Oedipus at Colonus* is visual in character. The chorus “spies out” and tracks Oedipus, seeking him with their eyes and saying to one another, “Look! Who was he? Where is he? Whither has he gone so quickly, of all, of all the most insatiable? Find out, seek him out, look everywhere!” But the Athenian elders cannot find Oedipus, no matter how well they “look through” the grove back and forth. And suddenly Oedipus says to them, “This him is I: for with your voice I see what is said.”

And actually the chorus first “watches” but “does not see.” The setting of the action, where Oedipus has come, is the sacred grove of the Erinyes. The kingdom of death is characterized here in the form of a “trackless grove,” i.e. in the conceptual meaning a reserve, “without a path.” The elders step through it reverently, “without looking, without a sound, without a word.” Into the blind kingdom of death comes the blind Oedipus. The whole plot of the tragedy, in essence, is the conceptual unfolding of this single image of Oedipus dying. But image is built concretely and once. It knows nothing of “dying.” For it “dying” is the arrival of a certain being in a certain country. Death is expressed for it in the externals of this being—blindness, rags, old age; in the position of this being—exile; in the characterization of the country—devoid of tracks and paths, sounds and looks. Oedipus’ arrival here is the conclusion of his life predetermined by his fate. At the end of the tragedy he heads for a slope which descends into the underworld, and from there he disappears unseen. It was not allowed to “watch” this death, and no one “saw” it. Speaking was forbidden, and it took place without a sound. Now Oedipus received a “good shady couch.” This bed, deprived of light, consisting of “shadow,” is situated “under the earth for eternal time.” “O father, O dear, O you darkness found eternally under the earth!” exclaims Antigone in the mourning lament for her father. This paired lament of the two daughters of Oedipus, Antigone and Ismene, consists of verse lines split into half-lines each of which belongs in alternation to each of the two orphans: as always in Greek tragedy, the formal construction of the structural parts completely
corresponds not only to the semantic content of the given passage, but even to the characters who sing it.

In this lament, which is reminiscent of the lament of Antigone and Ismene in Aeschylus’ *Seven*, there is talk of Antigone’s passionate desire to “see the underworld abode (lit. “hearth”)” of her father. “But do you not see,” says Ismene to Antigone, “that he fell unburied, deprived of everything?” The visual meaning of these images is already effaced, because it has completely become the base of the new conceptual meaning. But here too it was a case of “watching” a dead man. This “vision of death” (in the active-passive sense) is expressed in the words of Oedipus when he addresses the underworld and calls it “light without light.” The blind Oedipus personifies precisely this “world without light,” eyes without sight. Tragedy shows that one can see the light, and one can see the “lightlessness,” darkness. Palliata for the most part introduces watching of *tableaux vivants*, panoramas, shining beauty; tragedy presents pictures of death. They take the form of the story of the messenger or stichomythia laments, for the most part in the dénouement.

As to the messenger’s story, it begins with amazement at a “miracle.” The underworld Zeus, terrifying the daughters of Oedipus, gave the sufferer a sign from under the earth with thunder that it is time to say farewell to life. Strictly speaking the story of the messenger depicts Oedipus’ death alive. The blind man comes to the place that leads to the underworld, performs the ritual of washing himself, dresses, and even offers burial libations, hears the underworld thunder (“the bitter sound”), sees his daughters who have fallen at his knees and begun the funeral wail. Then in the complete silence an otherworldly voice suddenly rings out, making hair stand on end: the underworld god calls and hurries Oedipus, who has just said farewell to his daughters. Then Oedipus sends all away, completing the mystery of his death in the presence of Theseus, the Athenian king, alone. His miraculous disappearance is called *tâ drôμeâ*-a term that was applied to mysterial and sacral “acts.” Everyone but Theseus has left, bursting into tears. When the messenger and Oedipus’ daughters looked back, they “saw from their place that this man (Oedipus) was no longer anywhere present” (in the original there is a more ancient construction which preserves the “physicality” of the disappearance: “we saw from there that man who no longer was present anywhere”). Theseus stood with his hand covering his eyes, “as if at the appearance of something terrible he had not the strength to watch.” But the messenger and the others “saw” Theseus fall down, bowing to the earth and to Olympus. And the messenger ends with the same reference to a miracle: “by what lot Oedipus died not one of the mortals could explain save Theseus, for no one killed him, neither the fire-bearing thunderbolt of the god, nor an agitated storm of the sea—they were not there at that moment—but either someone was sent as an escort by the gods or by the will of the underworld gods a step of the earth deprived of light gave way.” And for Oedipus’ children death has come, depicted as blindness: “deadly night descended on our eyes.” The children suffer their father’s fate. Conceptually this is a metaphor of grief, but in image they are the concrete actions of elements like night which has descended, stepped on the eyes of Antigone and Ismene. Both daughters, lamenting their father, speak of the fate that awaits them when they deprived of food will wander at the ends of the earth or “be carried by the sea tide.” “O if bloody Hades could take me, unfortunate, to my father!” exclaims Ismene.
Concepts distribute the images, but do not destroy them. One and the same image can turn into metaphor or remain in the language, or become the basis for the plot. Often an image, losing its mythical meaning, is filled with negative meaning. Later a negative simile, negative metaphor, or negative parallelism can appear on this ground. In Sophocles such an image is rationalized. Oedipus dies in a relatively mythical way, and his death is an underworld earthquake, the opening of the earth, underworld thunder. Like the death of nature, the death of the blind Oedipus presents thunder, lightning, and a sea storm. However, the messenger says that Oedipus was “not” killed by “either” lightning “or” storm. In the speech of Antigone “sea storm” becomes a realistic image. And for Sophocles this is an authentic realistic image as it is for us, the readers of the 20th century. I do not dispute this realism. I even stress it, but I would like to say that the concept of “sea storm” came in Sophocles from the mythological image and is not simply a concept, but a mythological image that has become concept. The same can be said of *Oedipus at Colonus* as a whole. The word “colonus” (κολωνός) is the name of an Attic deme, but it also means tomb and “burial mound.” In myth Oedipus finds death in the tomb kingdom, the name of which is Mound. This is a blessed country, of good horses, eternally blooming, it knows neither wind nor winter; its gardens are rich in flowers, greens, and fruit, nightingales sing sweetly, the waters of its rivers are sleepless, its rains pure; here Dionysus frolics and dances with his divine nurses, and it is not disdained by the dancing Muses nor by Aphrodite. What this country is is clear: the utopian land of plenty, blessedness, and beauty, as mythological paradise is described. This “hilly” country, Colonus, is described by Sophocles. But his Colonus is a real geographical place, even more, it is his birthplace. However, the place Colonus has its own myths, and these Colonus myths are rationalized by Sophocles. The actual existence of one locality or another does not disprove the mythical ideas about it: every myth is an image idea of some reality. The difference between Colonus the land of death and Colonus the Attic deme is not at all that one is mythical and the other real, but only in that the former is perceived in image, the latter in concept, Egypt also existed, though it was incarnated in the mythical father of fifty sons-aggressors; Europe existed, in myth the beloved of Zeus-bull; Lycia, the birthplace of the sun, existed geographically; Scythia, the boundary of the other world, existed, as did hundreds of other mythical “countries,” “islands,” and “cities” incarnated in the heroes of drama and lyric.

In order to define my thought, I will dwell briefly on two tragedies of Aeschylus; in essence, any of the Greek tragedies can be used as an example. *Prometheus Bound.* Here as nowhere else the basic conflict is shown with particular clarity. It consists of the agon of Zeus and the titan Prometheus. In myth Prometheus and his brothers are hubrists, “theomachists” in the literal sense, children of darkness. The light gods fight against them and defeat them, throwing some of them into Tartarus, chaining Prometheus to a cliff. The plot which lies in the substratum of Aeschylus’ tragedy echoes to a certain degree the plot of *The Madness of Heracles:* in both there is a piece of titanomachy and punishment of the fire-bearing hubrist. In almost every tragedy, by the way, the hero was a mythical personification of fire, and his basic agon was cosmic in nature. But in *Prometheus Bound*, as I said, this is particularly distinct, perhaps
because the agon of Prometheus and Zeus preserved the form of a struggle between the “old” principle and the “new.” Aeschylus enjoyed reworking myths in which just such a struggle took place. This gave him the opportunity (in The Persians and The Oresteia) to interpret the conflict of “old” and “new” conceptually, translating it into ethico-religious and ethico-social terms. This conceptual scheme of Aeschylus, however, arose from the mythological image scheme, where the agon of the two opponents always took the form of a duel between the old year and the new, the old sun and the new, old death with new life. In the world of mythological images such semantics was incarnated in old men, in choruses of old men, in old fathers and senile heroes, in the killing of children and youths, in the conflicts of fathers and sons (Oresteia, Oedipus and his sons, Hippolytus and Theseus, Ion, modified in the Persians, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, etc.). For Sophocles the agon of the “old” and the “new” was not so interesting; in Euripides it takes the form closest of all to myth—the physical killing of the young principle, abuse of the old; Aeschylus understands this image socially, and his sympathy is on the side of the old institutions. Prometheus denounces Zeus as a “new ruler”; though he helped Zeus in the titanic conflict, though he introduced culture, still his sympathy is on the side of the old world. In Aeschylus’ plot Prometheus is a champion of the old order, not a “revolutionary” at all. He is disturbed by the treachery of Zeus, who used Prometheus’ help, but did not reward him and even brought him low; he rises up against Zeus, but not against the gods in general. Prometheus’ drama is the drama of the abused hero of Greek tragedy, a drama that is always concrete, personal, based on a definite “local” offense that can be reconciled and even concretely rewarded (the cure of Philoctetes, Orestes, Io, the freeing of Prometheus, the new marriage of Medea, etc.). But in myth Prometheus is really a theomachist and a hubrist. His downfall takes place in the destruction of the entire cosmos of darkness, with earthquake, thunder, lightning flashes, and violent whirlwinds. His death is the death of the cosmos. Aeschylus makes this image into the logically consequent, but unjust revenge of Zeus. Falling into Tartarus, Prometheus exclaims, “No longer in words, but in fact the earth has begun to shake. A deep echo roars of thunder, flaming-fiery circles of lightning flash, whirlwinds whirl the dust, the blowings of all the winds jump, creating between them a contrary-blowing perturbation, the air is disturbed along with the sea. And such an onslaught, arousing terror, openly comes upon me from Zeus. O my mother, reverently honored, O ether circling all with an equal light for everyone, you see how I suffer injustice.” Here the rebellion of nature (στάσις) is understood as trampling on justice, i.e. ethically. The storm and gale, the squalls of wind, thunderstorm, earthquake—all these images of raging nature are reread by conceptual thought in the form of ethical “injustice.”

Prometheus vanishes the same way Oedipus does; they both vanish from a cliff, and both are accompanied by terrifying natural phenomena. Mythical imagery is devoid of ethics. Prometheus and Oedipus are neither bad nor good. Their death is the image expression of their semantics, and nothing else. But conceptual thought, which creates ethics and is already saturated with it, cannot perceive phenomena without quality and least of all neutrally. For it the same situation in one case (Prometheus) signifies illegal vengeance, and in another (Oedipus)—divine grace.

Aside from Prometheus, there is a female character as well, apparently one that once played a central role: the chorus, at least, consists here of female beings, Oceanides, who
have flown from afar. This female character is Io. Like many heroes of Greek tragedy, Io is possessed by madness which now passes, now overcomes her.

*Prometheus Bound* is significant for analysis because in it natural elements and supernatural beings act—gods and demigods, not people or even heroes in human form, and this presents the most ancient form of tragedy. A tragedy like *Prometheus Bound* shows that later heroes with human appearance and human emotions derive from direct incarnations of fire, water, air, etc. It shows something else as well. Prometheus is continually addressing natural elements, not people. In his first monologue he begins the story of his sufferings with an address to the forces of nature: “O divine air and quick-winged blowings, sources of rivers and uncounted laughter (conceptually: splashing) of sea waves, and all-mother earth, you too I call, all-seeing disc of the sun!” And he ends with a similar address in the concluding words of the epilog to the mother (earth) and the air (ether), the source of light. At the same time the characters of the tragedy are these same forces of nature, but not in conceptually-abstracted form, not “earth,” “fire,” “water,” “air,” but in their image form—the only one possible for image thought, concrete and singular: Hermes is the god of the underworld world, Hephaestus and Prometheus are incarnations of fire, Io is the earth (a variant of Demeter), Ocean and the winged Oceanides that fly through the air, “sent by the quick-carrying winds” are the image expressions of air and water. The earth is Prometheus’ mother.

Here too the life of nature is presented as perceived directly and visually, in the form of the feelings and simple events which characterized the life of primitive people. But the life of nature could not be perceived any other way than in the form of human life, so long as it was perceived by mythological image thought.

So long as there was no abstraction, reality was not contemplated, not observed, and not subjected to conscious interpretations. In the sphere of consciousness it was only watched and felt (to a lesser degree). The spatial, object perception of things and phenomena created imagery. Its entire underlying principle was immediately given visual appearance.

*Prometheus Bound* is filled with remnants of visual images, though they are reworked conceptually. First, as soon as Might and Hephaestus arrive at the end of the earth to chain Prometheus, in the first stichomythia, Hephaestus asks Might, “Do you see the ill-beheld spectacle for the eyes?” Might replies, “I see him who receives what he deserves.” Left alone, Prometheus addresses the air, the sea, and the earth, “Look how I suffer… Look how I am outraged, destroyed, I must suffer an uncounted number of years.” And further on, “What unseen sound, what scent will come to me? … Let the spectator of my suffering come on the tip of a snowflake [to the end of the earth]… You see me, a fettered, unfortunate god….”

As soon as the Oceanides arrive, Prometheus says to them, “Look, see how chained to the top of a cliff over a precipice I must keep unenviable watch.” And the chorus responds, “I see, Prometheus: a terrible cloud, full of tears, came to my eyes, when I saw your desiccated body, attached to the cliff with steel fetters of defilement.” Prometheus asks Oceanus the same question, “Have you too come as watcher (epoptes) of my sufferings?…or did you come to see my lot and be indignant with me at my troubles? Look at the spectacle, at this friend of Zeus…etc.” Oceanus answers, like the Oceanides, “I see Prometheus….”
Particularly clear in Prometheus is the archaic structure of “illusion” mime—ἐπίδειξις (showing) first of Prometheus and the chorus, then of Prometheus and Oceanus. Prometheus, who has made “blind” people “seeing,” given them the “light of fire,” “shows” himself to the seeing and watching spectator, whether it be Ocean, Io, or the Oceanides. The peripeteia of the transition from blindness to sight of the heroes and back is one of the topoi of tragedy, most distinct in the blind but seeing Teiresias and the seeing but blind Oedipus (Oedipus the King). Thus in Prometheus the fire-eye allows others to “see” the spectacle of his death.

Visual images also accompany the heroine with the horns of a cow—Io. Hardly has she run on stage when she is dumbfounded at whom she “sees” fettered to the cliff, and Prometheus answers her, “You see the maker of fire for mortals, Prometheus.” Then she presents her story. The beginning of her suffering is “nocturnal visions which came to her maidenly chambers.” An unseen voice spoke to her of Zeus’ love and called her to give herself to him “so that Zeus’ eye could rest from passion.” Finally Io decides to tell her father about the “night-walking phantoms.” Obeying the oracle, her father drives his daughter out of the house to the ends of the earth and forces her to stay there alone. At once her appearance changes, and she turns (“as you see,” adds Io in her story) into a cow. Argus is with her as a guard, “looking with empty [clever] eyes” and a gadfly, “a phantom (εἰδώλον) of the earth-born Argus,” begins to sting her and chase her over the whole earth. She always “sees” before her the “thousand-eyed shepherd,” and he follows her “having a clever eye.” At the end of her appearance on stage she is again overcome by frenzy, the same tragic “mania,” the same “lyssa,” madness, and her “eyes roll like a wheel, turning in circles,” her spirit becomes “mad,” her tongue “unrestrained.”

Hearing Io’s story, the chorus calls the suffering of the deformed victim “ill-seen”—a term which appears several times in the corresponding scenes of tragedy in the sense of an “ominous, evil spectacle.” The chorus ends thus: “O moira, moira! I tremble when I look on the state of Io!” I will point out that all this response of the chorus is made up of assonances, repetitions, rhymed words and alliterations, which shows it to be very archaic.

The image of Io is still not reread by concepts, as those of Heracles, Ajax, Orestes, Pentheus, and many others are. The frenzy of the cow-shaped heroine is presented visually, mythologically, but it is not psychologized and not developed in character or events. It is a case of simple transformation, and the girl’s madness is the bites of the gadfly. The “insanity” of other heroes of Greek tragedy, however, though they invariably take the form of “wildly rolling eyes,” impudence and fury, is already completely rational in character. The deep rebuke of Philoctetes and the righteous logic of Orestes, Medea, Pentheus, et al. derives from this, the image of an “unrestrained loose tongue” and “mad spirit.” But Io has the advantage that in her the semantics of the “spinning wheel” of her eyes and fury of the spirit (or rather of breathing) is clearly cosmic, light, fire semantics. Why does Io appear in Prometheus Bound? Because she is more archaic here than Prometheus. Io and Prometheus are the same thing as Pentheus and Dionysus. They have the same image nature. The difference between them is created by concept.
In order to see the connection between Prometheus and Io we must turn to the images of eros-death that I discovered in my works on Sappho and lyric. Archaic eros does not mean “love” at all, since such a concept appears very late. It has the semantics of a fiery luminary—which is expressed in much more than torches alone,—a luminary that falls into water, the archaic form of which was a rock (cliff, crag, gorge, etc.). It is well known that eros has two natures—one destructive and one constructive. In lyric, and then in tragedy, it is usually destructive eros which acts. Some heroes of Greek tragedy were incarnations of the element of “mad” fire (and other elements), but in Prometheus, as in a number of tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, the heroes once acted as expressions of fire-eros in its archaic sense. Prometheus, nailed to a crag, represents the mythological likeness of that very crag; his passions are the presentation in images of cosmic destruction, falling into Tartarus of the fiery (stone) luminary. Such a death takes place with thunder, whirl-winds, and earthquake—the destruction not simply of one disobedient hero, but of all nature incarnated in this hero.

Io is connected with eros in its direct form. She “lights the heart of Zeus with eros,”228 as Prometheus says. We are used to using the metaphor “the fire of love.” But in the words of Prometheus, this is not a conceptual metaphor, but a mythological image: Io “sets Zeus on fire” with eros. We must remember her bovine form, which identifies her not only with Hera, but also with Isis, in whose cow horns the moon was held, and Isis was a constructive divinity, a mother-divinity. The Greeks themselves identified Io with Isis and Demeter, the earth-mother. A lunar, purely feminine divinity, Io was the incarnation of light eros in its two natures, but predominantly in its destructive, night, passionate nature: what for Zeus was “passion” was “passio” for Io, as is often the case in Greek myths. Aeschylus’ metaphor “the eyes of eros” derives from the image of “eyes” as “rays.” Zeus has to give his “eye” “rest from passionate lust;” Io, suffering passions, has eyes that “roll like a wheel.” They “turn in a circle,” “spin like a wheel” precisely because they incarnate the luminary-eros. This is why the chorus pronounces the oath, “Let eros with his inescapable eye not look upon me.”229 But Aeschylus’ conceptual thought inserts into this phrase the words “strongest of the gods,” and it comes out, “Let eros strongest (than man) of the gods…” etc. The structure of this phrase, however, is archaic. In the original “eros” is in the nominative; but “unavoidable eye,” conceptually translated in the accusative, can be understood as nominative as well (the nominative and accusative of neuter nouns is the same), which logically equates “eros” and “eye.” But this is parenthetical. Significant here is the epithet “inescapable,” which is always an epithet of death. Since in this phrase “eros” and “eye” are semantically and logically united, this epithet can be attributed both to “eros” and to “eye” (both are neuter in Greek).

28

Io is the daughter of Inachus, the river. A few variants of the myth give her other fathers, but inconsistently; in one version her father was Prometheus.

As a lunar divinity, Io “wanders” all over the world. In myth it is invariably the “lunar” hypostasis that roams, wanders, journeys homeless. The moon in the image understanding of myth is a female being connected with eros, night-death, with the underworld and with water. In Aeschylus the entire literal meaning of these images is
lost. Yet its traces are still present, as always, in the poetic language, particularly melics, in metaphors, similes, threats, exclamations, curses. Thus in her first song after she comes on stage, Io complains that her fate is unbearable and exclaims, addressing Zeus, “May you not decline my prayers, sovereign, burn me in fire, or hide me in the earth, or give me as food to the sea beasts!” Here, as always in Classical poetry, the image nature of the character has the conceptual form of the theme put into the mouth of this very person: what the hero incarnates becomes the contents of the events that he participates in. This gives rise to the feats performed by the hero in a novel (a water divinity is drowned, a fire god burned, etc), and in normal law to punishments (one who cuts down a tree is hung on a tree, etc). The incarnation of fire, the underworld land, and water, Io asks Zeus to burn her, to hide her beneath the earth, or to throw her in the sea. But she also has a feature which links her to Prometheus-the-cliff. In a dialogue with Prometheus, she says, “What’s the use in my living? It would be better for me to throw myself from this hard cliff so that, falling down, I would be rid of all suffering. For it is better to die quickly than suffer day after day.” Aeschylus has no choice but to understand this part of the myth rationalistically. But the concept he introduces clashes with the image that lies behind this concept. Io, still thoroughly mythological, does not harmonize with these words, which would be more appropriate for Euripides’ heroines. They were given to Io because they were suggested by a variant of the “Sapphic” motif of jumping from a cliff “because of” destructive eros itself, the rock-luminary. The topos of such an image is confirmed by the analogy from Aeschylus’ Suppliants. Here too the girls say it is better to fall from a lonely steep cliff than to enter a marriage against their will.

The “all-seeing” Argus, thickly filled with eyes is the eternal companion of Io, like the starry sky, which does not take from her its “clever eye.” But Prometheus too is “all-seeing,” only in the conceptual sense of a “prophet.” Only he is a “seer,” and in myth “reveals,” “shows” the unfortunate Io all her wanderings, all the concrete locations through which she will roam. Plautus’ prologuist takes the spectator from city to city, but Prometheus purely conceptually turns concrete movement into a “story about” future wanderings; nevertheless their visionary character remains in force. And it is no coincidence that in tragedy the figure of the prophet is so typical: Prometheus, the title character; the prophetess prologuist in The Eumenides; Teiresias, who plays a constructive role in Oedipus; Pythia in Ion and many other “prophesying” heroes, to say nothing of the many oracles.

Prometheus in his semantic essence is the image expression of fire. He is the creator of all crafts and arts, but Might says of him to Hephaestus, “It was, after all, your flower, the light of all-artful fire, that he stole and gave to the mortals.” Fire is all-artful (the light of which is simultaneously a flower); Prometheus is fire itself.

The passions of Prometheus are also the passions of elements, and not of human beings. The terrible, violent elements sympathize with Prometheus’ sufferings with roaring, moaning, and thunder: “The sea wave screams…the abyss moans, black Hades thunders from the depths of the earth, the streams of sacred-flowing rivers moan with pitiful pain.” Prometheus is still alive, the earth has not yet opened under him, but nature is as catastrophic as if he were to perish. In the language of mythological images this “winter,” “cold” of nature (χειμών), is incarnated in the persona of Prometheus. As in Sophocles, in Aeschylus “winter” (“cold”) suggests the concept of “misfortune,” “disaster.” It is in such an abstract sense that Io asks, when she sees the titan chained to
the cliff, “What is this man I see suffering (χειμαζόμενον—literally “suffering cold”) among craggy bonds?” Prometheus’ suffering, his chains and his “cold” are at the same time his “illness” (νόσος) and his hubris. Hermes points to both of these. But Prometheus, like Ajax, Orestes, Menelaus, Philoctetes, and other typical heroes of tragedy responds that with hubrists one must act as a hubrist: he is active and passive, he is a destroyer and himself perishes.

In the character of Io too the myth has depicted the same active-passive force as in Prometheus. She too has an “illness” (νόσημα) and she is “sent winter by the gods” (χειμών, abstractly, “misfortune”), and she too speaks of “waves” of dark destruction. In Io, as I said, there is more myth than in Prometheus. Aeschylus made her a secondary figure and put Prometheus in the center; therefore Prometheus underwent greater conceptual reworking than Io. Aeschylus only rationalized the mythical heroine, while all of Prometheus is logically transformed. The motif of the rebellion of nature took on in Aeschylus the new character of rebellion of a titan: of the whirlwinds, parallel to the of the “στάσις angered gods” turned into the moral “indignation” at the injustice of the “new sovereign.”

Images lie inside concepts not only in Prometheus and not only in Aeschylus. His Persians is also characteristic in this respect, and it clarifies many things. I will cite only a few examples. One of them is particularly characteristic. The chorus of Persian elders praises the might and bravery of the Persian army, using the following metaphor: “Not one powerful man, acting contrary to the great flow of men, could have held with a secure barrier the indefatigable sea wave: for the Persian army and its brave people are indefeasible.”

“Water” (the sea) and “people” (the army, the people) here are completely identified, so much so that they are not connected here with comparison or parallelism. We also say a “stream of people,” but by “stream” we mean a continuous flowing mass of people moving nonstop. By “stream” we here capture the “movement,” “rushing,” “mass,” that is, the conceptual “properties” and “features” of the abstract sphere. For the Greeks “stream of people” gives the image of a “flow” of water—a concrete flow of a body of water; a specific substance indivisible from the form it takes; flow, current (ποτίμα) contains nothing abstract. This is supported by the further words about the sea wave. The image of sea waves continues in direct form the thought about the flow. But both “flow” and “wave” here are completely identified with “men,” “army,” and “people.” The course of thought here is clear: in the place of an element, man appears, still merged with nature, but already separated from it by the metaphorical nature of the semantic link. Image identified them, concept separated them, introducing figurality of meaning. But this figurality should not be overestimated. It is not yet abstract. Every Greek abstraction contains something concrete. We, on the other hand, have already lost this concreteness.

Atossa’s story about nocturnal visions abounds in visual terms: she uses the term “see” ten times in various variations. But what is interesting about this story is that it still has no metaphors, much less symbols, and presents the obligatory figurality in the archaic
form of a “visual object.” Atossa “sees” a hawk plucking off the head of an eagle with its talons, “sees” two related women who have received by lot Hellas and a barbarian land and are not seized by “uprising” in relation to one another, “sees” the fallen Xerxes tearing his clothes at the “appearance” of his father Darius, and all these “visions” are supposed to correspond to the defeat of Xerxes. As always in visionary images hidden by concepts, visual “vision” signifies futurality. It “reveals” the future. Events are not stated, they are not told, they do not take place. They are only “seen,” and static “showing” takes the place of development. The transition from image to concept happens through the figularity of meanings; its most archaic form is “watching” the object which was meant to signify another object identical to it. In word this is riddle, in action (ritual) all kinds of visual acts; both become the basis for divination, and for the words of the oracle people begin to seek identical correspondences, for actions—identical deeds. “Fore-sight” turns into “prophesy” and fortune-telling. One person “shows” the future, others “look” into water, or at fire, or at grain, (or in a mirror) and tell fortunes—i.e. seek something different that corresponds to what they “see.”

But the action in *The Persians* takes place at Darius’ tomb. The Persian army described in the parodos of the chorus is a “spectacle terrible in appearance.” But what Atossa “sees” is also terrible. The nocturnal character of her visions is emphasized twice, the phantom character of these visions is emphasized three times (“it seemed to me, that I see” “I imagined” “appeared in a vision”). The correspondence of these visions to reality underlines the semantics of such “phantoms:” they are truthful, but refer to the world of death and destruction. When Atossa “sees” in reality two birds, a fleeing eagle and a trembling hawk, she has to “see something awful,” and the chorus to “hear” about it. We must mention that “to see something awful” in Greek is close in meaning to “amazing” and like a wonder. In this scene one of the two partners “watches” and “sees” an unusual, amazing miracle, and the other “hears of what has been seen.” This is the core of spectacle presentations (showing) and of story.

The visual omens are proven true by the defeat of Xerxes. A noise hums in Atossa’s ears “not because of salvation,” in her “eyes the opposition of the gods becomes visible.” In *The Persians* there are three such contrasting levels: the agon of the gods—of dike and hubris, the agon of the Greeks and the barbarians, the agon of the old principle Darius and the young principle Xerxes. The image scheme lies inside the ethical scheme: the setting is a tomb from which the dead Darius is called out to the world (“Appear, show yourself, lord of lords!” sings the chorus). The phantom of Darius “shows itself” from the tomb. Shaking and horror prevent the chorus from “gazing” at him. The phantom explains to Atossa that Xerxes suffered for his own hubris, that he is possessed by “illness” of his reason, that he “being young thinks in a new way” (in Greek “young” and “new” are translated by the same term) and he does not remember Darius’ orders. The mythological-image understanding of “hubris” here is very obvious: “Blooming hubris,” says the phantom, “gave fruit in the ear of ruin, from which he (Xerxes) reaped a harvest full of lament.” Aeschylus depicts Xerxes’ hubris as ethical, impious “arrogance.” But he depicts it by means of a vegetal image.

Xerxes’ “illness” is expressed in “empty hopes.” In the Greek poetic lexicon, “hopes” do not mean what they do for us; they are close in meaning to “phantasmagoria,” “mirages,” “inflated empty dreams.” And this is precisely what Xerxes’ “illness” is, as opposed to the “true” reason of his wise father. Vanity is what distinguishes him and
what destroys him. He is also a kind of phantom. In this tragedy, which takes place at a
tomb, phantoms not only came up out of the underworld, as they continued to come out
in the rituals of the Anthesteria. They acted, “showed themselves,” spoke, “watched,” and
listened. Conceptual thought made their “phantomness” into a psychological feature and
some of them, like Xerxes, took on “vanity” and “empty hopes” in the form of a “new
way of thinking.” But in paliata “phantom” turns into visual deception and fooling.

*The Persians* ends with laments for the dead Xerxes. He has lost his army and his
military honor. He wears torn mourning clothes, his head covered with ashes. “The rest
you see from my cloth-ing?” he asks with a cry of the chorus of old men. And the
chorus answers, “I see, I see!” The tragedy ends with the melic stichomythia of Xerxes
and the chorus, stichomythia alternating with a mourning lament.

Looking at the fallen king, the elders see a catastrophe. This stichomythia scene again
leads back to the initial and final stichomythia of other tragedies where one of the two
partners watches or shows the spectacle of death and the other asks questions or listens to
the “answerer.” If the scene takes place at the doors (or gates) it is accompanied by agon
or lament. In *The Persians* too there are traces which suggest that the mourning
stichomythia of Xerxes and the chorus took place not far from the entrance to the house
(like, for example, in *Helen*, where the tomb of the king was at the entrance to the
palace). Xerxes at any rate twice says to the chorus, “Bewail, bewail the misfortune, go to
the house!” and “Go into the house with lament!” People do not speak abstractly and
“in general” in tragedy; if the house is mentioned, it is here on stage. And in that case the
action takes place at the doors of the house, as usual in Greek tragedy.

**EXODOS IN TRAGEDY**

1

Every Greek drama ends with an exodos. It is obligatory that the stage be left empty. It is
left by the actors and the chorus.

The same is true of tragedy. It begins with the arrival of the chorus or the soloist and
ends with a general departure. But the entrances and exits are not asemantic. Entrance is
connected with the beginning of misfortunes and suffering, exit is connected with their
end. Greek tragedy is not at all drama of catastrophe, i.e. of some kind of irrevocable
destruction. Although its contents include the downfall of entire families and the death of
heroes, almost every tragedy in its epilogue passes to the opposite thematics with a
clearly constructive tendency.

What is played out in the tragedy is one side of things—the mournful, woeful side of
death, murder, desecration, injustice, destruction. For tragedy this is the center. But
inasmuch as mythological images are still present in Greek ethical concepts, the destruc-
tive side of events inevitably turns back to the side of rebirth and construction. In myth
death is the beginning of life.

The epilogues of Greek tragedy translate eschatological plots into cosmogonic ones.
Almost every tragedy, as long as it is not part of a trilogy, ends with the foundation of
new cities, houses, family lines. The exits (exiles) of the heroes from the stage are not
merely exile or exits into the unknown; they represent departure for something new,
which awaits the arrival of these heroes, a residence where these heroes will found a new city, a new kingdom, or a new dynasty, they will be the progenitors of new tribes and families.

Thus Aeschylus’ Suppliants establish themselves in a new land, settle a new city, where having renounced the violence of the impious, new marriages await them. Such is the ending of Euripides’ Medea: the sorceress flies off on the chariot of the sun to another, new land, and will unambiguously give Aegeus descendants. Sophocles’ Women of Trachis ends with the destruction of one house (of Heracles—Deianira), but the birth of another (Hyllus—Iole), the destruction of an old marriage, but the creation of a new, young one. The end of Philoctetes is sailing for a far land, bringing salvation. Such salvation comes at the end of Oedipus at Colonus: the city where the hero is buried will flourish. Oedipus’ daughters will return to Thebes, and new families will be raised in place of the old destroyed family. Such is the ending of Aeschylus’ Oresteia. Purified of matricide, the renewed Orestes again will obtain his homeland and give birth to a house: “O Pallas,” he says to Athena, “O savior of my house, having deprived me of my father’s land, you will once again settle me in it and some Hellene will say, ‘the Argive man again resides in his fathers lands.’”2 The idea of renewal of the house is clear here.

Even clearer is the ending of Prometheus. The titan falls into the abyss, but Io’s fate is foretold: in Egypt she will find a cure and begin a new house. The ending of Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis is also salvation. In the epilogue of Ion (no matter who wrote it) Athena presents a list of tribes, houses, countries, and cities completely in the Biblical style, what will be founded by Ion and his descendents: lands will be settled, cities built, new peoples born.

The renovation of the family ends Euripides’ Ion, Helen, Alcestis, Iphigenia in Tauris. In most cases there is a new marriage, though of old spouses, or a new acquisition of relatives, like the new birth of a son (Ion). In Heracles too the end is not catastrophic: Theseus takes away with him his unfortunate friend, and Heracles acquires a new homeland and a new house. The epilogue of Orestes is characteristic. Electra is to become Pylades’ wife, Hermione—Orestes’. Paralleling the new marriages and foundation of new houses is the new settlement of cities: Orestes will live a year’s cycle in Parrhasia, which will take his name, then Menelaus will give him Argos, and he himself will rule Sparta. All the heroes set off, but their departure signifies a new life.

The hatred (νέικας) is ended. Apollo says to them, “And now, go on your way, honoring the most beautiful of the gods, Eirene (peace).”3 Andromache ends exactly the same way: Orestes takes Hermione from her husband, Andromache moves to a new country, Molossia.

Greek tragedy always has heroes as its characters and plots about heroes as its plots. Meanwhile the “heroes” of Greek cults are for the most part connected to the foundation of cities—tribes—lineages; they are κτίσται, founders of cities and settlements. Undoubtedly the plots about the “heroes” must have included elements of legend about the birth of tribes, cities, lineages. The epilogues of tragedies have preserved such elements.
But aside from epilogues and exodoi in tragedy there are also some other signs that the “heroes” of tragedy were once mythological incarnations of “cities,” and the histories of these heroes were the histories of destruction and construction of cities. This concerns in the first place the polis thematics of tragedy which I have discussed above. Next, it is characteristic that the chorus in its stasima and the soloists in their monologues address not people, but the land, city, country, elements, which does not show their human entourage. Cities, lands, rivers, the air, luminaries listen to the participants of tragedy: this shows that the “city” too occupied a place among the elements, that its character was mythological, and that all these mythical elements were not always only passive listeners of the active heroes. It is significant that the chorus, this most ancient character of tragedy, almost always represented a specific ethnos or city. I shall return to this question later. But now I want to point out something else. Through all Greek tragedy which has come down to us runs the motif of the “pious city” which is invariably in a state of flourishing. Such a city, as a rule, has a corresponding “pious king” who incarnates it. Of course he also has his opposite in the form of the hubrist-king and the hubrist-city, and both of them derive from the image of the same “two cities” and “two kings” that sounds so clearly in Homer and Hesiod.4

In Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* Argos is such an ideal city; its hymn is sung by the daughters of Danaus; the king of Argos is the incarnation of wisdom and piety. The Suppliants, saving themselves from forced marriage, entreat the Argive king to give them hospitality (in the Classical sense), and the king, risking bringing war on Argos, takes in the foreigners. Such is the idea of *Oedipus at Colonus* as well. Theseus is a utopian “righteous king” filled with nobility; he accepts a foreigner, the bearer of pollution, Oedipus, and defends Antigone and Ismene. In this tragedy a central role is played by Colonus, the description of which in the mouths of the chorus is like a hymn; Colonus is depicted as a utopian, paradisal country, as a blessed city. In Euripides Theseus again has the role of the “just king.” In *Heracles* he is portrayed as a faithful, true friend who is not afraid even of the defiled Heracles; more than that, he goes so far as to take the infanticide into his native city and share his hearth with him. These motifs are particularly prominent in the *Suppliants* (which has nothing in common with Aeschylus’ tragedy of the same name). Here too Theseus is a just king of a just kingdom. First he refuses to give refuge to the bodies of the leaders who have fallen at Thebes. But yielding to the prayers of his mother, he does not retract his word even when it leads to war. In tragedy the praise of Athens, where there is equality between men, where the king rules for a year, sounds ardently. Theseus is a messiah like Heracles in the later tragedy of Seneca, a fighter for justice, the pious bearer of dike, a punisher of hubrists.

The incarnation of the city and country in the hero can be found in almost all tragedies, but, of course, it is retouched conceptually. In Euripides Sparta and Athens are opposed; Sparta, the “evil city,” speaks through Menelaus. The Attic king Theseus, on the other hand, is a typical incarnation of virtue in all the tragedians. Behind the political conception lies the mythological image. Darius and Xerxes are two opposed kings, one good and one bad, Athens is an ideal state, opposed to the Persian state. Eteocles and Polyneices incarnate the city and, as it were, the anti-city. Zeus in *Prometheus* is opposed to “the ancient ruler;” his kingdom is bad. The polis antithesis, conceptually taking on a socio-familial form, can be found in Aeschylus’ *Suppliants* and the *Oresteia*. In
Sophocles’ Antigone the polis and the anti-polis are depicted in the state point of view of Creon and the anti-state point of view of Antigone.

In some tragedies the fate of the hero and the fate of the city are completely indivisible. A striking example of this is Euripides’ Trojan Women. The catastrophe of Troy, “famous by name,” “never surrendered to barbarians,” is the catastrophe of the former queen of this city, Hecuba. Troy is defeated, humiliated, destroyed; Hecuba, who has lost the kingdom and her whole house, becomes the slave of the hated enemy, Odysseus. In the epilogue to the tragedy, Hecuba says farewell to Troy: “I leave my fatherland, the city burns in fire. You they burn, and me they are taking as a slave from the country. So let me run to the fire, most beautifully to die together with this fatherland—burned (meaning, like Troy was burned).”5 The lament for Hecuba is indivisible from the lament for Troy. “Unfortunate Hecuba” is echoed dozens of times in the tragedy with “unfortunate Troy.”

At the same time the “fire of Troy” as is shown by the corresponding passages in the Iliad represented the mythological image of “fire,” the destruction of the cosmos in destroying flame. When there were no concepts, the elements were represented as concrete beings—places.

The cities whose destruction was shown in the image base of Greek tragedy were not the later conceptual cities, real political countries.6 Their semantics was cosmic, and therefore “heroes” could incarnate them. Such cities periodically perished and were created anew, like the cosmoses of Greek philosophy. But the line of the birth of new tribes, lineages, and countries was not the object of reworking in tragedy, like eschatology was for comedy. The presence of destruction motifs in the epilogues of palliata and of cosmogonic motifs in the epilogues of tragedy is organic, inevitable from the point of view of mythological images, but it is dissonant with ethics and no longer necessary for the tragedians. Only Euripides, who moved away from the problems of cult ethics, could bring himself to create such exodoi as those in Medea or Orestes.

3

The polis-utopian component of tragedy is shown not only in the exodoi. Further I will speak of the contiguity of such genres as the heroic choral lyric of epinikion and the heroic choral lyric of tragedy. If you like, in their epilogues many tragedies are nothing but a “post-victory” song. And while the epinikia, for example, of Pindar are “glorifications” of cities and generations, a number of tragedies act as a whole as “glorifications” not only of new lineages, but also of polises, understood ideally. Examples include Aeschylus’ Suppliants, that praise Argos, or Oedipus at Colonus, the praise of Colonus, or Ajax, which praises Salamis, the Women of Trachis, which praises Trachis. Each such city is presented as a utopia; the praise of each such city contains the ancient type of utopia which combines the cosmogonic mythologem with elements of “praises” and “founding of cities,” tribes, and lineages. But this is the line of the chorus, of image, which is preserved in the choral epilogues of many tragedies.

Epos, as we know, was the “glory of men” in which it was a matter of siege of cities, destruction, single combat of heroes. In ode and tragedy the “glory” of cities consists of agonies of heroes, but of the construction or flourishing of abundant, richly flourishing pious cities as well. As to rebellion (στάσις), in tragedy it occupies a definite place in
the plot itself, while good behavior and “peace” (εἰρήνη) figure only in the words of the chorus. I will again point out that in lyric the motif of rebellion is very stable: in Alcaeus and Theognis it is the rebellion of a city, in Solon the destruction of a city is paralleled by the motifs of hail, snow, clouds, storm, storm at sea, the “rebellion” of nature. In Alcaeus and Horace, who describe traditional storms, earthquakes, the stormy sea, whirlwinds, etc., στάσις of nature or the city presents echoes of Homeric similes—the path from eschatological images to realistic concepts. Rebellion of a city or “peace” of a city are two positions of one and the same image, and therefore the destruction of the polis can be lamented in lyric and its “glory” praised in tragedy.

The utopian nature of such “glories” is particularly obvious in Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Suppliants. In the choral epilogue to The Eumenides, the exiting chorus sings a “blessing” to Athens. It supplicates, praying that this city be conferred the grace of the gods, that it know neither the spoiling of trees, nor fires, nor illnesses; that it not be touched by spilling of blood or rebellion; but let the earth send a rich issue to the livestock, let the maidens have husbands, let the citizens be in agreement. This blessing, which depicts a just city, has typical features of utopia.

In The Suppliants the exiting chorus in the epilogue calls its hymn to Argos praise: “let this city of the Pelasgians receive praise (song), and let the mouth of the Nile no longer be honored by us in hymns.” But here is the glory of Argos. What does it consist of? First praised are “many-childered rivers, which pour through the land a willing drink, delighting the soil of the earth with luxurious treats.” But then they start to talk about Aphrodite. This speech sounds logical, when the refugees pray for “chaste Artemis” to protect them from violent love—from the “mystery of Cythereia”—and they quickly add that they consider the powerful Cypris worthy, however, of holy things. But the end of the praise, which further on turns into a personal prayer, overturns this apparent logic. Unexpectedly they start to talk about Aphrodite’s suite, about Lust, about the charmer Peitho, about Harmony, lovers’ whispers, and the affairs of eros. The glory of the city is expressed by means of praising the “many-childered rivers” and introducing fragments of lyric (Sapphic) utopia, in which the central place is occupied by Aphrodite and her suite with the attributes of love.

The fragment of love utopia in the middle of the chorus of virgins does not mesh with the stern coloring of the tragedy. This shows how archaic it is. In order to justify the motif of Aphrodite, Aeschylus had to make a logical transition by introducing prayers to “chaste Artemis.” For Aeschylus the connection between the “polis” and the female divinity, between the flourishing of a city and blooming-fertility was already incomprehensible.

That in the image sphere the theme of the tragedy ended differently than in the conceptual scheme is shown by the concluding words of the choral utopia, which ends The Suppliants. Here we have two half-choruses which sing in the form of a debate—questions and answers, negations and affirmations. One semichorus argues with the other, but the theme of both is the same—the wilfulness and indefeasibility of Zeus. When the first semichorus expresses the fear that “Zeus’ great plan is inevitable and inescrutable,” the second does not continue, secretly praying, “Let great Zeus ward off my marriage with an Egyptian!” The first semichorus objects in the enigmatic phrase, “That would be the best. But you would charm the uncharmable.” “And you do not know what is to come,” the second semichorus answers significantly. “Why,” asks the first, “should I
see Zeus’ plan, an abyss view (in the sense ‘spectacle of the abyss’)”\(^\text{12}\) The second semichorus corrects it, afraid, “Pray now with a moderate word!”\(^\text{13}\) The first asks, “what moderation do you teach me?” and hears the answer, “Not to make the gods angry at all!”\(^\text{14}\)

Here, in such a significant place as the concluding song of the chorus-protagonist, it is no accident that the theme of Zeus surfaces. The chorus fears his intentions, trembles before his glance-underworld (one must take into consideration that “abyss”/“bottomless” is an epithet of Tartarus), speaks evasively and with innuendo about the stern and unfathomable temper of the divinity. They speak of the possibility of “seeing” the soul of Zeus, which is a “sight” or “glance” or “spectacle” of bottomless death. This is terrifying for the chorus even to talk about; it is better to suppress one’s fear and quietly pray to the god without annoying him. Nevertheless, one half-chorus accuses the other of trying to “charm the uncharmable.” For Aeschylus these words have a conceptual, abstract meaning—“to influence something subject to no influence;” but in the vocabulary of Greek they are completely concrete and refer to a property of eros. These words about the impossibility of bewitching Zeus are opposed to hints of the vague future.

This short agon of two semichoruses later turns into the wish “that lord Zeus protect us from hostile and bad-husband marriage, like he benevolently freed Io from her misfortune with his saving hand.” These words contain the key to the whole passage. We know how Zeus “saved” his victim. Aeschylus is talking about the concluding moment of destructive love without mentioning its beginning. The chorus of people “entreating” are the descendents of Io; mythologically they bear the theme of their foremother and therefore keep coming back to it. They are persecuted, like Io, by bad eros, but his name is not Zeus. The collective, impersonal female principle runs from the violence of the collective toponymic male persecutor, and the woman-chorus is saved by a city, a good king, the incarnation of Argos (cp. the words of the chorus to the king, “you are the city,” in Aeschylus they already appear in conceptual interpretation). The later myth about Io yields echoes in the myth of the “supplicating” people. The motifs of death-eros interlace with motifs of impious marriage, but also violence/rape on the part of the gods, Zeus in particular.

I am dwelling on this passage in order to explain the presence of a fragment of lyric utopia in the concluding choral song of *The Suppliants*. The praise of the city in the form of description of luxurious rivers and Aphrodite’s suite is a predictable phenomenon in solo and choral lyric: the flourishing, flowering city-woman (in Russian [or English] we have to add “woman,” but in Greek this is clear morphologically, since “polis” is feminine) is understood by myth in the form of blooming itself, love itself.

Utopian motifs appear in *The Suppliants* everywhere where praise is offered to the city. When the chorus sings Argos a “good prayer” it wishes it exactly the same thing the chorus of Eumenides wished Athens: “May human deaths never devastate this city, may rebellion never bloody the land with the corpses of natives, but may the flower of youth be unpluckable, and may Aphrodite’s spouse, Ares, the destroyer of men, not force [anyone] to cut locks of hair”\(^\text{15}\) (locks of hair were cut in mourning). Thus, wishing the city eternal youth, the chorus wants to deflect from it rebellion, war, and death. It prays, in other words, for “peace,” for that Classical Eirene which appears to the Greek in the form of a flourishing city, abundance, feasts and songs, eternal youth, marriage and childbirth. And therefore in the further words of this prayer the chorus wishes for Argos
that its sacrificial altars blaze and there is respect for the gods, that the earth be fertile, that Artemis protect women in childbirth, that there be no war or disease, that Lycian Apollo be well inclined to every thing young and Zeus fill the fertile earth with burden, that the productive livestock have fodder; “let glory which loves the lyre rise from pure mouths.” Here we have caroling, and the “peace” of Bacchylides, and motifs of Pindar, and the image of Aristophanes. Peace is the muses, songs, flaming altars; Ares is called “without chorus, without lyre, giving birth to tears.” Peace of the city is spring and fertility, justice and piety, dances and songs, glory. War is the death of nature and of the city.

Lyric and drama interpret these two basic images the same way. Where the motifs of Cypris, eros, weddings, feasts, and flowers appear they talk about cosmic fertility of the city-peace, which is opposed to city-death, war.

Choral lyric in one aspect looks toward comedy, ode, and songs like those of Sappho or Ibycus; in its other aspect it looks to tragedy. It is significant that its utopian thematics is preserved in many tragedies in its ancient form, while the plot of tragedy works out the opposite theme—of passion-death. A striking example, which I cited above, is presented by Euripides in Iphigenia at Aulis: death alive awaits Iphigenia in the underworld along with marriage to Achilles, and the chorus sings to her about the marriage of Thetis and Peleus. The plot of the tragedy contains death, tears, passions; the choral song—a utopian picture of a feast of the gods and a sacred marriage of the gods in the style of Sappho. In The Bacchae Dionysus “suffers” mockery, persecution, violence on the part of the gloomy Pentheus, while the choral songs recreate cult utopia. The messenger depicts a fairytale picture of tame beasts, wine and milk pouring from the ground, all the “removal of evil” that characterizes utopia. Euripides rationalizes antiquity; what the ancient tragedians put into the songs of the chorus in Euripides is said by the messenger about the chorus.

It would be wrong to think that the tragic chorus had only the function of mourning. It sang the passions of Adrastus and other heroes, but it invariably sang the glory of cities and gods. It was impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the two aspects of one and the same theme.

But this demarcation was introduced by concept. It left the “post-victory” element with the chorus—and of course left it in the epilogues of tragedy, when the agon was already behind and the hero, who had become the incarnation of the conceptually conceived “subjective,” lay overthrown and the “objective” celebrated victory, of which concept made the chorus the expression. Greek tragedy began to take shape at the time when the subject was growing in consciousness at the expense of crowding out the object. Exaggerating its significance and bending before it, the subject unwittingly moved away from that “unshakeable” that it related to through its archaic connection. And therefore the ancient choral principle became more and more archaized and endowed with the functions of the objective.
In Greek tragedy the basic character, which became degraded with time, was the chorus. The dialogues and monologues of the soloists alternate in tragedy with choral songs. The soloists, however, sing too—they sing with the chorus and, less frequently, alone. The lyric component of drama is doubly marked in that the songs, unlike the monologues and dialogues, differ in their language: the iambic, dramatic parts are written in Attic, while the sung parts are in Doric with some Ionisms. This construction of Greek tragedy like ancient comedy of two components makes it an unrepeatable genre even formally.

We know of no Greek tragedy that is not at the same time a lyric genre. But neither could we find a Greek drama that lacks melodic rhythmization and is really a prosaic genre—even the mimes of Sophron. Greek prose of course is also rhythmic, and as to its metric feature, it undergoes with time a dual process of strengthening and weakening. In the first case the songs become verse, in the second, prose.

But when I say the lyric forms of Greek tragedy I mean its choral and solo songs, those songs that coexist side by side in lyric (hymns, hymeneias, laments, prayers, complaints, epinikia, etc.). It is also striking that all these songs are composed in another language, for the most part in Doric, and in lyric it is precisely choral songs that have the same Doric character. Furthermore, it is not merely a question of dialect; much more important is the fact that choral songs, whether in free state or inside tragedies, are distinguished by their archaic thought and syntax. At the same time mimes—such an apparently everyday and “folk” genre—both in prose in Sophron and in verse in Herodas were created in a special Doric or Doricized [or Ionic] language, invariably archaic, which was ill-suited to the living contents of its sense.

The archaism of the lyric parts of tragedy is undeniable, as is the archaism of the role of the lyric voice, the chorus. The Dorisms of the choral parts and of choral lyrics show only one thing: collective singing came from the Doric tribes and had behind it ancient roots that preceded the choral and solo songs of other peoples. Doric collective song retained priority in language and common traditional form. “Doric” became a literary synonym of “old-fashioned” and brought with it the whole ancient complex of old song: chorality, an old-fashioned way of thinking, long-outmoded turns of phrase, vocabulary, syntax, and also the double and triple construction of strophes (strophe—antistrophe, sometimes with epode as well).1

Doric choral lyric cannot be separated from Attic dialogue, or tragedy would not be tragedy. To define tragedy in form we would have to say that it represents an organic unity of choral lyric and personal monologue or dialogue. But why do two heterogeneous categories create a unity? Perhaps it is because the chorus, with its songs and dances, was the nucleus for future verbal-singing and action forms? The dual nature of iamb and melic (the difference in their language, their thought, their performance) suggests the opposite. The iamb is not the result of melic. The Attic nature of the iamb did not “differentiate itself” from out of the Doric. It is namely tragedy that shows what the two different elements of iamb and melic have in common, the parallelism between some of their features which allows them to be united.
In melic one can find everything there is in iambs—dialogue, stichomythia, monologue. But one thing it does not have—the messenger’s story. As to the iambic parts, they have everything present in melic, with the exception of laments. Stories in the mouths of the messenger and the chorus are also different. The messenger recreates a picture of events that have just taken place on stage, for the most part pictures of death, but sometimes of destructive events like duels, battles, attacks of enemy armies and other misfortunes. The many stories of the chorus are completely different. They never present concrete events that have real dimension in time and space. What they tell about happened once and for all, and the past in which it took place applies to the present. In other words, it is unreal: it has neither present nor past; instead both past and present without “lasting” stand in one place in their unidimensional space. Such too is the space in which these events take place. It is present somewhere far away, and close, both everywhere and nowhere, but it has a geographical name and narrow limitations. The characters who take part in these events consist of gods, heroes, and monsters, natural elements endowed with human features. They all have names which define and limit them, but at the same time these characters are “considered well known to all,” i.e. they have schematic, impersonal general features. They were and are and will be, though they cannot be found anywhere in real life. All this allows us to call the stories of the chorus mythical, not only because of their contents, but also because of the manner in which they are told. They have nothing in common with the discursive narrations of the messenger, in which both time and space are contained by precise limits and the events themselves take place in a concrete location with concrete characters in a concrete situation at a definite moment of time, completely finished.

The stories of the chorus and the messenger’s stories have nothing in common. This difference is an accidental result of two different kinds of thought, which create two types of perception of reality. At first glance the stories of the chorus have no relation, or at least no direct relation to the action of the play. But if we examine them more carefully, they speak “à propos” of what is going on. Thus after Io [in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound] has told of her torments the chorus prays fate to preserve them, the Oceanides, from the amorous passion of the gods; learning of Prometheus’ fate, the chorus expresses its fear of attracting the vengeance of Zeus. Aeschylus’ chorus gives the impression of a discoursing passive participant in the drama who co-experiences the sufferings of the main character. Everything that takes place on stage in action and is precipitated out in concrete facts has in it a kind of amorphous reflection—a meditation, sympathy, prayer, lament. Typical in this respect is the famous second stasimon of Agamemnon. The herald has just announced the successful return of the king from Troy. And the chorus responds to this news with a story of how a tame lion cub became a bloodthirsty hunter.

The meditations of the chorus “à propos of” events developing on stage eventually become completely disconnected from the action. The song with which the chorus reacts to events often seems to have nothing to do with them. In the dramatic moment of a dialogue between Oedipus and Theseus, the chorus sings a song about blessed Colonus. This song is connected to the drama of Oedipus only by the theme of “Colonus,” by
nothing else: it faces mythology, Pelops, Zeus, Athena, Poseidon, and not Theseus or Oedipus at all. In Antigone the dramatic tension grows and becomes ominous when Creon orders the breaker of the state law be caught. The chorus, however, sings about the all-powerful reason of man, which is powerless before Hades. Antigone is buried alive beneath the earth. And what does the chorus sing about? Eros, the all-conquering power of charm, which shines in the maiden’s eyes “promising a blessed bed.” Finally the fate of Antigone and of the whole house of Creon is completed in a full catastrophe. The chorus sings a graceful song in which it joyfully invokes Bacchus. Even more striking is the incongruence in Iphigenia at Aulis. Iphigenia is deceived, deprived of marriage, condemned to be murdered. And the chorus sings a bright hymeneia about the marriage of Peleus and Thetis and draws a joyful picture of the feast of the gods. All Greek tragedy is full of such examples.

The chorus seems not to listen, it sticks to its own theme, as if there were two different lines in tragedy: one of the soloists, and one of the chorus, as if it does not have its own function. The chorus cries, complains, rejoices, ponders, but only thematically, not to move the plot forward. It carries the theme, but not the narration, the action, or the plot. In tragedy, which is already based on a plot in action (Handlung), the chorus expresses not the active, but the song principle.

What we are presented with in the chorus, something “à propos,” a pure theme lacking plot, in fact reflects very archaic thought and is not accidental. A connected plot is possible only where subject is separated from object, because the plot says something about someone, and introduces consequentiality into this “something.” At the same time in tragedy there is no narrator; the messenger tells only about a single episode, no more. The heroes of tragedy are the heroes of passions not only because they suffer, but because their functions are passive: the plot and the action are about them, and they are the object of depiction. But who depicts them? Who tells about them? They themselves. Unlike the heroes of a novel or a story, they do not have an “author,” an invisible narrator. As in lyric, they speak of themselves with their own mouths. More than that, they not only speak of themselves as in lyric, they depict themselves directly in action. In other words, in drama the subject “depicts” the object. While they are the subjects of what is experienced, the heroes are also the object of the experiences.

We know that the ancient author of tragedy (up to and including Aeschylus) was both actor and main character of his own plays: this feature is preserved in ancient comedy. And the ancient lyric poets like Sappho sang about themselves both as authors and as objects of their songs. When they spoke of Anactoria 10 or Atthises 11 they were speaking of their “I,”—since “Sappho” was a variant of the same hypostases—and they could not present an “I” separate from the objects of their songs. Alcaeus, Anacreon, and Archilochus sang “about themselves” through lyric topics made up completely of ready-made features of “others,”—through a lyric “mask,” if you will.

In tragedy the chorus sings and the heroes depict themselves in action. The chorus does not participate in this depiction: it is still subjective-objective, like the ancient lyric poets. And it is pre-narrative and pre-plot, because it has no pure object from which it could be separated as a subject. What it sings about is schematic, with no end and no beginning. “À propos” is an exposition which itself proceeds from apposition; it is devoid of plot and has no duration, it is flat and point-like; it is not connected with the immediate object of dramatic action and knows no connections within itself. Story
appears in the song of the chorus suddenly and can be present or absent with no damage or benefit not only to the action of the tragedy, but also to the song itself. Thus in *Antigone* the chorus begins to sing about the campaign of the seven leaders,\(^{13}\) in *The Phoenician Women* about the founding of Thebes,\(^{14}\) in *The Women of Trachis* about the fight of Achelous;\(^{15}\) these stories are mythological both in content and in language. The facts are perceived and presented by the chorus not realistically, but in the form of mythological images. In the *Llibation Bearers* the chorus sympathizes with Orestes. The choral song begins with a moan: the chorus is afraid Orestes might die, “that the eye of the house should not perish utterly.”\(^{16}\) The further events in the house of the Atreidai are presented as follows: “justice came in time to the Priamides, a penalty of heavy vengeance (and “heavy justice”). To the house of Agamemnon came a twofold lion, a twofold Ares. The Pythian oracle has driven the exile to the end, urged on by counsels from the gods.”\(^{17}\) The Pythian oracle, driven on by divine counsels drove (Orestes) into exile forever. Then the “two polluters” connected by their common “dissolute fate” (*i.e.* Clytemnestra and Aegisthus) gave out a “cry of joy at salvation from woes and salvation from deprivation of their possessions.”\(^{18}\) But a “clever retribution came,” with the weapon one needs in a “secret fight:” during the “fight” she “really” touched with her hand those fighting, she being the “daughter of Zeus—we mortals call her Dike—inflating the enemies with a deadly anger.”\(^{19}\)

It is impossible to translate the language of Greek melic into a modern language. It is impossible because one would have to translate not from Greek into Russian (or another foreign language), but from images into concepts, which makes it absurd, ridiculous, humorous or—and this is what our contemporary translators do—reworks this language conceptually and deprives it of its uniqueness. First of all, melic is built on pre-conceptual thought, which is conventionally called “pre-logical” thought in scholarship, in other words, mythological-image thought. It lacks abstractions, and therefore it applies one and the same concreteness to extremely varied facts and substitutes repetition of one and the same thing for poly-semantism. Thus the chorus can react to the passions of Oedipus or to the crime of Polyneices or to the grief of the seven mothers with the same story about the foundation of Thebes or the campaign of the seven leaders: all it needs is a thematic similarity. Whether this story is embedded in *The Seven* or *Oedipus* or *The Phoenicians* is immaterial; it is appropriate for any tragedy with a plot from the Theban cycle.

In solo-choral melic image serves as attribute to image, inanimate things and abstract concepts are presented as living beings, adjectives and participles contain whole sentences. The phrase has no sequentiality and no connection—no connection of discursive, cause and effect thinking.\(^{20}\) Ideas are presented mythologically: Orestes is the eye of the house, retribution is a clever woman who touches her victim with her hand in battle, anger is blown into the enemy by the divinity; fate is defined by the epithet “a bad road.” The syntax of the melic phrase is not at all like the syntax of our translations. Every noun is accompanied by a multitude of complex adjectives that take the place of verbs and the ordering of ideas; image sits on image. Here is how Colonus is described in a choral song: “In the best stable of the land of this fair-horsed country, where the ringing
nightingale, often flying in from green valleys, sadly sings, living on the cluster-visaged ivy and the non-walking divine leaves, thousand-fruitred, sunless and windless of all frosts, where Dionysus-bacchant always goes among the goddess-nurses. Beneath the heavenly dew every day the fair-clustered narcissus ever blooms, the ancient wreath of two great goddesses, and the golden-rayed saffron. And the sleepless springs, the nomad springs of Kephis, do not decrease, but ever, day after day, quickly-giving-birth go down the plains of the breasted earth together with unmixed rain. Neither the dances of the Muses disdain them nor the rein-gold Aphrodite..." etc. In the first place, the images of this song have a very concrete meaning, for example, “stable, sty of earth,” “the earth having breasts” [στερνούχοι χθόνος], “quickly-giving-birth” [ώκυτόκος] springs, etc. Each such image contains in itself an idea long overcome by concepts, an idea of water and earth as living beings with some certain single external feature: the golden rays of saffron, golden reins of Aphrodite, the shining of Colonus, sleeplessness of the spring, and so on. At the same time these features do not refer to the things they define themselves, they are ascribed to them only externally, by analogy with other things that (from our point of view!) have nothing in common with them. Thus neither gold nor a ray is a real feature of saffron, and Colonus does not shine, water can neither sleep nor not sleep, nor can it give birth quickly or slowly, and a city, no matter how famous for its horses, cannot be a stable or a pen of earth. Consequently, all these epithets do not contain “features” of the things they describe. They add to the image of the thing another image; thus saffron is identified with the sun, Colonus—with a luminary and with a horse, water—with a woman giving birth who knows no sleep, and the flow of this water—with nomads, and so on. One concrete thing is known by means of another concrete thing, and each of them is taken monolithically, compared as a whole, without separate qualitative features. Nevertheless, identification with the rays of the sun, with gold, horses, or women, can be found in hundreds of other phenomena besides saffron, a city, or water. Furthermore, one can find in choral melics identification of a luminary with a city, of gold with a flower, of a woman with a spring. After all, all these linguistic images are the result of the identity of the images city-luminary, light-gold-flower, water and woman’s womb themselves. In Pindar Delos is a star, in Aeschylus fire is a flower, in Euripides the woman Dirce is a river.

With the appearance of concepts these image-doubles begin to be perceived in the form of an external feature that characterizes two different things by analogy: saffron and the sun (gold) have the same yellow color, the city and horses have the same location in a walled off corner of the earth or the yard, springs and those without sleep have ceaseless work (running), and being full of ever new water is the same as giving birth to one child after another. Thus the melic epithets, which do not come from the real features of the object become standard “attributes” of the thing as a semantic tautology and preserve and amplify its concreteness (ep. in epic “salty sea,” “white hands,” “quick feet,” “winged words,” etc., where “sea” and “salt” have one term, “word” is identical to a winged bird, etc.) For Sophocles Colonus could not possibly be “the stable of the earth.” This epithet takes on for him a metaphorical sense of “living place,” “place of the earth,” that is, a conceptual sense. The translations in this respect are correct. However, in Greek the concept of “place” is given by the word “stable, animal’s sty, pen,” and it is impossible to deny this. But the problem is not only one of translation and distortion. The problem lies in the peculiarity of thinking, the kind of thinking that bases abstraction and
generalization of features on the image while the image remains in force. When we say “golden-gleaming saffron,” our epithet is conceptual, that is, abstract: both “golden” and “gleaming” are concepts. But when a Greek says χρυσαυγής κρόκος, his “gold” and “ray” are completely concrete and object-like, like things. When it has to say “place” the chorus says “stable,” though it means not a stable, but a place. The image lies in the concept. The concrete lies in the abstract.

The image does not designate a point. It marches in place because it knows neither movement nor forward motion, because it is in a complex of identities. Strictly speaking, unidimensional time marches in place, enclosed in the pre-conceptual image. It creates a “picture,” but no plot movement. Every new thought does not develop that which preceded it, but simply hooks onto it and follows it. Melic is not governed by one central thought that could be set out in syntactic order; its phrase is not segmented. Describing Colonus, the song first of all begins to speak of the nightingale, and having begun speaking of the nightingale, it turns to the nightingale’s habitat—among the foliage; having introduced the foliage, it describes it and recalls the visits of Dionysus; having named Dionysus, it speaks of his nurses. Only now is the thought of the nightingale finished. The description of Colonus continues, but already along the lines of the greenery where the nightingale flies. Colonus, in effect, is forgotten, and the description continues of the same thicket (“foliage”), where the narcissus and the saffron bloom, where the Kephis flows; therefore the narcissus is described and its relation to the great goddesses defined, then the color of the saffron is given. The idea of the Kephis grows into a picture: here are its flow, its waters, the rain with which it flows through the plains, and the land through which it runs—and all in short descriptions that end with the words about the relation to Colonus of the muses and Aphrodite, who is also briefly described. Such are the contents of the first strophe and antistrophe of the hymn to the Attic city.

Instead of a description of the city itself, we are presented with an epithetic definition of several secondary features that have a collateral connection with Colonus: the arrival of the nightingales, the thickness of the foliage, the beauty of the narcissus and the saffron, the force of the streams of water. Furthermore, the connection between all this picture and the cults of Dionysus, the Muses, Aphrodite, Demeter, and Kore is preserved. The description of Colonus is a chain of attributes: each thought is an attribute of that which came before.

In content Colonus is a typical “blessed city” with groves of the gods and choral dances of the muses. Here Bacchic Dionysus frolics and conducts orgies with the benefactress-goddesses. Here Aphrodite passes the time with “golden reins,” flying in on her chariot—the eros god. Here bloom the famous cult flowers saffron and narcissus, “the ancient wreath of the two great goddesses.” Pure waters, luxuriant thickets, plains, and meadows—such are the features of all blessed cities and countries. Such they are in choral melic, and in Sappho, and in Pindar. These are the dwellings of the gods of fertility, of Aphrodite, of Eros, of Dionysus, of Demeter.

Colonus is therefore not described at all. In Sophocles’ times and for Sophocles himself such an image-mythological and therefore impersonal description of “the city” is the only means of literary description. For Sophocles the whole song of the chorus has a new conceptual meaning. The solemnity of the ancient images is filled for him with praise of the homeland, for he was born in Colonus! Admiration for the beauty, culture, and humanity of his homeland sounds in every word of the song “hymn.” Yet all of these
ideas are presented by means of standard mythological images and archaic language, which create all the texture of Sophocles’ literary expression, the entire formal aggregate of his poetic facts.

4

In the language of melics epithets and appositions carry the center of semantic weight. If they are deleted, the phrase breaks apart into separate meaningless nouns. The epithets create the “picture,” i.e. an immobile, still anti-narrative means of exposition, which is the verbal equivalent of visual showing in ritual; the static method of depiction takes the place of future narration.

In the epithet there is no time. The language of melic piles up epithets, applying them to every noun. Thus one gets bunches of attributes lacking all dynamics. Even the description of events full of movement is given by means of enumeration of a list of nouns and epithets; the phrase is furthermore stiff and static. Here is the melic description of the boxing duel in *The Women of Trachis*, which in its meaning is dynamic and dramatic,—the result determined the fate of Deianira: “then was there the noise of hand and arrow, mixed with bull’s horns; there was an interweaving climax (bending of the opponent), there was a deathly blow of the forehead and a moan of both. And the tender beautiful-eyed one was sitting at (the foot of) a far-seeing hill, waiting to see who’s spouse she was.”

Thought cannot turn and distribute itself; each epithet is a whole phrase without a verb, without articulation, without conceptual syntax. The only verb here is “was,” which helplessly and colorlessly repeats itself, marking time. “Mixed with bull’s horns” replaces the expression “a battle in which the hands of the hero intertwined with the horns of a bull-like monster;” “the far-seeing hill” means “a hill, from which one can see far;” “waiting to see whose spouse she was” means “waiting to see whose spouse she will become as a result of the duel.” The subject and the object are not distinguished: the hill sees far, but it is also seen from afar, depending on the context in which the given epithet functions. Similarly, further on the “eye” of Deianira is called “an eye evoking enmity from both sides,” though all this conceptually translated phrase is expressed in one epithet in the original. Not only in this epithet, but in every other in Greek poetry the meaning contained in the epithet has an active-passive form; we translate it according to context.

In essence, the “pictures” of melic story consist of one uninterrupted epithet. Thus the thickets, the waters, the beauty of Colonus are a static picture, which represents an “addendum” to the image “Colonus,” taking on an attributive meaning. Such, for example, is the invocation of Bacchus in the choral song in *Antigone*. The idea of this invocation is simple: Bacchus, come and help us. But it is expressed thus: “many-named, adornment of the Cadmian maiden and descent of heavy-thundering Zeus, (you), who care for glorious Italy, rule in the lap of the Eleusinian Deo, common to all, (you), Bacchus, who inhabit the metropolis of the bacchantes Thebes, at the damp streams of the Ismene, by the sowing of the wild dragon; you were seen over the two-peaked cliff by the shining smoke (fire), where the Parnassian nymph-bacchantes walk in line and where the Castalian moisture is. And the hills of the Nisean mountains wreathed in ivy and the green many-graped bank accompany you who gaze at the Theban crossroads (streets).
You honor (Thebes) above all cities together with your mother, who was burned by lightning. And now, when all my city is seized by a violent illness, come with your pure foot over the Parnassian slope or the moaning strait. Alas, leader of the dance of stars that breathe fire, guard of night sounds, son, descendent of Zeus, O appear to us together with your companions, the Thyiads of Naxos, who honor you by wild all-night dances—you, their ruler Bacchus.”

In all this picture there is no movement or advancement. Thought stands still. There is no plot, as there is no time or causality: there is nothing to develop. We insert punctuation marks in an attempt to give the ideas some syntactic order. But in fact the whole song is devoid of punctuation, because it has no main and secondary parts, no government or dependence. The whole thought in its entirety is an “attribute” of “Bacchus” and can be continued, cut short, stopped—whatever one likes. It has the shape of a toothed band, and the impetus to the next sentence is given by the last word, not by some central postulate that is developed in an argument.

What we call “à propos”—a thematic connection lacking factual reality—in fact is the absence in thought (and therefore in the songs) of duration, length, sequentiality. Facts are perceived generally, in a summary and schematic way, only externally, through two or three standard features. Everything that is described in such a way takes on the character of a kind of indefinite, impersonal, concreteness, in which phenomena have no quality. Here, for example, one and the same fact is described by the characters of the drama and the inactive chorus. The Delphic oracle has just announced that the deaths and barrenness in Thebes are brought on by impiety, the carrier of which must be found and punished. King Oedipus (in Sophocles’ tragedy of the same name) still does not know that he himself is the criminal. The hints of the seer Teiresias make him indignant. Naturally the chorus of Theban elders thinks only of one thing—who can this impious man be and how to find him. Creon reveals the demands of the oracle in iambic trimeter. He tells Oedipus: “I am ready to speak of what I heard from the god. Lord Phoebus clearly ordered for the defilement of the country, inasmuch as it is nurtured by this land, to be driven out and not to nurture that which is incurable…(The criminal) must be driven beyond the borders of the city, or else murder must be destroyed by means of a new murder, since this blood has turned the city to ice.” In these words we see logical sequence, a goal, causality, in spite of the fact that the oracle is ambiguous in meaning and that a number of concepts are expressed in mythological images. But the image “the blood has turned the city to ice” in the mouth of Creon no longer sounds literal, but metaphorical—“blood has brought unhappiness on the city.” The intentionally obscure, double meaning of the oracle here takes the form of a metaphor: defilement is “incurable,” because it consists of patricide and marriage to the mother, and it is “nurtured” (“fed”) in this land, since it took place in Thebes, and it should not be “nurtured” (“fed”) any longer, in other words the unpunished presence of Oedipus on the throne cannot be tolerated. The difference between these images and the images of the choral songs is that the metaphors of the oracle can be deciphered like a riddle, while the images of melic remain mythological.

The difference is not in the chorus, but in melic. When the chorus speaks in iambs, it thinks conceptually. Thus, to Oedipus’ doubts and searching the chorus logically answers, “since you have taken me by oaths, lord, I will answer you thus: it was not I who killed and I cannot point out the murderer. But who once completed the murder, this...
should be revealed by Phoebus, who sent us this task.” And during the confrontation between Oedipus and Teiresias the chorus, reasoning, interjects a few iambic phrases. The point, it says, is not angry speeches, but “to find the best solution to the divine predictions—to examine this.” When the chorus is singing, rather than speaking, however, after this scene, its thought and language begin to reflect pre-conceptual, mythological ideas, turns of phrase, lexicon. In the first strophic pair, it reasons, “Who is he, whom the prophetic Delphic cliff called the accomplisher with bloody hands of the most unspeakable of unspeakable things? It is time for him on stormy horses to direct his quick foot toward escape. Armed with fire and lightning, the son of Zeus falls upon him, the terrible never-erring Kairoi follow him. The appearing voice only just lit up from snowy Parnassus, that each should seek out the unrevealed man. For he wanders in the wild wood, and in caves, and on cliffs, like a bull, pitiful, with a pitiful foot wandering alone, avoiding the prophecies from the middle of the earth: and they, ever living, fly around (him).” Instead of “Phoebus” it says “prophetic cliff,” instead of “criminal,” “the accomplisher of the unspeakable,” instead of “drive out,” “direct a quick foot toward escape,” instead of “Phoebus said,” “the appearing voice lit up,” and so on. The cliff prophesies, Phoebus hurls himself, armed with fire and lightning, the Kairoi do not err, a voice appears from snowy Parnassus, the criminal wanders like a bull, and his foot is pitiful; the epithet of the prophecies is “middle-navel-of-the-earth” (as Delphi was called), and they (the prophecies) are represented as living, flying like birds around man. All of these ideas are mythological images, void of figurative meaning. There are still no qualities, no matter how many epithets there are here. The murderer is pitiful, his foot is pitiful, he wanders alone, wanders everywhere like a bull. Here there is neither indignation nor hatred, and with what pathos Oedipus curses this murderer!

Ideas are communicated in melic completely differently than in iambics. The absence of qualitative thought makes them amorphous, for all their concreteness and “picture-ness.” If an object does not have a name, they can neither signify it nor name it. A series of epithets and attributes pile up that do not envelop the object and do not clarify its distinctive features. And the most important thing in all these epithets is their direct, concrete-unique meaning, lacking figurative meanings.

The chorus is the oldest character in tragedy, the main character. Why does it only sing “à propos of “what happens on stage?

The problem is that the content of the choral songs is as much older than the content of the iambic plot as the chorus is older than the soloists. Its themes are very important: in them are the genesis of the plot of the given tragedy.

The melic and the iambic parts have the same themes, but in the chorus they are more archaic and pre-plot.

Let us take, for example, a classic tragedy like Oedipus the King. The iambic plot tells us that there is a plague in Thebes. The priest, who comes to Oedipus as a “suppliant,” describes the misfortune in the following archaic (this is why he is a priest!) image language: “The city, as you see yourself, after all, is already rocking too much, and cannot raise its head from the abyss and bloody tossing; it is withering away in the fruit-bearing buds of the earth, it is withering away in the grazing bulls and non-bearing
(fruitless) births of women. Furthermore the fire-bearing god—a most evil plague—persecutes the city with its blows; from it Cadmus’ house is growing empty and black Hades is growing rich in moans and sobs.” This language of the priest formally coincides in its image lexicon with the language of the chorus. The plague is represented as a fire-bearing god who beats and drives the city. At the same time the plague is the abyss of the sea, the bloody waters of which rock and splash on the city. The image is subjective-objective; the city is dying in plants, animals, and humans, who are themselves dying of barrenness. Instead of saying that the buds of plants do not develop into fruit, that bulls cannot graze, that women do not give birth to living children, the language of image speaks of the city fading in “fruit-bearing” buds, in “grazing” bulls, in “non-bearing births:” as in Homer (the “starry” sky in the daytime), the feature of the thing remains with it even when it is clearly out of place (alien to the thing). This shows the peculiar character of the image “feature:” it is not meant to reveal a quality of the thing, but merely accompanies the thing by the principle of tautology. When it is necessary to give it an opposite meaning, a new word is introduced which contains this opposition. Thus every image is both subjective and objective, both passive and active, both positive and negative. “Non-bearing births” signifies “births that do not bear living children;” here the subject should be “woman,” and not “births;” the language of image, however, does not distinguish the action from its agent. In the same way Hades “grows rich”[πλούτιζεται] in moans and sobs. The image of “ploutos” can be found in every tragedy; but the tragic poets, not knowing what to do with it, gave it financial meaning. In Euripides it becomes a social motif, in Sophocles and Aeschylus it is turned into a concept. Hades is Plutos himself; the language of the priest makes a metaphor of the subjective-objective image. But essentially every Greek abstract concept is nothing more than a metaphor. In Russian it is “get rich” and the linguistic semantics of “wealth” is lost; in Greek πλούτιζεται contains the undeleted image semantics of “ploutos.”

Yet still the image language of the priest is different from the language of the melic parts. How? The kind of thinking is different in both cases. In the mouth of the priest, the phrase discussed acts as a metaphorical illustration of his general thought about the plague punishing the city, about the necessity for Oedipus to find a means of delivery from it. The priest speaks in obscure, figurative language. Even more, as a religious professional, he uses euphemisms to avoid calling bad things by their direct names. But his figurative language is completely discursive. With logical consistency, he develops his proofs to the best advantage of his central thought.

The song of the chorus is different. It begins in connection with the same event, with an address to a personified Voice, “the sweet-voiced” scion of Zeus, which now “has come from many-gilt Python to shining Thebes.” Trembling before the daughter of Hope, News, the chorus invokes the gods, bestowing complex epithets on each one. But here is the middle narrative part: “O, woe is me, woe! I bear uncounted misfortunes. My whole people is ill, and there is in my mind no spear that might deflect (misfortune). Neither does the virgin soil of the famous land nurture nor do women bear their sad birth pains. You would see them (carried off) one after the other, like a fair-winged bird drawn on more strongly than a raging fire to the bank of the evening god. In them the countless city is perishing. A pitiless, death-bearing posterity lies on the earth without cries of grief. Meanwhile wives and even gray mothers—one on one side of the raised altar, the other on the other—lament, praying for protection from the deadly misfortunes. The paean
shines (sounds) and the moaning, repeating voice. O golden daughter of Zeus, send, O fair of face, protection from all this! And violated Ares, who now burns against me without his copper shield and with a cry comes against me, force him to turn his back in a reverse run, distant from the fatherland: either to the great chamber of Amphitrite, or to the inhospitable harborless Thracian wave. For if night gives up its tribute, it comes in the day. Destroy this Ares, O Zeus-father who has power over the fire-bearing stars, destroy him with your thunderbolt! Lycaean lord! I wish your indomitable arrows, the command of protection, would fly out from the twisted gold bowstrings and the fire-bearing luminaries of Artemis, with which she rushes over the Lycaean mountains, (would fly out)! And I invoke the eponymous god of this land, evoian Bacchus, the cluster-visaged in his golden miter, the companion of the maenads, let him come near with his burning...(lacuna) torch against the god detested by the gods.”

This language and the thought system expressed in it are so peculiar in their archaism that in places they can only be translated with difficulty. The difficulty here is twofold. In the first place, the epithets contain whole sentences, and they cannot be translated by adjectives or participles. Second, they are both subjective and objective. The idea of the “countless” victims of the city is expressed in the phrase “the countless city is dying.” Also archaic is the phrase about the posterity that carries within itself death, that is, about the bearer of death. People, deprived of the sympathy of those close to them, lie right on the earth, without funeral lamentations. Yet the compound adjective “death-bearing” speaks of the “posterity” as it does of a death-bearing plague, as if the posterity itself were sowing death. Then it is called “pitiless,” while it is logically “deprived of the pity of men.” Such is all the language [of this passage]. It does not distinguish subject from object, active from passive, transitive from intransitive. To say nothing of such expressions as “noncopper of shields” (without a copper shield), “inhospitable of harbors” (without hospitable harbors), “luminaries” in the sense of “arrows,” “the sound shines,” “golden-mitered” (with a golden cloth on his head), “similarly-dressed” in the sense of “companion,” participle-nouns combining the accusative with the nominative (“Violent Ares [acc]… strong-crying [nom]” instead of “strong-crying [acc]”). Adjectives have no tense; they have no active or passive. In this language, however, adjectives have the function of participles. We distinguish “violent” from “violated,” “destructive” from “destroyed.” The language of melic does not know this distinction. Posterity is “pitiless,” “Ares violated/forced.” When we say “moaning sound” we do not imagine the sound as a living being that is moaning. But in the language of melic, the inanimate world is made animate, and a sound may make moans “like-sounding to a flute” (an epithet-apposition in one word), furthermore the flute mentioned is that used to sing a prayer about healing, a paean; in other words, the moans echo the paean.

It is no accident that the ancient language requires commentary and hermeneutics. We have to pull out of it thoughts that we can understand, to translate it first into our language, then from images into concepts. For example, the phrase “If night gives up its tribute, it comes in the day” means “the victim saved by night destroys the day that follows the night” (the continuity of death). Such a translation is required of every phrase. Not only the lexicon, but also the syntax of image thoughts must be translated into
conceptual lexicon and conceptual syntax. Melic has its own special vocabulary and its own special rules for combining words.

The melic language of tragedy is a more ancient version of the iambic language. The Greeks themselves commented on it; they did not understand its archaism one century later. The same is true of the semantic side of this ancient language. The contents it communicates are also a more ancient version in respect to the semantic context of the iambic part. By this I mean that the images of melic, no matter how far they seem from the iambic contents, are in fact the same contents, but expressed by more ancient means. They contain the same semantic element that gave rise to the later conceptual contents.

In the chorus cited above, as in the priest’s passage, plague is presented in the form of a fiery divinity. I have already mentioned that in mythology fire has two aspects: it is either a beneficial being, inventor and master (Hephaestus, Prometheus, Athena), or it is a destructive being that strikes with death and war (Ares, Apollo of the First Book of the Iliad). What conceptually became “plague” is expressed in image as “fire.” But this image, as always in myth, has its variants. In myth, where there is fire, there is water. But this water is special—the water of death. In myth, where there is fire, there are the waters of the underworld, bloody or black abysses, in which surging waves rage. The priest depicts the plague as such a bloody abyss, filled with disturbed waters. The city rolls in furious rocking, chokes and perishes. Hence—without any logical consistency—the barrenness of the plants, animals, and women, i.e. a general world barrenness. And the chorus presents the same picture: nothing in the city is born, neither from the “famous earth” nor from woman’s womb. Conceptually this is νόδος, that famous “illness” which organizes the intrigue in most tragedies. Here the “illness” is a plague: Sophocles interprets the myths realistically, when the image texture does not oppose this process. In most other cases, the “illness” takes the form of madness or moral insanity; in Sophocles Philoctetes suffers realistically from his wound.

The character of the “illness” in Oedipus the King is revealed by the song of the chorus. The priest’s images may be taken for metaphors. But the chorus portrays the plague in the form of fire-Ares in a very literal sense. Ares attacks the city, but this city is identified with the chorus itself: “With a cry Ares burns me, coming against me.” This identification is worthy of note. What is happening to the city is also happening to the chorus: the chorus was the bearer of the basic theme, the chorus was the main character, as in the Suppliant Maidens of Aeschylus. The plague is portrayed as a fire sent by Ares or without mediation as a “fire-bearing god.” It is also portrayed as a battle. Ares swoops down, attacks with a loud cry, as in war. Athena must either make him turn and run or drown him or throw him into the very stormy abyss that is represented by the plague itself. Zeus must turn him to ashes with his thunderbolt, Apollo and Artemis—with their arrow-rays, Dionysus and the bacchantes—light him on fire with a torch. Thus this is a whole theomachy as in Iliad 20; it is a variant of the titanomachy, but in the form of a war of the gods. The light gods are fighting a god-destroyer, and they all have the same weapon—lightning, torches, rays. Of course this is not simply the driving of a plague out of Thebes: this is a cosmic battle as a result of which light kills death. This is why the chorus complains that there is no “spear” that would deflect the illness.

Thus we come to the circle of mythological images of Homer, Hesiod, and the lyric poets. The chorus shows how the themes of the tragedies, hidden by Theban or Trojan
“cycles,” in fact derive from a single circle of common ancient Greek ideas of the periodical death of nature.

“One after another man rushes, stronger than raging fire, like a bird, to the shore of the evening god,” says the chorus. The bearers of the plague, the dead are likened to a raging fire. The shore of the evening god is the shore of the sea of death, the abyss full of bloody waters, the “inhospitable” Thracian sea that seethes with waves, the “great abode of Amphitrite,” where one must throw the fiery plague. The god of the underworld is called “evening;” death is darkness, and it is defeated by the lightning, rays, and torches of the light gods.

The images are subjective-objective. The chorus and the city are one; the dead and Ares are one.

But while the chorus depicts the death of nature in the form of general barrenness and mortality, the plot of the tragedy speaks of patricide and the incestuous marriage of Oedipus: an unintentional crime supposedly evokes divine retribution. Thus the connection between these two different phenomena is presented by the plot of the tragedy. In Sophocles this connection is ethico-religious and causalized: because of a certain act, a certain retribution follows. But within this conceptual understanding lies the myth-image identity of “patricide” with “death of nature,” “marriage with the mother” with “barrenness.” In Greek eschatologies the death of the cosmos is always understood as violence of son against father, as murder or forced barrenness, as dethronement and deprivation of life (royal) potency; “patricide” is the way the change of mythological ages and generations is presented in image. Hubristic marriage to the mother is an even more ancient variation on this image. In myth Hubris is barrenness, Dike—harvest and plentiful descendants.

Now we can understand why the chorus always sings “à propos of” what happens on stage, but not directly about it. Melic is connected to the iambic part by a most ancient link—a thematic link, but not one connected to the action or the plot. The plot of tragedy grows out of the thematics of the choral songs, and the choruses remain in the composition of tragedy as the image remains in the concept, as concreteness remains in Greek abstraction. But the plot of iambic and the amorphous song-images of the chorus represent different phenomena. The plot springs from the mythological image, but becomes specific only in conceptual thinking, when cause and effect logic already exists, along with narrative construction and its categories of time, goal, and—most importantly—with its indirectness, i. e., with the complete separation of the narrative object from the narrating subject. Thus the plot of Oedipus the King tells “about” the unwitting crime of Oedipus “which” therefore “brought on” the punishment. But one should be more precise. No tragedy has an integral narrative plot. The plot that we abstract from tragedy is not narrated by anyone, but is presented immediately in action. To put it paradoxically, in drama there is no plot.

But tragedy is already constructed on plot and recreates it in action. The chorus, on the other hand, is outside of this action, because it is still pre-plot. It has no indirectness. It is theme, and audience, and actor, and author.
The textbooks state that the oldest choral lyric was narrative. It turns out that choral narration preceded solo plotless lyric and that narration preceded plotlessness... This reminds one of the way before the discovery of primitive culture it was considered that high forms came first, then they degraded into low forms.

Rarely in tragedy one comes across choral songs in the middle of which there are narrations as well.

A typical case is the narration in the second stasimon of Agamemnon. The chorus learns of the successful return of Agamemnon, who is expected any minute. It sings “à propos of” the events, presenting fragments of myth about Helen, Paris, the destruction of Troy amorphously. This is not a story and not a plot, but a meditation.

But in the second strophe without any transition there suddenly appears a plot narrative about a lion cub. Here is this story: “A man raised in his house the child of a lion deprived of milk and loving its mother’s breast, so that in its young years it was tame, much beloved of children and pleasant to people of respected age. Often he took it in his arms, like a newborn baby, when it with a clear glance rubbed against his hand (prompted) by the demands of its stomach. But, growing up, it showed the customs proper to its parents, for—showing gratitude for its upbringing!—it voluntarily made a feast of the sheep (it) killed, sprinkling the house with blood. Insurmountable woe to the household, great many-moaning ruin! By the will of god a certain priest was raised in the house for evil.”

In this passage, as always in choral melic, there are spots that are difficult to translate, exacerbated by the poor preservation of Aeschylean manuscripts. “Beloved of children” may mean “loving children,” since it is a simple adjective lacking verbal features; many such adjectives must be translated as extended phrases or with adverbs, nouns, or participles. But this is a problem of form. In content the last phrase requires explanation. The lion cub is called a “priest of evil” (or “nourished for evil”). What is the “priest” doing here? The point is that it was priests who killed and disemboweled animals, the entrails of which played an important role in cult. The beast of prey tearing apart the sheep and eating their flesh is metaphorically identified with a priest. This sounds bitter and strong. The entire story is shot through with a certain feeling of horror, as if it were about blasphemy. It is very significant. The fate of the animals is felt as human fate is. This is not merely a paradigm or a novella, but a story of events that all can understand and that can move anyone. The murder of the sheep, as in Ajax, has the character of a drama; we hear the echo of the times when people wore mourning for a murdered and lamented animal-god. The hubris of the lion cub consists in the fact that he became a “murderer.”

After this narration, again without any transition, the interrupted thoughts on the Trojan theme continue. The end of the entire song is a meditation on Hubris and Dike. It ends with a greeting for the returning Agamemnon.

What is the function of the narration in this choral song?

In its entirety it has one specific theme, no matter how slippery its material: disturbed “establishment” is followed by vengeance. Thus the first antithesis of the strophes speaks of Helen’s departure, the chase after her, the “bloody quarrel,” then about Paris breaking the laws of Zeus Xenios and the horrors of Ilion lamenting its misfortune. The second antithesis contains the story of the lion cub. The third sings that in fact Ilion
was entered by Eros (“the tender glance of eyes, the heart-gnawing flower of Eros”). Helen completed the bitter mystery of marriage, but Priam’s family was entered by an “evil guest, coarse in manners, Erinys lamented by the newlywed:” she was sent by Zeus Xenios (hospitality). Immediately, in the antistrophe, it begins to discuss an impious affair that gives birth to children like itself and a beautiful son sent by fate to a righteous household. In the last, the fourth antithesis, the “old word of mortals” composed about Hubris and Dike continues. “Old Hubris, growing young in the troubles of men, loves to give birth to Hubris;” but Dike shines in smoke-blackened houses and avoids impious, but gilded dwellings.

In this song the chorus means not so much Helen as Clytemnestra, who has defiled the marriage bed with Aegisthus while her husband was away. Such an action is hubris. But it is followed by retribution. In spite of the gilded throne and the wealth of the royal chambers, Dike turns away her face from him. The Erinyes take up their “heavy place” in the family of the Atreidai. Ilion is destroyed by the “arrow” of eyes, the “flower of Eros.” And the House of Atreus falls as a result of a “bloody quarrel,” because of criminal Eros.

The narration about the young lion means that bloodthirsty habits sooner or later will come to light: meek while biding its time, the beast of prey remains true to its nature. There is no reference to the punishment of the lion; this creates the impression of the complete victory of hubris, as it always happens in fables and parables untouched by cult ethics.

The content of the narrative part of this choral song turns out to be more ancient than the content of the song as a whole: animal in form, it is still devoid of cult ethics. At the same time this narration has an everyday narrative character. It has a consistent, connected, finished plot. The habits of the lion cub are drawn psychologically. The action is set beyond the bounds of the general contents of the song. Time moves and plays an important role. Causality is clearly designated: the lion cub fawns when he wants to eat, but reveals his bloodthirsty nature under the influence of time, as he grows up. In spite of the ancient imagery, the narrative is in essence already conceptual, goal-oriented, conditional. And I must repeat here the law that I have pointed out in my works on Homeric similes and on Sappho: it is exactly the oldest layers of Greek poetry that are subjected to modernization, acting as the nidus of the new thought that is already poetic.

The story about the lion cub acts like a parable in the choral song. It is connected only thematically, not by plot, to the general contents of the song, though its imagery represents the oldest lyric layer of the tragedy. At one time its concreteness was the content of choral laments for the slaughtered innocent animal, the victim of the beast of prey. Later, turned by conceptual thought into a narrative, this concreteness began to stand out among the amorphous contents of the rest of the song parts. It took on the function of a parable, of a figural sense that grows out of the context of the entire song as a whole. If such a story were to figure independently, it would act as an apology, a didactic narrative from the world of animals. But Classical Greece still has no independent stories. I said above that each narrative is enclosed in an anarrative exposition or in its antithesis. The figural sense of the story about the lion cub arises precisely from the anarrative context, where the subject is the ways of women, by nature ungrateful and destructive of the sacredness of the bed. The direct concrete meaning of narration turns into a transferred “figural” meaning. The story of the lion cub is
figurative. Its function is secondary, dependent, directed toward the entire song as a whole.

At the same time any iambic story, including the messenger’s story, has a completed, independent, and factual character which rests precisely on the literal meaning, on precision and documentality. In this respect the two styles of tragedy—image and conceptual—coincide with the two styles of Herodotus and any other Classical narrative based on the transformation of image into content. One must take into consideration that ancient lyric from the very beginning contained the same two styles—recitative and melic. The only difference is that in lyric these two styles are already separated, while in tragedy, which has preserved for us the most archaic system in which lyric as well once functioned, these two styles are an inseparable unity.

Narrative turns up in the choral melic of tragedies only rarely. Usually it is preceded by the pre-narrative form of exposition revealed in the fact that the chorus “mentions” the myth, but does not tell its story. In some cases such mention takes in conceptual reworking the form of meditation, in others—of an embryonic story presented in passing and only partially, in still others—of an emotional theme.

Choral meditations are not abstract at all. They are thematic, that is, they have a concrete image texture, which has still not settled into an ordered plot. So it is in Aeschylus. In Euripides, who already introduced strong emotionality into melic, the thematic parts form the motifs of pity, moaning laments and cries, as always happens in lamentations.

But I have something else in mind. I want to point out melic pre-narration, which I would call a “static story.” Its external features are as follows. It is mythical and plotless. It has no connected narration. When such vague thematic fragments (“mentions”) are found in Homer, it is accepted to consider that “the listener knew the myth well, and therefore there was no reason to tell it.” But this is a philistine’s explanation. In fact the singer still did not have a more perfect means of narration.

If one can say of ancient story that it is not independent, then how much more applicable this is to static story, i.e., to the melic narration of myth. It is cited not for the narrative itself, but for the dependent nature of pre-narration itself. Such dependence is revealed both in syntax and in semantics. Syntactically, the static story is concentrated in dependent clauses, for the most part in subordinate clauses of definition, which act as complements to the subject. This subject has an “enclosed” character in which the subject is given not directly, but through various object expressions; passive forms of the verb and participles emphasize the subordination and connectedness, the “passiveness” of the subject, which is in a state of “status” rather than “action.” In pre-narrative (static story) participles and attributive-appositive constructions play a decisive role; noun and predicate often form one whole, expressed by a participle.

From the point of view of semantics, the static story consists of two identical parts, each of which is dependent on the other,—the defined, and that which defines it. All pre-narration as a whole acts as a thematic attribute of separate motifs and events of the tragedy.
Here are a few illustrations. Aeschylus’ *Libation Bearers*. The situation is as follows. The chorus already knows that Orestes has returned in secret to take vengeance by stealth for his father. It is “à propos” of this main event that the chorus sings, thinking of the criminal love of Clytemnestra, which drove her to murder her husband. The chorus, however, says nothing about events directly and immediately, but gives distant vague analogies to them: it sings about the “loveless love” of women, about the force of eros, about Althaea who killed her son, about Scylla, who betrayed her husband for the love of Minos, about the Lemnian women who killed their husbands, and, at last, about avenging Dike. Each of these myths is presented briefly and obliquely. On Althaea (I am consciously staying as close to the original as possible): “Let him who has received knowledge without winged worries find out about the fiery-burning plot that the son-killer thought up, the unfortunate daughter of Thestius, who on the day designated by fate burned the fiery-red brand, the coeval of her son, corresponding (to him) in the duration of life,—after he, coming from his mother, raised a noise.”

The construction “let him find out about the plot that Théstias (the daughter of Théstius) thought up” is clear: it has two subjects—“him” and “Théstias,” two predicates “find out” and “thought up,” the object “about the plot.” But such an analysis is purely formal. I will go so far as to say that formal grammar is applicable only to conceptual languages; it lies beyond the scope of image meanings and the peculiar syntactic forms they produce.

Of course, from the formal point of view “Théstias” is the subject. But in this melic construction the object “about the plot” acts as the logical subject, while the subject (“Théstias”) acts as the logical complement. Conceptually it would look like this: “Let the plot of Théstias be known to him.” But the same thought in image construction forces the subject to become an object, the object a subject. What should “he” find out?—The plot of Théstias. This is the meaning of the first part of the sentence. In the second part the plot itself is revealed. But here the logical subject becomes Théstias. The first subject, “he,” is logically forgotten.

Now comes the central part of the exposition. All its weight lies in the appositive attribute “who burned (the brand).” Formal grammar sees in any attribute an index of a feature (quality, goal, time, cause, etc.), i.e. a conceptual category. But mythological images lack qualitative indices. The attribute-participle here wholly coincides semantically with the subject, indicating not a feature (way of action) of a person, but the merging of this person with his constant state which always accompanies him and is expressed in the attribute.

The fact is that Théstius had several daughters. But when the song speaks of the “daughter of Théstius who burned the brand,” it is clear that it means Althaea. The burning brand is the image that defines and exhausts Althaea. In pictures this image was her graphic attribute, in later symbolism—her symbol. This is why her plot is called fiery-burning (literally “fiery-lit” in the active-passive sense). And in this case as well such an attributive adjective is far from indicating a “feature of the thing.” The plot is not a living person and not a weapon that can be lit on fire. Transferred to it are Althaea’s actions, and Althaea herself as a whole, including her plot, is defined by burning the brand. After all, in myth this brand corresponded to Meleager, Althaea’s son, and Meleager’s life was ended by burning the brand. The angered mother burned the brand, her son died.
Althaea in her entirety is characterized by this one act. She has no “features” in the sense of qualitative indices. All the attributive clauses which contain exposition of the myth gradually set out the parts of this one image: what did she burn?—a brand; what kind?—coeval of her son; why did she burn it?—because the son abused his mother; when?—when he came from her; what coeval?—one that corresponded to her son throughout his life; when did she burn it?—on the day preordained by fate. The series of dependent clauses presents the myth in the form of attributes of one image.

“Coeval of her son” is a normally understandable apposition to “the brand.” But in essence, the whole semantic construction by which the myth of Althaea is presented reveals an attributive-appositive system. Here I do not mean the formal grammatical terms, but am merely pointing out that the entire second part of the sentence acts as a single mythological definition of Althaea (“burning the brand”), who is called “son-destroyer” in the first part. Therefore, no matter how formal grammar might evaluate these two sentences, the second member (“burning the brand”) is connected to the first member (Thestias) tautologically. All this second part of the sentence, that is the presentation of the facts of the myth, I would call a semantic apposition to the first part, although it has the form not of a noun, but of a series of attributive clauses. Apposition is a very ancient category of thought. It is tautological to what it defines, but differs from an adjective in that it acts as a noun, i.e. as an attribute-state, but not yet as an attribute-property. And in essence the entire second part of a static story, all of its exposition, is pure apposition to the name of the hero, to the logical subject, an attribute that does not reveal qualitative features, does not develop any new traits and does not aid in moving the theme along. Its cognitive significance is still poor. No matter what dynamics it may speak of, the form of its expression is immobile.

The myth of Scylla is presented in the same way. Once again it is entirely contained in one sentence which consists of a number of dependent clauses, the sum of which is a developed attribute of “Scylla.”

The chorus in the *Libation Bearers* turns to Scylla immediately after the story of Althaea and says, “and there is another woman, rumor had it, who should be hated—a bloody maid who destroyed for his enemies a dear man, persuaded by the gifts of Minos, a Cretan gold-wrought necklace, thoughtlessly depriving Nisus of his immortal hair—the bitch—while he slept, and Hermes caught up with him.” The archaic expressions and word order are hard to approximate in a modern language, but this is about it.

Here it is already immediately clear that the subject is expressed in the object (“Scylla” [a maid, acc.]), although the participle “persuaded” and the appositive “bitch” (literally “dog-soul”) are in the nominative, presupposing Scylla as the subject. Apposition here is more obvious than in the myth of Althaea; at the same time “persuaded by gifts” is not only a grammatical complement, but also a semantic definition of Scylla, as “burned the brand” was a definition of Althaea. It contains the entire essence of the myth of Scylla. It exhausts the image of “Scylla” and acts with the further objects as an apposition to the subject—if not formally, then semantically, as a semantic tautology of “Scylla.”
Here as well the static story consists of two identical and mutually dependent parts, one of which acts as an attribute for the other (bloody—persuaded by gifts, cf. son-destroyer—having burned the brand). The second part still cannot be called a figurative rendering of the first, since it lacks a figurative meaning. While it does present the same image in a “different” form, these are two identical mythological images: where there are no concepts, there can be no figurality.

In the presentation of the myths both about Althaea and about Scylla the construction is such that the exposition is presented not in direct form, from the subject, but from the object; in the myth about Althaea the subject is inside the object (literally: “let him find out about it Thestias thought up the plot,” i.e. conceptually “about the plot that Thestias thought up”).

The static story presents myths in oblique and dependent forms. It reflects the absence in thought itself of a clear demarcation between subject and object, past and present, far and near. The subject is “enclosed” in the object and contained by passive forms of the verb and participle; subordinate clauses are strung one after the other and are equally dependent. Thought bypasses the most important thing, without developing the main theme consistently and without subordinating the secondary to it. Such an exposition, taking up one sentence and expressed by subordinate and dependent clauses, turns into an image bundle, a static “mention,” which is not developed into a narrative. No matter how long it is, however, its attributive-appositive form is not capable of introducing any qualitative revelations. Pre-narration is inevitably mythological. Expressing the mythological, pre-conceptual system of thought, it itself is a product of myth and a transmitter of myth—the oldest form of myth-story.

Narrative story, on the other hand, is always plot oriented (fabulistic). It presents its theme not in profile, like prenarration, but frontally, in direct forms (“a man raised a lion cub in his house…often he took it in his arms…but coming of age, it showed its temperament…” etc.). Every sequential thought in narrative advances forward: a man took a lion cub—and then what? He tamed him. And then?

Narrative looks ahead, opening the way for interest in the unknown; the static story is closed and bounded. In its very nature narrative story is amythological because it makes myth into everyday reality. Thus the story of the lion cub is an embryonic novella.

The chorus as an archaic phenomenon continues the old verbal tradition even in Attic tragedy of the 5th century. This does not mean, of course, that in Sophocles or Aeschylus the choral collectives of Athens thought pre-conceptually. It was a matter of the ancient canon of the muses. Thus the citizens themselves who made up the chorus as a social obligation could no longer be identical to the preclass collective. The entire chorus as a whole, as well as its language, thought, and speech, recreated in performance what before the appearance of stage tragedy corresponded to historical reality.

The closer one gets to Euripides, the stronger the role of tradition, approaching stylization; in Euripides one can find much more faithfulness to archaic forms than in Aeschylus or particularly Sophocles, the freshest of all the tragedians.

Because of the “enclosure” of the subject in the object, the chorus began its songs from some secondary circumstance or from a third person who had nothing to do with the myth presented (“let him know, who…” or “it was said,” “there was an ancient legend,” etc). The chorus in Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens, in referring to its descent from Io, begins with an extraneous object,—which inadvertently allows it to put the subject in an
oblique, dependent (“enclosed”) position: “I stepped onto the ancient track of the flower-nourishing field (lit. far-seeing place) of mother, on the meadow which feeds bulls, from which Io, driven by a gadfly, ran crazed…etc.”46 Although “Io” here is the subject, it is inside a dependent clause of the sentence. “Driven by a gadfly” is a definition of Io in past-participial form, her semantic opposition.

Likewise the chorus in Medea, when it recalls Ino, starts with the following turn of phrase: “Of one I have heard, of one of the earlier women who raised her hand against her dear children, of Ino, driven mad by the will of the gods, when the wife of Zeus drove her distracted from the house. She fell, unfortunate, from a jump [into the brine], because of the impious murder of her children, stretching her foot over the edge, and perished, dying together with her two children.”47 Here too the subject “Ino” is in the form of an object; in Greek it is in the accusative. The (in the semantic sense) appositive participle which defines her (literally “driven mad out of the gods”, where the preposition signifies dependence) demonstrates a passive, subordinate condition.

Later on such a turn of phrase takes on a stylistic character. While the Iliad begins—in a semantically normal way for an archaic epos—with the words: “Of the anger sing, o goddess, of Peleides Achilles the destructive,” the beginning of the stasimon in Euripides’ Trojan Women has another shading: “Sing me in tears of Ilion, Muse, the burial song of new hymns: for now I will cry out a song about Troy, how I perished, unfortunate, won in battle…,”48 etc. In this song the Trojan women identify their fate with Troy. The expression “of Ilion” in the original sounds even more oblique (“about/around Ilion”); Troy and Ilion in Greek are in the accusative of the object as an “object” (predmet) of a story, although in the song they are the logical subject (“I will cry out a song about Troy, how I perished”—and later comes the story of the fall of the city itself).

In the Hellenistic age this turn of thought becomes a cliché device of a literary style. Epic imitations open with an invocation of the Muse and “enclosing” the subject in the object.

Pre-narration (static story) is dependent as a whole, not only in its internal parts. In the mouths of the chorus it has no independent meaning. The chorus cites it as an allusion to the events that are happening on stage. Sometimes the connection between the song of the chorus and these events is difficult to perceive, because it is expressed only in a common theme, and not at all by facts in common. For example, in the quoted reference to Ino: the myth of Medeà and the myth of Ino are completely different, but they have in common the theme of infanticide, and therefore the chorus puts them together. The myth of Ino is apposed to the plot of Medea the infanticide as an ancient thematic variant on the conceptual plot.

I will give another, more revealing example from Sophocles’ Antigone. Before Antigone is walled up in the underground, the chorus sings a long stasimon in which it consoles the suffering Antigone with three references to the fate of Danae, Lycurgus, and Oreithyia.49 The form of these three paraineses [exhortations] is pre-narration. Here is the entire song: “The body of Danae had to exchange heavenly light for a brass-bound abode: hidden in a tomb chamber she was imprisoned. However, though of honored birth,—O
child, child!—she was the repository of Zeus’ gold-streaming seed. But the power of fate is terrible: neither wealth, nor Ares, nor a tower, nor sea-smitten black ships can escape it. Also bound was the rash son of Dryas, the Edonian king, locked in a rocky prison by Dionysus for mocking ways. Thus his bursting rage and terror of madness trickled away. He learned to know the god, assailing him with mocking words. For he would have stopped the god-inspired women and put out the evoian [Bacchic] fire and angered the flute-loving muses. By the Cyanean waters of the double sea—the shores of the Bosphorus and Thracian inhospitable Salmydessus, where Ares close to the city saw the accursed blinding wound of the two Phineidai, the blind orbits of their eyes calling for vengeance, struck by a wild wife with bloodied hands and the points of spindles. Melting away, they unhappy cry for their unhappy misfortune, born of an ill-married mother, who had her lineage of the Erechtheids’ ancient birth and was raised in distant caves, in her father’s tempests, the daughter of Boreas swift as a horse over the steep hills, the child of the gods. But she too was controlled by the long-living Moirai, O child.”

These three melic static stories are feasible as expositions of the three myths, yet anyone who does not know the myths and their sequential, logically connected plots could hardly understand them in the presentation of the chorus. The problem is that the chorus cannot tell stories directly. It cannot say, “Danae was hidden by her father in a tower to avoid her marriage. Nevertheless Zeus got in to her in the form of a shower of gold.” This myth is presented by the chorus in a roundabout way, avoiding the main point. But it is avoided not because one should not speak of it, but because of the inability to distinguish what is important from what is secondary, to separate and subordinate to it that which is less significant. For example, what should be developed and emphasized is presented in static participles or passive forms (“hidden” [κρυπτόμενα] Danae, Lycurgus “was tied” etc.): dependence and attribution dominate thought. Furthermore, the epithets emphasize inessential, insignificant features. Thus Danae is locked in “brass-bound” rooms, the “black,” “sea-smitten” ships cannot escape fate, and so on. The features emphasized by these epithets are superfluous for the whole, for the plot of Danae and the other heroes of the myth. Where the story is so short as to be a mere mention one need not dwell on what Danae’s apartments were made of [“brass-bound rooms”] (here twice called the “grave chamber”) or on the color of the ships subjected to the vicissitudes of the sea. But the point is that the epithets are not meant to “point out the essential features” of the object; they are merely its tautological attributes, and thought moves from theme to theme, completely dependent on the last theme it stopped at. Even the function of the subject is attributive in this prenarrative construction. We say “Danae,” but the original avoids the direct form. It puts the subject in a dependent, oblique position (“the body of Danae” [Δανάας δέμας]). In the original “the body of Danae” means “Danae,” and therefore it goes on to speak of this subject in the neuter (“body”) “it.” In such a construction, referred to in formal grammar as a descriptive construction, one cannot deny the traces of the former objectivity of the subject.

In the story of [Cleopatra] nothing is said about her, or about her marriage, or about her children and husband, without all of which one cannot understand what her fate has in common with that of Antigone. But it does mention the two seas, the banks of the Bosphorus, and “inhospitable” Salmydessus. Why? Because starting with one thing thought follows it and moves on to another by degrees. The story of how the sons of [Cleopatra] were blinded by their cruel stepmother (not “how,” but rather “with what”) is
told by the chorus obliquely and in a roundabout way, making a full circle, as it were: in such and such a place, it says, there was such a city “where” Ares saw such and such (and the story follows). The entire myth of the sons of [Cleopatra] is presented in a dependent, strictly passive, oblique, subordinate form, completely attributively. Furthermore, Ares too has an epithet here that increases the encumbrance of images and the clumsiness of the logical construction. This epithet cannot be translated; it means “near-city” and in attribution to Ares takes the function of an adjective “suburban,” that is, “living near the city,” conceptually—“the god of the given city.” So, in Salmydessus the god Ares saw such and such. Instead of directly telling the story of the horrible fate of [Cleopatra], the daughter of the wind, abducted by Phineus, and about the blinding of the boys by Phineus’ second wife, the chorus begins with the location of the city “where” Ares saw the boys’ “accursed wound,” a wound “torn out”…by whom? by a cruel wife…with what? without spear, with hands and a shuttle…what kind of wound? a blind one…in respect to what? the eye sockets…what kind? crying out for vengeance. And here is the whole story of the sons of [Cleopatra]. Having presented it, the chorus can now go on to its main theme, because the grief of the Phineidai allows it to say that they lamented their lot, namely birth from the unfortunate marriage of [Cleopatra], their mother. In a literal translation this section sounds like this: “They bemoaned their fate, having an amarital birth from their mother,” where “amarital” [marriage-less] means “unfortunate in marriage.” As usual, that which relates to “mother” is transferred to “birth.” But once it has mentioned the “mother,” the story begins to speak about her, leaving behind Salmydessus and Ares and the blinded Phineidai. What is told about the “mother”? That she belonged to the family of the Erechtheids—an inessential feature; that as the daughter of Boreas she grew up among storms, in far-lying caves, was “horse-quick,” daughter of gods, that she had some other external quality (the image is incomprehensible in the original), but that she too was overtaken by the moirai. This last thought bears the center of weight. But how long it takes for the story to get to it! Why the marriage is “unfortunate” we never find out. The image concreteness of the story is so void of generalization that we drown in unnecessary details and never find the most important thing. The whole is always identified through its parts. In the mouths of the chorus the three myths—of Danae, Lycurgus, and [Cleopatra]—have no independent significance. They act as “examples,” from which Antigone should draw a conclusion about the inevitable power of fate. Danae was confined in a “grave bedroom:” this case at least has something in common with Antigone’s underground chamber, especially if we take into consideration that in myth marriage and death are identical. The story of Lycurgus, thrown into prison for blasphemy, has nothing to do with the righteous Antigone, who is innocent, yet punished. Neither does the blinding of the Phineidai provide any analogy to her; the story of [Cleopatra], abducted by Phineus, is not at all like the story of Antigone. If one wants to speak of the inevitability of fate, then the imprisonment of a blasphemer is a bad illustration.

Nevertheless, the whole song of the chorus is addressed directly to Antigone (“O child, child!” “O child!”). It is supposed to console Antigone, to resign her to her misfortune, to give her courage. Here, as I have said, it has the function of a parainesis. But it does not speak of this outright. Its basic function is to be apposed to the events of the tragedy.
In different instances the stories of the chorus have various purposes, but one thing remains constant: the absence of an independent goal. Melic stories are related not to what they speak of, but to something else, but their authentic meaning can be discovered only in the context of the iambic part of the tragedy.

Why does the chorus sing to Antigone of Danae, Lycurgus, the Phineidai and [Cleopatra]? Because all of them “suffered” imprisonment, which awaits Antigone as well. I have said that these “examples” are unsuccessful and not at all analogous to Antigone’s burial alive. But that is not the point. The important thing is that here, as in Aeschylus, the chorus’ song is on the whole an ancient thematic variant of the same plot played out in the action of the given tragedy. The difference between such a song and the basic plot is immense. It is the difference between image and concept. For the song the most important thing is the general schematic theme: the heroine will endure fateful sufferings. The song has no need for motivation or characterization. It is without quality. The innocent Danae, the abducted daughter of the Wind, and impious Lycurgus are all equally set as examples for Antigone. What is sung of them is related to her. On the other hand, in the action plot Antigone is provided with characterization; her actions are presented in connection with the actions of those around her. Antigone’s behavior, her feelings, the movement of her thought—all these have a well thought out motivation. The plot of Antigone has development, sequentiality, reasons.

The chorus still cannot construct a plot, much less narrate. It only gives a thematic variant of the plot of the tragedy, even that not entirely, but in fragments, in relation to separate “points” in the plot; but unlike the plot, the songs of the chorus are not presented as connected to the events that evoke them.

In Iphigenia at Aulis Euripides’ heroine suffers a fate like that of Antigone: instead of marriage, death awaits her. The chorus of women wants to cheer her up. But here the parainesis is completely different from that in the analogous part of Antigone. A long stasimon presents in glowing tones the happy myth of the marriage of Peleus and Thetis. Formally it strengthens the syntactic features of ancient pre-narrations: the myth is presented concentrated in subordinate phrases, the subject is in a dependent, attributive form, the object is made the subject. Its beginning is typological, moving from the secondary and insignificant to the dependent, avoiding what is basic and most important. The stasimon presents the myth as follows: “What a bridal song with a Libyan flute and dance-loving lyre and joyous sound of reed shepherd-pipes, when over Pelion the beautiful-tressed Pierides beating the earth with a golden-sandaled foot (lit. ‘track’) came to the feast of the gods, to Peleus’ wedding, over the mountain of the Centaurs, praising in melodious sounds Thetis and Aeacid in the woods of Pelion. And Dardanus’ child, the dear pleasure of Zeus’ bed poured libations from the golden hollows of goblets, the Phrygian Ganymede. Over the white shining sands spiraling circles fifty daughters of Nereus danced. On the fir trees and wreath-like greens came the company of the centaur-riders to the feast of the gods and the cup of Bacchus. Loudly they cried, ‘O daughter of Nereus, Cheiron the seer, who knows the prophetess muse, named you that you will bear a child, a great light to Thessaly, who will lead with the shield-bearers and spear-bearers of the Myrmidons to a country to burn the famous land of Priam, around his body equipped with gold armor wrought by Hephaestus, which he got as a gift from his divine.
mother Thetis, who gave him birth.’ For this blessed marriage of the noble-born of the Nereids [Thetis] and Peleus the gods set the first bridal songs.”

This pre-narration, which consists of a whole series of formal appositives and attributes, presents a static story—a “picture,” like the ecphrasis-depictions. It takes a single immobile moment of time, though it represents dances and processions. But there is one tense—the present; and there is one space, in spite of the presence of mountains, woods, and the sandy shore.

The narrative part of the stasimon is made up of five sentences and an ending. Each sentence contains a myth-picture. First: the dancing and singing muses. Second: the wine-pourer Ganymede. Third: the dances of the Nereids. Fourth: the procession of the centaurs. And fifth: the song about Achilles. This stasimon confirms that pre-narration corresponded only to one thought that was foreign to expansion, it was static and attributive-appositive in regard to the subject it defined. Each part of the story has a completed, closed character, which makes it into a picture with a frozen image. Particularly interesting is the song about Achilles. Although the subject here is Achilles, and not Thetis at all, the song praises Thetis and is directed towards Thetis. Each picture, entirely complete, is not independent in function: the external sum of four such pictures makes up the general picture of the feast of the gods at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis. The wedding itself, like the feast of the gods, is not characterized at all: the general picture is made up exclusively of separate marked-off, formally independent smaller pictures. This concept of compositional unity as the sum of varied independent parts distinguishes ancient thought not only in this chorus, but in the poetry of the Greeks, and even in its architecture. The wealth of dependent phrases, attributes, and definitions and the step by step thought in the song of Achilles shows the age of this choral melos.

But most interesting of all is the ending. It turns out that the whole description of the wedding was necessary to explain how the first wedding songs or hymeneia appeared. This etiological conclusion gives the stasimon a completed and independent quality. And here the function of pre-narration is revealed with particular force. We learn that the joyful song is related to Iphigenia, who is offered as a sacrifice. What unites them? Only the common theme of marriage. So what if Iphigenia has been tricked, and instead of marriage to Achilles she will find death at the stake. Still, the theme is the same. The motivation, the concrete circumstances, how the thought develops—these are not taken into account at all. It is enough for Achilles to be mentioned or for the motif of the wedding to be present for the chorus to begin to sing of the wedding and of Achilles—though it is the wedding of a happy and famous muse.

The formal cause here is contrast. There are wedding songs, and once weddings were celebrated by the gods themselves, but you, unfortunate girl, are deprived of marriage, and death awaits you in your prime. The narrative part turns into a lament without any transition. Iphigenia is compared to a young mountain animal which has come from a stone cave; this is a sacrificial animal, and it will be crowned with a wreath, and its mortal throat will be doused with blood. Having made this comparison, the chorus goes on to the ethical ending. Neither conscience nor virtue have any power. Only impiety has power, and virtue is ignored by mortals. Illegality triumphs over law. The struggle is uneven for mortals, since the envy of the gods may come.

There is nothing in common between the joyful song about the marriage of Peleus and Thetis and the gloomy epilog. But this is a first impression, from outside. Iphigenia is
contrasted to Thetis; the bride of Achilles is contrasted to his mother. Marriage is contrasted to death.

But in myth death and marriage are identified,\textsuperscript{53} and “mother” does not contradict “wife.”\textsuperscript{54} The stasimon we have analyzed, therefore, has a direct semantic relation to Iphigenia. The gloomy ending is the traditional remains of chthonism.

The concluding moral motif is another matter. The problem of justice and impiety is a basic one for tragedy. Nevertheless, it is never presented independently, but is always connected as an ending to a concrete example. The static story does not grow into a novelistic parabola or a fable or an apology, all of which rely on figurality. In mythological form it presents a separate moral, which shows the continuing absence of figural meanings.

In exactly the same way pre-narration lacks a figural meaning in relation to the event of the tragedy that it describes. The plot of the tragedy and the thematic analogy to it in the song of the chorus are two phenomena which lie separately, though they are connected semantically. What the chorus sings about is entirely related to the plot of the tragedy, no matter what apparently irrelevant things it tells.

12

Of interest are cases where the tragic chorus tells in song the same myth which makes up the plot of the given tragedy. Then it is clearer that we have before us two variants, one melic, the other iambic.

In completely oblique form, as if sliding by an immediate presentation of the myth, the chorus in Euripides’ \textit{Orestes} presents the story of Orestes the matricide.

First the chorus sings of the “argument over the golden sheep”\textsuperscript{55} which came to the descendents of Tantalus. Since then murder has piled upon murder, and blood has not stopped flowing in the houses of both of the Atreidai. After these words comes the following song: “A bad virtue (lit. good not good) with a fire-born tool (i.e. sword, lit. hand) to cut the body, to lift to the rays of the sun the sword blackened by murder. But it is complex impiety to do evil well and the madness of evil-thinking men. The unhappy daughter of Tyndareus cried out in fear of death, ‘Child, you do not dare the impiety to kill your own mother. Do not by honoring your father’s love attach dishonor to yourself forever.’ What illness, what tears, what pity on earth is greater than to shed mother-killing blood with your hand? Having completed such, such a deed, he is in Bacchic madness, he is the prey of the Eumenides, whirling his rolling eyes, the child of Agamemnon. O miserable, when he saw above her gold-embroidered mantle his mother’s breast appear, he made his mother a sacrifice in recompense for his father’s suffering.”\textsuperscript{56}

What is told here cursorily and obliquely about Orestes is his extended epithet. The plot of the tragedy, however, takes another moment: the arrival of the matricide in the house of Menelaus to punish Helen, the first cause of all the troubles. The ending is unexpected: Orestes is to marry the daughter of the hated Helen, Hermione, whom he was just about to kill. But after Orestes comes this epithet attributive of matricide. The semantic appositive turns into a story-state, dependent, oblique, closed, and immobile.

In respect to the plot of the tragedy, such a pre-narration acts as an ancient, primordial variant. Here, if you like, is the germ of the plot about Orestes and the subsoil of the tragedy about him. On the one hand we see the developed and motivated iambic part, on
the other—the primitive melic story, which does not enter into any circumstances and
does not come into contact with any characters, events, conflicts, or problems. These two
elements are alongside each other—the iambic conceptual element and the melic image-
mythological element.

Such a thematic interpenetration of melic and iamb can still be detected in a number of
other tragedies. I will dwell on Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, where the chorus describes
the battle between Heracles and the river Achelous for the hand of Deianira (I quoted the
second half of this stasimon above in 4): “Cypris always bears the great strength of
victory. I pass by the gods and will not say how she deceived Kronides or nighttime
Hades or Poseidon, the shaker of the earth. But for this spouse what stout rivals came
down for marriage, what men came out to the battle contest with many blows and much
dust? One was the power of a river, high-horned and four-footed like a bull, Achelous of
Oeniadae. The other came from Bacchus’ Thebes, with bow bent backward and
brandishing club and spear, the child of Zeus. Then they together went into the middle,
striving for the marriage bed. In the middle alone was Cypris, who brings fair marriage,
with her wand.”57

This passage, typical for all pre-narrative in its syntactic structure (it is interesting that
Heracles, as a subject, is not even named: his name is replaced by attributes—while
Achelous is described in detail) tells in lyric form the same thing Deianira, the heroine of
the tragedy, presents in iambics. She was courted by Achelous, the river, who took the
form of a bull or a dragon or a combination of bull and man; from the bushy beard of this
monster poured streams of water. Deianira was in a state of horror and loathing. “But
later,” she says in the prologue, “to my joy, the famous son of Zeus and Alcmene came
who taking him on in contest by battle freed me. I cannot tell the way of the fight, since I
do not know. But one who was sitting with no fear at the sight might tell. I sat in panic of
fear that beauty might turn for me into pain. But Zeus the decider of the contest ended it
well.”58 As in the speech of the priest in Oedipus the King, the contents of Deianira’s
speech are mythological, anti-real; if you like, this story in the mouths of the chorus
sounds much more real. Deianira, however, tells the story conceptually, with cause and
effect, even with judgment, while the story of the chorus is vague, lacks real causes, and
presents a “picture” without beginning and end, without connection (except for the
theme) to any events that take place dramatically on the stage. The audience already
knows about the duel between Heracles and Achelous, knows the role of this duel in the
logic of events that have influenced the life of the heroine; soon the audience learns what
constructive role this duel plays in the basic drama of this tragedy. The song of the chorus
is required neither by the action nor by the plot. It is simply a melic tautology—by this I
mean an image-mythological ancient variant—of the conceptually worked out, logically
caused plot of the iambics. This melic tautology neither explains, nor deepens, nor moves
forward the contents of the tragedy. Why is it there? Such a question cannot be asked
when the same story appears in conceptual form. There it is necessary to introduce the
revenge of the defeated Achelous,59 and the revenge is necessary to explain how
Deianira’s cloak was soaked with a magic herb, and this herb is necessary for the final
event: Deianira, who loves Heracles, sends him a cloak as a gift soaked in what she
thinks is a love potion but in actual fact is fiery poison that will consume the body of
Heracles in wild flame. The step by step cause and effect structure that characterizes the
early stages of conceptual thought requires that the explanation of a fact move from effect
to cause and find in the cause the effect of a preceding cause—and so on until the “beginning,” until the “first cause.” This is why Deianira speaks in the prologue about Achelous, who it would seem is already superfluous to the plot: the courting of the ugly monster is the “first cause” of the tragic death of Heracles and the unwitting guilt of Deianira.

The same can be said of another passage in the same *Women of Trachis*—the iambic cause and effect explanation by Deianira of the “first cause” (the misfortune that will take place when Heracles finishes his tasks) and the melic image-mythological “mention” of the chorus that presents the same event in the form of a song of pitiful lament. The two means of presentation differ not in theme, but only in the form of thought in which it is perceived and expressed.

Of course the melic song about the duel has thematic justification in the *Women of Trachis*, but the chorus glosses over the theme, while in the plot of the tragedy it is well argumented and worked out. If we discard the motif of the duel in the basic plot, the tragedy will cease to exist. Discard the song of the chorus about the duel and the tragedy will not feel it at all.

But the point is that tragedy never requires the choral static stories, though the chorus itself in the oldest tragedies is an indispensable part or even the main character.

Such, however, is our contemporary aesthetic standard, brought on by a highly developed conceptual relation to the idea of the literary work and its realization. We think that everything superfluous for the basic literary goal should be eliminated.

But the Greek playwright was dealing with traditional material. Furthermore, his thought preserved obsolete forms. The superfluous did not bother the Greek. This is explained by the fact that the mental life of Greece “came into being” in transitions from image to conceptual thinking, and nothing was “superfluous” for such thought: it either turned “yesterday” into “today,” translating what we consider rudiments into topicality or calmly allowed yesterday to continue to live.

The static story held the same position in the plot of the tragedy as the chorus did among the soloists. At one time the songs of the chorus were the alpha and omega of pre-dramatic ritual. Then new thinking transformed them without destroying them. Two parallel forms were juxtaposed: the image-mythological in its ancient form, and the image-mythological in its new, conceptual form. Between them appeared a connection of two parts, united by a common meaning, but not at all by their factual or cognitive-structural side. This connection cannot be called metaphorical. Metaphor presents two meanings with one form, and here we have one common thematic axis of two different forms. Still, the semantic connection between melic and iambic in tragedy is very reminiscent of the connection between the two members of the epic (extended) simile. There too the parts which are different in form are connected by a common theme: the ancient mythological meaning lies alongside the new conceptual meaning, which springs from the same mythological meaning. There too there is no figurality; its place is taken (for the time being!) by comparison.

When the choral songs of tragedy, which are not necessary to the action, interpret one event or another that is in the form of iambics, they somehow identify or compare this
event with myths presented in pre-narration. They do not contain a formal element of comparison, “like…so…”. But in the examples I have cited Althaea and Scylla act as analogies to Clytemnestra; Ino to Medea; Danae, Lycurgus, and [Cleopatra] to Antigone,—to the main characters of the tragedies: all these heroines of pre-narration were once complete analogies to the later heroines of tragedies. But this was true before conceptuality. The conceptual thought of the tragedians compares the heroines of tragedy and the heroines of the pre-narrations to one another. This thinking compares their thematic homogeneity and justifies logically the ancient choral inheritance. Thus Euripides’ thinking makes the wedding of Thetis and Peleus a negative (and implied) comparison to the wedding of Iphigenia that does not take place—while in the myth of Achilles, the motif of his marriage to Iphigenia or the marriage of his mother with the legend of his birth were clearly identical.

Orestes the matricide is completely identical to Orestes, the unsuccessful murderer of Helen; the duel between Heracles and Achelous is completely identical to the duel that made Deianira the wife of Heracles.

But were epic similes not likenings? To be precise, they were likenings in which thought collated two different phenomena and found a connection between them. Comparison is a later conceptual process; it is reflected in later short similes.

Behind conceptual identification and likenings, as research has shown long ago, lie identity and likeness which are mythological in nature. Above I have attempted to clarify the consequences which arose from the biune ideas of ancient thinking about phenomena and their likenesses. The static story, in this respect, has much in common with extended (epic) similes. The structure here is the same. There are two “twins,” of which one is the “likeness” of the other; what is true for one is true for the other—it is the period of mythological ideas, mythological identities. As two parts of a sentence these subjects are first objective. Then, in the process of conceptual changes, they are separated from one another, but remain connected so that one term, remaining in the form of a mythological category, and the other, taking on a new conceptual nature, are “likened” to each other. Homeric similes show that the term that undergoes conceptual reworking is stretched, developed, activized, while the member left in its mythological function, on the other hand, remains constrained and limited. The ways of narration, as I have said above, come from the conceptual part, moving from the developed “picture” to plot.

Thus went the process of plot-formation in tragedy as well—not from the chorus, with its archaic material that was dying off, but from the solo part, from iambic. But the Homeric tradition was more progressive, it looked at life more, was not connected with cult, and was fresher in thinking than the tradition of Dionysian acts. Indicative is the regularity with which Homeric myth is assimilated by means of conceptual realistic categories (for example, the comparisons of mythic heroes to phenomena of everyday life and real nature, but never vice versa), while conservative tragedy allows the chorus to drag thinking backwards, to a likeness of the image more developed in the iambics—the obsolete, melic image.

The likening, comparative meaning of the lyric stories is revealed only in the context of the iambs of the tragedy. It is characteristic that in itself this meaning has no figurality—which shows directly the organic connection between the chorus and the iambics. At the same time, the iambic part of the tragedy can get along perfectly well without the analogies of the choral songs. We see it this way: the later it is, the more
dominant the conceptually developed part of the tragedy—the iambic part—becomes; it preserves the choral part within itself until it engulfs it completely.

One can reconstruct in melic form all the structural peculiarities of the iambic parts of tragedy: the agon, the stichomythia, the role of the messenger, etc. This, however, would not produce a tragedy. The uniqueness of Greek tragedy lies in its antithesis-system, which consists of logos and melos, recitative and song. Melos, as well as its melodic difference from iambic, has a different metric structure, a different language, a different kind of thinking. Tragedy presents one and the same theme in two cognitive forms. But the crux of the matter is that here there is a unified cognition, that concepts did not come into being any other way. In this respect tragedy is already very far from Old Comedy, in which the antithetical system of song and telling (ode and epirrheme) together with anti-song and anti-telling (antode and antepirrheme) maintains only a structural significance, without any internal cognitive difference. I mean that conceptual reworking affected the structure of tragedy, but not of Old Comedy. And one more comment. By using “telling” or “recitative” I am trying to find an appropriate modern term for the particular form of rhythm which was never repeated after the Classical period, and which later becomes “prose.” Arsis and thesis are the integral unit of rhythm; a certain system of such units shrouds every Classical word; this system contains the prototype of the future system of prose-poetry. The part of this system which received more conceptual reworking was more futural. And the difference was not in that its rhythms turned out to “lie” closer to conversational speech, but in its conceptual character. This is where prose came from. Poetry, on the other hand, preserved the image tradition, though it is true that its later literary images were a phenomenon completely different from mythological images.

In the Classical period prose and poetry are still combined, and comedy and tragedy—two archaic genres—show prose in verse (iambic-trochaic and epirrhemes). Again: “prose” is created by concept, and at first its role is insignificant, the difference in prose lay only in its formal-rhythmic melodic side (“recitative”).

The speakers of logos (recitative) and melos in tragedy are different. Actors speak, the chorus sings. But here we have to introduce a reservation: the chorus can speak short iambic lines. The soloists can sing—for the most part, laments.

The melic parts of the soloists can be explained by the fact that the choral collective sometimes included the songs of the coryphaeus and was—apparently from the very beginnings—not a solid collective, but a “multiple unity;” as in choral lyric, first a separate character sang in the name of the whole chorus, but the whole chorus also expressed the sentiments of an individual person. As for the iambic lines of the chorus, their late character is beyond doubt—they are so meager, cursory, and sketchy. The original function of the chorus us lyric.

I have already mentioned that one cannot make a strict division between the lyric collective and the actor-soloists: the soloists sing and the chorus acts (in old tragedies). The chorus and the soloists are differentiated by another peculiarity. In tragedy there must of necessity be a dual system of performers, no matter how insignificant the role of the chorus or of the soloists: one part is the medium of the ancient imagery, the other of conceptual thought.
Hence—and this is already a result—the chorus “sings” and is inactive, located outside the plot, while the soloists “speak” (declaim) and perform the action of the plot. It is clear that the soloists came out of the same chorus, with which they preserved an organic connection, and the theory of a later external merging in Attic tragedy of two separate elements, chorus and dialog (scenes), is groundless.

The chorus is by nature subjective-objective. This explains all its uniqueness. The soloists, on the other hand, are a subjective part separated by conceptual thought from the action—the object. Hence the further development of the solo part at the expense of the chorus.

The difference between the systems of the chorus and the soloists is reminiscent of the levels of gods and heroes in Homer. The heroes have characters; they have plot movement. The gods lack qualities; they have no plot—they have only themes. So it is in tragedy. The soloists present the active plot (what the Germans call *Handlung*), the chorus is the plotless medium of the themes, much more devoid of qualities than the Homeric gods. The chorus is a collective “singer” beside the “acting” soloists, which suggests the biune system that later falls into poetry with a theme and prose with a plot. I would like to emphasize that where there is no conceptual thought there is no plot—there is only theme (image); and that the unity of these two kinds of thought, the old and the new that arises out of it, makes for the special peculiarity of the Classical (Greek) system of cognition. In Greece image and concept are not two cognitive forms, but one.

The chorus of tragedy has no independent function. It is situated outside real space and time. It has three features: sex, age, and ethnos. Aside from these three features it has no characterization. The chorus is not an active character of tragedy. Only heroes act, and the chorus is made up of people like slaves in tragedy. This is not the place to raise the problem of “man” in Greek literature; suffice to say that “man” is considered a foreign body (especially in the heroic genres, epic and tragedy).

Properly, the chorus is a void. The characters see it, speak to it, but speak as if they were speaking to themselves. The chorus always supports the hero and is his friend, but this does not help the hero; often the hero complains that he has no support and no friends, although the chorus which sympathizes with the hero is present right there. Of course the very “presence” of the chorus on the stage among the characters going through various events is strange—a chorus that is multiple, with one face, immobile, silently watching. The lack of its own character and opinion is demonstrated by the chorus in *Philoctetes*, when it says to the main hero: “Whatever [Neoptolemus] may say to you, we say the same.” In fact, nothing new is connected with the chorus; it does not influence the course of the plot. The chorus of tragedy contains social and historical archaic material. If the thrust of the tragedy is against novelty, then it particularly defends the age of the chorus.

In the overwhelming majority of cases the tragic chorus consists of slaves, of ethnic captives; rather either of slaves or of old men—and in myth “slave” and “old man” are equally chthonic. These old or captive nationalities, no matter how they may be justified, represented ethno-social collectives of people. Because it is archaic, the chorus is psychologically amorphous; it is the medium of the idea of fate. The soloists, on the other hand, are yesterday’s totems, gods, heroes, who undergo conceptual reworking and become the medium for expressing the human psyche and the human element, the objects of the new and the progressive in the thinking of the play-wrights. And this is in spite of
the fact that “hero” in mythological semantics was the bearer of the image of death, who took death on himself, died with a mask on his face: we must remember that in Rome it was those sentenced to death who performed, that at funerals an actor portrayed the dead man, and that masks and figures of actors were placed in graves. One can show that the soloist is meant to express “pity” connected with his sacrificial death, and the chorus “horror,” “fear” before fate: there are many corresponding lexical data in tragedy itself to support this.

The basic function of the chorus is preserved only in the structure of tragedy. It consists in the entrance and exit of the chorus, which corresponds to the beginning and the end of the tragedy. It is thus clear: originally the action on stage consisted of the chorus entering and subjectively-objectively singing about itself, entering into conflict with its antagonist, going through victory or defeat, and exiting. The agon contained its basic experience. This is shown by the agonistic character of tragedy as a whole and in all its parts.

This is borne out by Aeschylus’ *Suppliant Maidens* as well, where the role of the main character is still held by the chorus.

If we take a look at the structure of this most ancient tragedy, we will be convinced that it is not at all limited by the participation of the chorus alone. No, alongside the chorus there are two more characters here: the soloist, who stands off to the side of the chorus as a kind of representative of it (Danaus and the King of Argos) and an antagonist, who attacks the chorus of maidens (the Egyptian herald). The tragedy begins with the parodos and song of the chorus, after which comes a speech by Danaus, and after Danaus’ speech, stichomythia between the chorus and this father of the girls. Thus we already have in the first scene the three basic forms of tragic language—the song of the chorus, monologue, and stichomythia in iambic trimeter. Then these forms are repeated and alternate until the arrival of the Egyptian persecutor. Here the agonistic part begins, which is in the center of the action. After it, the same three forms serve to organize the denouement.

We know of not one tragedy with a chorus, but without soloists, agon, or stichomythia in monologic (to put it conventionally!) speeches. In tragedies like *The Eumenides* the chorus plays an extremely important semantic and structural role without which the tragedy would fall apart. But here too the center of the action is the agon. While later the chorus is only present at the agon and passively awaits its conclusion, in *The Suppliant Maidens* the chorus is itself a direct participant in the agon, and in *The Eumenides* the result of the agon concerns the chorus directly. This shows that originally the chorus itself had its own antagonist in the action of the tragedy.61 This is confirmed by the tragic competitions of choruses, which are preserved in certain rituals.

One must point out that the chorus is organically linked to stichomythia. Truly there is nothing that distinguishes the structure of tragedy more than stichomythia. While choruses can be found in comedy as well, stichomythia is found only in tragedy, and only in Greek tragedy. Originally it was here that the agon was concentrated.62 Above I pointed out its ancient forms—the battles at the closed doors. By agon we should understand not only competition and arguments—its later, milder forms—but a battle in
which one side attacks, while the other fends off the attack. This element of attack (conceptually—in the abstract sense) is attested by iambic. We know that it was the basic function of iambic, and that it is so in all Classical lyric.

Greek tragedy invariably forms stichomythia of iambics. But in spite of this, one can find quite a few examples of melic or trochaic forms of stichomythia. In both cases the chorus can be a participant. We know that in the tragedies of the 5th century stichomythia became a form of dialogue made up of questions and answers, insistences and objections. I have added to these well known facts my own observations of those cases in which one side is the chorus and the other is the soloist, and one watches and the other hears about what has been seen, or one asks questions and the other answers.

All of this shows the connection between choral and iambictrochaic parts. We know from ritual that in the Classical period the chorus had iambic functions. This should be put even more strongly: we know from invective “serenades” and pre-dramatic invective choruses that iambic, in the Classical understanding of the term, made up the function exactly of the chorus. The iambic trimeters of tragedy are already conceptual in the sense that, with the exception of stichomythia, dialogues, and scenes with agonies, they no longer have their ancient “attacking” meaning. But if we delete from the iambic composition of the tragedy its dialogues, scenes with agonies, and stichomythia, not much will be left. More essential is another feature introduced by conceptual thinking: when the chorus ceased to develop, it lost its iambic function, and when the soloists began to develop, melos fell away from them, and the iambic function was assigned to them. What is this iambic function and iambic form?

Lyric iambic is characterized by three features: its general low (hubristic) level, mocking of the enemy (curses and laughter), and its militant aggressive character. I said mocking “the enemy.” Iambic always implies an “opponent,” an “enemy,” which in itself shows its agonistic character. Unlike the European “lyric ‘I,’” Classical lyric is dialogic, since it invariably has in mind the relation of the singer to some other person and is addressed not to itself, but to another character. Iambs are no exception. But its peculiarity is its attacking quality. Beginning with Archilochus, iambic singers either complain of persecution by someone (including the injustice or persecution of gods or fate) or they themselves attack their opponents in vicious forms. There can be no doubt that behind verbal scourging there once lay flagellation in action, which is attested by purification rituals. Originally the performer of this ritual was the community, i.e. the principle represented by the chorus.

Wherever there is hubris, there is catharsis. Imaginary “likenesses,”—all kinds of “pseudos,” were whipped, driven out, delivered to their deaths. This was preceded by acts of struggle with physical attacks and blows—as we know from the sources—to the death.

Conceptual thought changed physical categories into moral ones.

The connection between iambic and the chorus, the agon, and purification ritual became in essence the organizing principle of Greek drama. On the one hand, this is Old Comedy and its off-shoot—lyric like Hipponax. On the other hand, it is the conceptual road of the same ideas—ethical tragedy.

Above I stated that every hero of tragedy in one form or another is the subject and the object of hubris. The most striking examples are Prometheus, Ajax, Philoctetes, and Pentheus. But are not Oedipus, Xerxes, Polyneices, Agamemnon, Antigone, and Clytemnestra the same?
Greek tragedy has, like epic, its lexical commonplaces. They have not been studied; but one can hardly find a play in which there were not the topoi of “illness” (mania, lutta), “hatred” (quarrel, anger, enmity), “wealth” (ploutos), “revolt,” “winter” (storm, bad weather), “home,” “bacchism” (in the good sense, and especially in the bad), “hiketeria,” “eros,” and “dyseros” (evil, destructive eros). Among the lexical commonplaces one constantly comes across expressions like “hubris,” “hubrist,” “subjected to hubris,” like “mocked,” “insulted,” or “mocking,” “insulting,” like “ungovernable,” like “brazen,” or “who allows his tongue free rein,” like “daring all.” It is particularly indicative that in almost every tragedy the characters themselves designate the basic conflict of the heroes—the basic plot of the tragedy—with the term “agon” or “great agon.” Such vocabulary and others like it, when they become commonplaces or clichés, show the standard images.

In fact, the tragic hero suffers exclusively moral passions. These passions consist in mocking and insulting the hero. Righteousness, honor, faith in the gods are profaned. Again Prometheus, Ajax, and Philoctetes are the clearest examples, and among the women—Medea. Aeschylus poses the question not of Eteocles’ ambition or his usurpation; Xerxes suffers moral collapse, for the Eumenides trampling on ancient order is difficult, etc. In short, in tragedy as well, and not only in Old Comedy, mocking takes center stage. I have said enough of the hubrism of the heroes. “Heroes who dare all” can be found in almost every tragedy; in the abuse agon one hero curses another, decrying his “brazen tongue.” Trampling on the holy, invective, mocking are as much present in tragedy as they are in comedy.

This is exactly the iambic function. Now we no longer notice that the iambs of tragedy have certain meanings. It seems to us that they are raw metrics. Yet iambs continue in tragedy as well to serve the agonistic goals of the plot; in them is concentrated the basic development of the theme of the abused or blinded hero, of the collision of the hero with a force which surpasses his capabilities. As opposed to comedy, in tragedy all these myth-ritual categories have turned into ethical categories.

The conceptual reinterpretation of the ancient semantics became possible only when the archaic community with its division by sex, age, and ethnos gave way to class structure. The choral principle, which reflects the age-sex community-tribe is connected for the most part with Doric and all kinds of archaism (ancient speech, obsolete expressions, antediluvian thought), this choral principle became a frozen, separate, self-sufficient form in the structure of tragedy. The choregia appeared as a transitional phenomenon from chorus-community to chorus-performer of roles—the public obligation to defray the costs of dramatic choruses. That the chorus consisted not of actors, but of citizens, and that the organization of a chorus was a public obligation is confirmed by the peculiar genesis of the dramatic chorus as a collective of citizens. The author of the first tragedy was not differentiated from the choregos (“the leader of the chorus,” who later took on the significance of the “supplier of the chorus”), and from the participants in the performance. As a real person, and not a character, the author went off to the side of the stage and became invisible; his functions (“the author’s opinion”) remained with the chorus.
The solo principle, on the other hand, began to be developed, since in social life as well differentiation came to undifferentiated societal structure. What was modern in the chorus turned into the system of three soloists, while the chorus—in a purely Classical way—continued to be preserved alongside with all its obsolete archaism. The iambic function was transferred from the chorus to the soloists; at the same time this function itself changed. The contents of the iambs took on an ethical, i.e. conceptual character, and the rhythm of the iamb turned into a fixed form with a ternary measure, including six feet or rhythmic units. The chorus no longer had anything in common with this metrical system; the iamb became a solo rhythm and melic remained with the chorus. From that time arose the ancient tradition of reserving the lyric function for the chorus. Thus even in Roman *fabulae salticae* one actor danced all the roles (both women’s and men’s), while the lyric solo parts were sung by...the chorus!

Tragedy as before was organized by the “entering” and “exiting” chorus—and the two passages into the orchestra allowed only two standard possibilities for such arrivals and departures—either from abroad or from local regions. Nevertheless, along with these physical situations of the chorus—the arrival, immobile presence during the performance, and the departure, the soloists also began to “appear” and “disappear” from the three doors, and their “appearances” and “disappearances” laid the groundwork for “scenes,” later “acts.” The possibilities of the soloists developed according to the growth and depth of conceptual thought of the author; but the plot could not bring on or take off soloists to just any place or from anywhere.

The most progressive of the Greek states in the 5th century was Attica, or rather Athens, the birthplace of the concepts that were appearing and which attained significant progress in the 5th century. It is completely logical that the innovative part of tragedy—the solo-iambic part—should appear as Attic, with a strongly developed iambic system (at the expense of melic), in the Attic language, composed by conceptual thought. We know of not one pre-Attic tragedy, though we know of many pre-Attic comedies. And this makes sense. The very category “tragedy” speaks of a solo-choral, iambic-melic whole, i.e. of a system in which the greater part of the composition is conceptual. Who before Athens could have created a “tragedy”?

Old Comedy, on the other hand, had many predecessors in Doric, but there were no iambic-choral systems in it. Again, only in Athens of the 5th century was the solo-choral, iambic-melic comedy created, though it is true that it is still not so highly conceptual a form of drama as tragedy.

**WOMEN’S CHORUSES**

1

The most ancient choruses in tragedy are choruses of women.

Of the tragedies that have come down to us, in the vast majority of cases the choruses represent a women’s collective.¹ There are half as many men’s choruses as there are women’s; for the most part, these are local elders. Among the women’s choruses, a third are maidens, two thirds consist of adult women. Thus one should not exaggerate the real features of the tragic chorus: from the point of view of realia, it is an ancient communal-
tribal collective, but it has a mythological function. Where the collective is made up of animals or fantastic beings or “elders” or “women,” there is no room for realistic representation. Tragedy was connected with the world of death, not life, with “heroes” and images of destruction, catastrophe; and in myth “elders,” “slaves,” “women” semanticized death. More than that: suffering (passions) was also related by myth to death.

It is indicative that the chorus was often thought of as coming from afar. For example, in *Prometheus* the Oceanides fly in from distant parts, the maidens of the *Suppliant Maidens* are exiles, in *Ajax* and *Philoctetes* the chorus is made up of men who have arrived by sea, in the *Bacchae* there is an imported chorus from Asia Minor, in *Iphigenia at Aulis* the women of Chalkis sing about their arrival from a distant land, in the *Phoenician Women* the chorus is made up of maidens who have come from afar, and so on. In other cases the chorus is made up of captive women, in other words, also of women from far lands, or of women who accompany the heroine into exile, separation, or captivity (*Helen*, *Hecuba*, *The Trojan Women*, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Io*, *The Libation Bearers*, *The Women of Trachis*, et al.). Such tragedies are in the majority.

This confirms the peculiar character of the tragic chorus. It is almost always alien to the iambic part, the iambic (conventionally speaking!) cast. At the same time the solo principle of tragedy sprang from the choral principle. How could the chorus become a foreign body among the characters?

Here too the crux of the matter lies in two completely different systems of thought. On the image-mythological level the chorus is a collective of “elders,” “slaves,” “women,” who speak an archaic language, a language still pre-Attic. On the conceptual level such a chorus turned into a solo “cast,” into three actors who speak an Attic language contemporary for the 5th century, a conceptual language. Such a cast portrays humanized “heroes,” who are already placed in a context socially, psychologically, and morally. The chorus and the actors are organically united, that is historically united, in spite of the fact that in dramatic tragedy everything sets the chorus apart: its structure and function, its past, its thought and language, even its dialect. It is clear how the further development of dramatic characters will go. Conceptual thought will kill mythological imagery, and with it the chorus. The image with time will take on a new conceptual nature, turning into a “poetic image.” The future is open to the solo principle. But the chorus, having lost its semantic contents, remains the traditional background in the European opera: history will cling fast to only two of its features—collectivity and singing, and one of its functions—to be the musical accompaniment to the soloists without participating in the action.

The predominance of female roles in the chorus leads to interesting results. It raises the question of the role of female parts not only in the chorus.

If we examine tragedy from this point of view, we will discover that with the exception of *Philoctetes* (and Sophocles is the least traditional of the tragedians) every tragedy contains the passions of a heroine. In most cases they are suppressed or displaced by the passions of the heroes. But science is not an audience or a reader. For science, every fact is significant, no matter how suppressed it may be.

I will begin with Aeschylus. In the *Suppliant Maidens* women’s passions make up the basic plot of the tragedy, in *Prometheus* the passions of Io are given as an analogy to Prometheus. In *The Seven* the women’s chorus acts as bearer of the idea of the suffering city; its role is passive, but immense, and it is fully doubled by the crying sisters of the
heroes. This tragedy shows how the women’s sufferings and laments moved from the chorus to the soloists.

The passions of Atossa in *The Persians* play a constructive role as well in the plot of the tragedy; as to the *Oresteia*, here too the suffering women’s chorus of Eumenides is doubled by the passions of Electra and Clytemnestra, the main heroines.

In Sophocles *Deianira*, *Antigone*, and *Electra* are the basic characters of the dramatic passions. In *Ajax* the suffering Tecmessa is a complete parallel to the suffering hero. In the two Oedipus plays the women’s role is significant: Jocasta commits suicide as a result of a moral catastrophe, while Antigone in *Colonus* “endures” with her father all his deep misery.

One need not mention Euripides. Returning to ancient material—innovators always love archaism—Euripides places the passions of women at the center.

Two conclusions can be drawn: in every tragedy there is not only a women’s part, but passions (πάθη) of a woman; this role first belongs to the chorus, then both to the chorus and to the soloist—i.e. the theme of the women’s passions moves from melic to iambic.

The humanized, conceptually understood heroes of tragedy were preceded by mythological heroes and gods. What kind of goddesses could have preceded Tecmessas, Hecubas, and Electras?

We see that in many tragedies the leading force of all the action is incarnated in a divinity. Sometimes it is a god, but more often it is a goddess.

Athena plays the organizing role in Aeschylus, in Sophocles, in Euripides’ *Rhesus*. Aphrodite and Artemis play this role only in Euripides. These three goddesses were apparently once in the center of the plot, like Dionysus in the *Bacchae* or Heracles in a number of dramas. It is apparent from Apollo that the divinity was first the character of agon (*Eumenides*), later yielded this place to the hero (*Alcestis*), and then was preserved for the denouement (*Orestes*). It is curious that the dramatic divinity—Dionysus—does not appear like Apollo or Heracles in the epilogue or prologue. This shows that the gods of epilogues and prologues are a relic of the once basic role of the gods; a real divinity has a more important function.

The absence among the goddesses of Hera and Demeter shows a certain regularity in the female tragic pantheon. Goddess-wives and goddess-mothers are close to comedy, but not to tragedy, to the sphere of images of fertility, but not death. There is reason to think that Hera (along with Zeus, Hermes, Hephaestus, and Ares) was also a character in pre-stage drama. She still performed not a tragic, but a comic role, which shows how ancient she is.

If we compare the contents of men’s and women’s passions, we see their radical difference. Heroines suffer from love (marriage) or death. In some cases they are the direct victims of evil eros (Io, Deianira, Phaedra, Creusa, Medea, the suppliant maidens), in other cases, of death (Alcestis, Iphigenia at Aulis, and many others). Clytemnestras, Electras, Andromache, Hecuba and others either themselves kill, or others want to kill them, or kill their children, or their children kill them. In most cases all these victims suffer passively; they lament, pray, mourn.

In lyric Archilochus, Sappho, Ibycus, and Anacreon are “unlucky in love.” Such is the “unlucky love” of Phaedra, Deianira, Io, Medea, Creusa, and many, many heroines of tragedy. In the *Women of Trachis* and *Medea*, however, one can still sense the semantics
of eros-fire; Phaedra, that incarnation of evil eros, by her name alone—"shining"—
recalls eros-luminary.

The passions of the heroes, on the other hand, are of a moral order. The point is not
pity for the hero, but posing ethical problems connected with one hero or another. The
women’s roles are older than the men’s—not because there were no men’s roles before a
certain time, but in respect to the interpretation of their actions. The heroines’ parts are
pre-ethical; the heroines suffer emotionally, often physically, but not morally, like the
heroes. The passions of the women are still not generalized, and they are too concrete,
representing a “given case.” I even think the generalizing meaning of Antigone and
Medea are strongly exaggerated.

2

Women’s passions, sung by the chorus or acted out by the women soloists, had a definite
content, a standard form. They were laments. They still had no plots, but they had
thematics—two themes: the passions of eros and the passions of death.

Herodotus tells us of the tragic chorus which sang the passions of Adrastus, later—of
Dionysus; from this source one can see that Adrastus was honored not only in choral
songs, but also in something that passed to the hero Melanippus. This means that tragic
choruses were connected more with heroes than with gods; and rituality in tragedy was
not restricted to the choruses alone.

We know nothing about women’s tragic choruses. And it is clear why: when tragedy
was being formed, it still rested on a male pantheon. Nevertheless, the oldest tragedies of
Aeschylus consist of suffering women’s choruses, and of Euripides’ 17 plays that have
survived, 14 contain choruses of women, and the 15th has women characters at its center.
A huge place in tragedy is held by the criminal Trojan Helen. All the themes of the
Trojan cycle go back to her. Choruses of old men and choruses of women sing about her.
If we take all the stasima of tragedies, it will turn out that they sing of women’s passions
connected with eros or death. In these stasima there is almost always a female divinity
who is the subject. This is either Helen or the Erinyes, or Dike, or Moira. Her
significance is one: she sends Ate, i.e. destruction-punishment. She is accompanied by
ruin of the family and death; therefore the heroes and the chorus respond to her with
laments. But neither the Erinyes, nor Dike, nor Moira has any plot in tragedy—while
Helen is plot through and through. Plot, built on concepts, does its work. It establishes for
Helen a stock set of motifs. But there was a time when Helen did not have a plot either,
or rather when there were two Helens, who appeared in their authentic and imaginary
forms: in Euripides, when the recognition scene between Helen and Menelaus takes place
by means of looking at each other. When Orestes wants to break down the door in the
house of Menelaus to deal with Helen, when Orestes and Menelaus have an agon at the
closed doors because of Helen—there is no thought of illusion: here we have a purely
conceptual plot. Nevertheless, its structural factor belongs to illusion. The double Helen
with a double husband become part of the \textit{dramatis personae} of tragedy from the
beginning, characters that with respect not only to thematics and plot, but also to genre
and structure unite with agones, deaths, laments, scenes at the doors and panoramas, with
the destruction and capture of cities. The Trojan Helen is herself an image of Troy, the
captive and conquered woman-polis; but Hecuba is the image of Troy destroyed, Helen the image of Troy-war.

Helen wove a pattern about herself, about the events brought on by herself. The theme of this “double cloak” is Helen herself. But in conceptual consciousness the creator of events turns into either the author of the events recounted, and then the theme grows into narration, or he becomes a plot “about” himself. In the epos, Helen weaves a pattern with the theme of herself. In lyric such a theme turns into the living character of the poetess-singer; in the *Odyssey* Helen is a teller of narration. But in tragedy she is sung about by the choruses.

I already said that the theme of Helen went from epic and lyric to tragedy by way of Stesichorus. This was the way of choral women’s lyric, which had its special genres.

The women’s choral songs of Stesichorus are the closest pre-dramatic parallel to the women’s choruses of tragedy. Stesichorus worked out a folk choral melic in which the sphere of matriarchal ideas was expressed in images of suffering women. The form of such songs both in folklore and in Stesichorus was choral laments, the content—the passions of eros-death. But alongside the songs about Kalyke and Rhadine, Stesichorus worked on songs about the two Helens, the authentic and the spectral. The language of his songs, which is Doric with Ionisms, their choral and hymnal nature, the ternary structure (in tragedy it is binary, although the question should be put differently for Aeschylus)—all this has its parallels in tragedy, in its choral melic, especially in the thematics of the women’s choruses, in the *dramatis personae* and the interpretation of Helen.

But the role of Helen in tragedy has one more foundation. I mean the large place taken in the tragic chorus, in spite of the basic plot in iambic, by the motif of eros. In *Prometheus* the women’s chorus, addressing Prometheus, already introduces the motif of marriage and the marriage bed of Prometheus and Hesione—a motif completely left out by the plot of the tragedy. This same chorus, in response to the passions of Io, prays for eros not to touch her with its “unconquerable eye.” The women’s chorus of Aeschylus’ *Suppliant Maidens* sings of the same victim of Eros, the proto-mother Io, and prays for salvation from the marriage bed. In *Agamemnon* the chorus of old men speaks of Trojan motifs, the theme of Aphrodite, of sweet temptations, betrayal of the marriage bed. Elsewhere it sings of the “tender arrow of eyes, of the flower of eros that gnaws at the heart.” The women’s chorus in *Medea* is famous—about Eros invincible in battle, arousing enmity even between brothers—and at the side of the battle frolics Aphrodite.” It is exactly in this meaning of eros—misfortune and disaster—that the term is used in the choral song in *Ajax*. In the *Women of Trachis* the women’s chorus sings of the love judgments of the “fair-bedded” Cypris. But the choruses in the tragedies of Euripides sing of Aphrodite and eros as a destructive force with particular frequency. In the first stasimon of *Hippolytus* there is much said of Eros and Cypris; death and damnation are connected with this Eros. The fourth stasimon of this tragedy again sings of Eros and the all-powerful Aphrodite. Such are the women’s choral songs in *Medea*, and again they are connected with the motif of enmity and hatred. One might think that all of these eros songs are provoked by the plot of the tragedies themselves, where the passion of Medea
or Phaedra stands in the center. But no—in *Iphigenia at Aulis*, which is devoted to the theme of sacrifice, the women’s chorus sings of Aphrodite and Eros. Conceptually interpreting this tradition, Euripides introduces the motif of “mod-erate love;” out of death-eros he makes a lesson about the harm of destructive unrestrained passion (especially in *Medea* and in *Iphigenia at Aulis*).

Not always, however, does Aphrodite appear in tragedy openly. More often she takes the form of one of her hypostases, Helen, *i.e.* from the mythological image she turns into the concept, a “character” endowed with human form and a human psyche.

**THE ORIGINS OF TRAGEDY**

1 Tragedy is composed not of a sum of elements placed together, but of one single element which has reappeared three times; it is this triple process peculiar to the Classical period that can be seen in tragedy in its “workshop” directly; this is what creates the false impression of several layers or generic variety.

This single element is visual mime, which has assumed the character of a purification ritual—first in the concrete, physical sense, then in the religious-ethical sense. The single genetic basis of tragedy is mimesis and catharsis, which have followed the path from mythological semantics to conceptual generalization. Such are the origins of Greek tragedy. Such was its potential existence, when it did not yet have its own peculiarities (was not yet itself), but was only acquiring their formants, without which it could not have been created.

Light or purely visual shows were common in the low theater of antiquity and had neither a connected plot nor a stable program. They were “spectacles” and “plays” (*mime*, *ludus*) like magician’s tricks, living and dead tableaux, carousels, shining depictions, sparkles of bugles [tube shaped glass beads], etc. I am using anachronistic terms on purpose; but the important thing is not the names, but the phenomena themselves, different modifications of which are in evidence in the ancient period.

Pre-tragedy was an act of watching a certain panorama that was shown. Such showing had two variants—in epoptic and epideictic of mysteries and in the spectacle acts of the balagan-circus type (taking into consideration again the anachronism of these terms). Closest of all to this original source are not only the comedy of Plautus, but Classical tragedy as well, in particular its prologues. The prologue, pointless from the point of view of conceptual logic, presents in advance the basic action of the play. It thus obviates the plot. It still knows nothing of plot. It is pre-plot. Who was the prologuist? The one who showed the performance. His function was the same as that of the hierophant in the mysteries of whom Hesychius says, “the hierophant is a priest who shows mysteries, he also pronounces the unsaid” (i.e. the secret holy formulas). Such are the functions of the prologuist in any folk drama in front of a tent or curtain, next to puppets or *rayok*. The prologuist shows, explains what he shows, calls on the public like a barker.

First he shows a panorama that might be a shining “wonder” or, on the contrary, the darkness of death. In both cases the participants of the act were inanimate objects (things) that were thought of as animate (people, *i.e.* heroes).
A chorus of such beings came from afar, asked the shower questions of a visual nature; he answered about what he had seen. But the chorus could see itself: part of it watched or “spied,” asked questions, and the other part listened or answered. The beginning of Prometheus preserves such a “showing” which is made up of the chorus and soloist preceding the gnomic stichomythia. Prometheus shows himself to the chorus, to Oceanus, to the elements.

The solo character—“the witness” and “spy,” later “messenger”—also appeared from afar. He was asked questions, he answered; he no longer “showed,” he “told.” He was listened to. In tragedy, however, the purely showing role of the thing was preserved: a wagon with the dead (murdered) heroes of the given tragedy was rolled onto the stage. This wagon, the eccyclema, was the thing predecessor of the messenger, the narrator of death.3

One of the participants arrived from afar and then there was a mutual looking of the one who had arrived and those who were present; he was “recognized.” But things that shined and sparkled were looked at in the same way. Such “watching” evoked “recognition” of the thing-luminary.

Along with the panorama came agones of an illusion type, in which shining and darkening of light, the real light and its likeness, the phantom alternated—the play of shadow and light (the “two truths” of light). A shining object, especially a round one (a luminary) was thrown up, caught, hidden. Such an object represented a piece of light or darkness, a portion of life or death (“moira”).

A two-doored house (the dipylon) was represented as the horizon with a sunrise and a sunset like the doors. Here at the “entrance” to the house the duels of the luminary with darkness took place; the closed doors were opened and the chorus “saw” the panorama of death or “beauty.” In comedy, as we know, the action remained in front of two houses, near two doors. In tragedy the consistent and only stage decoration was three doors, which corresponded to three actors (I will speak further on of periacts).

Thus in pre-tragedy, as in any balagan-circus act, there was still no plot. Aristotle says that tragedy first had petty (short) plots and came “from the humorous” (laughter).4 Now we call such series of clowning, agones, panoramas, and showings of illusions and tricks “acts” and we are not at all surprised that the circus and the balagan (in the broad sense) have no whole plot structure. So it was in the Classical visual mime. There were two characters there, regardless of who the collective was and who the soloist; for the most part the agon was conducted between two semichoruses and their two solo representatives. They incarnated the two worlds, the authentic and the imaginary. The actors in the “imaginary” realm of death were phantoms and likenesses. They completed imaginary journeys to phantom countries. This was the realm of deception and trickery, an example of which is found in Euripides’ Helen and in all tragedies with heroes that disguise themselves and use deception. On the other hand, The Madness of Heracles, Ajax, and other similar tragedies return us to the world of the phantoms, likenesses, and trickery. I must repeat that Helen and Heracles are the characters of the so-called “folk theater,” i.e. pre-tragedy, where there was still neither Dionysus nor the other gods—the theater of “heroes” in the literal sense.

The act of spying at the door, at the window, at the bed-curtain, etc., grew later into the watching of the “spectator” from outside. Later on came the footlights with their artificial “light.” The box, illuminated from within and filled with shining figures was
reminiscent, however, of folk sculptures of those satyrs-sileni with the doors that could open to reveal the shining idols. In Classical sculptural folklore there are numerous analogies to the footlights; it was also logical that the spectators remained outside, where they “watched” from. One must not forget that this watching (zritel’nost’) remained the main convention of drama: drama is watched. Aristotle points out this complex of watching, including all the visual exposition of the tragedy, as the most important; he calls it ὀπτική—what the eye can see, a spectacle, the visual appearance, stage set (we say “production”). When Aristotle warns against fantasy damaging the internal image (I am using our modern terms!), he makes a distinction between the visual and the psychological exposition: one should, he says, experience horror and pity from merely hearing about the event, without resorting to showing it visually, because horror brought on by an external show leads not to drama but to the realm of the miracle. Among such dramas based on external, visual miracles (the fantastic!) he counts Prometheus and the dramas set in the underworld. These judgments of Aristotle, which are already completely conceptual, do not interest me in themselves. What is important is this: Aristotle devotes much attention to the “optic” side of tragedy and still has to polemicize with the aesthetics of the external, visual image, which leads to the “showing” of miracle. While he admits that opsīs is one of the basic and indispensable features of tragedy, Aristotle objects, in effect, to what I would call the “illusion-ness” that lay within the ethical drama in its original nature.

Above I showed the connection between visual “showing of miracle” and the scenes in which “watching” gods or temple depictions were recreated, and I mentioned their interpenetration by illusion and mystery. The Panhellenic Games introduced another kind of visuality: here the object of watching was the races of horses and chariots, the duels of athletes, etc. We imagine that in the archaic balagan-circus races were run, as in our day, around a closed circle, in an enclosed and limited space (like a circus, rather than a stadium); the modern carousel, which turns around a fixed spot, may help us imagine the time when the characters were wagons, shining and round things, wooden horses.

In the modern circus, aside from acrobats, clowning, and magicians’ tricks there are always horse “acts;” It does not seem strange to us that in the theater it is people who act, while in the circus it is animals and that animals as actors are possible. In Greece and Rome we find such plotless visual shows now separately, now together. In particular, the Panhellenic Games—duels were made up of duels of horses and duels of “heroes” incarnate in kings and tyrants. But tragedy shows that in ancient times agonés were visually played out between wild beasts as well—goats, satyrs and tragoi, and between horse-like sileni. As to the legends about the origins of Greek tragedy, they say that tragedy owed its appearance to several “heroes” with horse names.

Legend ascribes the “invention” of the dithyramb to Arion, that horse hypostasis, and connects tragic choruses with the names of Adrastus, the owner of a horse Arion, and Black Horse, Melanippus. As to Dionysus, in this legend, he acquired the choruses that sang the passions of Adrastus, while the rest of the cult of the hero of Sicyon supposedly fell to Melanippus. In other words, the tragic Dionysus was closely connected by inheritance with Adrastus and by contiguity with Melanippus—two variants of horses.
must add here that in satyricon, this embryo of tragedy, horse-like sileni played the leading role. At any rate, the horse and Dionysus were not sharply distinguished. The very fact that the dithyramb was considered a Dionysian genre and its composer was Arion speaks to the semantic links between the earliest and the latest stage images. This is also shown by the construction of the theater and the very fact of periodic performances. Everywhere there is an arena, an orchestra, circular and semi-circular buildings, the foundation is the image of the race of the sun; the hippodrome and all the variants of the circus speak for themselves. But the orchestra and the scena are united: to the image of the hippodrome, of horse racing, is attached the image of the balagan-tent stage.

The same must be said of the periodic character of agones, be they Panhellenic or stage agones. At first they imitate the solar cycle; this is preserved in the Olympic, Nemean, Isthmian, Pythian, to which triumphal odes are timed. Consequently, in the stage presentations, the agricultural cycles which are still outside the cult of Dionysus are added to the solar cycle: the Attic village Dionysia were rather related to Artemis (they were celebrated in her month), while the city Dionysia were related to Poseidon (timed to his month). As the orchestra is connected with the scena, the image of the circle with the image of the bed-curtain, so the circling path of the sun is united with the agricultural and is concealed by the cult of Dionysus, so the image of the solar-chthonic horse is connected with the image of the agricultural goat, i.e., with one of the forms of the agrarian god—Dionysus.

The zoomorphic form of the “hero” was semantically justified. The horse was an incarnation of the sun, which rushed its chariot across the sky. The sun fought with darkness and defeated it in a race. The arena, the racetrack was the sky, and the location of the duel was the horizon. Horse agones were accompanied by choral songs. Part of them became related to the pre-stage tragedy, the other part began epinikion. The epinikion was a song of victory in honor of a horse, and only with time did it begin to be ascribed to men. Simonides begins his hymn with the praise of the horses themselves, addressing them and not the hero; Pindar continues to sing of the horses that fight in the race. The lexicon of the victory ode remains true to the ancient animal images. Thus, when Pindar speaks about the real priestesses of Aphrodite, the hetairas, he uses the expression “hundred-legged herd of grazing girls,” where the term “herd” first meant a herd of mares. And in the choral lyric of Alcman maidens are identified with mares; Helen too is closely connected to a horse (as Bowra showed). In one case we see horse agones “in honor” of Helen, in another the agones of a chorus of maiden-mares (Alcman), in a third the agones of horse-heroes (epinikion).

And in tragedy Helen draws with her horse-images, but they are muffled in the songs of the chorus, without spreading into the plot. Individual horse images are scattered here and there throughout tragedy, but only in its rudimentary parts.

Epinikion is the song of “heroes” who defeat death. That Pindar’s victor-heroes were not identified with people is shown by his judgments of people as insignificant, blind in their ignorance, powerless beings. If we take the treatment of people and heroes in tragedy or in Pindar, it will be clear that it is not people who act in ode and drama, but
another category of beings, one that does not lie at the usual social level. The heroes of ode and drama are mythological beings, later identified by conceptual thought with people.

The heroes of the victory ode have their variants right there in the same ode. Such variants of the “heroes” are competing horse-victors, countries coming into being or flourishing, founders of cities and tribes, dead ancestors-founders of houses, and righteous kings. This gives us the undeniable right to assert that the original heroes of victory songs were not people, but mythological incarnations of the forces of nature, between which an agon of life and death took place, horses and polises in their dying and new birth. The presence in the ode of dead ancestors supports the proximity of the epinikion to the sphere of beyond the grave images. The heroes of tragedy and the heroes of odes are underworld beings, incarnations of the dead, who fight in single combat and win, becoming alive. This is why the victory is so important, why it traditionally evokes such rejoicing and such praise for the victor and for the very fact of victory. In tragedy the agon remained a structural skeleton both within the action of the plot and outside it, in stage ritual. But in the ode the agon is operative, in the ode it remains completely intact and in force; without the agon there would be no ode. The close connection between the hero-victor and the city which “gave birth to” him was conceptually interpreted by tradition as an abstract connection; in fact inside such a concept lies the image incarnation of the city in the hero. It is no accident that Pindar’s hero-victors, like the heroes of tragedy, are tyrants, kings, sovereigns, but never regular people: “kings” were always understood by myth as “victors over death,” as the rulers of life, directed on the one hand towards heroes, on the other towards the gods.

In tragedy what comprises the soul of epinikion acts as the concluding part, the epilog. Tragedy works out the theme not of the white solar horse-victor, but the passions of the Black Horse (Melanippus), defeated in the agon; only at the end does the theme turn to its light opposite. Most tragedies depict the destruction of cities, capture into slavery, fires, captivity, the destruction of countries. The righteous kings suffer at the hands of the impious; heroes “suffer” torments and mockery. Nevertheless epinikion and tragedy are alike based on a heroized-animal agon of ethical contents.

Formally these genres are close: in both the foundation is choral, it is even identical in structure—with the internal agonism of strophes and antistrophes.

In epinikion, the choral song, there is a solo principle. First, it is addressed to a definite person, the victor. Second, in its folklore form the victor himself sang in his own honor. The choral principle, in content, merged with the solo, but formally they were separate. Thus behind the author the victor himself once stood. But in tragedy author entered into agon with author, protagonist with protagonist, choregos with choregos, while in the Panhellenic Games it was horse with horse, athlete with athlete, singer with singer. First the battle was real, later on abstract, conceptual, with “victory” in the figurative, abstract sense.

Ritual battles were both visual and active in nature. They were presented, shown directly, but not narrated. Usener has a theory about the connection between ritual battles and the origins of epic. But I would like to point out something else—the presence of such battles in the scenes of epic poems. I mean the duels in action in the Iliad, where the agones of the heroes were duels that ended in the death of one hero and the triumphant victory of the other. On one hand, this was a duel in action, on the other—a verbal duel.
This second, verbal agon consisted of the bragging of the victor, the “iambic” abuse of the victim and its entreaties. In such epic agones we see the mythological parallel of iamb-agon, but not only of that. The victor is “praised,” pronouncing praise to himself: this is the future victor of Pindar, at first subjective-objective, then purely object, praised by the subject. The whole scheme of epic duel reminds us of the structural peculiarities of drama, the entreaty of the “suppliant” victim, mocked, slandered, defeated, that together with the bragging and abuse of the victor composed the dramatic agon. In lyric the iambics of Archilochus, the invective of Catullus, the epodes of Horace all derived from epic incantation-curses, from entreaties and agones. In Aeschylus it is thus that the chorus of “suppliants” with their branches of entreaty in their hands, pronounce their prayer and simultaneous curse of Egyptus the hubrist.

Iamb-duels formed the basis for epic, lyric, and drama. Epic is still shot through in its essence, in the essence of its plot, with agones; agones are its main theme. In lyric the agon is removed from the theme and transferred to ritual, as in drama. It is characteristic that the choregia as a social institution was connected not only with drama, but with lyric as well. And where there is choregia, there are agones as well. Lyric choral agones were attached to three gods: Athena, Apollo, and Dionysus. The same three gods that were preserved as the moving forces in tragedies.

The genetic basis of tragedy—the visual mime—took the form of an agon. The parallels are demonstrated for us by a large number of folklore scenes both in antiquity and among modern peoples. Here there are duels of beasts or of man with animal in dozens of different variants, the most striking of which is presented by the Panhellenic agones and the Roman ludi. Where the animals are doubled by things, the agon too is present. This is the most archaic variant, about which I spoke in detail in my analysis of the palliata. Mime derived from the trick of “showing” vanishing and appearing things, from rolling dice, from opening and closing bed-curtains, doors, houses, gates. One person showed, others watched. The semantic content of the agon consisted of the victory of light (life) over death.

I used the term “visual mime,” but it would be more precise to call such a mime mimesis, as Aristotle does. He always calls tragedy “mimesis of action.” One can judge the importance he gives this definition by the fact that he uses this term in his short tract 76 times. Tragedy, he says, imitates authentic actions (acts) along with ethos and passions.

In fact, when we say mime we are accustomed to thinking of something finished and stable; the Classical mime was precisely mimesis, i.e. imitation, miming, an “act” with moving boundaries, “amateurish.” Aristotle himself says that drama arose from improvisation, from what we now call amateurism. This once again confirms the social, civil genesis of drama. Its characters are not actors but “real” citizens.

Visual mime still does not imitate the life of what it represents (as Aristotle means, when he studies developed tragedy), but the authenticity of “life” with its “properties” of light and the “essence” that belongs to it alone. Mime, in short, is mimesis (imitation) of a “likeness” as “essence”—deception, fooling, practical jokes. Here lie the roots of the
“humorous” out of which, according to Aristotle, tragedy came along with comedy. Such mime was preserved in palliata and organized its whole literary plot, its composition, its structural peculiarities, its characters.

In later tragedy, in Euripides, these external features of mime come to life again, sometimes taking on the character not of tragedy, but of comedy, and precisely of Middle or New Comedy, that is to say, neomime. Such are Alcestis, Orestes, Iphigenia in Tauris, Ion, but also the Madness of Heracles, in part Medea. Traces of direct mimesis in the visual-balagan sense lie within Classical tragedy as well, as I have already pointed out. But this is not the point. The peculiarity of tragedy consists in the fact that it alone of all the forms of drama gives mimesis a purificational character and transfers its catharsis from a concrete physical category to an abstract one; visual mimesis turned under the influence of concept into ethical mimesis.

Before it became conceptual, catharsis was image-mythological and purely light catharsis. This is exactly how we find it in many ritual purifications, in the purification rituals of pre-stage drama, in the role of purification in lyric connected with the cult of Apollo, in reminiscences in epic and in all hubristic genres like fables, comedy, etc. Where there is hubris, there is purification; where there is purification there is hubris. And this is exactly because catharsis purified physical “pollution”—“dirt,” darkness, death.

Apollonian catharsis was still pre-agricultural, light catharsis, connected with shining divinities who defeated the darkness of death. At the heart of this light catharsis drama and lyric are twins, and the “horse,” Apollonian stage of both of them derives from this. The agones are of a light nature; one animal rushing over the heavens wins and “rises,” the other is thrown into the abyss—and this is something to be watched, alongside the agones of things. I must make one reservation here: purely horse races or the pure play of things were a late phenomenon. They were preceded by a more archaic epoch, in which horses and inanimate things were thought of as “heroes,” i.e. as beings that had names and a living “essence.” In this respect the purificatory Thargelia, during which Apollo triumphed, and the pharmakos, the carrier of physical pollution, was driven through the city and thrown into the abyss, are older than the Olympian Games with their agones of horses.

Light and visual semantics are identical in mythological image (for example in Antigone “the eye of the golden day”17 or “the holy eye of the luminary;”18 the blindness of Oedipus is “the cloud of darkness”19). Visual-light catharsis takes on a new content in agricultural thought (представления). The “heroes” become dying and resurrecting gods in the form of plants and domestic animals, and their theme is “suffering,” i.e. sacrificial death. In this sphere of ideas the catharsis consists in the purifying death of the animal-pollution (infertility, drought, plague, etc), death that brings rebirth. Of the two animal antagonists one is tormented, the other the tormenter, one is real (with “essence”), the other a pseudo. Mimesis here too remains the foundation, but it is purificatory in character. One must remember that the fool king had to portray the authentic king, and then he was unmasked and subjected to a shameful death—lustral death. This happened at the “break of seasons”—the “birthdays” of the year and the sun. Everything “old” and “winter” was thought of as imaginary, only temporarily, externally, and deceptively “made like” the real. Its destruction brought a purifying salvation. “Suffering” concerned the pure animal, which was tormented by the impure, and the impure, which died a
sacrificial death. Entreaty, complaints and pity, horror and passions, lament—these are the basic motifs which run through the action that once was only visual in character.

The entreaty to the gods, to the city, to the earth which later became in tragedy the contents of many plots was the entreaty of the sacrificial victim to the sacrificer. In Old Comedy the sacrifice took place right on stage. One imagines it must have been thus in pre-tragedy; but in tragedy the sacrifice took on an abstract, religious-ethical character. Later, however, we again find the entreaty of the victim to the sacrificer in the form of the actor’s entreaty to the public (in Chinese folk theater the actor addresses the audience and “requests” it); in Old Comedy it is the author who “requests.”

The thing is pushed out only by an animate being, an animal or a human, more correctly a being in human form, who represents both animal and plant. Goddesses and gods appear as characters. But the thing has not become obsolete. In place of the thing-being one main part of the thing functions—the head, the face. When we speak of the Classical actor, we forget that he had no face, that he wore a schematic, generalized, faceless face that belonged to no one and to everyone. In place of the thing there appears the person-thing, the agonist with a face of wood and clay. It is only natural that the mask later becomes in sequence animal, fantastic, and human-like. In tragedy the mask has the same distinctions as the chorus: age and sex, for the most part. It is these two phenomena, the mask and the chorus, which do not come from religion and cannot be reduced to any cult. The mask has a universal origin, which dates back to earliest folklore, and the chorus belongs directly to the ancient social structure, which predates by far the age of the appearance of religion. What cult origin of tragedy can one speak of, if it is based on a sex-age faceless and nameless chorus? But this is beside the point.

Pre-stage tragedy was an “amateur” mimesis in the form of a choral agon and in this form it was linked with the choral lyric agones. In the pre-religious period such agones were timed to coincide with the agricultural cycles (“holidays”) and agricultural gods—female and effeminized, but also to ancient sexless gods: Athena and Artemis, the cathartic Apollo, Dionysus. It was these gods who retained in religious cult as well ritual lyric agones, but they remained connected with tragedy too: Dionysus as the main stage god, Athena, Artemis, and Apollo (plus Aphrodite) as the accomplishers of the tragic peripeteia.

The Delian choral agones also took place in honor of Apollo, and the agones at the Thargelia, the feasts of purification. The dithyrambic agones at the Great Dionysia were in honor of Dionysus. Cathartic-light images were connected with Apollo; both purification and dithyrambs were agonistic in character.

We find the same in tragedy. Its plot, already built on the ideas of religious-ethical purification, is accompanied by stage ritual in which pre-ethical, physical purification is present as ablution, libation, partaking of ritual food. And among all these forms is the intoxication with wine that forms the basis of dithyrambic.

In tragedy Apollo has a pre-cathartic character in the moral sense. Thus in *Alcestis* he is a regular light divinity, who undergoes the phase of death-slavery with the otherworld king, and in the plot of *Alcestis* he is opposed to the “moral” hero, Heracles, who knows the value of moral good and will sacrifice his life for it. In *Orestes* he is also far from
ethical criteria and does not look at the drama of Orestes in its moral essence. Even in the *Eumenides* the patriarchal morals of Apollo cannot bring the purification Orestes receives in the end with Athena’s support.

The fact that Apollo, Artemis, and Athena are not married shows how archaic these pre-religious, and later religious gods are. They are most important in lyric and tragic agones because of their age. The cathartic images associated with them derived from the motifs of luminaries-islands-cities which died (by falling into water) and came back to life. Hence the many vestiges of “stone” and “fire” images in tragedy, the destroyed or besieged cities. Athena is a special polar goddess. Entering tragedy as an official Attic god, she remains in essence the same figure that in Sappho’s lyric has the form of the “girlfriend” Atthis.21

Only in *Rhesus* does Athena still retain her connection with “military” themes. Here, as in *Ajax* and the *Trojan Women*, she is an evil intriguer, a dark, death-bearing divinity. In the *Eumenides* she appears paired with Apollo, in place of Artemis, and she obviously replaces this pre-marriage “sister”-goddess. In *Iphigenia in Tauris* Athena is even more confused with Artemis, and not so much with the Greek virginal “sister” of Apollo as with the bloodthirsty divinity of death, the Tauric goddess. It is characteristic that in so “Apollonian” a tragedy as *Ion* the fate of the heroes is decided not by Apollo, but by Athena.

As far as the dithyrambics of Dionysus are concerned, they were directly connected to both lyric and dramatic agones: according to Aristotle, it was from here tragedy arose. At the same time legend makes Arion the “father” of tragedy and dithyramb.

The dithyramb, however obscure its origins may be, was a Bacchic genre. It is well known that Archilochus connected the “beautiful dithyrambic song of the lord Dionysus” with the wine that inflames the soul.22 To Dionysus, the god of the grapevine, was attached the song that belonged to its “inventor,” Arion. In lyric “wine” motifs run through the songs of Alcaeus and Anacreon, and in stage legend the choral dithyramb is considered the “tragic chorus” with which the origins of tragedy are associated.

Lyric and tragedy thus converge in Arion. But what kind of lyric? Was it only the choral? Arion was considered to be from Lesbos, though he was connected with Italy, Sparta, and Corinth, while Lesbos had in lyric cults well-defined matriarchal semantics that allow us to define Arion as a “heroic” pre-deistic form of the Lesbos Dionysus, *i.e.*, the incarnation of music-song and Bacchism-wine; what in the female music divinities had the form of flowers, eros, beauty in later male divinities took the form of wine, dithyrambic, and passions-suffering.

One can see Arion’s horse nature. The dithyrambic chorus might have consisted at first of horselike sileni, then of tragoi.23 Thus the Sicyonian pre-Dionysian passion choruses were already goat-choruses.

The agricultural age introduced new series of images. The bull and the goat began to correspond more to the agricultural gods than the ancient horse. Dionysus forced out Adrastus, Arion, Melanippus, and he was a dying and resurrecting god. With the appearance of “religions of suffering” the motifs of death, defeat, and suffering became predominant. The later form of the maternal, female god, Dionysus, like Adonis, ends by taking the form of an independent male god.

The deeper its genesis, the stronger the lyric choral and solo element is in pre-stage tragedy. Lyric is preserved in stage tragedy as a significant part of the composition, but a
part where the plot does not take place. This alone shows that its role was that of a past now overcome.

I repeat: in order to make sense of the confusion of evidence about the origins of tragedy from dithyrambic, from satyr play, from myths “about heroes,” to collate the legends of the characters—horses, goats, heroes, one must keep in mind that these were not zoological horses, bulls, and goats, but mythological ones, that is heroes, these very Adrastuses, Melanippuses, Arions, Dionysuses, but also Agamemnons, Ajaxes, and Pentheuses. These were “choruses,” the civic principle, not herds of domestic animals, though citizens were thought of in the form of zoomorphic-humanlike beings.

Aristotle says that tragedies and comedies were preceded by the drama of satyrs. Its history is hidden from us. Our knowledge of the satyr play is based on a few late examples from the age of its completion and extinction as well as from fragments and titles. It is important that this is the most ancient form of pre-tragedy, when it had something in common with comedy and the “humorous;” that it was a mythological drama with stichomythia and a chorus—Doric drama in which satyrs and sileni act, gods and heroes like “demigods,” monsters, animals. But this Doric drama lacked what was later characteristic of tragedy or comedy: mourning laments, parabasis, etc. Its contents were “caves,” pre-polis; it was set in caves, mountains, woods, analogous to a certain extent with *Philoctetes*. This content of the satyr play is so vague and amorphous that it would be difficult to call it a plot. The gods and heroes who act in this drama—Hermes, Heracles, Silenus, nymphs, are incarnations associated with mountains, woods, and pastures. They cheat, steal, eat, and drink, but for the most part they deceive, pretend, pass one thing off as another. Such acts, however, are presented not realistically, but mythologically, only superficially covered with a realistic layer.

The pastoral tone of the satyr play does not suggest Dionysus at all, but it does point to gods like Daphnis and the bucolic world, to the Doric sphere, more ancient than the later Attic one, where the same agricultural ideas are already reworked by religion and polis culture. The satyr play has internal links with Sicilian folklore and the themes of its poet, Stesichorus, themes that are revived in the Hellenistic Age in the bucolic of Theocritus. Taking advantage of every possibility of finding new sources, we should not neglect Theocritus, who follows the ancient models precisely. Like a real “Hellenist,” Theocritus is an educated archaizer. And it is he in his bucolic in the Doric language who reconstructs the myths of Daphnis, Menalcas, Thyrsis, Battus—of all these agrarian and pastoral gods, whom he turns into “characters.” And they are not the only ones. He also has as actors Tityrus, Polyphemus, and Heracles—the original figures of a satyr play in which the chorus consists of “tityroi” (Doric goats, which correspond to the “satyrs” of Attica), and Cyclops and Heracles are the favorite characters. Bucolic is set in meadows, pastures, woods, grottoes, groves. The action takes place during the harvest and various agrarian feasts, including the feast of pressing the grapes—Lenaea [Λήναια]—when the Attic playwrights conducted their agones. And here again setting off from drama we end up at lyric, and from lyric at drama. Theocritus’ bucolic is notable structurally as well: its form is the dialog of two characters, often in the form of
stichomythia. In the manner of performance and internal content it is an agon. In no other genre can one find such structural parallels to tragedy as there are in bucolic.

But another thing too is striking: the bucolic genre (“idyll”) is nothing but mime. Every idyll is a “scene” recreated in action by two and sometimes three characters. Idyll can be defined as a mime-agon in the form of a dialog or stichomythia or narration. I have already said that every ancient poet cultivated only one genre, no matter how varied it might be in appearance. Theocritus wrote literary mimes of two types—realistic and bucolic, but both of them derived from folklore and both from mime. Here too belong the “tableaux” of Theocritus like the “Epithalamium of Helen,” “Hylas,” “The Lover,” and others.

There is no doubt that these literary mimes derived from the Sicilian folk theater which existed in deep antiquity, from the agones of bucols and satyrs, shepherds, bulls and goats, who incarnated agrarian-pastoral gods and were incarnated in humanlike beings. Reitzenstein was right when he remembered the role of bucols, sieni, and holy woman—“cows” in the mysteries of Dionysus, where Dionysus himself was a bull, and the bucol incarnated the image of the divinity, the hegemon of women-cows (and of course of their impregnator). On the other hand, Reitzenstein connected the shepherd cult with the cult of Artemis: according to legend, at the foundation of a temple to Artemis in one of the Doric cities many domestic animals were dedicated to the goddess, and along with them the sacrificial gift of the shepherds. According to Reitzenstein these shepherds were “poor priests,” and in this cult the singer himself represented a bucol: the festivals of this Artemis were accompanied by song-agones with prizes (just as in the mimes of Theocritus).

The bucolic of folk mime derived, without a doubt, from mythological rather than realistic ideas, contained no ethics, and was close not to the Attic “cultured” Dionysus, but to the Artemis of woods and mountains, to the heroes and god-shepherds like Hermes and Polyphemus, to the incarnations of bulls and goats in the form of Tityruses (satyrs) or the “animal” Dionysus. Apollo here played the role of the shepherd-poet Daphnis (“laurel”), who entered into an agon with his variant (Menalcas, Battus, Milon, Thyrsis and others).

The idylls of Theocritus show that there was a Doric mime, in form a dialog or stichomythia, which was for the most part an agon of two antagonist-singers, of whom one, the victor, received from the judge (a third shepherd) a prize, and that the characters of such a mime were “goat” and “bull” herders who on the one hand are found in the mysteries of Dionysus and on the other bear the names of satyrs, agricultural gods, and heroes of satyr plays. This shows that alongside the Doric drama of satyrs, the drama of Epicharmus and the Doric mime of Sophron, there was another line of the same Doric genre represented in later times by the Doricized idyll. Horace also spoke of the connection between the comedies of Epicharmus and the palliata of Plautus, and the connection between the mimes of Sophron and Theocritus was also known in antiquity. All the paths of the genesis of tragedy lead to folklore. There is not some single archetype of tragedy, but many variants. The only constant is the element of the agon, which is always connected with spectacle (in the mimes of Theocritus, which made drama into a narrative, literary genre, there is a “judge”) and with recreation in action. The remaining elements of Doric folk drama take the form now of amoebean-stichomythia now of melic. The themes of the folk scenes are also different. Idylls take place under the sign of
eros. Bucols—formerly dying and resurrecting gods of vegetation in animal form—conduct competitions in eros songs.

The connection between bucolic nature and eros, satyrs, agricultural and pastoral gods is understandable. It cannot surprise us in satyr plays either. Eros plays an important role in satyr plays in their pastoral-woods and mountain form (one wants to say “Arcadian”!). Along with it come Hermes and Heracles, the Doric Heracles who is the hero both of Sicilian folk mime and of any kind of Doric drama from Epicharmus to Theocritus. These three gods form a triple unity of three very ancient gods of one essence, three former rulers of the world, when “the world” was thought of as cattle-breeding, shepherd’s nature in its pre-city, uncultivated forms. One must point out that the depictions of precisely these three gods as a single whole were usually found in those special places where agonistic exercises took place—in gymnasias. This irrefutably shows their semantic interconnection and their direct semantic relation to agones. Therefore there is nothing at all surprising in the role that they play in the most ancient dramatic agon.

Theocritus’ mime, as I just said, was an agon of eros songs, alternating with performed bucolics, which were not so much realistic as mystical or ritual hypostases (in an earlier period, of course). In connection with this I would like again to turn to Plato’s philosophical and literary mime, The Symposium, where the characters one by one compete in praising Eros. It is in this mime in particular that we find fresh material for the satyr play in the character of the folk silenus and satyr Socrates, who is at the same time a reflection of the folk Eros. The genesis of the satyr play, which is lost for us, can be filled out by indirect evidence: there are vestiges and links with the satyr play of what one might call an objective nature, such as these ancient connections in Plato’s Symposium.

The folk Socrates, the fool and hubrist, helps us understand Eros in the form of satyr and silenus. True, these are special satyrs and sileni, not yet dramatic, only things in the form of dolls and opening-and-closing figurines-cases. Silenus figurines are more interesting. They are analogous to the little temples with idols (silenus figurines had idols inside them), to Roman dolls and figurines that were exchanged on certain holidays, to doll-larvae that danced on ancient tables during “symposia” like Plato’s. In such sileni and satyrs we are dealing with the most ancient variant of the actor in the form of doll-figurine.

The puppet theater is really the most archaic. It is a folk, pre-stage theater. Its closest analogies are the roman cases with imagines, wax depictions of dead ancestors, and the Greek comical funerary figurines: both were either simply masks or variants of masks. In both cases the figurine depicts the image of a dead man, and it is no accident that it is found in the grave. In some cases the masks of the dead lie in little chests, in others in graves or little temples over the graves, in still other cases they perform in the form of dead people on the table—they dance or lie in coffins before the “feasters.” In this sense dolls, figurines, and masks are the pre-scenic incarnations of death or fertility, they are pre-actors. They already have completely expressed ancient “comism:” they are ugly, hubristic, obscene, with emphasized digestive and sexual organs. Furthermore, they have music attributes. Some of them dance to the singing of the feasters, others play flutes and
pipes. Specifically, the molded sileni and satyrs that Socrates is compared to play the flute and the shepherd’s pipe. From the Hellenistic age we have the description of a mechanical puppet theater of Heron of Alexandria: figurines of gods and heroes stood and moved on a board with two leaves. Every Socratic silenus is such a figurine. But it was also a kind of small puppet theater: the inside of the figurine opened into two parts, and within one could see statuettes of gods. The little temple or case was transformed into a miniature theater, both a puppet (figure) theater and a satyr theater. The external figurine was ugly, but the statuettes of the gods inside were beautiful. The satyr played a musical wind instrument. In Plato’s interpretation he was invested with a divine power, which he passed on to those who needed gods and mysteries. This interpretation is conceptual, rationalistic; behind it lies the connection between the puppet theater with the divinity that was found (literally!) inside the satyr and the mysteries. We must not forget that the basic theme of *The Symposium* is mystical and that Socrates is as much “dual” as Eros or the silenus: ugliness and hubris outside, mystical beauty within.

What was the purpose of these figurine satyrs and sileni? To open and “show” the shining beauty. In the figurative sense this is the internal beauty of Socrates, “divine, golden, all-beautiful and miraculous.” But we are warned that Plato’s Alcibiades creates figurative meanings out of mythological concreteness: everything that is figural in Socrates is literal in the satyr. And in fact the “divine, golden, all-beautiful and miraculous” inside the silenus are the golden shin-ing gods, the “miracle” in the image, mythical sense—both as a balagan “trick” and as a mystical “beauty.”

Socrates is an example of such a magician and epoptes. But the satyr-silenus is also one. He too has a dual nature: one inside, one shown outside. He is a deceiver and a concealer, like Socrates, and his role is the oldest one in the Classical balagan, the role of eiron, presented in his character concretely as a thing. Furthermore, he thus shows where the two balagan roles of fools came from, the two which are obligatory for any conceptual comedy of the Classical period—the trickster and the braggart: the former hides the “true” behind the “imaginary” and the latter shows off the “apparent”, behind which there is no “truth”—both are incarnations of mimesis. But the principle of “divine beauty” is important in the silenus as it is in Socrates. Only what is conceptual (abstract spiritual beauty) in Socrates is image (the figurine of a god inside the body) in the silenus-satyr. It is significant gnoseologically that Plato characterizes Socrates by means of likening Socrates to a mythological statuette. The satyr is our “rayok.” It is a box which contains a representation of a shining, sparkling, brightly-lit thing which is meant to act as a model of something very beautiful. The rayok player “shows” the object through illuminated glass or through a crack; people “peek” and “look” into it. Inside the rayok or the satyr people “see” some shining, beautiful, golden and divine thing, that is a visual “miracle,” a spectacle, ἃμα. The satyr is connected by this visual “miracle” with mystery in its main visual part, the so called epoptic. Every satyr has a Bacchic nature in myth, in ritual, and in the cult of Dionysus Bacchus. Both the satyrs Alcibiades speaks of as an analogy for Socrates are possessed by mania, by divine ecstasy, and Bacchism, divine inspiration. Both these features are as mystical as they are Dionysian, and they have a direct relation to dramatic acts.

The original visual character of the satyrs does not exclude the possibility of their doll-like statuette nature. In Greece it was not only the theater that was folklore, sculpture was
as well. The puppet theater (in the broad sense, i.e. the theater of figures, statues, and masks) had impersonal, monotonous characters. Folk statuettes, sculptures, herms, figures of gods were also mass, impersonal, and were cast in regular sculpture studios.

This shows how ancient they are. In the literary satyr play of the 5th century, which is almost lost to scholarship the original features of the satyrs are vague. Plato’s *Symposium* recreates much of this. It shows the pre-stage, folk character of the satyrs, shows their nature as spectacle, but at the same time balagan and mystery. And if one were to draw the conclusion that the satyr play is the embryonic form of both comedy and tragedy, this would be enough. It is even more important that the *Symposium* itself contains the idea of the unity of tragedy and comedy. Why is this important here? Because it gives us the right to say that the balagan-mystery satyrs of folklore in movement correspond in their basic semantics to the satyrs of stage folklore, to drama that contained the undifferentiated prerequisites of tragedy and comedy. These echoes in Plato are valuable because they reveal the more ancient nature of agricultural satyrs, the visual nature, without which no “beast” would have turned into an object of a spectacle.

The undifferentiation of comical-tragic images, and therefore the prerequisites for the future differentiation into two independent genres was contained in the biune image of the “external” and “internal,” of ugliness and beauty. The external is imaginary, the internal authentic. The external deceives and “fakes” the real or “hides” it. The whole image is mimetic in its biune entirety. In it art is born.

Hence the significance of “showing” what is inside, later the opening of the curtain with a dramatic show, even later a story “inside” an exposition, “encased,” dependent, and passive.

The satyr which is opened has many parallels to temple and ritual, but especially to stage. Recall that in Old Comedy the audience watches the revelation of a spectacle of beauty, in tragedy of death. But it is here, in this biunity of semantics, that the cathartic images nest, since the “authentic” is only temporarily “hidden” behind the imaginary, and one has only to “open” it for it to “appear,” “show” itself (cf. ritual cries to savior gods “appear,” “show yourself to us” etc.). This whole mimetic cluster of images is potentially cathartic. Agricultural ideas translate its visual-light character into fertility, but still pre-ethical fertility. In time “purification” comes to mean predominantly the fertility of the earth. This is the goal of the creation of lustral rites—first in the fields, later in the city. And it is no longer things, figurines and masks, but domestic animals that bear the images of purification and pollution, purificational death in its biune semantics: the impure animal, having suffered persecution and destruction, turns into a pure animal (later, with the separation of the subject from the object, it brings purity to the polluted).

The catharsis of the satyr play has just this character, still devoid of ethics. Here the characters are divided into those who deceive and those who are deceived. But the cleverest wins; this sharply distinguishes the satyr play from tragedy and foreshadows comedy. The roots of the resemblance between the satyr play and tragedies like *Philoctetes* are not so much formal as semantic. True, in both the scene is wooded mountains, caves, the wild; this is because of the ancient pre-polis images preserved by the cultured Greeks in the meaning of “rudeness,” pre-culture. The blinding of Cyclops...
and the blinding of Oedipus have nothing in common; the distinction in the same mythological motif is created by the moral level on which Oedipus’ drama takes place, the distinction between mythological image and conceptual interpretation. At the same time the Cyclops is a pharmakos just like Philoctetes, living sullen and alone in his cave on an uninhabited island. He is a pharmakos just like Theoclymenus in Helen, who kills visitors, like Thoas in Iphigenia in Tauris or bloodthirsty Artemis herself in the same play. He is a variant of Busiris and... Heracles, who greedily tears pieces of meat with his teeth. Just like Polymestor in Hecuba, the typical pharmakos, Cyclops is blinded, deceived by his enemy—who outsmarts him—and punished. But Polymestor is a villain in the ethical sense, a breaker of divine laws, greedy for gold, he offends the laws of hospitality and respect for the dead. He is a criminal. And his blinding and death are religious and ethical recompense. It is not the same with Cyclops, who simply devours people as death “devours” them—without any motive or cause, merely to satisfy his bottomless stomach. This is a luminary monster with his one circular “eye,” which is put out, throwing the Cyclops into eternal darkness, into the very element the monster incarnates. No longer does he “see” or shine. If we compare the scenes of Odysseus’ plot with the chorus of satyrs in the Cyclops, the tracking and spying on the Cyclops, the observance of silence while he sleeps, etc, with the same kinds of scenes in many tragedies (especially Ajax, Philoctetes, and The Madness of Heracles, where the hero is a pharmakos, even if ennobled) their typology will be apparent. In the Cyclops the motif of “eye,” “sight,” “pupil” is varied endlessly; the basic theme and the basic action consists in “burning” the eye with fire, and in the language of myth “fire” corresponds to the “light” of the eye (therefore Cyclops’ eye is called “light” and the “light (fire) of his eye is turned to coal”44). The chorus discusses who will be the first to put the burning beam “into the eye” and “scrape out the shining look” [γυμνός ὁπίς ἔξαμιληθά] lit. “before the sight is forced out of his eye”].45 And Odysseus promises to put a piece of wood “in the fire,”46 light it, and thrust it in the “eyes”47 of the Cyclops and “melt out by fire” his “sight,”48 “dry up” his “pupils.”49 Odysseus “looks” into the cave and sees Cyclops roasting human meat on coals: he has “seen something horrible inside the cave,”50 he says. This is a spectacle of death, the opposite of a spectacle of beauty, instead of a “wonderful vision” (θαύμι αἰδεῖν) a “terrible vision” (δεῖν ἱδών). Odysseus addresses Zeus, “Look at this; if you do not see this, then…”51 etc. Here aside from the typical scenes of peeping, spying, and showing, there is also a reminiscence of the scene at the closed doors, reinterpreted by Euripides here as in Iphigenia at Aulis. In reality, the cave of Cyclops cannot have doors, but the convention of spectacle mime requires someone to knock. This is why the chorus of satyrs sings about the Bacchic komos, which ends with the exclamnation of the lover, “Who will open the doors for me?”52

The Cyclops is a typical pharmakos. In his own words he was “subjected to hubris,”53 “mocked,”54 “given to mockery and misfortune.”55 The dramatic catharsis consists in the fact that the hubrist “suffers” the same that he did to others. His destruction is the “salvation” of Odysseus and the satyrs, the servants of Bacchus.

It is curious that the “Bacchism” of the satyrs is still completely concrete, of the character of an image. This is not yet the later conceptual “Dionysia” with its “ecstasy” and “enthusiasm” as in the satyr-Socrates, but wine-drinking, eating, and drunkenness, the kind of service to Dionysus which in tragedy takes on an abstract, religious-moral
form of “divine inspiration” and communion with the divinity. At the same time in the Cyclops the satyrs are called not some kind of beings of a higher order or of human form but “beasts.” This again shows that the “goats” (or “horses”) of tragedy were thought of as anthropomorphic hypostases like “heroes.”

The Cyclops contains in reduced form features that can later be found in tragedy and comedy. Thus the plot to blind the hubrist and the secret mission of the plotter-satyrs into the cave of the Cyclops recalls the corresponding scenes of the Oresteia. Cyclops himself is like Pentheus: like him, he “sees” in his drunken apocalypse the heavens rushing by united (apparently carnally) with the earth, and the throne of Zeus and all the gods. Pentheus in his madness “sees” a double heaven [sun] and a double Thebes. In The Bacchae when Agave comes to her senses she “sees” the sky shining more brightly than before; thus the chorus of satyrs raises its eyes like Agave and “sees” (against all logic in this scene) the stars and Orion. But the similarity to tragedy is quickly replaced by similarity to comedy. Cyclops thinks he is being seduced by the Graces, but he prefers the old Silenus, who responds to this hubristic eros with the appropriate “Aristophanic” lines. This recalls the scene of the recognition of Mnesilochus in Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae and the fool scene in satyr play where the Cyclops tries to catch Odysseus, who slips to the right, when the Cyclops seeks him to the left, and runs to the left when the Cyclops seeks him to the right (Mnesilochus bends forward when he is being examined from behind and turns back when approached from in front).

Often in satyr plays the main hero is Heracles, the favorite character of low theater, ancient balagan. His role is clearly defined: he is the Classical “purifier” long before Apollo in lyric and Dionysus in drama. At first Heracles’ “purity” is the purity of fire, incarnated in the hero. Then Heracles “purifies” the earth. And he purifies it by fighting with death in the form of monsters—first monsters like Cyclops, then with impious men and villains. Only after the appearance of ethics does Heracles turn into an ethically “light” force that personifies moral nobility, a fighter against everything that is morally negative. But he is such only in tragedy. In satyr plays he has the same pre-ethical features the satyrs themselves have: he drinks too much, eats too much, has base features. In the half-tragedy half-satyr-play Alcestis Heracles is a coarse glutton and a fighter with death and a magnanimous friend.

As choruses are the past of tragedy still found in its composition, so the satyr play is the past of drama, found “alongside” tragedy. This does not mean that the satyr play is the archetype of drama. It has neither many formal features of tragedy nor the tragic conflict nor the tone of tragedy. The only correspondence is the “folk” foundation, which derives from spectacle mime, pre-ethical catharsis with its motifs of mockery, ridicule, and punishment, from mimesis with deception and cleverness, with the imaginary faking the real. In the satyr play we find in primitive and concrete form what in tragedy will produce subtle and figurative forms. The coarse spectacle, against which Aristotle will come out in time, is here the only method of exposition. The characters are monsters, animal-like fantastic beings and animals. Goats make up the chorus, which is an active character related to Dionysus. The Bacchism of this drama is also concrete and primitive. It is still understood as intoxication from wine and coarse eros brought on by wine. In the satyr
play Dionysus has the form of that Bacchus, the god of the grapevine and of wine, who is one with “folk” (Plato’s term!) Eros; among his functions are gluttony and concrete intoxication. Such an Eros—the pre-cult Dionysus—is Bacchic in the form of the satyr.

The Attic literary satyr play preserves Doric elements in the melic language, in the goat chorus, in the characters like Heracles, and in the stylization of Peloponnesian nature with woods and mountains. All the rest is atticized. The archaic nature of the satyr play, however, is shown in the fact that its primitive plots lack great semantic resonance, are elementary in their thematics and development, naive—and all this alongside tragedy!

We are prevented from perceiving this ancient drama correctly by the philistine evaluations and judgments of textbooks of Classical literature that have been forced on us from childhood. Thus popular wisdom says that the satyr play took its plots from the Homeric epic (and from literature in general), while tragedy took them from the Trojan and Theban epic cycles.

The usually acknowledged identity of themes in epic and drama is first of all a problem. For some reason this identity is characteristic only for the Classical period.

We would look at the themes of epic differently if we saw that they were the same as the themes of the satyr play and tragedy. Above I have pointed out what duels in epic and drama have in common, because agones determine the character of both genres. No one would assert that drama borrowed them from epic. But the same is true of the themes.

Behind epic lies a multi-tribal world with many parallel local legends and a variety of heroes analogous in semantics and different ethnically. Myths and heroes are the direct expression of the mythological world view of the ancient Greek tribes. Two forms served this expression—songs and showing in action. But whether it was showing or songs, the perception was the same, and the “myths,” i.e. the themes and embodiments of this world view were the same. It is by convention that we call the mass, involuntary production of that time, the only kind possible for the archaic period, popular folk art; this is clearly an anachronistic term appropriate for a society divided into classes. Greece is unique in that “popular folk art” organizes all of its art (in general, all of its ideology), although its creators were only one class, and an anti-folk class at that. This is because Greek art (like other ideologies) was going through a phase in which artistic thinking—the first in history—appeared directly out of its opposite, out of impersonal and concrete mythological thinking.

The overwhelming majority of the themes of tragedy, to say nothing of satyr plays, coincides with epic. But in satyr play, as in epic, the absence of ethicism or of any basic tendency, which is characteristic of folklore, remains. The same “heroes,” but not people, act in epic and tragedy: Agamemnons and Ajaxes, Andromaches and Helens, Heracles, Medeas, and Jasons. These are not the heroes of Homeric epic only, but of any ancient epic, since all epic as a whole sang of the same heroes that alongside served as the object and subject of showing in action. Epideictic remains have not come down to us of all these heroes. Judging by epic and Classical drama, all of them “watched” and were the object of “watching,” all were found now in authentic, now in imaginary state. The entire Iliad is dominated by the fact that the authentic Achilles is hiding, and an imaginary Achilles, i.e. Patroclus, dressed as Achilles, goes out to fight. As to the Odyssey, it is full
of the mystifications, cleverness, and deceptions of Odysseus, who even returns home in an imaginary form, but as the authentic head of the household, king, and husband, punishing the imaginary pretenders to his throne and bed. Every epic has these “pseudos” who pass themselves off as heroes. Their end is death. As Patroclus shows, at first the death of such pseudos did not have the semantics of punishment: the imaginary itself is death. The imaginary Achilles dies and has no choice but to die. The authentic Achilles remains alive.

In the same role we see Zeus and Hermes (in Roman transcription Jupiter and Mercury), Demeter, who “pretends” to be a nurse, Aphrodite, who imitates an old washwoman, Apollo in the form of a slave, almost all the gods who take the deceptive forms of rivers, animals, or people in order to deceive mortals. In tragedy Athena and Dionysus try to fool mortals; in epic Hephaestus arranges for the gods a “show” of Aphrodite in Ares’ embrace, which will later lose its quality of “watching” a tableau of eros and “beauty” which is again found in the analogous scenes of comedy (palliata). Later the “gods” will act as the idea of beauty and shining, and people will “look” at them. In the ancient epic, the gods themselves “look.”

But most of all “spectacle” is preserved in two heroes who are more ancient than the gods. I mean two Doric, though different heroes: Heracles and Helen. I have already spoken of Heracles imaginary and real, “himself” and possessed, deception and apparition that accompany him. I want to dwell on Helen, who dominates a huge cycle of epics, Only a child could believe that Helen’s betrayal could produce such an incredible response in folk verse legend. Of course the truth is exactly the opposite: Helen became popular because the tales about her were ancient and widely spread, as they were suited to mythological thought. The invented “events at Troy” or “events at Thebes” would play no role whatsoever if there were no facts of the world view behind them and if they did not represent cosmogonies and ethnogonies of sacred importance to the tribes that created them.

The Spartan Helen is an ancient Doric divinity connected with the Troad. Like all light gods, Helen incarnates eros and “beauty,” but also the nature of the muses. She is the female Apollo, who did not have a full female correspondence, but expressed a few features in Aphrodite, others in Daphne, still others in Artemis, whom Helen, according to the Odyssey, is like. The feast of the Helenia was celebrated for the Spartan girl Helen. Another Helen—the Trojan hypostasis—was like a Trojan Aphrodite, paredrus of Paris, forever connected to the motifs of Troy destroyed, death, the countless sufferings of the Trojan women. The wife now of Menelaus, now of Achilles, now of Paris she is an ancient multi-tribal divinity, first luminary, then vegetational (Helen-Tree63), the mythological “woman,” i.e. death and eros. In Helen mime and epic, lyric and drama are genetically united. She is ancient in that she is a “heroine,” but not yet a goddess.

In epic Helen is already connected with creative functions. She is the bearer of the “beauty”-eros that later, in Diotima, will turn into the sublime mysterial eros “beauty,” the beauty of giving birth, of creating cosmic birth. In this demiurgic sense Helen has woven a huge purple tapestry into which she has woven the representation of events that have taken place because of herself, Helen. So it is in the Iliad. And according to the Odyssey she gives a bride a shining garment that beams light like a star. A luminary god living on Light island, the sister of luminary-twins, Helen weaves a cosmic fiery (purple) cloak and dresses the bride for her wedding. She is a prophetess and the possessor of
In the epic Helen is subjective-objective. She weaves the pattern she is herself, as its subject and object—its theme and its character. This is not merely a tapestry, but events that take place directly, the Trojan war because of Helen. No sooner has she woven the battle between the Trojans and the Achaeans than Iris comes and calls her to watch these very events “full of wonder.” It transpires that the Trojans and the Achaeans have declared a truce. Now Menelaus and Paris will come out to duel for Helen.

The famous teichoskopia begins. The city elders sit on the high Trojan wall at the Skaian (“Shady”) gates. They watch Helen come up and are struck by her beauty. Old Priam asks Helen about each Achaean hero in turn. A beautiful tableau is revealed for those who are sitting on the wall to watch: the Achaean leaders come out for the ceremonial duel. When the agon for the possession of Deianira takes place in the Women of Trachis Aphrodite is only a judge; here she herself participates in the agon, determining its outcome.

Thus we have the gates of shade, on one side of which are old men, and on the other side are knights at the peak of their strength and beauty. Priam asks Helen questions about these “men.” Helen answers, praising and describing each one. In this scene there is undoubtedly a reflection of the parallel in action found in the structural peculiarity of tragedy. A panorama opens beyond the wall, beyond the gates. It is “seen.” The whole scene is one of “watching.” The old man asks questions of the young Helen, who shines in her beauty. Helen answers, describing what she “sees.” Her answers are praise. What is “seen” is the agon. The object of the agon is Helen, who sits on the border of two worlds, watches and waits. And the conclusion of the duel is the agon between Helen herself and Paris and their eros.

As the effaced structural traces of tragedy show, two variants were possible: at the doors of death a tableau was revealed either of shining beauty or of the dead, of darkness. But the “viewer” was also both the object and the subject of “watching,” which corresponded to the duel between life and death, an argument, an amoebean-stichomythia dispute of questions and answers. The question had negative significance (corresponded to “old age”), the answer was positive, constructive, later narrative, creative. Helen, weaving her “double” purple cloak, first weaves a pattern, then gives a verbal picture in narrative. For the dying and revived Logos is the creative principle, is the recreator of what it speaks of.

The element of the muse in Helen brings her close to lyric. Sappho sings about her, women’s choruses sing of her beauty and destruction. In fact, Helen and Sappho have much in common in their origins. Sappho is Helen, only a Lesbian Helen, the same Aphrodite, an eros-polis divinity, but in the aspect not of an artist, a predicter and storyteller, but of a “poetess,” a singer who sings about herself. Conceptual thought makes the forgotten Lesbian divinity Sappho into a real author, turning the popular Greek heroine Helen into a “character.” In tragedy she plays a marked role: Helen fills both the choral parts and the iambics. She turns up in the plot. Even more, in Euripides she
becomes the main character in one of the tragedies, to say nothing of the plays where she has secondary roles.

Nevertheless, between the lyric and the tragic Helens there is also the Helen of Stesichorus, which derives from folklore. In the ancient version there were two Helens—one authentic one, who remained faithful to her husband, the other a phantom, abducted by Paris. As we know, Euripides as well as Stesichorus confirmed this archaic version.

Thus the theme of Helen derived from the “illusion” plot that was not yet plot. It unites, however, this Helen with the one that watches from the “Gates of Shade” the beauty of the heroes and answers the old man’s questions. Helen is connected with “wonder” and “miracle” (“deeds filled with wonder” as Homer says), the visual “beauty” that remains the main characteristic of this heroine. A star and the moon, Helen (“selena”) now appears, now vanishes in darkness; now she is with the luminary of the day, now of the night; now she is authentic, luminous-luminescent, now imaginary, setting, and her “husbands” are now real, now imaginary. Like light, like the “shining beauty,” in archaic myth she “watches” beauty and “reveals” beauty herself, “shows” it, which is particularly brought out in the beginning of the teichoskopia. This is her θαύμα, the “wonder” that turns conceptually in later centuries into her “charms” and “magic,” in part in the miraculous circumstances of her life (Euripides).

Helen is now a shadow (in Euripides, μίμημα, now authentically herself. She sparkles, like a bright object on a carousel or in the hands of a magician. One can watch her like a living picture, and she herself can watch a panorama. The place for such “watching” is a tower—a height—or the horizon: wall-door-gates, any “boundary.” She watches from a height or from the horizon what she herself represents—the duel of light and darkness, conceptually a duel “because of” her. Her authentic husband fights her imaginary husband.

The agon in action is accompanied by a verbal agon. The beautiful Helen “sees” and the old man asks questions. The beautiful Helen answers. Thus a semantic stichomythia takes place by the wall, on the tower, by the gates.

The idea of two Helens, of Helen-phantom survives for centuries and is reborn in the Middle Ages. As an original illusion figure, as a character of balagan, Helen survives in the European puppet theater, in medieval legends, in stage folklore, in later folk theater.

In balagan Helen watches and shows herself. Here she has the purely visual nature of beauty which now sparkles, now is darkened. Book 3 of the Iliad shows her connection with duel-eros; here her divine hypostasis Aphrodite appears now in the form of the active goddess of beauty-love, now in the form of an ugly old being. Such we must imagine was the agon of two Helens—of a beautiful eros Helen and an ugly old Helen. It is precisely these two aspects which appear in lyric, where the theme of eros (creation) and beauty alternate with the theme of old age and wilting, sometimes, as in Sappho, in regard to one and the same character, the “author.”

In tragedy these features are retouched. Helen as μίμημα (mimema=phantom) is recreated only by Euripides, who is not afraid of any archaic myths. Relying on Stesichorus, he decides to introduce into tragedy a figure popular in comedy and folk theater.
Thus the composition of tragedy is complex. Here we have both spectacle ritual with all the elements of folk theater and pastoral-agrarian ritual and undoubted contiguity with horse races like the Panhellenic Games. The entire nature of future tragedy is agonistic through and through, and the form of this potential genre is choral (“lyric”); the participants of pre-tragedy are the chorus, *i.e.* the civilian collective, which incorporates in itself the solo principle. Stichomythia, this most ancient structural form characteristic of tragedy, is also brought on by verbal agon; but stichomythia itself leads deep into folklore with its questions and answers, riddles and solutions, and visual divination.

I stress again that even earlier than the cult elements of tragedy we can establish without question the existence of the entire structural and image composition that characterizes tragedy: agon, the animal chorus with its songs, stichomythia and amoebean, laments, the fight at the doors and “showing” of panoramas of death, mutual “watching,” entrances and exits of the chorus, peripeteia from death and destruction to the founding of houses and tribes, catharsis with its images of the putting to death of the polluted animal and the victory of the pure animal over it. Which of these images, which became later the basic formal indices of tragedy, has its origins in cult? None of them.\textsuperscript{68}

If we take the evidence of Aristotle, the embryonic nature of the satyr play and the later appearance of tragedy with its great and variable past, its coming out of the “humorous” and relation to comedy, its cathartic character, its Peloponnesian precedents, finally the definition of tragedy as “mimesis”—all of this evidence can be confirmed already in the pre-cult composition of tragedy, where all the facts pointed out by Aristotle are already present.

Above, when I spoke of the spectacle origins of tragedy, I consciously avoided defining the boundary between the future tragedy and the future comedy. I wanted to stress that low \(\tilde{\mu}\widehat{\iota}\mu\omicron\omicron\omicron\) and *ludi* cannot contain any qualitative distinctions.

The distinction appeared only in the agricultural period, when the image of death took on dominant significance—death of the earth and in the earth, on the eve of its fertilization. In the same agricultural period the prerequisites for the future cult of the dead are created. Now “imaginary” and “real” take the meaning of “appearance” of life, *i.e.* “likeness,” “image,” and “authentic life,” *i.e.* “breath,” “soul” (Plato still believes in the *Laws* that the body of the dead is only an image, its essence is the soul\textsuperscript{69}). The epoch adds here a new series of images, for the most part having to do with the death and revival of the suffering god in the form of an animal or a plant. Religion is always the religion of death and not life. One series of pre-religious rituals, which undergoes reinterpretation in religion, became a cycle around the images of death-suffering; another, which remained closer to agricultural ideas, around images of death-birth: conceptual thought already separated these two aspects. Thus the future comedy began to be constructed on the images of fertilization, while the future tragedy rested on sorrowful images of sacrifice and burial. And it turned out that the same image idea in its two aspects gave rise to two parallel structures with opposite semantic contents.

The visual images filled with semantics of the life beyond the grave became the foundation for the future tragic structure. Two features became standard: 1) the immediate presentation of death [looking death in the face] and 2) mimesis of the dead as if alive (in the form of the imaginary as really existing). The main character of such a mimesis became the “hero,” an underworld being, a dead person. He went through a
struggle with an imaginary-living person, and as a result of this struggle and suffering
turned into a living person, while his enemy turned into a dead person. Tracking the
victim, chasing it, tricking it, spying and deceit came into tragedy as one of its obligatory
(if modified) motifs. Then the duel at the doors or the gates, the entreaties of the dying
person, all kinds of showings of death. Vision is the main semantic and structural feature
of such actions. Vision reveals a “view” now of a sparkling city (for example, Ithaca of
the Odyssey), now of bloody death (in the same work in the revelation of Theoclymenus). Showing such a view in time takes on the character of prophecy. In
tragedy it is still pre-visionary and lacks generalization. Here one finds shows of death
either in the form of immobile murdered heroes lying down or the equivalents of death
like phantoms or heroes in deep sleep (Rhesus, Philoctetes, The Madness of Heracles,
especially the beginning of the Eumenides, where the prophetess tries to wake those who
are sound asleep). The visionary characters of tragedy (Prometheus, Cassandra, Darius,
Pythia, Teiresias, Polytemnus, and others) derive from this, as does the huge role of
“dreams.”

Incarnating death, the dead or the “heroes” show themselves in misfortune. Thus the
suppliants, Prometheus, Antigone, and others invite people to “look” at their troubles
(“look at one who walks her last road, who sees the last light of the sun” … “look at what
I suffer… I can never again see the holy eye of the luminary…” etc). Thus in the
concluding scene of Sophocles’ Electra Orestes reveals himself to Aegisthus who sees at
the same time the “unenviable spectacle” of Clytemnestra dead. Aegisthus ordered that
the “enemy be shown” (a mystical term!) to the citizens, and for them to “look” in
silence at the supposedly dead Orestes, whose “phantom” Aegisthus himself looks at with
feigned good will. But when he commands that “the whole cover be removed from the
eyes” Orestes suggests that Aegisthus himself “look” at the body. The usurper wants to
enjoy the spectacle of the avenger imagined dead with Clytemnestra rather than alone. He
calls her. “She is near you,” Orestes tells him, “do not look elsewhere.” Only then does
Aegisthus see that it is Clytemnestra who has been killed, not Orestes. “Woe is me, what
do I see?” cries Aegisthus. Orestes reveals himself to him and pulls him into the house
to kill him there, as he has just killed Clytemnestra, his mother. Aegisthus tries in vain to
put this moment off. Orestes orders him to go into the house quickly: “Now is an agon
not of words, but the agon of your life.” To this Aegisthus exclaims, “Why are you
dragging me into the house? Why if your action is good does it need darkness?…” But
Aegisthus must “see the same roof” under which he killed Agamemnon and where so
many evils awaited and await the descendents of Pelops: seeing the house of death—this
means for Aegisthus to die himself. Here the house at the gates of which murders take
place is called “darkness” [σκότος]. Through its open doors a panorama of death is
“revealed” to the citizens.

“Tableaux of wonders” (θαύμα ἰδέοθαι) which are normal in palliata and
preserved in the messenger’s stories take on in other parts of tragedy the character of
phantom visions or “pictures of horror” (ὁπαν δεινά). Electra sees such an unusual
wonder at the grave of their father; the decoration of the grave serves as a recognition
sign that Orestes has returned home. Electra shows her brother to the chorus, suggesting
they look at him, as before the brother showed himself to his sister and asked that she
look at him. When the chorus answers, “We see,” it recognizes the Orestes who has been standing in front of them for a long time.

In *Agamemnon* the watchman has a purely visual role. The murder of Agamemnon is presented in the form of a show. Cassandra prophetically “sees” this death and invites the chorus to “look” at the evil deed. She “sees” the “phantoms” of the murdered as well. In the *Libation Bearers* Orestes sees Electra’s funeral libations and this begins the action. Immediately there is a scene in which Orestes stands at the doors and beats on them, trying to get inside (to commit murder). Such a scene connected with death appears later: when Aegisthus has already been murdered by Orestes, the servant tells Clytemnestra about this; he pushes the door, yells, calls, demands that the doors be opened as soon as possible. And when Orestes kills Clytemnestra too he himself, the murderer, shows the bodies to the chorus and invites them to look at the picture of double death.

Such panoramas of death fill all tragedies. Here we have to add the stories of pictures of suicide: the “horrible spectacle” of Jocasta, who hung herself, of Haimon and Antigone who committed suicide, of Deianira, of the blinding of Oedipus, etc. These spectacles of death are revealed now to the heroes themselves (for example, to Creon), now to the chorus, now to the messenger. “Look at Oedipus…” says the chorus which “sees” a “terrible suffering.” Oedipus denies himself the ability to see: he says, “Why see if there is nothing pleasant to see…that can be the object of my sight?” As everywhere in tragedy, here too “see” means “live,” and “to be blind” means “to be dead.” Like Oedipus, Creon in *Antigone* in the words of the chorus “saw Dike too late.” He too “needs to see” and he “will see” the death of his wife. The time comes and he “sees” it. Like Oedipus, he prays to be taken away from the city “so as no longer to see the day;” he prays for death.

The role of funeral images in the genetic structure of tragedy forces us to recall the most ancient forms of Roman and pre-Roman spectacles. Such were the agones performed by people destined to die (morti) with animals (gladiators). Such were the staged performances during which the “actors,” who were condemned to death, died right on stage (pantomimes). But such as well were the non-stage but purely funeral acts as well: the actor’s mimesis at funerals and collocation. In the first case actors “mimed” the dead, pretending to be him in living form: passing off death as life, it was as if they brought the dead back to life. In the second case there was the ritual of putting out the dead to show the community. The Greeks and the Romans adorned the dead, put them on a high bier, and “exhibited” them inside the house or in an open place. This ritual, which required people to “look at” the body, has been preserved to our day. Its meaning becomes clear when we remember that “look” meant “be alive.”

Death shows with time in part turn into stories about death presented by an “eyewitness,” *i.e.* a messenger, and in part remain in the fabric of the plot of the underworld being, the “hero,” who undergoes death.

The acts of watching which bring life to the dead person, battles and entreaties at the doors, showing the dead, all took on the character of sacrifice in the agricultural period and led to a semantically unified mimesis of the dead as living, the imaginary as the real. This accounts for ecphrases, “miracles,” and peripeteias of the transition from the “unreliable” realm of death to the reality of the creation of life.
Not only the themes with their motifs and scenes, but the entire structure of Greek tragedy—as a whole and in its parts—is composed in the pre-religious period, when there is no cult or ethics. I will enumerate these structural elements: the choral base, which includes solo, agones, peripeteia, laments, parodoi and exodoi, stichomythia, iambic parts, “showings” and amoebean, which prepares the way for the future dialog.

Dialogism begins when the singer speaks about himself addressing another character. This strange feature essentially organizes Greek lyric. The subject can reveal himself only by means of addressing an object.

Therefore one must not mistake amoebean for dialog. In folklore there is amoebean; its traces can be found in choral songs, both lyric and dramatic, where the semichoruses contradict, “repeat,” “ask questions,” and “answer.” The image of amoebean is stichomythia; strictly speaking it is an altercation rather than dialog, just as a riddle is not a dialog, nor is just any “debate.” Dialog arises not from “responsivity” or from stichomythia. It is born in lyric.

Greek lyric is not yet conceptual; it has no pure subject. Since it arises from conceptuality, however, it forces the singer to divide the world into self and non-self, which are still connected to each other. Every lyric song contains not one but two participants: the one who sings and the one who is sung to. And both these characters are indivisible, though the distinction between them is fully realized consciously.

At first the song is addressed to the gods (heroes), only later is it addressed to humans. One must pay attention to the fact that epic is thought of as the song of the muse, while lyric is a song, figuratively speaking, “to” the muse. Lyric choruses are a variant of hymns and all kinds of prayers, as preserved in tragedy. In Aeschylus the choruses entreat the gods, praise gods and cities, or curse the impious.

Lyric monody, iambics or elegy always have their “addressees,” earthly people to whom they are addressed. In iambics the “addressee” is the main character, the main theme, like the “addressee” in Sappho. He is concrete and unique; this is not a generalized “reader.” Pindar is significant in this respect. In almost every ode addressed to a concrete victor in competition he speaks about himself. Or, to put it differently, he speaks about himself in the form of an address to one who has achieved victory in a competition. This is the birth of dialog.

The tragic author is a winner or a loser in a competition like the addressees of Pindar. But he is already separated from the actor, who performs his agon independently. The subject is removed, only the object remains. The “I” that remains in the chorus is simply a relic which no longer corresponds to the “I” of lyric.

In Classical tragedy there is no monologue in the European sense. Its monologues are always the speech of a subject addressed to an object; but unlike lyric with its human addressees (a conceptual configuration!) in the monologues of tragedy the subject is the “hero,” a being in human form, while the object is still nature (earth, a river, a “polis,” etc.). As it develops conceptually and overcomes image undifferentiation, tragedy too, like lyric, acquires “addressees” in the form of individual spectators who “sit” off to the side and “watch;” more archaic comedy, like iambic, has still not abstracted and separated out the spectator, but rather introduces him into the theme and composition, calls him by name, makes him concrete, attacks him, making him a participant in the agon with him.
Dialogism thus forms the basis of drama as it forms the basis of lyric. But the difference and the tone is determined by the level of conceptuality. In drama there are really at least two characters; they are already present physically, on stage. The choruses and monologues, however, recall the lyric stage, while the separation into actors and spectators recalls the “iambism” that once connected them. Conceptual thought introduced their agon into the structure of the plot construction of tragedy, and outside the plot conceptual thought preserved agon only as a stage ritual. It did the same with iambic, removing from it the aggressive contents it had in lyric and uniting it with agon.

In this pre-conceptual period there is no dialog yet in the active-lyric mimesis where the semichorus or the choruses with the soloist “exchange” lines, “alternating” questions and answers, “taking up” the refrain, etc. But here we already have the structural prerequisites for the future dialog present.

The chorus in this period was also the “author” of its own songs. Its active-passive character forced it both to “undergo” something and to create something; it was theme and narrator and author all in one. Hence the strange phenomenon that has already become familiar to us: the fact that the songs were sung by a collective, that they were connected with age, sex, profession, and with only one age, sex, and profession, and that personal motifs were expressed by a collective, that there could be collective lyric, that the basic principle of drama was the chorus. In these phenomena one can clearly see the connection between the chorus and the archaic social structure with its division into sex-age “classes.” The chorus is the incarnation of the polis, the polis itself in its mythological, pre-city meaning. It reflects the structure of the group society and is represented in image as being made up of luminaries, the forces of nature, animals, later of female incarnations. There is no “literariness” in it. It is not a “character” in lyric or drama. The chorus is always made up of citizens, always parts of a polis. This polis composition is found in choruses of girls, in women’s choruses, in choruses of old men and youths. All choral lyric is based not on actors, but on citizens. Hence it follows that providing and making up the chorus was a civic duty both in drama and in lyric: choregoi were provided by philoi. Originally it is the multiple-single polis which sings of itself, later it becomes the living person of the “author,” who is not a character. The song of the chorus is accompanied by certain ritual actions; in Greece it never functioned as an independent music act. In some cases the choral song is connected with walking, in others, with standing in one place, as is later preserved in lyric and drama. It has its own costume ritual as well as a ritual of setting and type of action, to say nothing of the strict genre canon of structure and content. Laments, dances, weddings, funerals, victories, processions, races—all these are choral songs woven into certain rituals, which are not yet cult rituals.

14

Of course, any question about the origins of any phenomenon is philosophical. For most philologists, a fact appears at the moment when it is born. But a biologist would laugh at this.

The question of the appearance of a fact and the question of its specification are inseparable. Philologists usually understand specification as a process in which origin plays no part.
Of course before concepts stabilized and before ethico-religious views appeared there was no tragedy. But they could never appear in the nature of tragedy if it did not have all its texture of mythological images.

Everything in tragedy except for the conceptual idea belongs to the image composition. Nevertheless, neither the image composition nor the conceptual idea separately from each other created tragedy. The essence of the matter is that tragedy arose not from these two “elements” separately, but that there were not “two” components. The whole point is that the conceptual idea appeared at first as a new form of mythological image, and if there had been no composition of light and agrarian images in pre-stage drama, tragedy would not have been created.

The cult of Dionysus undoubtedly played a constructive part; and at the turn of the 6th-7th centuries in Attica it had already united in itself the cult of the dead and fertility cults. The cult of Dionysus was a religious phenomenon. However, one must not think that religiosity was based on the appearance of gods, temples, rituals, hierology, etc. Everything in worship and divine service existed many centuries before religion, including the gods themselves, temples, acts, myths, prayers. But all this image conglomerate turned into religion when concepts appeared with their causality and finality, with the definition of space and the division into two worlds opposed one to another. The cult of Dionysus itself had its origins in folklore, but it became a religious phenomenon in the process of conceptuality, which also created ethical concepts. So long as there was no ethics, there was no religion. There was not one religion without ideas of moral good and evil, and not only the idea of revenge and fate, but the purely social idea of the moral conduct of man was born in religion.

Religion differs sharply from mythological ideas in that it is based on the concept of the qualitative. The qualitative is at first poor in scope, monotonous and standard. It uses only two concepts, exceptionally narrow, of the good and the bad. The two poles of the positive and negative have the character of good and evil, truth and falsehood. As I said in the beginning, this good and evil are not yet abstract, but are separate, concrete, and independent qualities, personified in the form of gods; these qualities are instilled in separate, concrete people, for the most part in kings (“heroes”). The bearers of the first ethical ideas are gods and kings, but not all of them in general, but a given god, a certain given king. Thus Ares is not granted ethical features; he is always the same. So is Hades. But Zeus may be fair or unfair. The majority of the ancient gods are extra-ethical. The gods become angry and are propitiated; only later are they credited with a single unchanging positive moral state.

As to human morality, it can only be dual and only in respect to the gods. Kings and “heroes” can only be pious or impious. The former coincides with righteousness, the latter with its violation. Each of these extreme and monotonous qualities has its internal semantic scope, which is narrow and unchanging: piety consists of fear of the gods and respect for the gods, hospitality, humility and justice (“the fair judge”); impiety of disdain for the gods and for truth, arrogance, conceit, and all kinds of violation and denial. Piety coincides with divine inspiration, impiety with possession by evil, madness (mania, “illness”).

All these Classical moral concepts, however, have one distinctive feature. This consists in the fact that their entire texture is not abstract, but concrete-objective, spatial, physical.
I have devoted a number of works to the semantic analysis of Classical ethics; \(^9\) I pointed out that ethics too had its origins and development, that it was not always characteristic from the beginning in all periods and all peoples as a kind of inborn sense of the good and the fair. I have never been able to express this idea in print, because it seemed terrible to those who “knew of not one single nation which did not have its own ethics in any early stage;” those who did not recognize behind “feeling” an act of consciousness which changed its structure and its content through history. Much less could I publish my main idea that Classical ethics had its origins in eschatology.

Now the problem is not the semantic fact—I consider it irrefutable—but the origins of the abstract concept out of the physical-spatial image.

Classical eschatological mythologems are very far from later conceptual eschatology; they still do not mention the fate of souls in the other world or the Last Judgment and retribution. In Homer the “other world” is presented in aspects both of sadness and of bliss, without any ethical coloring; this is not yet the abstract “lot” of the dead, but simply their existence in the world beyond the grave. The sinner Helen, the infanticide Heracles, the coward Menelaus, all enjoy eternal youth and bliss after death, which are not connected with any retribution. Furthermore, the famed hero Achilles in one version of the myth resided on the island of bliss, and in another languished in the underworld.

Mythological eschatology was interested not in people, but in heroized cosmoses, and not in their “lot” after death, but in death itself in the images of destruction and madness—storms, fires, and floods; it told of freezing and darkness, foul weather, elements raging in fury—heroes. All Homer’s heroes are heroized elements of light, fire, and water; the elements rage, the heroes are angered and do battle, the gods rage and fight.

Biological and social progress changes the structure of man’s thinking. Concepts introduce multiplicity and the qualitative. Static concrete units, which neither move nor vanish, begin to be understood differently, broadly and qualitatively. Now in every image one can feel the parallelism of two forms of thought—the concrete and the primitive-abstract. The semantics meanwhile remains the same, but conceptuality gives it a new, abstract character, which is clearly different from the first, and this makes a dual impression on us: sometimes it seems we have before us a pure concept, sometimes we take the concept and the image for two independent semantic units (for example, in epic simile).

Culture, like the material world, is indestructible. Obsolete life and obsolete ideas turn into the formants of religion, into its formal texture; but it is made what it is by conceptual thought, which narrows the significance of the gods and endows them with functions, which introduces causality and finality (“so that,” “let there be” \(\text{et al.}\), which separates the two spatial worlds, etc. In religion god and man are qualitatively different.

Ethical concepts and religious concepts, like the threads of one fabric, are indivisible, and not in content, but as a single inevitable result of primitive-abstract thought. All the former “physicality” of mythological images begins to be born again in the form of abstract ideas on the basis of the earlier semantics. The mythological figures Dike and Hubris, these two cosmic images of creation and destruction are conceptually transformed into truth (good) and its violation (evil), but at the same time they are transformed into goddesses who have the former mythological semantics as well as this new, abstract “ethical” meaning.
It was not because of the appearance of morality that the physical categories became moral. The Greeks did not even have a term to designate morality. It is obvious that before the appearance of quality there could not have been an idea of the properties of men, of “conduct” [nrav]. But another fact is telling: when quality appeared, ethical concepts started to be based on concepts of concrete rather than abstract morals.

Physical categories turned into moral categories inevitably, as a result of the appearance of concepts. Thunder and lightning, earthquake, hail, whirlwinds began to mean destruction in the abstract sense, and this abstraction, the multiple and qualitative sense of the enraged, destructive elements produced the concept “evil” which people filled with a historically variable content according to social convention.

Thus it was that social ethics appeared not out of itself, not out of a system of moral (and stable) views, but out of ideas about physical phenomena created in abstraction.

In Homeric similes and in Hesiod the parallelism of physical and moral images is already present. Here bad weather and impiety, justice and abundance appear in pairs. To explain the indissoluble semantic pairing of such images, conceptual thought links them by causal subordination: abundance appears “as a result” of the justice of the king, bad weather “because of” the impiety of judges. Of course neither Homer nor Hesiod understood that there could be no logical connection between natural phenomena and the morality of the leaders.

Originally external nature was imagined as the only character of everything around; it was thought of in the form of things, animals, plants, even people, but retained the character of the elements. Such perceptions are reflected in mythology; in epic nature is heroized. But the transition from nature to god marked the appearance of religion, and the transition from nature to man marked lyric. The connection between lyric themes and nature was formed because lyric was an illusion of nature, which had become man—it was the verse genre in which the functions of the elements-heroes and the gods were already performed by personified heroes and real people.

In lyric the parallelism between the “physical” and the ethical is strengthened. Solon uses the eschatological images of bad weather and cold, storms, and hail to express the concepts of illegality and injustice. He has no other means, though he has nothing to do with eschatology. But still he creates every ethical concept through an eschatological image. Theognis builds these concepts the same way. In Mimnermus “evil” arises from “old age” and “wilting” of physical nature. Almost every lyric poet has a paired opposition of two concrete things, which grows into two antagonistic concepts. In Tyrtaeus it is “valor-cowardice,” in Theognis two polises, in Hipponax poverty-wealth, in Sappho, Anacreon, and Mimnermus flowering-wilting or love-separation, etc.

In iambic the raging elements are reborn as the moral categories of injustice, persecution, punishment, revenge, anger. The hostile elements turn into “offenders” and “enemies,” and their attacks and blows (what in the Iliad, say, is “physical”) take on the abstract meaning of the “attacks” and “sharp blows” or “mockery” by the enraged opponent. Invective images in Archilochus, Alcaeus, and Catullus are still far from the generalizations of the conceptual genre of satire, and they preserve much that is concrete.

Particularly obvious is the parallelism between the “physical” and the ethical in the ode. Here the race of horses and ethicization are two independent lines, which have no causal connection between them. The semantic identity, however, is present: the agon of
two horses or the duel of two wrestlers are interpreted by the ode as the moral victory of the winner, as piety and righteousness. The image of the foundation of houses and new kingdoms, the image of victory over death is expressed by the ode in the form not of physical, but of ethical cosmogony; the kingdom of Dike takes on here the ethical character of righteousness, valor, virtue. Contrary to all verisimilitude, the tyrant-victor in the ode always turns out to be hospitable and pious. But this piety and righteousness are the conceptual ethicization of the same images that are present right here in the form of the founding and settlement of a city (κτίσις), the birth of an island, the founding of a house. Creation and construction, this is what the victory of the sovereign is. The city or the country, or the generation of heroes are the cosmos which is periodically “victorious” in the person of its creator. Celebration of such a “victory” is no less than at the awakening of Adonis. Even more: at this time war is ceased and all the separate Greek tribes and cities are united in single participation with those who fight.

But the ode, which is based on the common semantics of “overcoming death” and the mythological “good,” constructs two parallel series: the real, physical agon (image) and the ethicization of victory, elevated to a sublime virtue (concept). It is from this dual structure that Pindar draws his ethics, which contains the antithesis of the man-hubrist and the righteous man. The hubrist, proud of his material riches, is arrogant; the righteous man is pious and full of fear of fate and recompense (Rieder100).

If lyric is nature that has become man, tragedy is eschatology that has become ethics. Nature in lyric is not yet a character; it is dissolved in the suffering of the “author,” who sings either about himself or for himself. But aside from man, nature is preserved in the lyric simile, which is in essence parallelism. For example, in Pindar “Virtue grows in wise and just men like a tree grows in fresh dew, raising itself to the damp ether” (where “virtue” is the same as “tree”).101

In tragedy the heroization of nature has turned into personified “heroes.” In it physicality has vanished, having been completely transformed into ethicism. While the ode contains two parallel series, physical and ethical, tragedy contains only one, which has consumed both zoomorphism and eschatologism. There is only one agon here, between the good principle and hubris, but without any horses, chariots, athletics, et al. All of this shows the conceptual nature of tragedy, which rereads races and epinikion in later and more progressive forms. Ethics reinterprets outdated “lyrism” as well as the ancient feminine elements, though it leaves them in the composition of tragedy in the form of its texture. Thus the agon of animals and the passive wilting of vegetation, and the rebellion of stormy nature all have been turned from concrete to abstract categories.

This transition was taking place around the concept of “conduct” [nrav], which became the foundation for the creation of “morality” [nravstvenost’]. Only two kinds of conduct were possible, as I already said, light or dark; from this image concept creates pious and impious conduct.

In epinikion “conduct” always plays a part. Using the term “ethos,” Pindar shows it as the sum of features of a righteous king or hero, of an ancestor of the victor (or of the victor himself). Tragedy, on the contrary, understands “conduct” [nrav] in the dark sense, in the form of wilfulness, ungovernability, hubris. The Classical meaning of “conduct”
Starting from “conduct” [нрав], Classical morality [нравственность] is interested not in problems of right or justice in general, but only in showing the concrete bearers of dike or hubris. And Greek tragedy, which is still far from the drama of characters, shows the “conduct” [нрав] (in the Classical-ethical understanding) of its “heroes.” Ajax, Prometheus, Polynices, Medea, even Antigone or Oedipus are hubrists, in spite of the fact that they are right; but “morality” [нравственность] overcomes the right.

Classical morality is very peculiar—like all ancient morality; it recognizes the ethics of untruth to the same extent as the ethics of justice. Thus in hubristic ethics cleverness, treachery, greed, and lies are victorious; this is the basis of all the “edification” of the apology, fable, and comedy.

Greek tragedy became ethical because its foundation is the ethos of the animal. In the agon of the pollution-animal and the pure-animal dike—“conduct” suffered at the hands of hubris—“conduct;” but the former still won. This image scheme lies inside every tragedy, but it appears particularly obviously in the Agamemnon, where the chorus brings in the story of the conduct of a tamed predatory animal. I will repeat what I mentioned before: the narration of the chorus places in one series the conduct of the lion cub, the opposition of Dike and Hubris, and the events in the house of Agamemnon. Rituals with animal Dike and Hubris, myths about animal etha were the mythological-image base that was transformed in conceptual cult ethics into a new dramatic system; Greek tragedy became by right the genre where ethics took its place.

When we speak of the animal characters of tragedy, however, we should not understand this “zoologically.” The animal choruses of tragedy, the animal protagonists are first of all “heroes.” Elements are incarnated in them. The agon of two animal opponents and the passion of two “conducts” [нрав] were represented as the incarnation of the struggle which took place in external nature and took the form of a storm, a whirlwind, a “revolt” of elements and all kinds of destruction.

The choral narration about the lion cub is in Agamemnon because the story about the conduct of the animal precedes the dramatically worked out plot about the conduct of the heroised man.

Ethics and “animal” narration are very close: they are created simultaneously by conceptual thought. We call the narration about the conduct of animals braced by moralization [нраво-учение] fable, apology, parable. But the victory ode, which is thoroughly ethicized, invariably has in the center of its composition a narrative part. In lyric the narrative function belongs to the oldest performer—the chorus, and not the monodist, and we see the same thing in tragedy. On the other hand, we can find a narration about the “conduct” of an animal-hubris which triumphs over an animal-victim in the middle of an edifying poem of Hesiod, in Archilochus, who ethicizes in the fable form, in the structural details of Old Comedy (Wüst102), and in the songs of the tragic chorus. The thought occurs to us that the oldest narration was “ethos,” and then began to be accompanied by ethics, in other words, that the original “moralizing” [нраво-учение] had the form of a story about conduct [нрав].

And this is logical: the life of external nature is perceived for the most part in the form of “weather” which was thought of as the “conduct” [нрав] of a meek element or a fierce element. As a result of this indissolubility of the images of weather and conduct the
famous divinational parallelism was created, which later filled all folk calendars, particularly in antiquity. Conduct, if you like, is man’s “weather.” The calendar taught that on such and such a day or in such and such weather one should act thus, and such rules had no ethical character at all yet. It is the calendar and divination that show that “conduct” [nrav] was not understood ethically at all from the very beginning. Eschatological phenomena like hail, snow, storms, downpours et al. corresponded to “conduct” [nravy]: brother attacked brother, rebellion arose in cities, discord and quarrels flared up among people. Of course along with this the earth gave crop failures, livestock died, the sun was eclipsed, i.e. all nature changed its “conduct” for the worse. Conduct and weather were thought of as identical.

The first “conduct” [nrav] is weather, of which one can say that it represented a still pre-ethical conduct, the conduct of the elements, including the mythological “man,” i.e. thing, animal, and plant. Hence, from its calendar-divinational “ethos-ness,” derives conceptual ethics as the idea of concrete conduct-ethics [nravy] granted by nature to gods, kings, heroes, later to people.

The story of the conduct [nravy i povedenie] of nature was preceded by showing directly ἐπίδειξις. All spectacle “wonders” of an active, pre-narrative type were such pre-narrations. Among them were the illusion ritual acts, which personified and imitated nature, animals and people, gods and heroes, as well as visionary tableaux of which I have already spoken as forms that precede narration. Every visio was also an act: one person “watched,” another “showed.” I have already given examples from the Classical period. I would like to add the Biblical-Christian forms the Classical world did not know. Thus eastern visionary tableaux “showed” in divinational form the “conduct” [nravy] sometimes of animals (early apocalyptic), sometimes of polises (Biblical revelations); prophecies themselves consisted of showing the conduct [nravy] in its corruption and decline, the fall of cities “because of” impiety and vice. By the way, the vision of Theoclymenus in the Odyssey also belongs to this class. Both аρετή and θόσος are first “shown;” their spectacle nature has been preserved in balagan, in the aretalogies and ethologies, pretenders and imitators, fools and magicians that perform right in front of the “spectators.”

But what is spectacle in comedy is ethical in tragedy and epinikion. In the tragedians and Pindar аρετή and θόσος become the central ethical concepts.

The very existence of the drama, however, was brought on by the absence of the narrative form. When man could not yet narrate, he presented events by means of recreating them visibly and immediately, concretely. This explains not only the fact of depiction in action, but also the devices of concrete expositivity which are preserved in Classical drama: everything spoken of is accompanied by movements which are invariably named, as if the spectators were blind (“And here he comes,” “I take you by the hand,” “With this hand I touch,” etc.). Instead of narration about a quarrel, about the arrival or departure of the heroes, about their conduct [nravy i povedenie], about joy or sorrow, the tragedy presents the entrances and exits of the characters themselves, their voices and suffering, their arguments, their laments and tearing of clothes, even their corpses and funeral rituals in their honor. The external rituality within the Classical drama (the so called “structure”), which was explained as a relic or a mere “skeleton,” was in fact the same elements by means of which the story was constructed when there
was no ability to narrate: here is the struggle, here is the peripeteia, here is the singing chorus, etc.

17

Between showing conduct and narration about conduct, however, there was another genre—the gnomic [aphorism]. I have spoken in detail of the gnome in my analysis of Hesiod’s *Works and Days*. The gnome, like the Homeric simile, is an antecedent of narration; all of them consist structurally of two antithetical members united by a rhythmic unity (often a rhyme). Narration, simile, and gnome are all products of conceptual, generalizing thought. Above I said that the simile without “like…so” takes on multiplicity and turns into a gnome or a proverb. Before the act of comparison there can be no simile; before thought generalizes there is no proverb-gnome. Proverb and gnome are created when the unique, concrete object takes on the meaning of something general; any specific fact may grow into a proverb (“the wind drives the clouds away,” in Gorky “there’s no reason to salt herring”). The Classical gnome, however, has certain peculiar features, i.e. limits. It represents the debate between two opposed, antagonistic principles, united by an internal identity though externally different. This is the agon of “essence” with its “likeness,” of two rhythmically harmonious antagonists. Usually the gnome appears in the form of questions and answers; among the ancient peoples cosmogony and eschatology were expounded through gnomes.

The gnome is the bearer of ethics. Classical moralizing, like all didactic, is gnomic. Hesiod’s entire edifying poem is gnomic through and through. But the ethics of this poem are far from monotonous in its multiple forms. The basic teaching of the poem is agricultural and navigational, still far from ethics. Though it does “teach” how to conduct oneself at different times of the year (the connection between weather and conduct!), it is purely calendrical, divinational. This teaching is connected to a whole string of gnomes, of which some are ethical, others calendrical. “Do something” and “do not do something” in some cases are interpreted as rules for conduct, in others from the religious-moral point of view. Proverbs, gnomes, fables, myths-parable lead us deep into folklore, instructions and maxims about Dike and Hubris into religious ethics.

Gnomic runs through all Greek poetry. The elegy is gnomic; in some cases, dating back to folklore, it consists exclusively of gnomes. The gnome has an obligatory place in epinikion and tragedy. Not understanding its meaning, Sophocles and especially Aeschylus turn it into maxims and meditations of an ethical nature. It is telling that in these tragedians it is the chorus which meditates, the most ancient bearer of the gnome, at least in choral lyric; beginning with Alcman the gnome becomes an obligatory structural part of the song, with an obligatory ethical and ethico-religious content. Only in Euripides does the gnomic function of the chorus pass to the soloist.

It is more important that stichomythia in tragedy is one of the variants of the gnome, to say nothing of the fact that some stichomythia, especially in Euripides, is a site for gnomes. This is not as important as the structural likeness of gnomes and stichomythia as a question-answer form with a sharply expressed “debate,” an agon of two antagonists. Stichomythia represents in active, i.e. ritual and pre-narrative form the same thing that in gnome loses all action and turns into pure logos. The agon of two opponents becomes in gnome a structure that consists of two rhythmically united antithetical members. But even...
in this form the gnome shows that, in content, of the two opponents-agonists one is good and the other bad. The oldest Classical gnomes, with which Hesiod’s Works overflow, are always paired. Every positive fact is opposed to a negative fact (“There is no shame in work: idleness is shameful,” “Obey the voice of truth and do not think of violence,” “Shame is the lot of the poor, while the glances of the rich are bold” etc). But such gnomes derive from the antithesis of the impious and the righteous, earlier of animals; Hesiod opposes animals which know no Dike, predators, to people who have “law” and “justice.”

The gnome is the first bearer of ethics, the first conceptual form of the eschatological and cosmogonic image, which has acquired multiplicity and elements of some abstraction. In its base lies the antithesis of two morally opposed “ethea” of dying and reviving nature; these ethea are connected with the bad, more rarely with the good conduct of nature and man.

The gnome as yet has no time, person, number. Its essence is substantive. It speaks in an indefinite mood, addressing everyone and no one. The absence of past and present makes it figurative: it seems to predict and prophesy—it pontificates peremptorily. The parallelism of image and concept, or rather the presence of the image in every Classical concept makes for a peculiar understanding of the present, past, and future. Mythological time can have conduct [nrav], because it is a living or dead being. Thus the past, which corresponds with “peace” (εἰρήνη, Pax), abundance and harvest, is always characterized by good conduct [nrav]; everywhere in Classical poetry, when the past is mentioned, utopia appears, and not only a geographical utopia, but an ethical utopia. The present, on the contrary, is eschatological. It is the “Age of Iron.” Amidst drought, infertility, plague, and illness it is invariably characterized by bad conduct [nrav]. Concepts turned these spatial ideas into abstract ideas. The “conduct” [nrav] of nature—its death or revival—turned into ethical conduct, the conduct of man. In Plato this human conduct is still found fully parallel to the conduct of nature, to mythological “seasons” and “cycles,” but his spatial understanding of time does not prevent him from being conscious of the qualitative distinction between the categories of “time” and “man.”

The history of the future was different. In Classical poetry it preserved the most archaic features, remaining as it had been a spatial and visual [spectacle] tableau. Visionary, prenarrative forms of exposition were full of the future, the most static time, especially where “conduct” [nrav] or the weather, the conduct of nature, played a role. Prophesy came out of the visual: in mythology “see” and “speak” both meant “create.” The light sees, the sun sees; providence is a demiurge, seeing through [pro-videnie, providenie, providentsiia]. Visual images, the most ancient, were figural because this archaic mythological “time” was not an abstract category of perspective, but a static spatial category in the form of a delimited slice that could be seen and touched. It was on this that all divination was later built. The mythological calendar always predicts. It gives predictions about the weather and about conduct. But all Classical poetry was considered prophecy. Furthermore, it is interesting that Classical poetry had two other features: first, it was not only the product of prophesy and “prophesied” itself, but it also had an eternal static “future” in which the “glory” it sang did not fade; in the second place, the force of its “prophecy” was likened to the force of the elements and the weather, particularly it was connected by negative simile with eschatological downpours, hail, and all kinds of foul weather that had no power over the “future” of poetry.
This visionary nature gave the Classical future the quality of a “tableau” that is “revealed” in all its concrete spatial dimensions to the view of someone looking on. In this “future” one can see “conduct” [nravy], for the most part bad conduct, as well as evil events.

The immediate “showing” of events and conduct—the oldest form of divination—alters with predictions and prophecies. But such “futurality” is not always consciously recognized by the Classical author. Most often it is a result of the archaic image that lies within the concept. The prologues of palliata “show” events, apparently transferring them from city to city; but the prologues of tragedy present “exposition” of events futurally, contrary to all logic. It is well known how much providentiality there is in the Homeric epic; in the monologues of tragedy, which are not at all intended for such a function, the same elements are found (B. Galerkina[106]), and there is no doubt that tragedy is providential not only in the monologues. I mean here both the gnome and the choral songs (of the “punishment will come” type), the agones and the laments in which the future is indicated.

The gnome remained anarrative, impersonal, atemporal and plotless; it is always an “insertion” not linked to the context. Derived from a “showing” of ethos, the gnome took on a didactic, moralizing character in epic poems and in the elegy which is close to them. When the gnome about conduct [nravy] developed into narration, the gnomic, didactic moralizing remained with this narration as if as its generalization (the “moral”): the fable appeared.

Meanwhile, ethics took a different road than moralizing. With the appearance of religion, conceptual ethics began to be born, the religious system that poses the problem of good and evil in the aspect not of the “conduct” [nrav] of nature, animal, man, but exclusively of the relationship between man and gods, the deified Dike-Themis and her variants. Classical ethics were concerned with the questions of good and evil not in general, but in the concrete: good for whom? evil for whom? And this was first presented as good for the gods, for Establishment (Themis), for Truth (Dike). Past, Established—these are hypostases that took on ethical content. All religion arose as the cult of the past, established once and for all, as the conservation of the life that had died. Ethics were imbued through and through with these views, and they in turn imbued religion with them. In time even the fate of souls in the other world began to be decided by a moral [nravstvennyi] judge, by moral [nravstvennyi] categories of conduct.

Religious ethics broke with ethos, with its image—and immanent—principle. The direct showing of “conduct” [nrav] and the story about conduct [nravy] withdrew into balagan ethology, into folk drama, into fable, proverb, and sayings in all variants of didactic and moralizing—the ancient pre-conceptual forms of folklore.

The category of conduct [nrav] was replaced in ethics by the peculiar, purely Classical concept of Φρήν, the precise meaning of which cannot be translated into our language. Phren is the state one’s spirit is in. It is given by nature to a man and cannot be changed—except into its opposite. By Φρήν the Greek meant both a man’s spiritual world, and his reason, and his heart, and his way of thinking; at the same time Φρήν is a completely concrete concept, even a somatic one; in lyric it is like a double.
Classical ethics judge not a man’s conduct, but only the state of his φρήν (whether it is impudent, humble, etc.). What in image was the ethos of the elements became in concept man’s spiritual state (Aristotle’s Ἱθή καὶ πάθη!).

The heroes of tragedy are Dike and Hubris which have become human psyche; every hero is the expression, the bearer either of Hubris or of Dike. The concept of ethos coincides in tragedy with the concept of phren.

Tragedy poses the question of the relation between the divine law and the human phren; no matter how different the answers given to this question by the individual authors of tragedies, the problem is the same in all.

18

The basic thing that ethics did for the future appearance of tragedy was to translate the physical thing categories into general and abstract ethical categories. All physical nature became ethical nature in tragedy. The place of the animal was taken by man, and he began to be characterized only by this ethical nature. His “phren” turned into an ethical microcosm. And although he was not yet a man in general but only a specific king, hero, or god, his “ethos” began to mean certain states, good or bad, of his psychological sphere. The whole content of Greek tragedy changed radically and became richer.

Ethics transformed the function of the basic struggle between the two central antagonists. From a duel between mythological good and evil (light-darkness, life-death) the struggle turned into a moral conflict between two religious-ethical forces or tendencies (right and wrong with respect to divine law). As it moved farther and farther from the concreteness of the image towards conceptual abstraction, this struggle between two idea principles took on the features of the later moral conflict, still later, in Euripides, simply of an argument and verbal battle brought on by the conflict of two monolithically opposed points of view. In Euripides the positions of divinity and man change, and the moral collision, keeping its traditional problems, demonstrates that man is right and the god is wrong.

Ethics allowed tragedy to show the conflict of microcosm and macrocosm as a conflict of ethical and ethico-social principles, in the form of human conduct and psyche, on the one hand, and as a religious-ethical world order on the other. The religious nature of such ethics brought on the standard resolution of the conflict between subjective and objective, understood in the ethical sense: Classical tragedy always presented the victory of the objective, the victory of Truth. It was because of ethics that the single Greek drama took on the coloring of two different genres: the suffering of the righteous man and the victory of truth became tragedy, the suffering of the hubrist and the victory of falsehood—comedy. Tragic hubris took on the character of moral, religious-ethical excess.

Ethics introduced a decisive meaning in the understanding of the result of the struggle between two antagonistic principles. The mythological transition from darkness to light took on the meaning of moral rebirth, moral enlightenment. Concept, born of the lustrational image, gave a new meaning to “pure” and “polluted,” dirty—an ethical meaning. And though Classical Greece did not yet have Aristotle’s abstract “catharsis of affects,” it had purification from pollution, although moral catharsis consisted in the purely physical cleansing by means of washing the hands, but ethics gave catharsis a new psychological meaning. In the mysteries “pollution” had a luminous, physical character,
but it was hidden by a moral meaning, because concept was built only through image. In tragedy too, in spite of the preservation of the physical, ritual purification of the audience, the whole plot peripeteia came out of the idea of moral catharsis: the hubrist suffered defeat, the erring man was enlightened. But one must not forget that lyric and tragedy were both founded equally on catharsis; but what in lyric is mythological image that has become a thematic motif (the luminaries or heroes that fall from a cliff, the drowned cities or heroes, the birth and submersion of islands, etc.), in tragedy turned into concepts of an ethical sort (the overthrow and death of the hubrist, punishment for impiety). Mimesis too became ethical, and it was already completely undifferentiated from cult catharsis. The “pseudos” became “impious” bearers of false ideas, theologians and blasphemers, the bearers of false truths. Possessed by fury and boldness, they represented moral pollution, the death of which brought purification.

The main religious-ethical thesis about the agon of two antagonistic moral principles and about moral purification became the idea-foundation on which the problems of Greek tragedy were built. The idea of religious-moral catharsis led to the triumph of the macrocosm, no matter how differently the tragedians showed it, including Euripides, whose macrocosm wins a Pyrrhic victory.

Ethics transforms all the image material of tragedy, making it into a new semantic and already conceptual system. The mythological ideas of fate, lot, death take on new meaning. Fate and death, becoming moral categories, do not interest the tragic poet in themselves; the problem is death for what, the way man meets his fate, the way he lives and feels, how the “immutable” shows its force. Tragedy is no longer interested in the gods, though they continue to act in it. It has its new, purely moral pantheon—Dike, Hubris, Themis, Moira, Ananke, Pepromene, Ate. It is telling that they do not belong to the official circle of gods like the Olympians, but derive from folklore; they represent a series of images of fate-death in the flesh. Above I said that ethics hardly affected the Classical gods, that it only affected Dike and Hubris for the most part. They became the moral principles of phren in man and even in god.

All these pre-religious “folk” incarnations of Lot and Truth preserve in cult ethics their female (maternal) form. Above I spoke of them as the archaic, pre-cult, pre-Dionysian character of the archaic stage ritual. The women’s chorus incarnated them and sang about them in the first person (the “I-motif”). These pre-religious divinities, already removed from the cast of characters, take on in early tragedy the form of concepts about fate and divine law, about the moral world order. In later tragedy, in Euripides, they no longer dominate the plot; in their place the official Olympian finished gods appear, who accomplish the plot.

In the conceptual-ethics system of tragedy even the meaning of death changes. It too ceases to be a physical category. Death is impiety and sacrilege; death is the fault after which comes punishment. Vengeance for guilt leads to the rebirth of the hero.

The concept of death is undifferentiated from the concept of lot—the invincible and inevitable dark side of fate. This is already fate in the cult understanding rather than the former agricultural semantics of the Earth. Here “lot” is evoked with fear and horror, with a feeling of dependence on the powers that rule over man. The concept of “life” and “birth” is also filled with ethical content. The two former thing images, which organized the beginning and end of every myth—death and life—in the ethical fabric of tragedy become cathartic categories—guilt and retribution. Ate and Alastor are the original basic
figures of tragic personae, transformed by religious-ethical thinking from mythological personae into concepts of fateful destruction and punishment.

Let us say that Greek tragedy differs from the cult drama of the Orient in its conceptism and from medieval drama in the concreteness of its images. Its uniqueness consists in the fact that all of its ethical concepts are thoroughly mythological-image. And therefore inside the ideas of the sacrificial function of catharsis there is the image of the scapegoat, while the purely ethical categories of justice, guilt, retribution come from the images of violent nature typical for Classical eschatology and cosmogony. This mythological origin of tragedy lies untouched in the poetic images of melic (winds, storms, whirlwinds, foul weather, the abysses of the sea), sometimes in the form of destructive elements which act right on stage (as in *Prometheus*). In the plot, this late and conceptual product of thought, the same forces are changed into moral categories.

One often hears that the plots and “heroics” of tragedy were connected as a continuous succession from epic. This is not true. Ethicization places a boundary between them. As far as Homeric similes are concerned, their components—animals, elements, plants, everyday things—coincide with the components of tragedy both formally and in their imaginary realism; tragedy, however, puts them into a new semantic context and a new semantic configuration, forcing them to serve religious-moral ideas.

The genetic nature of Greek tragedy (including the chorus) shows not the layers of its past, but an internal inalienable composition of it as a whole presence. Without this basic texture *[faktura]* there would have been no second nature of tragedy, the ethic one that only on the base of the first could have prepared for the uniqueness of Greek tragedy.

**PROBLEMS OF AESTHETICS**

1

In order to be formed, Greek tragedy required everything that made up its genetic nature as well as the new factor that made it unique—produced its literary quality.

The road to Greek tragedy was long in the making, but it was short in completion. It existed only for a few decades. Both phenomena are explained by the extremely specific conditions of its formation as a genre. Like all Greek literature, it came not out of a literary antecedent, *i.e.* not out of a preceding dramatic art that did not exist earlier, but directly out of the old world view heritage plus the new principles of thought that actually led to the appearance of the literary genre of drama. Greek tragedy is the first tragedy in the world history of literature, an original phenomenon that took shape in history and lost its essence immediately, as soon as the striking uniqueness of its prerequisites vanished. The specific nature of Greek tragedy itself turned out to be unrepeatable. But as a literary tragic genre Greek tragedy was the beginning of the history of all future world tragedy and “drama” in the narrow sense of the word.

To understand this peculiarity, we have to compare Greek tragedy to ancient Oriental or folk drama. Tragedy and folk drama or the drama of primitive or uncivilized peoples have much in common. No matter what analogy we take, however, everywhere Greek tragedy will be the opposite of drama in its pre-literary state, whether folk or cult drama. Folk (low) theater at the base is pre-conceptual; it is always “comic.” The genre of
tragedy is never found in folk theater. Tragedy is the product of personal art, of subjective concepts, and therefore it is a phenomenon of literature.

The struggle between light and dark, a good god with an evil, a light hero with the dragon of the darkness—this is the content of ancient Oriental drama. This is still mythology which has gone through cult and taken on the character of cult. The ancient Orient stopped at religion and at religious ethics. Greece went much farther. Aside from religion and ethics, it created finished art as well.

Of course, without cult and religious ethics Greek tragedy too would be impossible, but cult and ethics alone do not create the tragic genre. Where cult is a factor of drama something like the “passions of our lord” appear, but that is all. While the Dionysian drama of 5th century Attica is not simply religious ritual, not the Sicyonian passions that once passed from Adrastus to Dionysus and Melanippus. The Dionysian drama of 5th century Attica is art.

There is no doubt that religious-ethical concepts played a very important role in the formation of Greek tragedy. They gave new content to the social thought of Attica at the turn of the 6th and 5th centuries. But this was not most important, since the concrete contents could have been different, for example politics, as we see in other cases. Much more important is the fact that in the Classical period of the appearance of concepts the new form of thought appeared not independently, but as a changed function of the old image thought. This concerned ethics too. In the 5th century problems of ethics were not yet posed in the abstract form of philosophical or scientific generalization.

They were not distinguished from the problems of religion and art, later of politics and philosophy. At the same time, no matter what form they took, they were folkloric in nature, and they were folklore reinterpreted by concepts. It is characteristic that Greek ethics grew from its indissolubility from religious ideas and required a connection with the cult of dying and resurrecting gods; ethics were still very close to mythological-image conceptions.

The folklore nature of religion and ethics is a feature very specific to Greece. Because of this folkloricity religion was established by means of dramatic ritual, not dogma, and ethical problems were solved with the help of art, and not treatises. In other words, religion and ethics became new, conceptual forms of the same thing that made up their genetic nature: mythological-image systems which they had in common with dramatic, pre-religious folklore. This is why religious drama was a drama with an animal chorus, with an agon of tormented and tormenting animals, with the peripeteia of the transition from darkness to light and from death to life. And this is why ethics began to be worked out on animal and agrarian material.

But still, in spite of the leading role of ethics in the conceptual genesis of Greek tragedy, like cult, ethics did not act as a factor in determining the unique genre of tragedy.

This is most clearly visible in the distinction that existed between tragedy and the mysteries. In the mysteries cult and cult ethics did play the role of factor. Tragedy, undifferentiated as it was from cult, leavened as it was with ethicism, became a “secular” genre, an art form.

But nothing was as close to tragedy as mystery. Both are visionary events, spectacles based on the play of light and darkness, on watching, showing. Both are pre-narrative dramatic recreations. Both contain the agon of the authentic and the imaginary. Both
tragedy and mystery arose out of mimesis and catharsis. But tragedy took the same open path of spectacle as the folk mime that lies within it, the path of a democratic, broad spectacle. Mysteries, on the contrary, were not developed into a dramatic genre, were transferred to cult and sealed off within it. They were accessible only to the chosen, and joining them was connected with great procedures and difficulty. The ancient light epideictism contained in the basis of mystery was completely transformed by cult ethics. The spectacle acts were endowed with the closed character of “mystery,” deep religious secret. In this state they were frozen.

The path of drama was different. The open and popular nature of stage ritual did not permit it to be limited to a closed cult institution. One of its branches continued to exist in the low theater without undergoing any influence by religion. Another branch went through the cult of Dionysus, which took it in because it had the same origins itself.

The “secular” principle (for lack of a better term) affected the formation of drama more decisively than the secondary cult principle. Its main character remained the civilian commune—both as a non-professional, purely civilian performer, and as a collective character depicting citizens and even slaves—the simple human mass, and not gods, heroes, or kings. To this ancient collective religion added the divine dead—the protagonist in the form of a duo or trio of actors, a sacral character who was supposed to incarnate a god, a hero, or a king. These actors were originally called first-, second-, or third-fighters: “fight” already meant stage competition. Actors were also called dissemblers [*litsedei*—*ὑποκρήτης*]. Neither the actors nor the chorus had individuality. They wore masks.

Stage presentations preserved their “secular” category in the fact of liturgies as well—putting on and organizing choral competitions at the expense of the citizens, which was a civic duty—and in the fact that the theatrical competitions were managed by the first Archon (*archon-eponimos* [ἀρχων ἐπώνυμος]), a representative of highest secular power as opposed to the second Archon (*archon-basileus* [ἀρχων βασιλεύς]), who organized the cult, as well as in the very fact of the competition, characteristic for social institutions rather than for cult.

The actors were supplied by the state, not by the civil commune. At first the first actor was the actor of tragedy and the teacher of the chorus: three authors-actors competed with each other. Thus the individual nature of tragedy, which made it the beginning of art, is already borne out by this competition between individual persons, who were no longer simply performers of cliché improvisations. They not only composed and worked out the contents for ready-made schemes and not only acted out what they composed, but they also tried to win superiority one over the other, which required artistry and personal qualities of mind. It is no coincidence that the Greek language had no term for the general concept of “art,” calling art instead “artistry” (*Tέχνη*) and endowing demiurge gods, creators with this quality.

Classical art arose from a kind of thought that was based on distinctions and was connected with individualization that led to the unrepeatability of thoughts and the means of its expression. It could not, like folklore, be impersonal, that is standard, though it would come down to later centuries in anonymous form.

In folklore drama creation was still of a collective nature. In the folkloric period everyone thinks the same way, and everything one member of the collective might depict
would coincide with the mental capacities of all the other members. Folklore is creation of the masses, like religion is world-view of the masses; folklore and religion are the antipodes of the personal principle. In works of folklore there could be nothing created by a personality—neither a general idea, nor a definite idea, nor subordination of the parts to a whole. At best they could have a piece of a plot, with no beginning or end, without being proportional to other pieces on the same theme; they could have readymade schemes, set masks—of characters, set images in language, etc.

In spite of the fact that the author of tragedy is invisible and does not act in his own person (as, for example, in comedy), his entire work expresses his authorial value judgment and is based on his personal ideas and conceptions. Of course, there are fewer of them than in modern drama, and they are obscured by the obligatory schemes of language, structure, and composition of tragedy, even the themes, the problems, even the solutions of the problems. Everything is given to the tragedian in readymade form, everything limits his personal relation to what he is creating. But within these limits he is already completely different, in that his literary personality is constructed only by his creative abilities.

The beginning of Greek tragedy coincided with the rudiments of individualization in the interpretation of the ancient ritual scheme and showed that mass and group thinking had been left behind.

The appearance of concepts was a long process which lasted for many centuries, a process which took place differently in different conditions in various Greek polises. It was held back among conservative tribes; in 6th-5th century Attica it moved quickly forward, especially in 5th century Athens. Mythological thought had been finished long before, but as I said earlier, the concepts of that age still contained concreteness which had not yet been overcome.

With the stabilization of the cognitive “I,” separate from the known “not-I,” the subject had already grown so much that it could begin constructing—in parallel to the world of the object—its own, purely subjective world, with its separate territory and its own special laws. Aside from the fact that this was a personal understanding of the world, in the rich intellect this subjective world took the form of a kind of independent level, independent of any object. Its basic function became reproduction of the same reality that apparently lay passively off to the side.

The more man’s consciousness developed, the more objectively and the deeper it expressed the regular laws of the real world, taking on in man’s consciousness the character of deepening and enriching his “I,” i.e. his means of knowing the world. People began to differ from each other in the scope and quality of their understanding of the world, and now some outstanding people developed the ability to think with a special and specific kind of thinking in which the boundaries of cognition were broader than for other people of the same age. This kind of thinking did not appear every day or in all circumstances, but it alternated with the accepted way of thought—not because man can have two kinds of thinking, but because everyday life forces the personality to submit to its routine pattern and demands that everything unusual be replaced by the usual, the
complex by the primitive. And in the Classical period a man could be different, that is himself, only when he was allowed to.

Literary thought in antiquity was the world of the subject which had the ability not only to be the fullest expression at the time of the objective world, but also to separate from itself a separate realm of this object refracted in itself and recreated in itself anew. The Classical artist could already find within himself a world of reality just like the real one, but one over which he had power to remake it, to construct it anew, to inhabit or destroy it, etc. This world of new, subjective reality was built by means of a peculiar literary image and was illusory, if we understand illusion not in the psychological sense, as deception, but in the logical sense, as a reflection of reality in the intellect. Counterposed to the phantom, this world of illusion regularly corresponded to reality and functioned as an imagined reality, true to the authentic one, as its second level.

From the cognitive point of view artistic thinking was a system in which the subject and object were conceptually undifferentiated. This means that facts of reality were most fully reflected in the consciousness of the artist, who perceived them in the form of his own world, a world created by him, and turned them into his “I,” reincarnated himself in them and then incarnated them out of himself in the form of new facts of reality. The consciousness of the artist not only recreated anew these facts in their life manifestations, but also entered in—with maximal precision for his age—to their causes, then revealed them in visible forms, thus making the hidden the object of profound cognition. Psychologically the artist felt himself the “creator” of a world every bit as possible and completely objective as the real one, but understood and brought to imaginary life by the subjective principle of his personality. Here of course there was nothing in common with real belief in the identity of nature and society, as there was in mythological subjective-objective thought. The Classical artist realized [enthinged] his ideas in visual, audible, and tactile forms, and in this profoundly personal process ended up at completely authentic objectivity, which organized his whole consciousness, expressed itself in it and again was manifested in the facts it realized [enthinged]. The effect of the artistic work on the spectators, who passed through a reality, the meaning of which was revealed, and lived reflected in it, becoming passive co-participants both of the creative act and of the artist who created it, this effect depended on the power of refraction of the objective in the subjective and of the transfiguration of the subjective in the objective. Classical art was act, like reality itself, but it was more active than reality, because it presented reality in the essential expressiveness of forms.

Gnoseologically, psychologically, and really, Classical art was the reincarnation of the subject in the object, i.e. mimesis of objective reality. It was an illusory reality which tried to “appear” authentic. Subjective ideas were presented as objective by means of perceptible reproduction.

The first form of mythological mimesis was an image in which the subject and the object were considered one, but one of them seemed to be different, one of them seemed to be the external “likeness” of the other. Such are the doubles of things or heroes in epic and balagan (e.g. Patroclus, who disguises himself as Achilles and “appears” to be Achilles). But as early as epic there are already ephrases and similes, where for the first time the
beginnings of literary mimesis break through, still interpreted naively, concretely, in the form of a “miracle” created by the artist. Thus on Achilles’ shield and in many other epic ecphrases the dead world, created by the hand of man, always seems “as if alive.” Ecphrasis is the first conscious reproduction of life in literary mimesis. Like ecphrasis, epic similes are built on conscious illusion; their “as if” shows the obvious illusion of something that really does not exist, an illusion that is not yet eliminated. Similes are attached to phenomena of life, but not of art, and it seems they do not intend mimesis. Nevertheless, when they show man as an animal, an element, or a plant to which the man is “as if” likened, epic similes contain conceptual mimesis which has become a kind of abstract likening of one object to another. Similes in lyric are equally conceptual (Anactoria “is like” the moon), they conceal the same illusory nature, with the mimesis of one phenomenon as another. Here simile is already close to metaphor, which leaves out the “like” and “as if” between the two phenomena it compares. In contrast to ecphrasis, metaphor is not visual and does not rely on likeness (the similarity of the made to the living), and in contrast to simile it makes no attempt at external illusion (“as if”). Metaphor eliminates any “like” through its figurality. For example “my clear falcon” means “my beloved,” rather than “my falcon bird” or “my beloved, like a bird, as a bird, as if a bird” etc. In this metaphor the bird “falcon” means “beloved” because in mythological image (but not in concept—the falcon and the beloved have different features) “falcon” meant “sun,” “light,” “heaven” (hence, contrary to any real meaning, the falcon was considered “clear”) and the male principle. With transferral of meanings one begins to signify the other in illusion, coming from the old semantic connection. Metaphor says Y instead of X, and this Y means precisely X. The later it is, the stronger figurality becomes, taking on a consciously figural sense, which creates symbolism, allegory, ambiguity, etc.

Classical metaphor appears as an inevitable result of the appearance of concepts and is still in the process of its poetic birth. Only in the 4th century is it reborn as “figure,” that is, only then is it really stabilized; it begins to be employed in oratorical prose (in prose, and not in poetry!) “for decoration,” and it becomes a kind of principle of artifice. Thus the paths of the future “style,” of the artificial verbal ensemble, are laid out. In the Classical period there is still no such “style.”

If there had been no metaphor and no mimesis, art could not have appeared. Precise facts, copying, the absence of “invention” and individualization would have led to photography, when it was technically still impossible, and to document, the road to which led through millennia, interwoven with mythography. As far as folklore is concerned, without metaphoristics it was condemned to remain the same among all peoples, impersonal and with no future. The main achievement of Classical art was to translate reality into another category, the category of the human imagination, the sphere of the “apparent” and “possible,” which because of the greater perfection of concepts, revealed all of its sides and dimensions in the subject most fully and most objectively. Classical art was the first to show a certain “X” of objective reality in the form of a “Y” of some subjective interpretation, the goal of which was aimed at convincing people of its authenticity to the original. Mimesis was thus built into the very nature of the metaphoricity of thought as metaphoricity was built into the nature of art. I stress that I always have in mind the objective figurality of the metaphor, the figurality or transfer
The transposition of the object in the subject and the recreation in the subject of the object reflected and expressed in it took on specific features in the Classical artistic consciousness. These specific traits are explained by the fact that the artistic concepts of Classical Greece were born out of mythological images and were not yet emancipated from them even to the extent that they were in the Hellenistic age, to say nothing of Rome.

Usually by poetic metaphor we mean a linguistic metaphor transferred to poetry. I have never met in scholarly literature the drawing of a distinction between metaphor “in general” and poetic metaphor, between metaphor in antiquity and any other, found beyond the bounds of Greece and Rome. But precisely this distinction is the most important.

In its subjective formation of the objective the illusory world was a kind of independent perceptible reality—visible, audible, touchable—in which space, time, causality were organized by the subject, but in complete correspondence to the objective: here a certain limited life took place, taken from the point of view of events and in relation to beings which spoke a special language and manifested themselves in a special form of actions, thoughts, and reactions to their surroundings. The fact that such a reality completely coincided with objective reality and was a purely subjective construct was its distinctive feature. Its objective side in a sense placed it above the artist, in a sense separated it from his personality and gave it the function of independent existence, ignoring the peculiarities of its creator. But it was precisely artistic individuality which strengthened this level of objectivity (the level of knowledge of the object) and the more power the artistic genius had, the easier it was to forget him as a personality. Classical art was a conceptual subjective world, the generalizing essence of which dissolved the subjectivity of the artist and endowed it with features of something objective and personal, so that everyone could find in it both his own “I” and a complete “not-I.” But it had its historical peculiarity as well: Classical art—I mean the Greek classics—expressed the category of object-ness more strongly than that of subject-ness. This does not mean that the subjective sphere was inaccessible to the Classical authors, or that it was poor or could not express itself. I mean the gnoseologically subjective. The cognition of the subject was still permeated by the object, from which it was freed slowly.

This peculiarity was revealed in the fact that Attic literature began with the genre that is farthest of all from the subjective sphere—drama. Furthermore, Classical drama was in its origins ritual and impersonal. And because of the dominance of the object over the subject the whole original foundation of drama became the significant formant of tragedy; the personal principle was entirely subordinate to the strictly obligatory texture [faktura] that determined it. But this process was involuntary. The Greek artist saw the subjective only through the objective; for him the subject was possible only in the form of the object. Such, for example, is Phidias’ sculpture, in which the “I” of the artist is consumed by the element “not-I,” or rather in which all the power of his “I” is revealed in the majestic construct of the impersonal and anti-individual, almost archaically

[perenosnost’] of meanings that was created in the process of appearance of concepts out of mythological images.
monolithic image of the supreme gods. Greek sculpture in general creates the depiction of man out of the depiction of god. But even the gods of Greek art are not religious gods like the Christian god. The entire Classical stage was dominated by the transition of cognitive vision from external nature to man—and it is in this rather than in humanity that the essence of Classical “humaneness” lies. Though before the Hellenistic period man does not appear in art in his direct form, he already stands at the center of intellectual vision both in the form of god and in the form of hero. Unnamed, he is present in everything, making the Classical gods humans. But this shows that the Greeks looked at the object through man, while they constructed man out of the object.

Drama became the first Attic literary genre because of its exclusive object-ness. In drama the heroes, the subjects of suffering, act as the objects of suffering. They speak about themselves and depict themselves.

The fact that the plots and characters of Greek drama were at first not plots and characters, but a pre-literary phenomenon is of major importance; I have returned to it intentionally through this whole work.

When the playwright recreated reality, he did not copy its manifestations, but subjected them to complete recreation—both formally and in their internal interdependence. This led to a new composition of events, a new distribution of the features of reality, new conditions of its existence. The plot of drama was a selected slice of such reality, taken in its illusory refraction. The artist’s consciousness reproduced a second, illusory life by means of the plot, as a purely subjective construct of a certain context of events through which passed characters which were equally illusory, created by the artist himself. The author appeared as creator, as the subject of his own subjective cognition. He produced works of himself entirely from his own imagination.

But all of this did not happen at once, complete, by itself like some extra-historical, normative phenomenon of art always true to itself. In antiquity author, plot, and character are being born before our very eyes, and the older they are, the more objective their nature.

The chorus of citizens, the participation of contemporaries as the characters of drama, the performance of the author himself in the parabasis, the ludification of those present, called by name—all this shows a time when the later literary invention was replaced by the intrusion of reality into drama.

At first tragedy had no author. He was undifferentiated from the first actor and director. As long as there was no personal creation, the authors (“inventors”) of tragedy were considered the mythical Arion or Thespis, or others like them. The impersonality of the author is shown in the fact that he was thought of as the divinely inspired performer of a role or a work rather than its creator; such “authors” of drama were still very far from epic or lyric authors. The singers of epics and lyre songs ascribed their songs to the gods, the Muses, and Apollo. Even iamb and elegy were so lacking in individualization that one could create the corpus of Theognis’ works in which one cannot distinguish Theognis, a singer with a “personality,” from those like him.

The first lyric and dramatic authors had many impersonal features in common. Both are agonists, both are not “characters,” but real people, both are the subjects and the objects of their works.

When the tragedians began to compete with each other, they already had at their disposal ritual drama, which was connected to the cult of Dionysus. This drama,
however, in spite of its internal ritual character, derived from real institutions like funerals, weddings, sacrifices, etc Not only were the authors-performers or choruses of citizens real (not part of the characters), so were the thematic events recreated in the drama. This is why the historical theme appears in the Attic tragedy of the 5th century. Phrynichus’ *Capture of Miletus* and the *Phoenician Women*, Aeschylus’ *Persians* (which derive from the same *Phoenician Women*) show that in the most ancient tragedies the characters and plots were still real people and real events. Such slices of life which intruded directly into drama can be explained by the fact that drama was still not completely a part of art, that the recreation of reality in the subject which was the basis of the artistic imagination, was not yet stabilized. The world of the object dominated the world of the subject.

Changing one ritual function or another, one separate form or another could not make ritual into stage play. Drama, whatever its genre, was created when ritual action began to turn into “presentation” of itself, *i.e.* began to be the plot for “recreation” of what this ritual action directly “showed.” Consequently, the important thing was not reworking the material, but changing the character of thinking that translated this material into a completely new category.

The difference between “showing” and “presenting” is both great and significant. In the first case the fact is shown directly, in the second it is the object of new recreation. Ritual “showings” contained neither spatial nor temporal shifts. Thus when Adonis died and was resurrected, the ritual did not present duration of time, which is obligatory for the real course of life, fading of life, and return to life: instead of the “process” of time the ritual operated with two finished immobile “points” of thoroughly perfected action—the death and resurrection of Adonis. This was not “time,” but rather “aspect” (grammatically speaking). When the commune moved, carrying the image of Dionysus from the temple to the sea, the ritual act ignored the spatial shift. It recorded only two points—temple and sea—as if there were nothing in between. All ritual “showing” and “action” was not process, but tableau.

But this is still not the most important thing. Ritual act is subjective-objective. Its participants relive the fate of the one they depict in action. For example, even though masked, they try to change their appearance, to become one, or to seem themselves in another form. But to become stage play ritual act has to turn into an “object” recreated by a “subject.” In the example given with masking “play” means placing as the basis of the recreation masking itself, transferring it from the state of subject-object to object alone. This leads to the illusory and mimetic nature of the category of conscious “likening” “like,” “as if,” Gk. ὡς). The comedies of Plautus show this conceptual revolution beautifully. The plot action of *Casina* is a former wedding ritual. What was once a ritual masquerade (disguise—mimesis of a false bride as the real bride) in comedy turned into a literary “plot,” *i.e.* the same ritual act, but generalized to the dimensions of any similar event possible in any identical case with any characters in similar situations, the only difference being that the ritual is something real, while the plot “about” the ritual is a conscious intellectual fiction.
Concept not only places limits on the image complex, it also changes the cognitive essence of phenomena, turning the world of concrete “thing-ness” into a speculative category. What was depicted concretely and really in ritual has a general reflection in artistic consciousness, a reflection freed of the concreteness of the thing. Ritual ceases to be an “act” sufficient to itself and acquires the causal and final character of “cause” or “goal” of illusory action, or rather “for” action. It takes on the function of the “object” created anew by the imagination, and this “newness” consists in tearing it away from the “subject” as something that is observed from outside and abstracted from its distinctive concreteness, as something that can become “plot,” i.e. a sequential (causal, motivated) intellectual construction of events. The subject who “recreates” this action is no longer undifferentiated from the action itself and its object. He consciously “likens” himself to the character in the plot, which shows the distance between them. He is no longer the participant in ritual, but a performer. He is an actor.

Drama appears when instead of real people, events, and settings one finds characters, plot, and sets. Characters are illusory figures which require illusory incarnations—actors. The radical difference between the actor and the chorus is not in their number. The chorus of Greek drama is to the end a civil collective, while the actors are people of a special profession. Of course the chorus “plays,” but whom does it play? Local inhabitants or foreigners, members of a commune-tribe, but never heroes or characters. On the other hand actors always have “roles,” and only of heroes.

In tragedy the author, separated from the actor, is hidden far behind the protagonist and the chorus. If, as Aeschylus still did, he performed the leading role on stage, he did not show his face. The author of tragedy (even in the days of the early Aeschylus) had already dissolved in the characters he had created. But though he was not visible, it was precisely in tragedy that he appeared: only the Attic tragedians could give life to works in which they themselves did not take part and in which they were no longer the performers. This was a giant step forward compared to the lyric poets. The tragic author marked the appearance of a genre in which events could be presented by an invisible character “as if” objectively, “like” in life. I mean narrative prose, where the “seeming” absence of the author becomes the category of style. In tragedy this absence strengthens mimesis, turning drama into “mimesis of reality.” Here there is no desire to “deceive” the spectator, to make him believe that what he sees is reality. Mimesis has the objective character of “artistic” truth, which is an invention that corresponds to reality, is a possible reality. The Sophistic theory of “deception,” which grew out of the practice of folk theater with its illusionism, was later conceptually than tragedy (though they functioned at the same time).2

The external world, where the tragic events took place, was signified by the sets. As we know them today, they did not exist in the ancient world. One set—the back wall with three doors—was constant. For changes in location of the action periaicts were brought in; these were special primitive stands with two or three standard revolving depictions of locations; these depictions would be turned to the correct side as needed. The action took place for the most part in front of a palace, but also in front of a temple, an altar, a grave; if one needed a landscape, the periaict was turned to a depiction of mountains, the sea, a river, etc. Such sets were not intended for visual deception, much less seduction. They were not yet props, but rather like the plot and the characters an illusory setting, reality refracted through the literary consciousness. But plot and character, which generalized
events and people, were profoundly exposed in tragedy, while nature continued to preserve its objectivity and did not take the form of “landscape.”

6

There is no doubt that the contemporary ballet derived from acrobatics. But how much of it remains in ballet? The character of the “figures,” the external form of the dance. On this foundation a new and varied content began to be built. Acrobatics became the structure of the dance and pantomime image.

It was different in the Classical period. Above I said that Casina recreated the wedding ritual of masquerade. Here we would seem to have the same relationship between the texture and the new content constructed on it. In fact the difference is immense. The ballet artist, performing the same figures, can use them to express the love of Juliet, the jealousy of Zarema, the grief of Cinderella, the dream of Parasha. In Casina the plot of the action recreates in a different form only the same wedding masquerade which lies within it. The ballet has no trace of acrobatics, though it is built on and came out of acrobatics. Classical plots were the conceptual form of the mythological images which are present right there within them. No matter what Classical literary work we take, it will be built not on individual free invention (“fantasy”), but on the mythological image texture required by the given genre. Therefore the content of the Classical literary work is always the same as it is in its prescribed mythological image skeleton.

This explains the fact that struck me when I was researching the Greek novel, the plot of which coincided with mythological motifs hidden behind the names of the heroes of the novel (Thecla, Falconilla, Strongulis, etc.): what lay inside the novel (mythological image) was identical to the novel itself (concept). Identical formally, but different qualitatively.

Above I said that only subjective-objective ritual contains the complete identity of action and content. If a man puts on the skin of an animal he is an animal. It is not so in art. The plot of the death of a hero who “as if” dies, which derives from the burial image, is neither his real death nor an interpretation of a funeral. Here the point is the causes that brought the hero to his death, the suffering of the hero, depicted in their manifestations. Three distinctions make a watershed between ritual drama and literary drama: quality (causality, motivation), illusion (“as if”), and the pictoriality of the means (manifestations of events and psyche), all of which are related to personal artistry. What was a semantic goal in itself in ritual (walking in procession, partaking of the divinity, plunging into water, etc.) serves in Classical art as the object of recreation anew in a different form, conceptually generalized and “as if” objective, but in fact subjective.

The basis of Greek drama was ritual act, the basis of its characters were the participants of the ritual, of its plot—myths, of its sets—external nature. This was not ritual, however, but drama, not participants, but characters, not myth, but plot, not nature, but sets.

Concrete things appeared anew in the artistic consciousness in the form of phenomena of a new intellectual type. They became the object of conceptual recreation, for one thing. For another, they took on a consciously “invented” character, i.e. were transferred to an illusory level. The Classical period itself considered art a “fiction,” which attempted to
“imitate” reality. It was actually correct in that its art sprang from mimesis as an act of thought.

Classical art was the elevation of a fact to a category new for the fact. The impersonal-collective, the unqualitative and concrete became personal, qualitative, and generalized. As concept grew out of image, artistic thought grew out of mythological thought, though the two were not at all identical. But the historical peculiarity of Greek literary consciousness lay in the fact that reality was mediated for it by the mythological image, which stood between reality and poetic perception. Poetic thought looked at reality through the mythological image. As a result, the presence of mythism in Greek art does not show the mythological character of the art, though we can neither deny its mythological images nor ignore their significance.

Classical art did not copy reality; it recreated reality, using the earlier world view, which in part was preserved inside the work of art in the form of a skeleton and in part figured in another form, conceptually generalized. This previous mythological world view precipitated out in tragedy in the form of the structure (agones, peripeteias, laments, exodoi and parodoi, stichomythia, etc.) on one hand, and on the other in the form of all the content which conceptually arose from this structure.

Thus the Greek artist did not transplant into his work pieces of reality. He did not transfer into poetic speech linguistic metaphors. He recreated all of this in a new quality, with a new cognitive function.

I have already said that the uniqueness of Classical artistic thought—the construction of poetic ideas on the basis of mythological images—is explained by the fact that the appearance of Classical art was brought on by and coincided with the appearance of concepts. But though it arose from concepts, Classical art did not stop there. Unlike other ideologies, art reproduced reality, i.e. it operated from the point of view of the manifestations of reality, which it recreated secondarily in the form of the same external forms, but of a pictorial nature. The conceptual character of artistic thought did not make art into dry theory at all. At the base of Classical concepts lay the image, which did not allow them to turn into bare abstractions. In its main reproductive function Classical art relied on this image base of concepts. But in the thought of the artists the image already had a different character, not the old mythological one, but a new conceptual one. Its essence was generalization and “qualification” [okachestvlen’e]. Conceptuality made for the distinction between the poetic image and the mythological.

The secondary recreation of the object in illusory-perceptible forms led to thinking in images, the main function of which was depiction. In this mimesis a significant role was played by the external image, which acted as carrier and expression of the ideas of the artist, of his analyzing and abstracting thought in its perceptible manifestation. Such an image has nothing in common with the mythological image, though it continues to bear its perceptible form. The mythological image, the result of spatial thought, recreates the object in a plane, in space. The literary image, born of concepts, recreates the object in the idea. The external image reveals the idea in the form of its compact concentration and carries the main semantic burden.
In myth morphology is semantics. In art the form concentrates the content, communicates its essence, expresses it through the specific medium of the external image. Artistic form is not, like the morphology of mythological semantics, the obverse or reverse of the semantic content.

Created by concepts which were still not liberated from impersonal mythologism, the Classical literary image only begins to move in the direction of greater quality. But still not all of its facts are significant, or rather they are not equally significant in all the various parts of one and the same work. So for example in sculpture of the Classical period the body is still “ideal,” i.e. lacks individual characterization, yet it is still dynamic and full of expression, while the face remains aloof; we know the history of the depiction in sculpture of eyes, hair, legs, pose which were at first not drawn into the stream of qualitative coloring. Thus even in Classical drama, in tragedy and comedy the characters are still monolithic, still lack psychological coloring. But even inside a separate tragedy the melic parts lag far behind the recitatives. They contain many details that are completely neutral in meaning, even lacking qualities. Their quasi-narrative songs show the road to qualities, which is attained by overcoming tautology in the thought process.

The conceptual nature of the Classical artistic image required that its sights be set on quality and generalization. To give as much expression as possible to the generalized quality of the object, the expanded significance of the object, characterization of the object—this was now the purpose of the image. It had to become a perceptible expression of the abstract. But its historical peculiarity consisted in the fact that the abstract thing it was called upon to express—the concept—carried within it concreteness which had not yet been overcome. This led to the peculiar character of the Classical artistic image. It could become a perceptible expression only of something abstract that still contained something perceptible in it. This limited it and brought it down to earth, shortening its semantic scope. But this also gave it particular plastic power, I would even say a higher power, unsurpassed in other historical contexts.

The Classical artistic image contained a meaning that was both multiple and single, both generalized and literal, both widespread and monosemantic. Thus Sophocles presented the drama about Philoctetes—about a specific hero of one of the myths. This myth and this hero were narrow in meaning. But in the plot of Sophocles’ tragedy the point is not Philoctetes at all. Who cares that Philoctetes was left on Lemnos? If Philoctetes were Adonis and he were wounded by an animal, and if Adonis were left on Lemnos (Hephaestus could end up there “tragically”)—the fate of the god would only be lamented by the commune; the very fact would have a significance sufficient to itself. But in its artistic reflection the narrow fact took on generalizing broadness. The fact that Philoctetes was dealt with treacherously turned his stay on Lemnos into a profound drama, not only on a religious-ethical level, but more broadly, as a drama of a man profaned. In Classical art there is more of the concrete-Philoctetean than, for example, in Shakespeare. A man could not be the hero of tragedy, social reality could not be plot. It had to be a concrete myth in which a concrete hero acted. In contrast to Shakespeare, the myth and the “hero” were not conventions of the traditional literary style (“a set plot”), but had a real meaning in Sophocles’ thinking, the meaning of a historical fact.

Like the plot about Philoctetes, every artistic image of the Classical period, while it spoke of a separate, narrow, conditional fact, had in mind something else, broad, with general significance, and unconditional; this image was related in meaning to something
else, not to itself. The artistic image is always figurality, and where there is no figurality there is no art. But the tragedy *Philoctetes* contains much more concrete myth about the hero Philoctetes than *Hamlet* does the history of a Danish prince from the chronicle of Golenstedt. The myth about Philoctetes is perceived by Sophocles objectively. It is not enough that for him the myth sounded like reality. The moral problems he posed in *Philoctetes* were for his thought dressed in the flesh of precisely Philoctetes’ story, rather than the story of Ajax or Oedipus, while Shakespeare could choose any plot for his generalizations. The embedding of the concrete in the abstract thought of the playwright was a peculiarity of the literary thought of Classical Greece. It was one of the features of its specific peculiarity. A second feature, conditioned by the first, was that the artistic image, which was already a function of the concept, generalized only the semantics which lay in its mythological sub-foundation. This is what created the picture studied by all the mythological schools of the 19th century, beginning with the brothers Grimm. They showed that the Classical poetic image is a mythological image. This was true as far as concerns the formal side of the question, but not true in essence.

Concept, like image, is not a constant quantity, but a historical and social variable. Concept, like image, through all the history of thought changed its character and its interconnection with the image.

The Classical concept arose in the mythological image even structurally; it grew out of the image. Its history is the history of its emancipation from the mythological image, from the laws of thinking and the semantics that it had to overcome and break with. But this break took place only after the Classical age; it began in the Hellenistic period; Aristotle marks the time of the abstract concept emancipated from the concreteness of the mythological image.

In Classical Greece concepts did not yet have their own function, though their dependence on the image semantics began to become a mere formal dependence. Artistic thought from the cognitive point of view enriched the concept, which drew out of it all its most progressive features: the possibility of abstraction, of generalization, of qualification. The poetic image became the form of these new sides of the concept. The Classical concept, unlike the later concept (we must recall the naked medieval conceptualism which led to Scholasticism)—the Classical concept created abstraction through concreteness. In the artistic thought of Classical Greece it continued to function in the image, endowing the image with its former functions; but the character of the image began to change completely. Now this new (“poetic”) image, endowed with conceptual features, turned into the figurality of the concept, as earlier the concept was figurality of the mythological image; it was on such figurality that Classical art was built.

This was also a new form of cognitive mimesis. The reflection of objective reality was mediated by the reproductive nature of the image: in Classical artistic thought the concept did not simply take on the quality of a phenomenon, but even transformed it into a form, “incarnated” it in the form of an external image. By external image I do not mean the external appearance of people or things. Only modern thought can reduce the external—outside—form of phenomena to complete identity with their internal peculiarity. Sarah Bernhardt in the role of Phaedra still looked like a Frenchwoman, and Classicism
presented ancient characters in the costumes of Louis XIV. Our modern stage art involves all accessories in revealing the internal image. Sets, costumes, makeup, expressions, the play of colors and of light and dark—all this now carries the meaning in the play, because our thought is so developed creatively that it turns the category of the external into a semantic quality. The Classical period had a different goal. It was only beginning to produce the understanding of quality and it knew nothing yet of “external image” in our sense. Its actors wore masks, were dressed in clumsy, standard costumes, stood on stilts in frozen poses. When I speak of the Classical external image, I mean the perceptible formation of the image as a whole, rather than its external form alone.

But let me return to my idea. The Classical poetic image was a figure [inoskazan’е] of the concept. The semantic link between them was not yet severed. Speaking through the image, the Classical artist thought with the concept. The poetic image made the abstract perceptible. But one must not forget the caveat: in the Classical concept itself and in its “abstraction” there was still much that was concrete, and the level of overcoming the concrete depended on the historical period within antiquity. The poetic image expressed the polysemy of the concept by means of a perceptible form, through the particular and the unique. Concepts of reality were translated into perceptible expressions, into conceptions in the form of the image. This created “artistic” illusion, the illusion not of just any reality, but of a special reality, revealed and known. Art was becoming an independent ideology with a characteristic “secondariness,” i.e. “recreation,” with “mediation.” The artist, as he reflected reality, distanced himself from it, transferred it to pure subject, turned phenomena into “images” of these phenomena, into their idea and ideal essence, “imitated” reality. This was mimesis not merely of illusion as reality, but the likening of a creative power, already obtained by the subject, to an opposed object. The appearance of art was the appearance of the subject. Through it cognition of objective reality was accomplished. The poetic image presented this knowledge of reality through its other form, through the subject.

And here again the Classical period had its historical limitations. First of all, for it the object was not yet something opposed. The degree of “separation” of the artist from real phenomena was still insufficient, and therefore (as I said before) the image, poetic level was intersected by “raw” material, which had not been translated through the imagination. But this did not mean realism at all. In realism the role played by image generalization is great; on the contrary, there is no realism in folk theater (such as balagan, circus, etc.) with its direct intrusion of everyday life. The same can be said of the cognitive side of artistic mimesis in the Classical period. The figurality of the Classical poetic image is limiting. Thus the Classical sculptor creates statues of gods or people and expresses with them only concrete images. On the other hand, the modern plastic arts present images with generalized figurality. The sculptural depiction of the Bronze Horseman has a meaning which goes far beyond the bounds of a portrait of Peter the Great sitting on an untamed horse. Modern day sculptures are sculptural metaphors that speak of ideas, properties, characters expressed in forms; they present meanings that are great and of general significance. Such is the difference between Classical and modern architecture as well. We see structures which present the idea of an age or even the idea of a given building, while the Classical period did not go beyond attributive characteristics (for example, the difference between a temple of Zeus and a temple of Apollo). The proportions of cognitive mimesis in Classical and modern art are also
different. Modern poetry attempts to create a self-sufficient subjective world which engulfs the world of the object; art of the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, which was no longer satisfied with metaphoricity alone, communicated the symbolics of thought. The art of antiquity was incapable of creating quality in the shape of form; in Classical quality there was much “thing-ness” [veschestvo]. If there were no dates for the poems “A lonely sail gleams white,” 7 or the sculpture of Spinoza, 8 or the painting “Zaporozhian Cossacks”9 we would never ascribe them to antiquity, and not because of their features of realia, but only because of the greater profundity of the background of thought which allows for the symbolism of figurality. Antiquity knew none of this. It described a ship on the sea, presented remarkable portraits (and that not in the Classical period), drew in the Hellenistic period the frescoes of Pompeii. But the figurality here was flat, one-planed, without the symbolism of meanings characteristic of later thought.

So long as stage act was based on the chorus and its “I-motif,” so long as the author was undifferentiated from the protagonist, there was no tragedy as a literary genre. There was no consistent plot. The author had to distance himself from the “I-motif” and turn it into a plot “about” characters and events which had no relation to the author. He had to create a distance between himself and the object of his depiction—to stop being Sappho or Homer, who were both the subjects and the objects of themselves. It was in this that the great cognitive significance of art consisted. The tragedian had to dissolve his “I” maximally in the object and present it in a new form, the significance of which was more active, the more generalized the author’s “I” was, leaving the concreteness of the narrow author’s personality far behind.

From this time the mythological image began to figure not in itself, but secondarily, in recreation, in the category of an object that was “imitated” (in the Classical sense) by the subject, creating the same image anew. Poetic metaphor took on a subject and subjective nature. It became the product of personal reproduction. But the specific peculiarity of antiquity is revealed in the dependence of the poetic image on the mythological, in the semantic constraints on the poetic metaphor, in the dominant role of the object.

Linguistic metaphor took shape spontaneously and impersonally; it was the only form possible in antiquity for the appearance of con-cepts. But metaphor in poetry changed its function and its nature. It was born in personal invention as a means of expressing personal, subjective thought. It had goals and tasks, becoming a poetic means. Artistic thought deepened it and expanded its meanings, but for the most part it used it for generalization, summarizing and emphasizing quality. Poetic metaphor became conceptual in its basic function, which was recognized by the personal consciousness (in the sense of the conceptual active consciousness, “making conscious,” rather than artificiality and intentionality). The author could choose a metaphor and apply the meaning of its figurality to any of its images, thereby making his thought general or more precise, depending on the goals of the context; in this process, however, the conceptual figurality of the poetic metaphor could not depart from the concrete meaning of the mythological image it contained (for example, Cassandra in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon calls herself θυροκόπτος10 [door-knocker], and asks if she has “missed the mark or hit it...
like an archer”¹¹—the poetic metaphor of the “archer” or the “one knocking at the door” yields a figurative meaning faithful to the mythological image of “death by arrows,” “archer,” and “θυροκόπος”¹²). In the Classical poetic metaphor the abstract meaning of the concept always depends on the concrete semantics of the mythological image and never breaks away from it. This shows how Classical poetic figurality is bound and limited, “down to earth” and unable to expand symbolic meanings.

The Classical poetic metaphor is a consciously recognized figurality. This reveals the subjectivity of personal thought. When instead of “Phoebus” the tragedian says “the prophetic cliff,”¹² instead of “the underworld,” “the meadow by the bank,”¹³ the mythological image takes on the character of a poetic image, because it is taken not in its concrete meaning, but in its figural meaning, and it is selected consciously, to emphasize the meaning needed in context.

I will give another example, one very far from antiquity. In the language of ancient and modern peoples there is the metaphor of the sun which “comes up” and “goes down:” it was created by the mythological idea of the sun as a living being which “goes” or “walks” through the heavens. We all use such a linguistic metaphor. But when Gorky uses it in the context “the sun comes up and goes down, but it’s dark in my prison”¹⁴ its meaning becomes generalized; here it means “time” in all its infinity. But there is no mythological connection between prison and time. The more developed concept is, the freer metaphor is, the less its figurality is restricted by the connection between concreteness and generalization. For us the traditional conventions of metaphorization sound vulgar (“hands like ice,” “ardent greetings” etc.), while antiquity could think no other way than the traditional way.

Beginning with the 19th century, conceptual thought strives to stretch the freedom of figurality to the limit. Pushkin expressed the history of Petrine Russia, whose power grew through the experience of difficult wars, in one metaphor: “Like a heavy hammer shatters glass and forges a sword.”¹⁵ What do these two concrete facts have in common formally or from the point of view of logic? Nothing. Yet the poetic image here is a figure of many complex concepts which in their uniqueness and concreteness lead to immense generalization and polysemy. Such an image was impossible in antiquity both in the scope of its generalization and in the freedom of combination of the figural sense (the Swedes are a hammer, the sword is the state). The Classical artist could create such parallelism of images only if the semantics of the concept and the image were the same. Let us take the image of the “hammer” in Classical poetry, in Anacreon. The poet says “Eros again struck me, like a smith, with the huge hammer (axe), bathed me in the icy deep.”¹⁶ But Eros is really a smith; he incarnates the fire and water of death; he is really the icy deep. Eros beats with fire, dips in the icy abyss. Figuratively passion torments Anacreon, deprives him of reason, drives him to despair, makes him feverish and cold. This figurative meaning is closely connected to the mythological meaning and is dependent on it. Here figurality is simply the same mythological semantics, the concreteness of which is “transferred” to the abstraction of the concept. This became a generalization of the image of “passion.” The poet made it subjective and joking, changing its function and thereby its semantic content. In Pushkin, however, the “heavy hammer” has nothing in common with the trials of war or the Swedes; it is a special intellectual level parallel to the other—the identification of the concept with the image. They are not connected by any common semantics.
For the poet of the 20th century, generalization with the help of common concepts has lost its power: common concepts have proven to be incorrect, since they embrace and unite things which are homogeneous by a formal feature but heterogeneous in essence (“people,” “freedom,” “democracy,” etc.). Modern poets began to resort to abstraction by means of introducing an image parallel to the given phenomenon, even if it were taken from a completely different sphere (Tiutchev: “O, do not awaken underworld storms, beneath them chaos moves!”17 The heart is likened to the earth, the passions to the primordial chaos). Poetic generalization began to be based not on the features of objects, but on something completely different, on difference. Here there is a likeness of basic meaning rather than a formal likeness. It reveals everything essential in the object, everything not immediately noticeable, not based on “symptoms,” which allows for the possibility of endless variations. In other words, the modern poet turns precisely to different forms of one and the same meaning.

The shutters are closed, the windows chalked
White. The mistress is gone.18

This means “Lensky died.” Such figurality removes both particular incidents (the death of Lensky and the departure of the mistress from the house) making them general.

The farther removed from the Classical period, the more distance there is between the poetic image and the concretized concept and the compulsory nature of its semantics. In modern poetry the image aims at a complete break with the concept as an outdated form of thought—even with a concept that is already abstract and no longer “oppresses” the image.

But the Classical poetic image, because of its internal semantic linkedness, could not yet have the broadening meaning that extends beyond the bounds of the form. It lacked poetic symbolism and never went beyond transferred meanings, i.e. the internal dependence of the meaning of the concept on the meaning of the image (“sea of troubles,” “fire of passion,” “the fruit of hubris is the ear of destruction from which one reaps a crop of many tears”19 etc.). This shows its historical cognitive limitations.

Figurality created poetry, and for a long time European lyric poetry avoided speaking in literal meanings. Thought was dressed in figural form. The poet talked about woman with passions: “Do not call her heavenly and do not remove her from the earth.” A special elevated language was selected, traditional images, which stylistically imitated an antiquity which essentially never existed.

Until Apollo calls the poet
To sacred sacrifice…20
The more mediocre the poet, the more his poetic technique is based on external figurality as a stylistic device, the more conventionally, the more conceptually he understood “other saying” [figurality]:

I love the color of clear azure:
It often captivated
My pensive eyes with languor…

The European lyric poet recast concepts in images the same way the Classical lyric poet recast images in concepts.

When the chorus says “fruitless illness” ( ἄκαρπος νόσος), it means an illness which cannot produce living shoots of life, i.e. “fruit” in the literal sense. This is a mythological image which has acquired some generalization—the generalization of the poetic epithet in which there is both the single literal meaning and its expansion. But when we say “fruitless labor,” we do not at all think of a vegetal “fruit.” And for us it is a linguistic metaphor. But it has completely become concept. Its meaning is so figurative and abstract that it has nothing to do with an image.

In Greek literature the appearance of poetic metaphor is still taking place (as of plot, character, author, etc.). But this process is taking place in tragedy, not in lyric.

One line of lyric allows the direct intrusion of everyday themes, which have not yet undergone reflection in the image. Alcman says

Here are seven tables and as many seats
At those tables—poppy breads,
Linen and sesame seed,
And for the children in pots—chrysokol.

Or:

Three seasons—winter
And summer, fall—the third,
The fourth is spring, when
There are many flowers,
Think not of eating your fill…

As a demonstration of individual facts we shall take the well-known fragment of Alcman which is taken by modernizers as the prototype of “Mountain crests sleep in the nocturnal dark”—a poem full of generalizing symbolism unknown in antiquity:

Asleep are the crests of high mountains and the depths of abyss.
Asleep are the cliffs and the gorges,
The snakes, as many as the black earth nourishes,
Thick swarms of bees, beasts of the high mountains
And monsters in the crimson deep of the sea.
And sweetly sleeps the tribe
Of fast-flying birds.\(^{25}\)

The lack of generalization and of figurative meanings is characteristic of all Greek lyric poets up to Anacreon; iambic grew out of completely real invectives directed against real people. For some, like Sappho, poetic facts can be beautiful, for others, like Hipponax, they are repulsive, but in all cases lyric poets have in mind only the given particular facts without any “background.”

Anacreon is closer to the ability to generalize than his comrades of the lyre and flute; he introduces a series of metaphors. Thus he speaks figuratively of the power of Eros (I cited this fragment earlier), who strikes him with his axe and dips him in icy water. The image of the same god throwing a red ball at him,\(^{26}\) the image of the boy holding his heart by the reins,\(^{27}\) the image of the jump from the Leucadian rock and floundering in the water—\(^{28}\) all have a figurative meaning and are metaphors, \textit{i.e.} the figural transformation of concrete mythological ideas into concepts. But these are not simply metaphors, they are poetic metaphors: the singer chooses them freely, places them in the context of his songs, consciously uses them to express his poetic concepts. Anacreon does not believe in either the hammer or the fiery ball of Eros. He does not at all think that the boy’s reins hold his heart. He knows perfectly well that he has not fallen from the cliff and been tossed about among the waves. For him these are “images” of phenomena and things rather than phenomena and things themselves. It is possible that in Anacreon’s opinion a divinity had the power to strike a man with his fire or ice, that passion was brought on by “attachment” (in the literal sense!) of one heart to another, that because of unrequited love people had to jump into the sea from a cliff. But independently of such views, “Leucas” is a generalized image of unrequited love for Anacreon. “The hammer,” “the icy deep,” “the reins,” “the ball of purple” are the same kind of abstraction. They communicate in concentrated form the whole path of Anacreon’s thoughts, expressing his personal concepts and coloring with quality such neutral mythological images as “eros-cliff-rock falling into water,” “eros—icy abyss” etc. Anacreon’s concepts take on perceptible form “as if” of concrete things, though they are in reality not concrete things; in their illusory nature they recreate real phenomena and things. But Anacreon makes no claims for their authenticity. He needs only their figurative meaning, not their literal meaning at all. For him the whole center of gravity lies in the figural function of the images that would have sounded literal in Sappho or Archilochus and would have seemed the same to Anacreon himself if it were not for his poetic goals.

European poetry responded to Anacreon because he was the first poet in the European sense. But the poetry lacking figurality, the poetry of the Archilochuses, Sapphos, Alcaeus, and others remained a peculiar antique and did not last beyond Rome. Horace did not exactly transform it, but he recreated it with the new methods of poetic thought and left nothing but the themes and individual images.
Choral lyric is built for the most part on mythological images. But one must not think that because it is chronologically older than choral melic in tragedy its form is more archaic. In antiquity chronology acts in a peculiar way: not as an orderly sequence, but by presenting the same ancient ideas reinterpreted in sequentially-different ages. In the tragedians of the 5th century one can therefore find untouched profoundly archaic material. But on the other hand the process of genre formation in antiquity also progresses in a peculiar way. Here the genres of art are far from syncretic. I do not mean the fact that the plastic arts outstrip literature, which does not even appear until the Hellenistic age, that literature outstrips painting, painting—music. But even within the pre-literary—still “muse”—genres lyric manages to attain its apogee and waning before the appearance of tragedy. Thus every genre has its own particular chronology which does not coincide with the general chronology of all of the genres of the muses. Lyric is in a decrepit state when tragedy appears on the scene. They have different social prerequisites, different tribal characters. In choral lyric and monody, in recitative lyric we see a relatively developed form not at all like the choral melic of tragedy, which preserves archaic folklore. Alcman and Ibycus use comparisons, like elegiac poets like Mimnermus. But their comparisons are still very close to mythological parallelism. As a genre which has lived a long life over centuries, choral lyric took on modern (for its day) developed forms with which only the images of the elegiac poets can compare.

In Alcman, as I said, short similes are very close to parallelism: one can feel that mythological images dominate concepts. In partheneia girls are still on the border of zoomorphism. While Simonides sees hypostases of the heroes in competing horses, Alcman turns competing choruses of girls into agones “as if” of mares. His comparisons of girls to animals and luminaries contain more literal than figurative meaning.

The same can be said of Ibycus. But what is interesting is that Ibycus speaks in choral song not about a third person, but about himself, like a solo singer. In Alcman it is not a case of a “character,” but of real girls. Simonides praises a real person or a horse, not a “character.” Lyric is the genre in which the image level is not yet stabilized, where events and people are not raised by poetic thought to generalizing figurality. Here the images are closer to mythology than to conceptism.

It is indicative that the recitative personal elegy used more perfected methods of thought than the iamb or the monody. When Mimnermus compares human life to the leaves of trees, he makes a certain image generalization, but behind this generalization one can sense a closeness to two mythological variants of one semantics (“blooming” and “wilting” of the life of plants and of man), that the level of figurality seems almost minimal. In Theognis there is more figurality. Theognis’ thought is conceptual. It generalizes social phenomena, creating monolithic and primitive schematic judgments (the poor are short, aristocrats are the bearers of moral superiority, etc.) When Theognis compares himself to a horse with a bad rider, the figurality of his image contains a broad conceptual meaning. His metaphors are not as much of a cliché as those of Mimnermus; they are personal, subjective, conscious, and their goal is figurality.

The development of the recitative line of lyric at the expense of monody showed the degradation of the lyric form, which no longer satisfied the requirements of conceptual thought, and it also showed how topical the forms were which were least of all dependent on the poor musical canon. Concepts required causalization and discursive means of
expression; they tended to argumentation. The primitive and monotonous musical modulation inhibited thought.

Choral lyric was the first genre in Greece which created the category of “style,” which immediately began to become stylization. It was characterized by being overburdened with images and imitated the ancient language of folklore. And though it was continued in the 5th century by Timotheus and Pindar, and in the 4th by their epigones, although Timotheus was an innovator and choral songs could still attain perfection, still they were nothing new and had no future. The way forward was open only to recitative as the most supple form for filling with concepts, a form almost emancipated from melody, supported almost by the repetition of the meter alone.

Tragedy shows the ways of transition from chor al melic with its mythological images to the poetic figurality of the recitatives. Metaphor appears, as a broad phenomenon, not in individual lyric works, but precisely here, in Attic tragedy. While in lyric parallelism and simile, which derive from epic, continue, in tragedy, which uses simile rarely, many metaphors appear.

That conceptual thought is a factor of poetic metaphor, that it was exactly tragedy, this new progressive cognitive genre that was the birthplace of metaphor is confirmed by the fact that in tragedy metaphor is still obviously connected with riddle.

In our modern thinking every new abstract category is created by our abstract concepts. In antiquity it always had its origins in concreteness. The poetic metaphor of Greece came out of the figurative meaning that the concept gave the mythological image. Such a form, the bearer of two concrete meanings, which later took on the meaning of figurality, was the riddle in folklore.

I have spoken several times above of the role of the riddle in the origins of tragedy. It occupied its semantic place among the verbal agones, arguments, and “disputes” in the form of so-called “griphs.” I will point out again that griphs were required precisely in the cult of Dionysus, the god of the stage; here riddles and their solutions accompanied the ritual disappearance of Dionysus, the search for him and his discovery. They were thus related to the passions of the stage divinity and were a parallel to dying and coming back to life. The chorus, as we know, asked the soloist or the coryphaeus, who answered (I have in mind both the data of tragedy itself and the evidence of Pollux, that at one time the actor answered the chorus from a stage table); we know of the passion content of these questions and answers. I would like to present one more piece of evidence for questions and answers. Often the chorus “questions” the arriving servant or messenger, sometimes the protagonist, and asks him to “tell” of the tragic event; the monologic story of the hero, the messenger, or the servant is often an “answer” to the questions of the chorus. As to the “answers” of the chorus itself, the responsive theory of Kranz substantiated well enough the problem of the role of the “answers” and “questions” of the chorus in the origins of stasima, the “immobile” songs of the tragic chorus. But in this case I am interested not in the choral song, but in the recitative, particularly the dialogic recitative and stichomythia. Solo recitative “answers” often coincide with “solutions” to counter “riddles.” Such, as I have said many times, is stichomythia. We also know that balagan fools and everyday jesters posed riddles, and the “fool” is one of the original
characters of folk drama. One must also remember balagan conjurers: they tried to present one thing as another, and the magician’s trick differed from the riddle only in its nonverbal character as action. The principle was the same in both cases: “hiding” the meaning—“revealing” the meaning, turning one concrete thing into another.

Metaphor appeared as soon as one of these two concrete meanings took on figurative meaning. Where was the Classical metaphor to be born? From the formal point of view—in dialogical forms, in stichomythia, in drama—the same.

This is what we see.

Greek tragedy, as always, preserved inside itself features of its archaic past. Aeschylus is characteristic in this respect, particularly his archaic tragedy *The Suppliant Maidens*. The main character, as we know, is the chorus here. This chorus is made up of girls who seek protection from the king of Argos against the sons of Aegyptus, who are trying to force them into marriage. But the king does not want to protect them, since he is afraid to draw Argos into war with the Egyptians. The girls try to influence the king with entreaty, but when the entreaties do not help, they resort to threat. A stichomythia is taking place between the chorus of girls and the king of Argos. In the original this stichomythia is laconic, as usual, but in this case its reticence borders on secrecy and becomes a real riddle. The chorus begins with a hint: I have, it says, bindings, belts, girths of clothing. The king understands these unexpected words literally. He answers, “This is most appropriate for women’s clothing.” But the chorus continues with even more of a riddle: “Know that they are a fine means.” Now the king becomes amazed: he asks them to explain what these words mean. But the chorus sticks to its guns: “If you do not oppose these garments with something reliable.” The king’s amazement grows. He interrupts: what is the need for belts for dresses? “To decorate these gods’ statues with new pictures.” The king can take no more. He cannot understand at all what lies behind this reticence, and he exclaims, “This speech is like a riddle! Tell me in simple words!”

Only now does the chorus turn to the usual manner of speech, putting the solution to the riddle in words: by means of these belts and bindings the girls will hang themselves from the statues of the gods (a great blasphemy for which the country might be destroyed).

Hearing this threat, the king is at an impasse. He is seized by vacillation and can find no way out. The chorus seeks protection which might destroy his country in a war with the sons of Aegyptus, but if he does not give the refugees asylum, they will also destroy the country by polluting it with their blasphemy. The king himself answers figurally: “From all sides insurmountable situations! Many ills flooding, like a river. I have entered this bottomless abyss of Destruction, completely impossible for sailing, and nowhere is there a haven from ills.”

Both the chorus and the king speak figuratively. In the first case it is a “dispute” of the two sides—one asking, the other answering. One of them “conceals” meaning; it “reveals” it, “shows” it only at the end. The participants are the chorus and the soloist, which shows how ancient these “disputes” were; the stichomythia-riddle emphasizes this age. Above I presented many examples in which the chorus and the soloist “hide,” “look for,” “find” the protagonist-hero, in which they “open” doors, “show” corpses, in which the heroes “hide” or “reveal themselves” to each other—usually in scenes of stichomythia. All tragedy is dominated by such “solutions of riddles” which are sometimes of the nature of concrete things, sometimes abstract.
Another phenomenon is observable in the monologue of the king. Here the substratum of mythological images plays a role, identifying the state of the elements with man: the dark forces of nature, dark waters, the abysses of Destruction, flooded rivers mean the destruction of man. But concept turns these images into metaphors. The poetic language says nothing in this phrase about the king’s hopeless situation, it only depicts the watery abyss without a harbor. The meaning is not named, but it is understood; it appears from figurality, which gives an abstract meaning to the concrete image of “abyss;” nevertheless this very figurative language, its figurality is fixed in advance by the identity of the macro- and microcosm (the state of the elements=the state of man). The intention, the function, the ideational fulness of this metaphor belongs to Aeschylus. For him this metaphor itself in all its traditionally acts as an object of recreation in a new semantic context; it turns into a consciously-illusory fact, one which has its special secondary nature.

Stichomythia lost its riddle-solution character the moment concepts appeared. Though the reciprocity of two concrete meanings was the first form of moving apart meanings, substituting one concrete for another could go no farther than riddle and magician’s trick. But as soon as concept was introduced, the riddle turned into figurality, and one of its concrete parts took on an abstract meaning, turning into the figurative meaning of the second concrete part. In this stichomythia the king has to guess what “belt” is. The riddle went no further than this. But concept made it figurative. “Belt” turned out to be the figurative meaning of “threats to perform blasphemy.”

Closing this enigmatic stichomythia, the speech of the king introduces a metaphor. And the metaphor is appropriate here. In conceptual monolog it breaks away from riddle, transforming it into pure figurative language.

The poetic image, in expressing the concept, gives the mythological image the character of genre—or rather it is what turns it into genre. In the same Suppliant Maidens one and the same image of stormy sea cold-abyss, under the influence of Aeschylus’ poetic thought, takes on various generic features. In the monologue of the king it was the metaphor of worry. In another passage the king likens his plan to protect the girls to a diver who has to descend into the abyss with his eyes open and not intoxicated: a simile the entire essence of which is conceptual, figural. In the words of the chorus this same image takes the form of a curse. The chorus prays for the bridegrooms who have been pursuing them over the sea to die: “Let them die in the storm-hitting hurricane, in thunder and lightning, in rain-bearing winds, falling into the raging sea…etc.” When it speaks about Io, about the vengeance of the gods, about the deadly marriage, the chorus makes a gnome out of this image: “From the raging wind of a storm.” This gnome, no matter how clear in its words, is difficult to translate. Its literal meaning is “from the heavy breathing of cold,” but its figurative meaning is “misfortune happens because of the ill will of the gods.”

But I will return to metaphor and its connection with riddle. In Aeschylus one can find curious passages in the Libation Bearers and the Agamemnon.

In the Libation Bearers there is the following scene. A servant runs to Clytemnestra to tell her that Orestes, whom everyone thought to be dead, has returned home and killed the
offender Aegisthus, Clytemnestra’s lover. The servant bangs on the door, yells of the
death of Aegisthus, calls the queen, raises a noise. The queen comes out at these shouts.
A short two-line stichomythia begins, interrupted by five lines and closed by two lines of
stichomythia.44 The queen asks the reason for the noise, audible through the whole house.
The servant answers, “I say the dead have killed (are killing) the living.”45 But
Clytemnestra immediately solves the terrible riddle. She puts it thus, “Woe is me, I have
understood the meaning of the riddles!”46

The servant’s words must be compared with those of Orestes in the closing scene of
Sophocles Electra. Aegisthus thinks he has Orestes’ corpse in front of him, but in fact it
is the body of Clytemnestra, whom Aegisthus is calling to enjoy the spectacle of the
supposedly dead Orestes. He does not know that the “dead” one is alive and standing
before him, while he is alive, though already condemned to death. But the Rigoletto of
antiquity pulls off the cover and sees the body not of his enemy, but of his beloved
Clytemnestra. Now he understands he is in a trap. Orestes asks him, “So what, do you
feel now that you have been speaking to the living as if they were dead?”47

Orestes’ speech, like the speech of the servant in the Libation Bearsers, has two
meanings. In content it is a riddle; in form, stichomythia. In Electra it is even more than a
riddle, it is a trick: underneath the cover instead of one thing there is another. And the
living turns out to be dead, the dead living. Exactly as it is in paliata. And it is no
accident that Aegisthus, when he pulls off the cover, exclaims in amazement and terror,
“What do I see!!”48

But this trick (action) and riddle (words) in both tragedians grows into poetic
figurality. There is immense figurative meaning concealed in Orestes’ enigmatic lines, in
the exclamations of the royal servant.

Such a metaphor based on riddle can be found later in the Libation Bearsers. Orestes
has already killed Aegisthus; now he raises his hand against his mother. The agon of
mother and son, the “dispute” of death and life is presented as a long verbal duel—in
stichomythia. Before it begins, Orestes cries to his mother, showing the corpse of her
lover, “Sleep in death together with this one, since you love this man, and hate the one
you should have loved!”49

Here is the same play of living-dead, the same enigmatics. But poetic figurality has
extended it to moral and psychological significance.

It is possible that in folkloric form “spectacles” like the Oresteia derived from
“disputes” and “showings,” where the living and the dead were presented in mimesis, one
“as” the other now hidden, now revealed. Tragedy is full of stichomythia which are
almost mystical in their terseness, reticence, suppression. For example, what could be
simpler than stichomythia in which one side asks the other of its origins, native land, the
names of his ancestors? Nevertheless the name is never given immediately, but only after
a sequence of questions and answers. Such is this usual type of stichomythia in
Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens. The king of Argos begins the interrogation of the chorus
of girls. He asks fifteen questions! And finally, in the sixteenth, having learned
everything else, he reaches the last name. “Reveal to me,” he says, “in generous speech
the name of this one as well”50 In [English as well as] Russian “reveal” sounds abstract,
but in the original it means “open” and it preserves a concrete character related to an
object, a thing. The riddle closed and opened, concealed and revealed meanings like a
magic trick that did the same with things. And stichomythia, true to its ancient origins,
remained enigmatic in tragedy. Concept gave it a metaphorical character. Concept also forced the tragedians to move the center of semantic gravity to stichomythia, which began to construct all kinds of conceptual riddle solutions (recognition scenes and various realizations like Oedipus’ learning the truth about himself).

The riddle with its “opening” and “revealing” was contiguous with “revelation” and “visions” [otmykanie-otkryvanie-otkrovenie]. It became the focus for prophecy (oracles). Everything that was foretold was enigmatic.

In Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* Cassandra “sees” everything that will happen in the king’s house; there will be murders. She tells the chorus of this first in riddling expressions, then (if one can say so) in solving expressions. She says, “The oracle does not look through a veil like a newlywed bride. In his shining he is like the sun which hurried to its rising, so that like a wave it can splash to light the greatest misfortune.” And she adds, “Furthermore, I will no longer instruct you with riddles.”

So long as Cassandra was prophesying in melic form, she spoke in riddles. Her speech in the form of recitative becomes conceptual. Here she speaks not in riddles, but in metaphors.

The oracle can be compared to a newlywed bride because both were “concealed” and “revealed” in the literal sense by a curtain or veil. But poetic figurality gives this concreteness a figurative meaning. Equally metaphorical is the image of the sun, which is likened to a splashing wave. Flood is the image of the destruction of the world; and the sun, which raises fateful misfortunes to the light, is equally eschatological. Cassandra speaks figuratively. In her words it is a matter not of the destruction of the cosmos, but of the moral retribution of the house of Atreus. And since Cassandra is a prophetess, her whole speech consists of riddles turned by Aeschylus’ thinking into figurative speech.

The poet of antiquity still cannot present the idea as a form, *i.e.* as an expression of a meaning generalized into an idea. But a concept made figurative by the Classical literary image gives the poetic meaning polysemy, which we perceive in the categories of our ideas. Essentially the road of art in antiquity is the road toward perceptible expression of quality.

The gnome, which derived from the aphorism, the metaphor, which appeared from the riddle, the epithet, which was born of the noun, etc., all these are landmarks in Classical poetic art, which was heading towards quality.

In the poetic inventory of tragedy one can find all the phenomena of the language of folklore: repetition, anaphora, simile, epithets, etc. Formally they are the same; but they are made different by their figurative character, which is unknown in folklore.

Mythological images were built on tautology. Concept, on the other hand, on distinction. The poetic image in antiquity was making the difficult journey from a category of state to a category of property.

Above I showed that in pre-narration the subject continues to be found in a passive state, in the state of “status,” rather than “actio.” The same kind of thinking can be felt in sculpture in the frozen Apollo from Tenea and Korai, in the static forms of architecture, in the utilitarian character of the sculptures of all those caryatids, atlas, and reliefs, but in parallel also in the immobile chorus of tragedy. The actor in mask and onkos, on
buskins\textsuperscript{55} depicted the status of the hero. Devoid of quality in tragedy were epithet, story, and the very characterization of the hero. Quintilian says that tragedy depicted “sad Aeropus, cruel Medea, mad Ajax, sullen Heracles.”\textsuperscript{56} But the inseparability of some single feature from its specific bearer was not a conceptual characterization, but the mythological connection of the thing and its property, a connection according to which the basis of a phenomenon or thing is its “essence” (sadness, cruelty, madness, etc). This corresponded to the mask. Folklore epithets—those fixations of separate “symptoms” which arose, as I have already shown, from tautology—were concrete, immobile, and appositive. Every balagan hero had his mask, and this mask standardized not only the external appearance of the hero, but also his “conduct” [\textit{mrrtv}]. From balagan to drama come the “cruel” Medea, the “mad” Ajax, and the “fierce” Heracles. From these mask-conducts later “characters” are created, and the place of these “characters” is comedy, which directly continues balagan traditions.

The epithets of tragedy, unlike metaphor, are found in the lyric, choral parts. Here they have an attributive role. But as I have shown (recall the definition-epithets like “who burned the brand”), at first every epithet was tautological with the object it defined, or rather to which it was “attributed.” It is appositive in nature. From the cognitive point of view this is the same mask with a concrete wearer.

But like the onkos or mask worn by the individual hero of tragedy, the epithet in the mouths of the chorus recreates the archaic line of mythological image, which does not stop it from fulfilling a new conceptual function as well. Showing the way to quality, melic epithets begin to define objects, to attribute properties and characteristics to them (if still clumsily). Poetic thought expands the content of the epithet, changing it from a category of statement (constatation) to a characterization, \textit{i.e.} expanding some one feature into a sum of contextually interdependent features. It would be completely wrong to consider that Medea, who wears the mask of “cruelty,” is shown by Euripides only in her cruelty. In the first place, her cruelty is brought on by difficult circumstances, which justify her. Then, Medea is an intelligent, strong-willed, single-minded heroine, passionate in love and hate, heroic from beginning to end.

But what the whole tragedy does with the image, the melic epithets still cannot do. They retain completely their “antique” static character. The “poetry” of these epithets consists in the fact that they are for the tragedians the object of new recreation in the conceptual image. Above I cited choral songs in which complex epithets were piled one upon the other. Their substantive nature, their incorporating character, their mythological lack of quality are immediately apparent. But in one case they are called on to glorify the abundance of Colonus, in another—the beauty of the groves of Dionysus, in a third—the inevitability of fate. Classical poetic thought does not produce new epithets, as it did not produce new metaphors, but it treats them as objects, reincarnated by subjective consciousness. The personal poetic intention endows them with a common contextual quality-ness and forces them to serve it.

The European poet used meters, combinations of words, and images to intensify thought and form, to activate the entire texture of the work, to “distribute power.” He uses them as a means of artistic influence. The European poet can achieve a kind of aerial
perspective which takes into consideration changes in light and color. The Classical artist gives the contours of things in linear perspective. This is why, once again, the external image is very important for antiquity: concept speaks through it.

In antiquity the external image replaces characterization: if he’s lame, cross-eyed, hunchbacked, he’s bad; if he’s handsome and well-built, it means he’s good. In drama the actor wears a mask, but his speeches and actions are the external image that reveal the hero’s “phren.” Impudent speech and rash actions point right away to an impious man, while a conciliatory tone and humble sorrow show the hero is positive. Unlike in false classicist tragedy, however, in Greek tragedy there are no straightforward villains and consistent incarnations of virtue. In every hero there is a struggle of two principles, and the scales achieve equilibrium only in the catastrophe. Classical poetic thought always presents one and the same thing in two mental editions, since concept in Greece, for the Greek tragedian, is a conceptual image. This is the difference between Aeschylus and Seneca. Seneca already thinks unilaterally. He allows no contradiction between the conceptual image and the old mythological concreteness. In modern art contradiction sticks to the battle of ideas and the battle of the old with the new. Seneca battles with nothing; he follows the ancient models, but his thinking involuntarily turns his copies into something very far from the original. This is why Seneca’s tragedies have the lifeless quality of striking “declamations” but not of art.

The external image plays an important role in tragedy because the basic idea is revealed through it. The tragedian discloses his intentions through external things alone: he uses recognition, stichomythia, the messenger so as to bring out the content—through them, through the structure. The character of the hero has to be broken in two, only then does he see the light (in Euripides by means of the *deus ex machina*), but he has no internal development. This breaking contains the “pity” that leads to catharsis. With the help of external show, the tragedian characterizes not only by means of the external image, but by means of external things as well. The ancient tragedian Aeschylus presents the characterization of the seven leaders in the form of various pictures on their shields. The armor in *Ajax*, Philoctetes’ bow act as the moral starting point of the tragedies and as attributes of the two heroes’ characters. Epithet and qualitative characterization are expressed by the tragedians in the form of attribute-things.

But this is the road taken by tragedy as a whole. From thing to quality, from space to idea.

The relation between the mask and poetic figuraiity (“cruel Medea”) can be felt through the entire composition of tragedy. In part this appears to be two forms of thought right next to each other. Onkos, mask, and buskins are the mythological image untouched; but the actor who wears these things-masks already expresses the personality of the hero, his conduct, his way of thought, his moral being. The same can be said of the relationship between the chorus and the soloists, song and recitative: image alongside concept has the function of concept.

Tragedy shows that the quality of a phenomenon was created not out of the properties of the phenomenon itself, but in the form of the function of another phenomenon, in the form of an attribute to something else. The possibility of separation from a given concrete thing and becoming attributed to a generalized phenomenon changed the nature of concreteness and “transferred” [figured] onto it a conceptual meaning. Mythological images had no independent significance in tragedy: they continued to be clustered only in
its oldest layers. Concept, on the contrary, strove to break away from any intellectual ghetto. Tragedy shows how concept is hatched from the mythological image, freeing itself from the image by means of the figurality of meanings. Figurality draws into its orbit the mythological image, turning it into a means of figurative speech.

This is how the internal expansion of meaning took place with epithet, melic, and the mask itself. Above I showed how pre-narrative took on the conceptual function of an attribute—“adjective” and referred not to itself, but to the plot: just contiguity with the concept turned it into another category, drawing it into figurality.

Epithet, which helped characterize the hero, the plot location, or the situation, was also transformed in this way. Gnome too served poetic goals: from a fixation of a unique fact (“cold from the raging wind”) it became a generalized aphorism with its broad meaning (“ill proceeds from ill”), then was again filled with narrow, contextual significance, while the generalization descended into the depths of the given example (“misfortune takes place because of the ill will of the gods”). In the poetic text the gnome is both narrow and generalized to the significance of an eternal truth. Zeus destroyed Io: this is the given, narrow meaning. Gods are to blame for much of the suffering of man: this is the generalization. Nevertheless, poetic generalization as a whole contains concretization as well; the narrower it is, the more polysemantic it is, because the poetic image is figurality of the abstract in the perceptible.

Metaphor, epithet, gnome, etc. can function outside of poetry as well, in speech. They are made poetic by the contextual meaning, by their place in a completed whole, where they are a part of an interdependent semantic system—in other words, where they are present not on their own, but secondarily, as objects of recreation, mediated by the intention of the artist (by the idea of the work as a whole).

I have always spoken out against the theory of rudiments, but now I can say with assurance that this theory was particularly wrong as regards antiquity. What was considered rudimentary—the dead past that had lost its living function—in fact was precisely the elements with a future, the pledge of the future forward movement of thought, the resource for its enrichment.

If Greek tragedy had consisted of rudiments, it would have had so much superfluous material in it that it would have bored the Greeks themselves, to say nothing of us. On the contrary it has complete harmony of parts and whole, and not only in the sense of proportion, but of well-roundedness and finished quality. It is amazingly economical. The smallest detail in its iambic parts is significant. Everything in it exists for the goal of the meaning.

Tragedy truly must be read in university auditoriums so as to reveal by laboratory methods the links of semantic lines, the significance of each syntactic turn of phrase, of each rhythmic unit; nothing in its structure, composition, metrical distribution, in the character, number, and structure of individual lines—nothing in it is asemantic. Even purely formal elements carry meaning like the conclusions and beginnings of speeches or dialogs; how the preceding scene ends before the beginning of the following one, how the new scene begins—all this is of major significance for the development of the play.
Such full semantic value is particularly strong in Sophocles. The logic of objective action rests in his tragedies on the significance of all the intervening landmarks, among which the structure of the rhythmic-metrical forms and of the verbal semantics occupy the first place.

His *Women of Trachis*, which is dominated by accidental murder and defamed fidelity, opens with words about death, the underworld, fateful matchmaking. Deianira, who begins the tragedy with her long speech, narrates the most important elements of the plot—the story of the centaur’s love, Heracles’ fight for her, the sadness of her marriage to a husband who is always away. Her speech ends with a mention of the precious letter left her by Heracles. The words about misfortune echo the first words of the servant about Deianira’s woe and tears; but the end of the latter’s words about her son Hyllus, who should set off in search of his father, coincide with the arrival of Hyllus and serve for Deianira as a harbinger of success.

In Deianira’s second speech, which is addressed to the chorus, the sadness of this marriage figures again and she again comes back to the mysterious letter, the ancient prophecy: either Heracles will die after his last labor or he will live the remainder of his life in peace without a care. Now is the fateful time, the fateful boundary. Deianira trembles with anticipation and fear. Her final words about her fear of “being deprived of the best of men” are pronounced at the moment the messenger arrives. The servant, afraid of this sign, implores Deianira to refrain from pronouncing ill-omened words. But they have already been pronounced….This fact is woven into the unraveling of the plot and replaces psychological preparation; alongside the increasing weight of factual events another level appears, one unspoken, full of figurative meaning, unnamed, but powerful in its inevitability.

At first glance, the “human” and false view, it seems that the messenger has brought happy news: Heracles is alive, well, and heading in triumph to his household. From this moment the whole plot of the tragedy turns to figurative speech 100%. The second, unnamed level intersects the first, stands behind it, overshadows it. It contains the center of gravity.

The chorus sings a joyful paean. The herald Lichas appears. He tells of Heracles’ victory, of his capture of Oechalia, and the women Heracles enslaved begin to pass by Deianira. Deianira does not yet know who Iole is, what her relation to her is, but she notices her, pities her, asks about her. Everything in this scene is figurative: the silent figure of Iole, Deianira’s anxiety, Lichas’ embarrassment all are full of a second meaning, not spoken, but the main meaning, which translates narrow concrete facts onto the level of great human drama onto a general semantic level, the perceptible expression of the idea.

The more Lichas denies, the greater Deianira’s anxiety. The stichomythia between them has its own architecture: two lines of Lichas at the beginning, two lines of Deianira at the end, two lines each in the middle—Deianira’s questions and Lichas’ answers. The major meaning is structured by this metrical form: behind every word of the agonists lies a meaning not yet revealed by the plot, but which appears as a threatening force as the background of the dialog. Deianira finally addresses a question to Iole herself and shows her sympathy. The latter makes no answer but silent tears. In this dumb show Sophocles juxtaposes two forces: the queen Deianira, who sympathizes with her secret rival, and the princess, who has become the slave and mistress of this queen’s husband. Both of them
are powerless over their own fates. Deianira’s ignorance makes the scene of her sympathy tragic. But the misfortune of the silent slave is also tragic.

This tragic line is emphasized by an interruption of the first, low level: the messenger slave who brought the first happy news intervenes. He is disturbed by Lichas’ evasions. He is concerned with his base little truth. And he reveals it to Deianira, accuses the sympathetic Lichas of lying. He excitedly reestablishes what Lichas has concealed: Heracles burns with passion for Iole, and this passion made Heracles conquer Oechalia to gain the princess. Distichomythia in compressed “shot” form, by means of questions and answers, assertions and denials, allows the terrible meaning of events, revealed only now, to appear.

Deianira’s tension reaches its limit. Her love and faithfulness are outraged, her illusions shattered. For the third time she returns to the story of the centaur who sought her love, was killed by Heracles, and gave her the elixir of love. Now she decides to anoint a robe with it and send it with Lichas to Heracles to charm him into loving her. She is deceitful with Lichas and Heracles, but Lichas and Heracles are also deceitful with her. All the words and all the actions of the heroes have two meanings. The literal, reduced to an insignificant fixation, always speaks through its figurative meaning, which grows out of the insignificant literal.

Now, as soon as Deianira has brought her vain human plot to fulfillment, another force comes into play, one that is not on stage. It acts contrary to the human, it overturns all plots and results. The preparation for it (though behind the scenes it has already taken place) is Deianira’s worry: she has seen that a scrap of wool anointed with the love charm has been destroyed and totally destroyed the place it was thrown by accident. Deianira is seized by a terrible suspicion. Again she recalls the centaur who desired her and the behest he gave her together with the charm as he died: keep this love potion in a secret place, far from light and the rays of the sun.

The presentiments of ill and terror of Deianira, which have just been spoken, immediately coincide with the arrival of the son, who is returning from Heracles. This coincidence reinforces the ill-boding unfolding of events. And its fateful character is already irreversible. The charm turns out to be a fiery poison, and Heracles began to burn alive in indescribable torment.

The story of the son, who curses his mother, is the apogee of the tragedy. Deianira is broken. She no longer exists. All her life consisted of constant waiting for her husband. And she received Heracles’ betrayal, his bringing of another woman to the household hearth, a mistress-wife he loves passionately, the curse of her husband and her son. Attached to her husband with all her heart, Deianira caused him unheard-of torture. Her dear beloved son disavowed her. And, most important, she remains unjustified. No one, except the chorus, knew her motives. A pure heart was taken by the beings dearest to it for the heart of a villain the likes of which the world has never seen.

With great poetic force Sophocles makes Deianira silent from the moment her son finishes his story. She says not a word in answer. Because, in essence, she no longer exists. Death is her answer.

The terrible, fateful power bursts in, rushes through the house of Deianira and Heracles; now it has only to die down. A series of conclusive facts will come out like small pearls—again they are external facts. But this is nothing but a denouement.
The Women of Trachis is not some kind of exception. Every tragedy, while it depicts the drama of people, also presents something completely different: the conflict between the divine and the subjective, the triumph of the higher, superhuman powers over the vain attempts of human beings. But now I am interested in the aesthetic rather than the ethical side of the matter. No one is as “Classical” as Sophocles (especially in Oedipus the King, The Women of Trachis, and Philoctetes) in his poetic ability to create a balance of whole and parts, in the absolute significance of every detail which corresponds to the general idea of the play, in the well-constructed semantic linkage of every scene, every word, every meter, each of which mediates the other.

The artistic normativity of Greek tragedy consists in its figurality, in the depth of the break between the named and the unnamed, between what is exposed on stage and what takes place offstage. Its range of possibilities is limited. It knows nothing but the fatal power of the predestined. Yet though limited in the content of its ideas, it is great in its artistic method.

The uniqueness of Greek tragedy consists in its conscious, open figurality. I would put it even more strongly: in its naive figurality, which is still incapable of justifying itself by rational logic. This figurality does not remind us of Shakespeare: it is wholly “antique,” derives from the concrete semantics of myth, on the basis of which figurality is created. When we read Shakespeare, we derive the whole range of his ideas from the facts he demonstrates. When we read the Classical tragedians, we strain to follow ideas that peek from behind the facts, almost from behind their backs.

In the Women of Trachis the fault of the heroine lies in her moral arbitrariness. She should either have submitted to fate or humbly prayed to the gods to change her lot. But Deianira’s will was active. She dared to fight the Established, to oppose her plan to the plan of the gods. For this Deianira reached catastrophe.

It is not true that only Euripides stood on the side of man against the divine. Sophocles and even Aeschylus (through the chorus) do the same. Sophocles is particularly subtle. His Oedipus, Antigone, Deianira, and Philoctetes are blameless morally; nevertheless they too are “transgressors” of the Established. Why? The point is that they are hubrists in myth, and the poetic image turns hubris into an active will. Only passive heroes are in the right; activeness contains guilt before the gods. This shows the constraints on poetic thought in the 5th century, when thought yielded to the world of the object and there was no freedom of personality. But is it typical for tragedy to understand Hubris as subjective and Dike as objective?

Oedipus the King shows human will (even of the purest man!) and divine predestination in the form of arrows pointing in different directions. All of Oedipus’ motives and actions, all the events of the tragedy are aimed at a rational way out of the disaster the dying country is suffering. Oedipus wants the good, the priests pray for a cure, the citizens sacrifice to the gods. Oedipus consults the oracle and follows its instructions. He curses the defiler who has brought plague and infertility on the land. He demands that he be found and put to death. He is full of decisiveness to fulfill his duty of piety to the end.

These are the events the tragedy is built on, this is what its facts show, this is what is on stage.
But the point, however, is not this at all. The point is that Oedipus is condemned to his lot even before he appears in the world. The defiler is he himself. He has cursed himself, without knowing it. The most important thing is offstage.

This most important thing has to be found out and “revealed,” and the revelation of what is unnamed and unseen on stage is the basic function of any action in tragedy. By means of stichomythia they begin step by step to penetrate the secret meaning of the events which govern the conduct of nature and human beings. A struggle of two powers appears, of the subjective (the confusion of Oedipus, who knows himself innocent, and the support of Jocasta) and the objective (the wisdom of Teiresias, who announces the will of the gods, the humility of Creon). In this struggle Oedipus falls, no matter how right and pure he is.

The irreversibility and speed of the catastrophe is stronger in Sophocles than in any other tragedian. In him figurality takes an active place along with the factual development of the events; it follows on the heels of all the words, all the facts of the tragedy.

The stichomythias are just as necessary in Sophocles’ tragedies as are his choruses. Here is a list of them in Oedipus. The prayer of the chorus that the disaster be averted. Here a description of the plague is given; behind the diffuse mythological images one hears the voice of inevitable fate. In the stichomythia between Oedipus and Teiresias a meaning appears which is opposite to the words and facts: here the higher sight of the blind Teiresias and the fatal blindness of the sighted Oedipus is established. In its second song, the chorus speaks of the secret murderer, not yet found, the polluter of the land; the mythological images, bypassing conceptual precision, create an anxious mystery full of horror. The following stichomythia confronts Oedipus with Creon. Oedipus suspects Creon of plotting. He attacks his imaginary enemy, the latter justifies himself with restraint. This stichomythia lends tension to the action; Oedipus’ righteous anger grows; but the internal catastrophe, the presence of which can be felt around Oedipus, is also growing. Oedipus’ dialog with Jocasta is built on forms which interrupt each other: stichomythia, short and long lines, distichomythia, more fragments of stichomythia, and all of them interrupt each other and collide with each other in an arithmetically orderly, if varied, sequence. This form communicates Oedipus’ confusion, which Jocasta dispels, and Oedipus’ disturbed tranquility. In fact, everything is all right. Fear and horror have given way to certainty. Nevertheless the plot line can no longer deceive the audience. The more factual arguments there are to Oedipus’ benefit, the greater the destructive power that rumbles backstage of the events. In the third song the chorus pronounces indefinite words which seem to have nothing to do with what is taking place on stage. Hubris raises despotism; woe to him who is unafraid of Dike. But you, O Zeus, are ruler over all, and you do not conceal your immortal eternal power. The fact that the main thing is not named creates the special force of this song. Zeus and Dike are somewhere near.

The factual goal of the stichomythia between Oedipus and the messenger is to clear up Oedipus’ past. The king’s origins turn out to be not what he imagined. But what transpires from these questions and answers defies logic and brings unutterable horror on Oedipus. He is no longer the son of King Polybus, he is an abandoned child. But whose? Of the same Laius whose murderer is being sought. Everything is clear to Jocasta: her husband is her son, the benefactor of the land is its polluter. The stichomythia between Oedipus and Jocasta is short: the queen entreats him not to continue his inquiries, the king rushes to meet his doom. What stands behind the words of the stichomythia is
already incomparably more significant and more powerful than the words themselves. Jocasta commits suicide offstage. The audience has not been informed of this, but the horror has reached such a level that it can suffer what the plot does not even say as if it had taken place without question.

The stichomythia between Oedipus and the old shepherd gives a release to the long tension. Oedipus learns that he is the murderer of his father and the husband of his mother. The chorus sings of the vanity of earthly happiness, of the fatal lot of Oedipus, who in a “marriageless marriage” both gave birth and was born. Thus the ancient active-passive image of the “birth-giving-born” took on conceptual figurality in the form of a king who fathered children of his own mother.

Oedipus is the solver of the riddles of the Sphinx. Figurality makes of him a being who cannot find the solution to his own fate. This motif is emphasized by the stichomythia between Oedipus and Teiresias.

_Oedipus the King_ is based on an ancient stage myth. We usually say that Euripides’ _Bacchae_ is valuable in that it shows the passions of Dionysus, the god of the stage. The value of _Oedipus the King_ is even more ancient. Here the posing and solving of riddles, which was of great significance of the forms of the future tragedy, organizes the basic themes of the play.

Above I said that all tragedy is dominated by the fact that words, events, and actions all communicate a single meaning, but express another. This figurality appeared on its own, inevitably, as the objective result of metaphorical thought, which created tragedy. But—again I emphasize—all the figurative meanings were born out of concrete meanings.

Artistic mimesis, enriched by ethical ideas, takes in tragedy the form of a conflict between “appearance” and “reality.” This basic conflict affects (aside from the central agon and the peripeteia) the atmosphere of moral illusion which surrounds the hero: the errors, his ethical blindness, his ignorance. We look for right or wrong motives in the Classical tragic hero; our ethical sensibility is upset when the moral law of antiquity brings a verdict of guilty against the lofty hearts of Antigone, Oedipus, Deianira. But the point is that the problem is posed differently in antiquity, that this problem was thought up in the 19th century. The conflict of Greek tragedy is not of right with wrong, but of blind with seeing, imaginary with authentic, ignorant with wise. These are collisions of error and truth. In this respect the modernizers completely distort the image of Prometheus. In the first part of the trilogy which is preserved the titan is depicted in the state of “revolt,” in a situation of error. But at the end of the trilogy his reconciliation with Zeus is accomplished: ignorance has turned to insight.

Such an interpretation of “error” derived from the visual act I call, for lack of a better word, illusion. I have said enough of the cognitive character of its origins. What led to it—a biune perception of the world—was reflected in many facts of literary structure. In epic we meet doubles and pretenders who pass themselves off as real heroes. The pretenders of epic and comedy are the first similes, but still in the form not of conceptual acts, but of persons (“like” the hero); these are mythological image pre-comparisons, they are spatial categories rather than abstract categories. In the epic there are many mystifications resorted to by heroes like Odysseus. But in comedy Jupiter “takes the
form” of Amphitryon just as in epic Athena takes the form of Mentor, Aphrodite of the old nurse, etc., in order to “deceive” the hero. Later on in the Greek novel the role of the imaginary is hypertrophied.

The illusion which lies within drama took on in tragedy a figurative character, and its contents became religious-ethical. The pre-narrative “show” expressed itself in the active depiction of events of a visual nature. On the one hand drama became a visual act, on the other all of its exposition became visual, and the themes began to depict changes in visual forms. Above I pointed out the visual exposition of tragedy; in Aeschylus’ Seven ecphrasis performs the function of psychological characterization, or rather replaces it; we see the same thing in Prometheus, in Sophocles, and in Euripides. The phantoms and the authentic of illusion turn into the “two truths” of tragedy, into ethical phantom and authentic, into two conflicting points of view, etc.

But the most constructive form of visual deception and positive visual showing in tragedy were the errors (“delusions”) and the misunderstandings they led to.

Blindness and sight organize the tragic conflict. Of course they are already ethical rather than visual. Nevertheless, in Prometheus and Oedipus one can see the path from concreteness through ethical concepts to poetic figurality. The blindness of Oedipus and sight of Teiresias are abstract. Yet Teiresias comes on stage blind and Oedipus leaves the stage blind: “blindness” is presented in the abstract sense, it is true, but unlike a modern playwright, who would have been content with this abstract metaphorization, the Classical tragedian introduces at the same time “blind” and “seeing” in the literal, concrete sense. Thus Prometheus credits himself with making the blind see: he brought them fire, and fire is the light of the eyes. Before him “those who looked looked in vain, those who heard did not hear, but were like images of dreams.”82 Before Prometheus mortals were in a state of phantoms, and only fire turned them into real people. Blindness is the imaginary; sight is authentic. Yet Prometheus’ people “see” metaphorically, under the influence of culture, i.e. of “fire” in the figurative sense; furthermore Prometheus “sows in them blind hopes.”83 Prometheus himself, the clairvoyant, foresees the events of the future. But he is an object of viewing, like fire in the flesh; he is watched, he shows himself; he even calls on an “audience for his sufferings.”84

Sight, watching, and visuality give birth to the spectacle, which is the soul of pre-literary drama. But only tragedy creates out of it the idea of religious-ethical “insight.” And not only the hero who portrays the passions of the “blind” gains insight, the “viewer” does as well.

Facts are presented by tragedy not in their own meaning, but in a completely different sense, although they derive precisely from this same meaning. Physical blindness takes on the conceptual form of moral blindness, errors, and mistakes. Deception, which plays a major constructive role in comedy, contributes to the central collision in tragedy as well, but here it has the “noble” nature of temptation or the anger of the gods or of moral involuntary self-deception. One can even find straight mystification in tragedy. In Rhesus Athena passes herself off as Cypris and sets up a real deception. She deceives the hero of Ajax as well. In Philoctetes Odysseus deceives the hero, in the Women of Trachis it is the centaur, who secretly takes his revenge on Heracles. In Euripides there are countless examples of mystification: Dionysus deceives Pentheus and his family, Iphigenia is deceived with a marriage, the Taurian Iphigenia and Helen play out false stories, Hecuba draws her enemy into her tent with a deception and “blinds” him, etc.
Deception is usually present in tragedy before the peripeteia. It is presented in the form of imaginary salvation (cf. the reverse in the Greek novel—imaginary death before salvation). This is a deception of fate. Always before death the hero thinks himself free of danger.

The duality of meanings characteristic for tragedy can be illustrated with a short example from Sophocles’ *Electra*. The paedagogs comes to the queen, who fears her son’s revenge. The old man fools the queen with the news of Orestes’ death. But Orestes is alive: the news of his death is necessary for him to get into his mother’s house and kill her. Therefore Clytemnestra is already condemned to death; according to the plot of fate she has already died and is only alive in an “apparent” reality, in literally conceived “fact.” Thus she answers the old man that until now she has known no peace by night or day, forever expecting death, and only this day has saved her at last from fear. The Greek language presents “expecting death” more significantly than ours, which is blurred by concepts; in the original this thought is expressed by the phrase “as if dead” (ὡς θανομένη). Thus alive she considered herself dead, and now dead she considers herself alive.

Deianira erred because she loved her husband. Heracles curses his innocent wife, certain of her villainy; Oedipus brought all his misfortunes on himself only because he decided to avoid them. Ajax’ error makes life impossible for him. Theseus’ error, when he takes the pure Hippolytus for a defiler, leads to catastrophe.

In Euripides this internal line of tragedy turns into the support for the plot. In him one finds external errors, external deceptions; and in all the tragedians ignorance leads the heroes to destruction, and every salutary wave of events reveals an as yet unrecognized catastrophe. Man does not see everything, does not know everything. He learns the most important thing only just before death—his own, or that of those near to him. The insight of the hero comes in death. And every death is insight and every insight death.

And how does the rebirth of the “viewer” take place? In catharsis, Aristotle will answer two centuries later.

The death of the sacrificial animal brings purification to those who watch the blind “phantoms of sleep,” shades, likenesses as well as to those who are blind, likeness, imitation (μίμημα—a term common in Euripides, later in Plato, alongside εἰκών). In tragedy the ethical character of such purification, which derives from ethical mimesis, *i.e.* overcoming the false with the true, reaches profound figurality. Though we do not know if tragedy in the 5th century had such goals as “purification of the passions,” the very existence of art theater shows the new nature of spectacle and spectator. Spectacle, aside from its religious-ethical intention, was made richer by having other goals as well: personal skill in composition and performance, the harmony of completion, the expression of ideas in form, affective power. The spectator not only watched, but with the performers went through the process of reincarnation into a “possible” reality, a “model” of which immersed him in the world of “reality.” But now this mimesis was artistic in nature. It was achieved not only by means of ethical rebirth, but by the force of poetic figurality which made everything literal figural, expanded the boundaries of meanings, abstracted from the “given instance” and raised it to a generalized “possibility.” But the
decisive feature was the category of “as if” which made up the essence of drama as art. But this was no longer a visual illusion in the sense of deception and fiction, not something visually “apparent;” nor was it an ethical error or the ethical “imaginary.” It was the subjective reflection of the objective, furthermore a subjective reflection that strove to lend the character of real objectivity to that which was reflected. Thus arose the category of illusion, which sprang spontaneously from the processes of artistic consciousness and laid the foundation as a cognitive phenomenon for the aesthetics of antiquity.

Literary mimesis had its first theoreticians in the 5th century among the Sophists. They built their theory of “deception” directly on the visual. As the first representatives of conceptual science, they rationalized the ancient folklore practices and once again turned out to be on the course of “mimesis” and “deception;” but they gave them the character of conscious imitation and conscious deception of the audience (intentional illusion). Plato, on the other hand, approached the problem philosophically, gnoseologically. According to his whole system, he divides mimesis itself into the imitation of “what seems,” the phantom, and of “what is,” the truth. When a painter portrays an object precisely, he deceives by means of its likeness to “what seems,” not to true essence. Tragedy and comedy also imitate the seeming; Plato calls them “mimemata,” which contains the meaning of phantom. Every mimesis, says Plato, recreates only one of the parts of the whole (“essential”), and this part is no more than a phantom “likeness” (εἰδωλον).86

Aristotle regards tragedy as mimesis of life and living actions. In his conceptual view art “imitates” real phenomena, attempting to recreate them either as they are or better or worse. Be that as it may, the aesthetic theory of antiquity saw in illusion a means of realistic imitation; how it evaluated the concept of “life” is another matter.

Through illusion, perceptibly reflected-incarnated and presented in action, the spectator underwent a “purification” that was neither physical, as in ritual, nor only ethical, as in cult (in mystery, for example), but artistic-cognitive and emotional-psychological. Aristotle calls the spiritual processes that led the spectator to “purification of the passions” “fear” and “pity.”87

In tragedy the terms for “fear” and “pity” actually do figure prominently, particularly in Euripides. Thus in the Madness of Heracles the messenger describes Heracles’ madness, which evoked in him, the spectator of this madness, “laughter and fear together;”88 Madness predicts that Heracles will dance “in fear”89 and the chorus-spectator feels the “blow of terror.”90 One can find a number of such examples. The motif of “pity” has an important place in melic, especially in laments. But these are the formal traces of the concrete which were interpreted abstractly by Aristotle.

Fear and pity are two states, later feelings, which characterize the sacrificial, purifying animal. In Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens the bearer of fear and pity is the chorus; later this function is performed by the hero who suffers passion. Ritual purification was accompanied by fear and entreaty for pity of the propitiary victim; it was expressed in the passions that this victim suffered. Tragedy undoubtedly turned these basic images into concepts: we see this in documentary form. But it also turned them into figurality; the entreaty of the frightened lamb calling for pity is turned by tragedy into supplicant maidens (as, say, the rebellion of the elements is turned into the rebellious Prometheus, etc.). Catharsis by means of suffering, fear, and entreaty, complaints and pity could take
in aesthetic theory the quality of “catharsis of passions by means of pity and fear.” But in actual aesthetic practice of the 5th century, in tragedy, the spectator was “purified” in the figurative sense, relieved of everything petty as he communed with the powerful “essential” of art, which generalized the narrow “personal.” Fear and pity show that the objective was drawn by tragedy through the subjective; but it was precisely in the subject that art recreated the greatness of the object through illusion.

The basic role here belonged to the poetic image, the creator of the conceptual-perceptive illusion. Artistic mimesis now required decorativeness. It had to recreate “what is” in the illusory, the world of man (πό η ὅν) which has engaged in battle with the world of truth (τό ὅν) and been defeated by it. The means for this was poetic illusion.

The aesthetics of the Classical poetic image are inseparable from the questions of gnoseology and the method of perception of reality, and therefore with realism as well.

The thought of the “likeness” of art and reality still did not mean a realistic perception of the world. I was trying to show that Classical mimesis, Classical “likening” of the invented to reality, Classical illusion still did not mean realism. Aristotle was correct when he saw in tragedy a striving for verisimilitude. But imitation as a whole was directed not towards reality at all, on the contrary, reality was interpreted as something phantom. Imitation was directed towards the religious-ethical “essential.”

Of course it is not enough to establish the gnoseological relationship between the subject and the object of cognition. One must also show how the object is perceived by the subject in content. For the tragedi-ans it was precisely in content that it was religious-ethical. Therefore “reality” in tragedy is dual: the authentic is unreal, this is the world of divinity; and the imaginary is real, this is the world of mortals.

Yet from the point of view of history the realism of perceptions is reflected precisely in the artistic image. Its figurative nature widened the borders of cognition and gave a new dimension to reality—a qualitative and essential dimension. Reality created an imaginary subjective reality; and it created not this reality alone, but also the forms in which this illusoriness was cast. The elements out of which the Classical poetic image was constructed were objective-real; the decisive role was played by the concept, which reflected and was conditioned by the reality of the object. Illusion itself reflected and expressed real connections and regularities which were more profoundly known in the biune abstract-perceptible perception. There could as yet be no realism, but artistic mimesis by itself acted as a preliminary preparation for the future mimesis in Aristotle’s understanding.

The poetic image had nothing in common with the mythological image. The latter was spatial in content, the former abstract. They were formally brought together by their perceptible form, their common semantic origin. But in essence they were completely different: the mythological image turned a semantic meaning into a spatial object: for example, “death” is a place (the underworld), or a thing (a mask), or a person (a captive). The poetic image made of the same semantics figurality, which required a completely different kind of meaning—abstraction from the concrete; space was turned into the category of “as if,” into an illusion of the perceptible rather than its supposed adequacy.
The bearer of this new progressive principle of cognition was the poetic image. It was the poetic image that broadened the boundaries of realistic perceptions.

Prometheus, The Eumenides, Oedipus at Colonus, The Women of Trachis, The Bacchae, Ion, Alcestis, Iphigenia at Aulis—these are undoubtedly models of fantastic plots and scenarios. Yet the heroes of these tragedies act and think according to real laws. They are endowed with the mental soul of people. The system in which these heroes live has a social character.

The problem of evil in Philoctetes or of injustice in Prometheus is generalized, based on the experience of human relations. More than that. Its artistic nature is revealed by the super-ethical interpretation which overcomes the conditions of the age. No matter how narrow Ajax, which rests on the point of view of the petty and formal Classical interpretation of “honor” may be, even here this convention is raised to the level of an absolute precisely because of poetic figurality: it generalizes the sufferings of Ajax, raising him above the narrowness of the ethical ideas of the 5th century and presenting an understanding of betrayed noble feelings that is more integral and more profound than in ethics, at the same time it acts on the spectator through greater concretization of the given instance. Ethics cannot present the abstract concept in perceptible image; it cannot shake the faith in the reality of the facts from which it derives. But artistic mimesis does both. It introduces illusion, the full force of which is based on the perceptible recreation of the authentic in the seeming. And the poetic image dresses the concept in the flesh and blood of reality.

What does the spectator care about the dreams of Atossa, the illegitimate Ion, Oedipus’ argument with his sons? We are wrong to think that the entire essence lies in posing religious-ethical problems. Antiquity itself understood that in Greek tragedy there is “nothing of Dionysus.” Tragedy is far from exhausted by the problem of Dike-Hubris. It left behind mysteries and the genre of “the passions of our Lord,” though it preserved both of them in its content; it could have remained them; but it turned them into another quality—the poetic, based on cognitive figurality. What would have been simpler than to make the Bacchae into a show of “the passions of our Lord” and leave it at that. But Euripides depicts the passions of Dionysus, the persecution of the god by the “animal-like monster” Pentheus, revealing as the cause of these events Pentheus’ unbelief, presenting the logic of this unbelief and revealing its consequences—revenge; Euripides also introduces the tendency to expose the powerlessness of man before a powerful god and, as a result, the torment and suffering not of the divinity, but of man. Therefore the tasks of cult are left far behind. We can find an analogy in the spatial arts, which were in a leading position in Classical Greece. First they served religion, but they flourished when their connection with cult was lost. The plastic arts of the 5th century are only attributed to cult and tragedy, but they already had their own functions and goals. Decorativeness in architecture shows the same thing.

Tragedy, formed through the art of the muses and timed to cult, was not yet an independent literary genre; this is not yet literature. Where there is interpenetration of ideologies there is not yet art as a separate ideology, as an ideology complete within its own bounds. Greek tragedy shows the development of such an early art which is being freed from neighboring ideologies and genres, but has not yet been freed entirely.

The figurality of tragedy endows it with polysemy without any allegory or emblematicness, without the slightest pressure on semantics or desire to give it some
conditional meaning. Ritual acts are standard; standard form and contents are the soul of ritual. In spite of its obligatory forms, tragedy is free of such standardization. It lacks cliché. One would think that the mask destroys individualization. Yes, individualization of character. But Electra is one thing, Antigone another, Phaedra yet another, though they wear masks on their faces. What distinguishes them and characterizes them? Aeschylus’ and Sophocles’ heroes are whole and unshakeable, Sophocles’ are passionate, Euripides’ are full of doubts. Yet even in Aeschylus no one could confuse Prometheus and Orestes, in Sophocles Oedipus and Ajax, in Euripides Medea and Alcestis. None of these heroes has either an internal world, or typical character, or interaction with the complex surrounding world: they have one or two features of “conduct” [nrav] and some polarization of relations with two or three heroes of the same tragedy. They are defined by moral situations. But these very situations are different for Phaedra and Electra, for Prometheus and Ajax. Still, why is Phaedra not made into a mask of passion, Ajax a mask of honor? In the Middle Ages this is exactly the kind of theater we find. Because figurality frees every concrete instance from the necessity of coarse typology. Greek theater is conditional, and this conditionality is brought on by historical causes of a social nature and by peculiarities of social consciousness; but Greek theater is unconditional as far as artistic relations are concerned. Its power lies in the absence of tendentiousness and emblematicness; it achieves generalization by fully balancing sense and fact. It expresses the idea by concrete form; everything perceptible is presented not in itself, but in expression of sense. And this can be explained by the historical uniqueness of the Greek poetic image.

The tragedians created a consistent sequential and motivated plot with logically thought out characters who corresponded to the real world of people. They no longer participated in their plots. The tragedians became only their authors. Along with the authors other characters were born separate from them—people of a postulate reality, plot and story (fabula) as the imaginary events of this reality, and acting as the recreation of reality by means of illusion. The plot took on the significance of a context for events and showed where, how, and with whom these events unfolded. Out of separate thematic points the tragedians created a fluid stream of events, their linkage and development.

The tragedians dressed the dramatic structure in idea content, gave the language a modern character, reflecting developed conceptual thought. They refracted the objective material they received through their subjective understanding. The concept of material appeared with them. They evaluated what happened on stage, introduced the motivation of events, revealed the causes of all the actions, characterized the characters. Reinterpreting, for the most part, one and the same plots, the tragedians managed to vary them internally, thus performing a very difficult and delicate job. One such example which has been preserved to our day is the three tragedies about Electra or the three interpretations of the Oresteia executed by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. They have the same plot, the same fabula, the same characters. Nonetheless, no matter how true all three tragedians are to their model, each has his own evaluation, his own judgment, his own selection of features; while all explain in impersonal form the chain of events and human actions and characterize through the Atreides people and the progress
of life, they present different depictions of what and how their eyes and ears, the mouthpieces of thought, see and hear.

The tragedians turned the fixed, stagnant theses of ethics and cult into ideas, elevating them into profound problems. They also changed the very essence of ancient visual show, which became for them a function of the external poetic image.

Art creates its own facts. But art also creates its own independence. The works composed by the tragedians were split from the personality of the author and took on a kind of existence of their own, the goal of which was to become a generalizing sign of the objective that was as broad as possible.

Nevertheless, in the 5th century the tragic poet himself was still as schematically typical and “ideal” as the heroes he created; there was more object in him than subject. The way of tragedy from Aeschylus to Euripides is the progression of the knowing (cognitive) “I,” which was being liberated from its object generality and from the schematic contours of its inner features.

The tragedians cannot yet consciously recreate reality; to do that they would have to see it, to sense it in opposition. Greek tragedy lies in an unusual world which does not exist on earth and among beings who are not people. The setting of tragedy is God knows where, though it has the names of cities; in reality these are all mythical cities, inseparable from graves and altars with three doors in the wall and two entrances for the chorus. All the characters of tragedy are heroes and gods of myth.

Where do they act? In what realm? Not in a real one, at any rate. But this is true not only of the formal texture of tragedy. Its factual semantic level also takes place in an unreal world. We are accustomed to modernizing its ideas greatly, attributing to them the abstractness of our own contemporary thought. In point of fact the ethism of Greek tragedy is still a concrete element with features of a “once upon a time never-never land.”

To call it an otherworld would be a distortion; it is neither in this world nor in the other, but everywhere and nowhere, in a sphere where ethea live and fates command, where the eternal struggle between the one and the many, between individual whim and the norm is carried out. Conceptuality transforms this mythical sphere into an idea sphere; here man, who is being liberated from object-ness, finds his expression; he still falls in the struggle with forces outside himself, still imagines that necessity is higher than human will, yet even in the most “tragic” case reflects the process of his cognitive birth.

The foundation of Greek tragedy is the agon of the subject with the object in the form of Established Law and Violation/Offence; if the main character of tragedy, as in Aeschylus’ *Suppliant Maidens*, is the bearer of the norm, then it coincides with the object. But such a cognitive proportion is possible only in the early Aeschylus.

Tragedy is the reproduction not of social reality (even where the questions of state, politics, family, and honor figure), but of a special ethical cosmos, where the gods are required to follow the same norm of Establishment as the heroes. In the final moral struggle only the subjective principle dies. This makes for the impression of greatness, something of Michelangelo or Bach. In the sphere of art it is so, because our consciousness reading Classical tragedy has already known Michelangelo and Bach. But from the historical point of view the point is the power of poetic figurality, which allows us to broaden our perception of the facts of tragedy to the boundaries of our contemporary understanding. Antiquity of the 5th century itself did not create the idea of the infinite and superhuman which engulfed the finite or the idea of the moral universe:
the Greeks had not yet grasped the philosophical significance of “the infinite” and “the universal,” representing both of them spatially (τὸ ἀπελπούν).

At first glance it seems that Greek tragedy poses real problems of state, politics, and contemporary social culture. But all these questions do not concern the actual reality of Athens in the 5th century. They are of an “ideal” nature, void of historical typology. They are concerned not with the problems of the given concrete contemporary world, but with the ethical-religious norm “established” and “set down” forever—the realm of the divine θέμις. Therefore historical tragedies lack any historicism except for the theme and the names; the “ideality,” the perception of the world allows no room for the individual, and just as in the lyric parts of tragedy there can be no “I” of the hero, so among the characters there can be no historical portraits. Classical sculpture knows no portraits for the same reason; before Myron it presents even the human body normatively, only “correctly” proportioned. Such “ideality” contains no elements whatsoever of “perfection” and is not Winckelmann’s “idealized reality” which supposedly “rises above” the real. The term “ideality” as applied to ancient Greece has a conventional character in scholarship: it signifies the absence in the portrait of individual facial features and the harmony of the whole, which balances all the parts. I would say, however, that “ideality” drowns everything personal in the stream of the general since Attic thought of the 5th century sees things as an “ensemble,” which is explained by the dominance of the summary whole over the separate and individual. Such a method of thought appears even now wherever the collective principle engulfs the personal, where synthesis holds sway over analysis. But in Classical Greece with its subordination of particular to general this was caused by the underdevelopment of concepts of particular/individual; “general” was not a synthesis, but the remains of the schematic-summary generality of image. The Classical “ideality” of thought was unavoidable and lacked the philosophical intention theoreticians of the 19th century ascribed to it. Furthermore it bypassed the problems of reality and did not set itself the task of reflecting in any form surrounding reality. It did not set such tasks because it could not isolate them.

One cannot speak of the “reincarnation” of the author so long as there is the mask, the fixed scheme, and acting in the sanctuary. For the author they are sacred. From his point of view these are depictions of holy things. For him the heroes once existed, and in this sense they are not something later, purely literary, “characters.” And there are few personal value judgments in tragedy, even fewer departures from the scheme: the author refrains from introducing his personal taste and sees his task as the opposite—to follow tradition.

But objectively this is acting, reincarnation of author and actors, literary characters. Only the scope of these phenomena is still limited. They are peculiar in content as well.

As we know, the requirements of “three unities” were introduced into drama by classicism. Yet in Greek tragedy too there is unity of time and place, often of action as well. This is because the tragedians’ thinking could not create a “background” of time by spreading it apart or pushing it away; it could not create a “background” of events either. In antiquity time still preserves its aspectual character; either it lasts or it is completed, but in both cases it is held up close to the spectator, just as Classical space is held up
close. The messenger in tragedy corresponds to the background of place, time, and action; what is found behind the scenes is expressed in him. In this sense he also corresponds to the periact, these things which stand and turn. The location in tragedy is depicted in the form of a narrow and shallow proscenium like a narrow corridor; furthermore both the scena and the orchestra were a uniform and stable flat place, I would even say an immobile flat place, since they lacked flexibility of function. The parodoi of the chorus and the wall with three doors were likewise “finished.”

At the same time, the conceptual thought of the tragedians transformed the ancient image props of tragedy, its ancient image structure. Stichomythia in particular took on a special significance for the tragedians. Where the modern playwright introduces circumstances to move the action forward or show the character of the heroes, the Classical tragedian resorts to a system of questions and answers which incorporates the pieces of the plot which are lacking. Thus stichomythia is related to the plot action which has not developed on stage and replaces events that would have to be revealed narratively. It is only natural that it speaks of something past and finished, something that happened somewhere far away, off stage. If modern drama has indirect characterization, which did not exist in Classical drama, stichomythia is indirect action. This makes it useful for the purpose of denouement: it suddenly reveals what was off stage, what was hidden from the heroes and was not taken into consideration by them. The classic examples of such stichomythia are those in *Oedipus the King* between Oedipus and the messenger, Oedipus and the shepherd.

The agon also took on a conceptual-constructive role in tragedy. It became the bearer of the basic idea, more precisely an instrument for revealing this idea. The tragedians turned the agon of the two main characters and the two main tendencies not only into a dramatic conflict, the compositional center which contained the peripeteia, but also into a means for sharp chiaroscuro which in European dramaturgy before Chekhov was considered the mark of the dramatic genre.

The peripeteia itself took on a new constructive significance. This consisted in the fact that it began to gather together all the threads of action, which were colored in it, then fell; the moment of dyeing—the revelation of semantic significance—was the most important for the plot action, and its denouement, the very “untying” of its “knot” was explained by this dye that could not be washed out by anything.

The tragedians, in general, were the first to introduce the principle of advancing composition. Tragedy contains the only example in Classical Greece: before and after tragedy composition knew nothing of increase, apogee, and decline. For Greece composition by “stringing together” is typical, as in the *Works and Days* of Hesiod or Aristophanes’ comedies.

In tragedy all the events are distributed such that each of them is used by the next, until the last reaches excessive tension. Then comes the peripeteia, the break in action, which runs rapidly to its conclusion. Thus the causal construction of tragedy is in force only on the way to the center; from the center comes a decline, which removes the intermediate levels of causality and reduces them to nothing. Hence it is clear that the peripeteia, which arose from the mytholog-ical image of the “cycle,” is conceptually reworked and causalized, preserving in part the now outdated structure of the image. Still in order to appreciate the centralizing composition of tragedy, one must compare it with
the anti-consecutive compositions typical of Greece: the pure cause-and-effect sequentiality of tragedy is the result of conceptual thought.

The two elements of tragedy, the image and the concept, characterize tragedy in everything. Not only in composition, but also in argumentation one can follow logical judgments, on the one hand, and mythological image, on the other. Thus in speeches, in dialogues, in stichomythia we discover all the elements of formal logic; meanwhile the melic part of tragedy derives from the images of myth. The two principles which nourish tragedy—duration and completion—correspond to this. While all the plot action of tragedy is already based on duration (“action”), the choruses and the structure of tragedy, as well as its props (masks, buskins, sets, and the stage) continue to express the principle of frozen completedness (“status”), not subject to any dynamic laws.

But aside from the transformations introduced by conceptual thought, the literary consciousness of the tragedians changed the function of the entire composition of tragedy. This composition began to serve the intention and poetical goals of the creators of tragedy, i.e. it switched from ritual and cult functions, to artistic functions. Laments were called on to express the emotions of the heroes and arouse compassion in the audience; the show of passions set as its goal the recreation of the heroes’ suffering to strike the audience; all parts of the structure and all the composition of tragedy had to serve the one goal of moving the plot forward. Thus figurality united the dual composition of tragedy, giving it the nature of an artistic unity, a unity in which the formal part could not exist without the idea part, the idea without the form.

The tragedian organized time, space, cause, the dimensions of events, the proportions between events and their significance subjectively. In Oedipus the King, the most Classical of tragedies, Sophocles makes Thebes a conventional space, where the deeds of Oedipus take place, then the plague, death and destruction of the house of the Labdacids. The time which the action fills is compressed: all at once one is presented with the arrival of those praying Oedipus for protection, the oracle’s answer, Oedipus’ curse of the polluter, and the discovery of this polluter in Oedipus, and the catastrophe that follows this discovery. The causal progress of events is logically thought out by Sophocles himself: it is brought on by his personal evaluation. Sophocles endows the hero with “conduct” \[\text{[nrav]}\] which defines the manner of action that leads to the catastrophe. Hot temper, intolerance, self deception, and endless certainty of his mental superiority are the causes that blind Oedipus even before his blindness. His wife and mother, Jocasta, is symmetrical to Oedipus. She contains the mortal, blind, petty principle of vanity and ignorance, vainglory and arrogance. She pulls Oedipus down with her logical argumentation free of belief in predestination. The other, wise principle is found in the prophet Teiresias, who is physically blind, but spiritually sighted.

The introduction of the psychological level is actually a victory over the cult principle. Cult requires the triumph of Dike or Hubris without any logic or justification. The hubrist must be destroyed, period. Dike must triumph because of the self-sufficient (\textit{a priori}) laws of Establishment (\textit{θεύμις}).

The tragedians introduce motivation of the acts and thoughts of their heroes, and this in itself eliminates the law of Establishment. No matter what gods they speak of,
whatever “Titans,” fantastic beings, or divinities Prometheus, Oceanus, Hermes, Dionysus might be—what takes place before the audience is the drama of a man profaned. Once the logical and psychological conditions for human conduct appear, once the events derive from some logical causes, the fatal character of Predestination is eliminated. The poetic image defeated the stagnant religious-ethical concept.

But these two tendencies came to a juncture in tragedy. While on the level of facts the central agon took place between the two principles of Established (Dike, Themis) and Violation (Hubris), on the level of poetic figuraiity the ethical nature of man struggled with the unfounded power of the macrocosm. The macrocosm won. But it won because a struggle was taking place. It would seem that Predestination has the possibility of acting autocratically. Doubtless it would act so if the idea of predestination had been created by abstract concept. But the Classical concept came from myth; and in myth Lot overcame Non-lot in the agon.

Ideas in Classical tragedy fought each other and led to the central collision. But the battle of ideas and the moral conflict which make up the soul of tragedy took place only on a figurative level. In this sense it is wrong to ascribe to Euripides alone the posing of such problems and their solution in favor of man; wrong to ascribe to Aeschylus the opposite tendency. One can only say that a later phenomenon merely condenses features that existed in sketch form in an earlier one.

In essence Prometheus Bound derives from the drama of “lot” in which the Titan was passed by; this is the drama of Evil Lot or Non-lot, Ate, traces of which are preserved in the female role of Io, which stands alongside the male role of Prometheus. In the same way in the Oresteia, Clytemnestra derives from the image of mother-Fate, or more precisely stepmother-Fate, who wants to kill her children after the murder of her husband, but is killed by her son; trampling upon the “mothers”—Fates, Erinyes, “Erinyes of Clytemnestra,” of old underworld goddesses echoes the matricide of Clytemnestra—a newer form of the archaic “mothers,” who were still collective and impersonal, nameless female divinities of death. At the end of the trilogy these Eumenides “depart” under the earth; Clytemnestra is simply cut down with a sword.

In both the Oresteia and Prometheus Bound Aeschylus poses the same problem of the struggle between the micro- and the macrocosm. In both it takes place on the religious-ethical level, with the victory of Established. But undoubtedly on the level of poetic interpretation the hubrist-Prometheus evokes sympathy, while the supreme divinity Zeus evokes censure. Even if this tragedy is only one part of a trilogy, the poetic fact, unlike real fact, is not subject to refutation.

The problem is the same in the Oresteia. The old goddesses are appeased, Orestes is justified in his matricide. Yet the entire artistic effect of this trilogy is based on the struggle between two opposite spheres of ideas. Clytemnestra has committed a violation of the Established by killing her husband-king and sharing the throne with her co-murderer-lover. The guilty wife, she has become through fear of family vengeance a guilty mother. Orestes, who avenges his father and kills his mother, is the purifier of pollution; he is pleasing to the gods and to the Established. Yet the erinyes of his mother take revenge on him. He himself becomes a polluter and requires purification. Clytemnestra herself has many justifications: she took revenge on her husband for sacrificing their daughter and for Cassandra, whom he brought into the house as his lover.
Finally all the murders and pollution together are the inevitable deeds of fate punishing the Atreides.

The facts are thus contradictory. The straightforwardness of simply establishing the facts is alien to Classical tragedy. Only in the theater of Seneca and the dramas of decadent periods does the audience meet face to face with well-drawn events bearing explanatory inscriptions. This is not art. Greek tragedy makes the facts figurative, translating them into generalizing interpretation. But in art this interpretation is done by the audience, not the author.

Poetic figurality signifies neither allegory nor vagueness. It is even more clear than the blind facts, the meaning of which man cannot recognize. Oedipus got tangled up in these meanings, though he was wise. Even Prometheus himself could not foretell that he would make peace with Zeus.

Figurality introduces many nuances and unexpected twists into the single and one-quality fact. Unlike concept, it takes into consideration the most varied sides of the fact, even those which are not part of it, but which are possible. It does not have to reckon with the narrowness of the age, is free of ethicism or any other historical convention. While high science consciously eliminates everything conventional and follows no ready-made judgments, even though insubordination to their dictates might bring the stake, prison, or exile, artistic figurality does the same thing freely and unaccountably in every member of the audience.

In Aeschylus there is a comparison of misfortune to a river: “A crowd of misfortunes is overflowing, like a river.” This simile is based on the mythological identity of water and destruction; the ancient underworld is made up of many rivers. Conceptual thought made the mythological image into figurality. All of its concreteness took on a figural sense—after all, misfortune can neither “walk” nor “overflow” nor have any features in common with a river. But the introduction of the illusory sphere (“like,” “as if”) allowed translation of the literal sense into the figurative. The thing that is peculiar to antiquity in such figurality is that its figural sense is attached to the semantics of the literal (misfortune-river) and could not exceed its limits. The result is a simile. Yet it is also a metaphor. Whether the “like” is present or not, the metaphoricity is unshaken (“misfortunes overflow in a river,” “misfortunes overflow like a river”).

The figurality of the poetic image does not emphasize its comparative-illusory nature. It does not say, “this is the way it is in life,” “Medea was jealous like any woman in her situation,” etc. Yet the whole level of art lies in the first part of the comparison, the second part of which allows for free interpretation.

But Classical artistic interpretation itself is bound by the concreteness of the interpreted material. When an educated Greek generalized about questions of insulted honor, he could think of Ajax; when he considered that injustice reigns in the world, Philoctetes could appear in his memory; and if it were not exactly these characters, it would be others like them. In this respect we used to understand Classical literary works in which there are examples from mythology incorrectly. We called this a “device,” a kind of educated dandyism, Alexandrinism. But is this not the way the chorus tells of
Scylla and Althaea, while the audience watches Clytemnestra, or of Danae, when Iphigenia is on stage?

Classical artistic thought understands only the generalization which follows from the given concrete case. The tragedian uses the ancient choruses to construct figurative, generalizing meanings; in the Hellenistic age generalization no longer needs such elementary methods of thought, and then concrete analogies become examples, similes, tropes.

The breadth of figural meanings depends on the historical age, and their content is composed in social concepts. In the Classical age Electra and Antigone are great heroines, though one rouses her brother to murder his mother and the other does not submit to civil law. Antiquity was charmed by Alcestis, who went to death alive for her husband and was returned alive from death. All of these concepts of a certain age died out for following generations.

But the generalizing force of the poetic image survived around two and a half millennia and will live longer still. Concepts die out, the images live. While the function of generalization lay with concepts, they achieved the maximum intellectual possibilities for their age. But in artistic thinking the image, having lost mythological features and shot through by concept, became the perceptible expression of concept. Now they switched functions: generalization went to image, and image became the bearer of figurality.

Unlike in Old Comedy, in tragedy there is no conscious conflict of mythological image and concept, concept and poetic figurality. Thus Prometheus’ address to the cosmos shows that the image has not yet been pushed aside, that concept gave it a logical, abstract nature, but left it in force. In the Women of Trachis the myth about the centaur’s love for Deianira is not in contrast to concept, though the tragedy as a whole develops on the level of conceptual logic, in accordance with reality. In tragedy the dissonance of the two systems of thought is eliminated. The tragedians arrive at a wholeness of thought which creates the famous “harmony” of forms.

Only in Euripides, as in comedy, does the conflict of image and concept lead to a dissonance of meanings. It is this rather than external features which shows his proximity to comedy; whether Euripides intended it or not, a number of his tragedies are turned towards comedy.

This is particularly clear in the Bacchae, because here there can be no doubt that Euripides intended to remain “tragic.”

The Bacchae contains two thought systems: one, conceptual, in Pentheus, the other, image, in Dionysianism. As a rationalist, Pentheus is right. Dionysus too is right on the religious-mythological level. The conflict of the tragedy, in essence, took place because of the intersection of these two incommensurate lines. This is why no one can tell if this tragedy is in favor of the gods or atheist. It is neither, because at its base lies the dissonance which has not been eliminated.

On one of these levels Dionysus is a benevolent divinity. To understand him one needs faith. To those who give themselves wholeheartedly to this divinity Dionysus sends bliss and joy. But those who do not accept him he punishes cruelly.

On the other level Pentheus cannot reconcile Dionysus’ “miracles” with reason. Reasoning logically, Pentheus has to consider Dionysus a charlatan. Which he does.
Euripides places all the actions and events which occur on the religious level outside logical causality. Especially outside the real level are the utopian orgies of Bacchus, in which the pure mythological image is recreated pre-conceptually. At the same time Dionysus, whose role is religious and mythological, is introduced as a “conceptual” god, who reasons and acts logically, is endowed with real human features and even such emotions as offense, vengeance, irony, the desire for amusement and mockery, etc. If we compare this Dionysus to the gods of Aeschylus and Sophocles, the difference between them will be that Dionysus is more conceptual than Apollo, Hermes, Athena, these amorphous, still half-mythological divinities of the older tragedians. The point, therefore, is not that Pentheus is a man, Dionysus a god. Objectively it turns out that the conflict of the Bacchae takes place because of the collision of the two irreconcilable spheres of the concept and the mythological image, not of belief and unbelief.

The scene in which Pentheus’ house burns and falls is typical, but Euripides makes the insane Pentheus imagine this fire and destruction. Here two intellectual levels are displaced and confused: now reality remains in force (precisely when the miracle is taking place) and the incarnation of logicality, the “Sophist” Pentheus is transferred to the level of mythological causality.

Euripides accomplishes the vengeance of Dionysus by purely external means: the god sets madness upon the rational Pentheus. But such mythological punishment eliminates the entire conflict in essence. The moral disharmony is preserved.

The whole denouement of the tragedy, which is dominated by the madness of Pentheus, represents from the objective point of view a transfer of the conceptual level onto the mythological. Henceforth everything that happens to Pentheus is removed from the laws of reason and transported to the world where fantasy rules. This is why the finale of the tragedy in the editions preserved is so unconvincing.

What is the point here? Euripides turns poetic figurality into a category of conceptual logic, i.e. returns the poetic image again to concept. He brings this concept together with myth and reveals the nonsense of myth: he dissects myth with the laws of conceptual logic. And nothing can come out of it but dissonance.

But what tragedy is not built on the motif of the hero’s failure to recognize a god? Prometheus does not want to recognize Zeus as the lawful ruler. Ajax does not recognize Athena. Hippolytus does not recognize Aphrodite. In other tragedies it is a case of not recognizing lawful kings or lawful decrees (The Seven, Antigone), most often not recognizing established laws of religion and ethics: the conceptual thought of the tragedians makes the motif “non-recognition of gods” real and relates it to the relations between people. Therefore the point is not the thematics of the Bacchae in itself, but that for the old tragedians there was no divergence of thought systems, or to be more precise, their poetic image, unlike that of Euripides, does not yet enter into opposition with the concept as it strives to become separate and dominant.

The Classical poetic image was a figurality of the mythological image, but figurality itself was created by concept and was a conceptual category. The Classical poetic image was a reinterpretation of the mythological image by concept in which the image lost its former essence, i.e. its literal meanings, and took on completely different, figurative
meanings; at the same time the figurality of these meanings depended completely on the literal meanings of the mythological image, which the concept made into generalization, polysemy, and semantic concentration.

The Classical artistic image was metaphorical in nature, and like metaphor it appeared historically, in the process of the development of concepts: Classical metaphor was the form in which concepts were born. This, by the way, explains the closeness of Greek society to art and to the craft of art. Greek art is “of the whole folk” because it comes from below, from the masses, subject to the laws by which concepts were born in the first class society.

But the poetic image did not coincide with linguistic metaphor. It was made distinct and specific by mimesis or illusoriness. The poetic image was related not to the world of phenomena themselves, but to the world of their reflections. Yet its function was not that of a mirror. Poetic figurality did not simply reflect reality, it made it into something generalized and possible; at the same time it preserved a feature of metaphor—the expression of much in little.

In his later works Euripides already shakes the system of the Classical poetic image. He again breaks thought down into its two biune parts, giving primacy to concept. This is not simply the “influence of the Sophists:” Euripides’ thought followed the same stages as the philosophical thought of his contemporaries. The abstracting concept entered into a struggle with the poetic image and replaced figurality with judgment, poetic harmony of oppositions with the antinomies of formal logic. But the ends did not meet in such a system.

A crisis of poetic thought ensued. Its task was to seek new ways which began to be sketched out by Plato a century later and were then established in Hellenism.

But Greek tragedy as a whole was historically the first model of poetic image based on artistic mimesis which overcame the cult stagnation of its age. Greek tragedy, in the personal art of the tragedians, attained so-called “expressiveness” of poetic means and managed to express more by means of less—in other words, to raise the basic principle of metaphor to the level of art.
Endnotes

**Introduction**

9. When possible, quotations from Freidenberg’s retrospective diary will be referred to sections quoted in Mossman’s edition of the *Correspondence*. Unpublished diary references are by book and, if numbered, page number: *Diary*, III, 103.
28. *Correspondence*, 125.
29. *Diary*, VI, 8.

32. References to Marr will be restored in future editions.


36. Correspondence, 85.

37. “Mif ob Iosife Prekrasnom,” lazyk i literatura, 8 (L: 1932), 137–58.


39. Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaja kul’tura srednevekov’ia i renesansa (M: Khudozhhestvennaia literatura, 1965), 62, n. 1.

40. Diary, IV, 226.


44. Rable, 10–14.


47. Her students recall that Freidenberg always shocked her pupils out of complacent admiration for beautiful Classical culture with the phrase, “Don’t forget that the Greeks reeked of garlic and urine.” (They used urine to bleach their clothes.)


49. Diary, II, 129.

50. Diary, II, 130.

51. From a letter to Ol’ga Nikol’skaia, quoted in Druzhby narodov, 1988, 7, 205.

52. Diary, I, 20.

53. Diary, I, 12.

54. Diary, IV, 99.

55. Diary, III, 192.

Chapter 1

1. Recently works have appeared which examine the role of mythological ideas in the appearance and development of specifically poetic language in Classical philology as well. See, for example, A.A. Taxo-Gody, “Struktura poehticheskikh tropol v ‘Iliade’ Gomera,” Voprosy antichnoi literatury i klassicheskoi filologii (M: Hayka, 1966), c. 45–49,

Mifologicheskoe proishoshdenie poehticheskogo yazyka ‘Iliady’ Gomera, Antichnost’ i sovremennost’ (M: Hayka, 1972), c. 196

See also some thoughts on the mythological reality of what became poetic metaphor in literature in G.E.Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 182ff; Snell points out the connection between ancient epithet and simile and metaphorical images that grew out of myth: Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind (New York: Dover 1982); See also H.Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (Bonn, 1960); H.-J.Newiger, Metapher und Allegorie. Studien zu Aristophanes (Munich: Beck, 1957).
Chapter 2

1. Among O.M.Freidenberg’s contemporaries I.G.Frank-Kamenetskii studied metaphor as one of the forms of human consciousness and the transition from mythological to poetic metaphor. The ideas in his article «К вопросу о развитии поэтической метафоры: Советское языкознание, T. 1, Л. (1935) in large part correspond to the ideas of Freidenberg developed in this chapter.

According to Frank-Kamenetskii, poetic metaphor and the mythological image share cognition of the concrete through the concrete. The mythological image presents a primitive, undifferentiated perception of the world in the single and particular, it is a cognitive category that combines features of generality and concreteness. Yet Frank-Kamenetskii does not consider that the quest for the genesis of poetic metaphor in the same undifferentiated “ideology” from which mythology is also derived makes myth a direct source of poetic creativity. “The tendency of development in the poetic image is diametrically opposed to myth creation. But both branches at first developed closely intertwined: poetry takes raw material from myth, myth reveals elements of poetic creativity in the process of re-forming traditional views. In myth the dualism of the fantastic and the realistic world perceptions is expressed not in the opposition of two world views, but in the opposition of two spatially separated and delimited worlds, both of which were recognized as real” (p. 142). Since the real and the illusory world are parallel, the transferral to the “illusory” world of characters and situations borrowed from reality allows the artist to use the images and relations of myth to reproduce reality in art. Here he presents the thesis that O.M. Freidenberg’s Poetics of Plot and Genre is dedicated to proving: what is content on mythological ground becomes form for poetic contents. But he makes a very significant caveat: “One must not lose sight of the fact that changing the content brings with it a corresponding change in the form” (142). Frank-Kamenetskii shows how the anthropization of nature and cosmic phenomena in myth-creation becomes the basis for the artistic reproduction of real characters and situations through the poetic images of nature as animated and alive. But to become such an artistic means the anthropomorphic image of nature must be deprived of its “ideological” content and receive it again in the creation of the author; furthermore, according to Frank-Kamenetskii, this poetic image acts as the expression of ideas and generalizations which had
as yet found no formulation in the abstract concept. Frank-Kamenetskii considers, furthermore, that the cognitive function of the image, which precedes and prepares the way for the appearance of abstract concepts, plays some role in myth creation.

2. Among the defenders of the “intellectualism” of primitive thinking who deny its “emotional” character Levi-Strauss is the most famous. He declares in his programmatic article “The Structural Study of Myths,” “Instead of trying to enlarge the framework of our logic to include processes which, whatever their apparent differences, belong to the same kind of intellectual operation, a naive attempt was made to reduce them to inarticulate emotional drives, which resulted only in hampering our studies.” (Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Structural Study of Myth,” Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf [NY: Basic Books, 1963], 207.) Mythological creation, according to Lévi-Strauss, is relatively independent from the influence of other forms of tribal life and therefore reflects the “anatomy of the mind” adequately, the mental structures that in themselves contain nothing mythological. “The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and...the difference lies not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied.” (Ibid., 230). Although Freidenberg continually speaks of the difference between primitive (pre-formal-logical) thought and “conceptual” and abstract thought, and of the moment of split, she emphasizes unity of human thought in her analysis of the construction of concept by means of the image, which is the theme of this work.


6. The notion that form on one level becomes content on another lies at the heart of all of Freidenberg’s early work. In Poetics, she writes “the structure itself, which represents the morphological side of meaning, is the occasion for semantic deciphering and again gives rise to meaning. Thus every phenomenon lives in both hidden and apparent form, contradicting itself. What later makes up literary plots and genres is created in a period when there are still neither genres nor plots. They are built out of the world view of primitive society cast in a certain morphological system; when the meaning of this world view disappears, its structure continues to function in a system of new interpretations” (Poetics, 118–119; see also 283, 304).

7. νόμος

8. ὀδίς

9. inludere

10. ἀπάτη

11. The meaning of the word νόμος begins to approximate “imagination” only in the late Classical period. In Plato it is “sensation” or “seeming,” “illusion” (Theaetetus 152e, 161e, Republic 382e) and only in the Sophist (264a ff.) is the fantastic imitation (subjectively distorted) opposed to the ekistic (precise copy), and “phantasia” is found in an aesthetic context. In Aristotle νόμος is completely in the sphere of psychology (On the Soul 428b 10 ff., 431b 2 ff. et. al.); for Pseudo Longinus (On the Sublime 15.1) νόμος is visual images
which give “visibility” to a verbal work. And only in Philostratus Flavius (Life of Apollonius of Tyana VI, 19) is νόμος opposed to imitation (mimesis) and can it be translated as “artistic imagination,” though it is still not equal to European “fantasy” (See E. Birmellin, “Die Kunsttheoretischen Gedanken in Philostrats Apollonios,” Philologus, Vol. 88. H. 2, 4, 1933; Taxo-,
«Классическое и эллинистическое представление о красоте в действительности и искусстве.» Эстетика и искусство, (М: Наука, 1966), 47–53).
12. Elsewhere Freidenberg refers to “cosmogonic systems, in which reality is thought of as a negative quantity, as opposed to the positive abstract substantial principle” (Poetics, 296).
13. The precise nature of Classical idealism, which places at the center of attention the theory of the perceptible cosmos, the materialist nature of Classical idealism and the “idealism” of Classical materialism are analyzed in the many works of A.F. Losev.
14. Presumably Freidenberg has in mind Antigone 241, but αποφαργυσαι κύκλω means “fence around” rather than “walk around.”
16. στιγμηρος ουρανος Od. 15.329, 17.565.
17. στιδιρεισον ητορ ll. 24.205, 24.521, κραδη σιδηρητη Od. 4.293.
21. Surely Freidenberg means Aeschylus, Eumenides, 942:
23. See Freidenberg’s «Происхождение эпического сравнения (На материале Илиады)», Труды юбилейной научной сессии ЛГУ, Л 1946, 101–113.
25. 17.20 ff.
26. ll., 17.61–69.
27. Eumathius Makrembolites’ Greek Novel Tale of Hysmenes and Hysmenia (12th century): “Bending to the maid as to a grapevine and pressing with my lips its still unripe berries, I drank the nectar the Eroses press; I pressed it with my fingers and drank with my lips, so that to the last drop it poured into my soul as into a vessel, so insatiable a grape gardener was I.” (V.19, from the translation by S.V. Poliakova).
28. In one of her excursuses to “The Semantics of the Composition of Hesiod’s Works and Days” called “Aristophanes ‘Eirene’ Freidenberg analyzes the metaphor of marriage as gathering the grape harvest, which is developed into the plot of the comedy Peace (Eirene): the marriage of Trugeus, the harvester of ripe fruits (from the verb τρυγαν — “to harvest grapes or other fruits”, Schol. Aristoph. Pax 60, 190; Diom. 487), to Opora, i.e. to the time of ripe fruits, to harvest autumn, to the very fruits themselves. “Remarkable in this respect is the hymeneia sung at the marriage of Trugeus and Opora. Here there are two motifs: one in the carol, where the plenty of barley, figs, wine, and childbirth is invoked; the second in the hymeneia itself, where the bride is metaphorized as a fig, the bridegroom as a harvester of ripe fruits (1320ff., 1336ff.); it is the same in Sappho, where “sweet apple” meant the bride, while the bridegroom is the “harvester of apples” (fr. 116 Diehl)”
М., 1988, 225. The marriage union is
metaphorized both as the harvest of grapes and as pressing the grapes (1349, 1084–87). “All these puns consist of terms connected with wine making, but applied to fertility; in the poetics of speech in Aristophanes these very ambiguities are suggested by the original dual-single meaning of the agricultural image, but this meaning has long been forgotten and is reinterpreted, so to say, by Aristophanes; it is interesting in that it is given again the meaning it had from the very beginning, only in a new context” (Ibid., 226).


31. Eugene Onegin, 6.22.9.
32. Hymn to Delian Apollo, 156, 162–63.
33. Il. 5.72.
34. θαύμα and θέαμα.
35. θαύμι ἰδείν (ἰδέσθαι), e.g. Il. 5.725, 10.439, 18.83, 377, Od. 6.306, 7.45, 8.366, 13.108, Hymn to Aphrodite 90, Hymn to Demeter 427, see also Hymn to Aphrodite 205, Il. 15.286, 21.344, 22.54, Od. 3.373, 4.44, 7.145, 13.157, 19.30, 24.370, Hymn to Hermes 219, 414.
36. Il. 11.628–33.
37.II. 11.639–40.
38. The image, for Freidenberg, attains definition through tautological reduplication in various forms which may later become epithets, similes, attributes: “The epithet which accompanies the hero turns out upon analysis to be the same as his name, i.e. his essence, only transferred from noun to the role of adjective. Thus the sun is quick, heat wild, fire inventive,—all because one metaphor is equal in meaning to another; the character of the hero is built of these tautological features, built of the same thing the image incarnated in the given hero represents” (Poetics, 245).
39. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 685.
41. Iphigenia in Tauris, 1095.
42. According to Freidenberg, this holds for thing-attributes of divinities as well: “every divinity has his vegetative and animal attribute, which remained with him as an attribute because in a preceding stage it represented the god in the form of an animal or a plant” (Poetics, 133; see also 199–201, 226).
43. Il. 11.24–28.
44. Il. 11.29–33.
45. Il. 11.632–5.
46. Medea, 319.
47. Il. 18.396.
48. Il. 3.180 and Od. 4.145.
49. Libation Bearers, 621.
50. Od. 11.424.
51. Page PMG 360.
52. Page PMG 376.
53. Page PMG 417.
54. Olympian 11, 3.
55. Olympian 6, 97.
56. Olympian 6, 83.
57. Isthmian 5, 50.
1. Tadeusz Zielinski showed in his work "О дорийском и ионийском стилях в древней аттической комедии" (СПб., 1885) that there are two kinds of composition in Greek drama—episodic and epirrhematic. Tragedy is composed according to the former scheme, comedy according to the latter, though the conflict between the two, which correspond to Dorian and Ionian origins, runs through the entire history of developed dramatic art. According to Zielinski metrics and melos, myth—which is connected with Dorism—and “secular storytelling”—which is connected with Ionism, cult auletics (flute playing) and secular citharistics (play on the cithara) all differ in correspondence with the Dorian and Ionian “styles.” These ideas are known in European scholarship through Zielinski, Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie (Leipzig: Teubner, 1885) and Zielinski, Die Märchenkomödie in Athen (Petersburg: Izd. Akademii Nauk, 1885).

2. The problem of the relationship between verse and prose and song and story continues to be important today. B.V. Tomashevskii shows the indefiniteness of the boundary between verse and prose.

3. Hieron I: tyrant of Syracuse 477/6–466/5, patron of Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, Aeschylus, Epicharmus. Olympian 1 is dedicated to him: he won a horse race in 476.


5. Il. 9.543 ff.

6. Pythian II.

7. Freidenberg appears to be mistaken here, though she refers to the connection between Medea and Circe several times. Perhaps she means Ino, whom Euripides’ chorus mentions in Medea 1282ff.


9. 13.344.

10. 13.352.

11. 20.351–57.


13. Or rather from διηγέομαι.

14. In Poetics, Freidenberg presents a slightly different view of the function of the messenger to report victory over death: “his function as the divinity-victor over death is to present in verbal form what the protagonist himself incarncates—the duel beyond the grave” (186).
15. In the third satire.
16. The 3rd century *Aethiopica*, the longest and best constructed of the extant Greek novels.
17. Once again, apparently a mistaken reference.
18. Pythian 4 and 5 are dedicated to Arkesilas of Cyrene, the winner of a chariot race in 462 BC, but there is no mention of Pelops in either. Perhaps Freidenberg had in mind Hieron of Syracuse, winner of a horse race in 476, to whom Olympian 1 is dedicated. This ode does contain a reference to Pelops.
19. *skólion*—a drinking song passed around the circle, *skólios*—1) crooked, 2) unjust, 3) false.

Chapter 4

1. Following 19th century thought, Freidenberg gives much prominence to solar myths and rituals: *Poetics*, 74, 69.
5. *Il.* 18.211–12.

21. Cratisthenes, “who could make fire burn spontaneously and invented many other magical tricks to confound men’s understanding,” was a pupil of Xenophon the juggler.

22. *Φλύαξ* = jester or hilarotragedy (tragic burlesque invented by Rhinthon).

26. According to Chantraine, the meaning of *νέμω* is “attribuer, répartir selon l’usage ou la convenance, faire une attribution régulière,” in the middle “avoir sa part ou sa portion de nourriture,” active “faire paître.” *νόμος* is “pâturage, nourriture,” *νόμος*—“pâturage, nourriture.” With paroxytone stress *νόμος* is “ce qui conforme à la règle, l’usage, les lois générales,” but also a technical term “air, melodie.”
27. This is correct according to Chantraine.
28. See also Freidenberg’s *Palliata* on this: Миф и театр (М: ГИТИС, 1988) 60.
29. Plut. Ages. 21; Apophth. Lac. 212 F (δεικηλίκτας), cp. Athen. XIV, 621e.
30. See Hesych. s.v.
31. Plut. Ages. 21; Apophth. Lac. 212 F (δεικηλίκτας) cp. Athen. XIV, 621e.
34. On the passions of Osiris see History II.171, on the mysteries of Sais—II.62–63.
35. Stob, Florileg. IV.107=Plut. fragm. De anima V.2 (VI.331 Tauchnitz); Procl. Comm. in Plat. Alcib. I.39; 1.61; Comm. in Theol. 111.18; see Н. И.
36. Freidenberg plays on the Russian doublet otkryvanie/otkrovenie.
37. Another pun in Russian, the phrase means “Socrates is concealed.”
38. Republic 363c. Plato here is ironic about the Orphic ideas about life beyond the grave: “According to this teaching, when they (the righteous) descend into Hades, they are laid down on a couch, a feast is presented for these pious people, and they spend the rest of time in drunkenness, with wreaths on their heads.”
39. These words form part of the “definition of tragedy” in the beginning of the sixth chapter of the Poetics (1449b 26).
40. 201d.
41. “A scabrous story about the gods in itself means neither lack of faith nor the disintegration of myth, but presents only cult-erotic semantics… Lucian constructs the composition of his satires on descents into the underworld and flights to heaven. But why is mockery connected with such a structure? Because the single literary process connects serious genres with comic, endowing them with common features” (Poetics, 320–21).
42. phlyax=hilarotragedy, comic burlesque supposedly invented by Rhinthon. Sud. s.v.
43. Joannes Lidus (De mag. 1.41) says that Rhinthon wrote his works in hexameter, hence the hexameter in the satire of Lucilius. Johanns Irmscher (Römische Säitere, Rostock, 1966 [Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock, Jg. 15, H. 4/5, 1966], 441–46) analyzes in detail this evidence, demonstrating the “peculiar” ideas about genres in ancient poetics, in particular the equation of Greek comedy and Roman satire and the transferral of the concepts of “Old” and “New” Comedy to satire, which thereby acquires its own “Aristophanes” and its own “Menander.” Joannes Lidus calls Persius the imitator of the mimographer Sophron and Rhinthon a Pythagorean. There is quite a bit of evidence that the comicodist was considered a philosopher, as Philistion was placed in one group with the ancient wise men, with Plato and Aristotle (Marc. Diaic. V.Porph. 86; Georg. Mon. 110.340 A Migne et al.), while the philosopher (most often Socrates) was linked with the buffoon, the charlatan, the magician (see the chapter “Excursus on Philosophy” and “On Old Comedy,” cf. Hermann Reich, Der Mimus, Bd. 1 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1903) Ch. V: “Sokrates der Etholoe und Platos ethologisch-mimische Kunst”). This strange tradition is important in connection with the controversial question unclear to this day of the origins of Roman satire. Quintilian (Inst. X.1.93–95) calls satire an entirely Roman genre, though one can accept this definition (satura tota nostra est) only as referring to the results of reworking folkloric sources and Greek borrowings into something different, something that could not be reduced to its sources, rather than as referring to the “purity” of Roman origins.

44. Lucian’s mimes 42: Αλεξάνδρος ἢ Πευδόμοντας. 55: Περὶ τῆς Περιγρίνου τελευτῆς 13: Ἀληθῆς ἱστορία, and 14: Ἀληθῶν Διηγημάτων 34: Φιλοσοφευδεῖς 59: Πῶς δὲι ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν

45. The Μιλήσιακά of Aristides.

46. In her monograph *Sappho* (1946–47) Freidenberg analyzes in detail the “Theocritan renaissance” in ancient Greek lyric.

47. “Helen” = “The Epithalamium of Helen,” Id. 18; “The Lover” is Id. 23; “The Conversation” is presumably 27; “Achilles’ Epithalamium” is attributed to Bion.

48. Daphnis was a Sicilian herdsman who died of love. The son of Hermes, he was the legendary inventor of pastoral song. In Theocritus Id. 6, 8, 9, and 27 he is a cowherd. Thyrsis appears in Id. 1, Battus in 4, Corydon in 4 and 5, and Menalcas in 8, 9, and 27.

49. Erinna was a Greek poetess, see Bergk PLG III. 141 and Richard Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolon*, NY: Olms, 1970, 142. The name is related to “of spring.” Kalyke (rel. to Eng. “calyx”) was the beloved of Euathlos; she jumped from the Leucadian cliff: fr. 43 Athen. XIV 619d. There was also an ancient song “Kalyke:” *Stesichorus’* spurious fragment, Page PMG fr. 277. See also Freidenberg’s *Poetics*, 130–1. Erphanes was a poet who fell in love with the hunter Menalca and wandered in the woods.

50. See H. Reich, *De Alciphronis Longique aetate*, Diss., 1894, on the creation of the bucolic novel based on bucolic mime.

51. On vegetation gods in the Greek novel see *Poetics*, 277–78.

52. 119.

53. 127.

54. The name of the girl, Σύμαιθα, is of interest. The Greeks attributed the epithet to the “pug-nosed” goat, satyr. Socrates. It is not unlikely this name has some relation to the goat (συμή) nature of the girl, who was a former nymph in myth, the female equivalent of the Hellenistic satyr, young and beautiful. The “bucolic” nature of the heroes does not at all contradict their being personifications of Eros and the moon in any modifications.— O.M. Freidenberg.

55. Idyll 2.131.

56. Idyll 2.133.
57. Pherecrates was an Athenian comic poet. CAF I.67–69.
58. On the cult drama, see Poetics, 205.
59. 83.
60. 80–83.
62. 84.
63. See Fr. 10 Kaibel.
64. Athen. 362b.

Chapter 5

1. Earlier Freidenberg associated this negative evaluation with movement in Old Comedy as opposed to the monumental calm of tragedy: Poetics, 297–99.

2. The forms of the verb φαίνω, -ένθαι, which describe the appearance of something shining in Homer are used for heavenly phenomena, for the appearance of Eos and the beginning of morning: Il. 1.477, 6.175, 8.555, 9.240, 618, 682, 707, 22.27, 23.109, 24.13, 417, 600, 785, Od. 2.1, 3.404, 407, 491, 4.306, 431, 576, 5.228, 6.31, 7.222, 8.1, 9.152, 170, 307, 437, 560, 10.187, 12.8, 24, 316, 13.18, 14.266, 15.189, 396, 16.270, 17.1, 435, 19.428, 23.241, in the sense of “shining” and “illuminate” and about the light of a fire: Il. 2.455, 8.560, 19.375, Od. 7.100, 19.37, et al. The hero is often compared to a luminary which appears in the heavens through clouds, through the darkness of night, or through other stars: Il. 9.64, 22.28, cf. 3.31. When Achilles has to “appear” to the Trojans, the goddess surrounds his head with a golden cloud and its brightness reaches the heavens: Il. 18.198ff. The fires of the Trojans “appear” like stars “appear” around the moon in clear weather, when hills, high mountains, and valleys “appear”: Il. 8.556ff. The divinity scatters a cloud so the sun may shine and the battle “appear”: Il. 17.650, cf. 16.299; the area “appears” to Poseidon, who watches from a mountain: Il. 13.13–14; a lighthouse “appears” to sailors in the night: Il. 19.375. The same verb is used to refer to the appearance of a god in some form: Il. 20.131, Od. 6.329, 7.201, 16.159, 161, 24.448. It is clear from many contexts that the appearance of a god equals the appearance of light or darkness. Thus Athena’s eyes appear-shine: Il. 1.200; when the interior of Odysseus’ house, the weapons and housewares begin to shine, to “appear to the eyes” like a hot fire, this means for Telemachus the presence of a god: Od. 19.39ff. Ares “appears” as the darkness of clouds “appears:” Il. 4.278, Od. 17.371. Particularly clear is the luminary nature of the “appearances” of divinity in Zeus, whose “appearance” is a flash of lightning in the clouds: Il. 2.353, 9.236, Od. 21.413. Φαίνω (φαίνεσθαι) is used as well for a marvel or a sign that “reveals” the divinity, or when the appearance of the god is a sign itself: Il. 1.197, 2.308, 318, 324, Od. 3.173, 8.112, 15.168, 18.379, 20.101, 114; also for the description of a sudden or long-awaited appearance of a countryman, of the shore to a sailor or traveller: Il. 7.7, 15.275, Od. 6.137, 9.230, 460, 12.242, 403, 13.194, 16.181, 410, 18.160, 165, 23.233, and others; cf. 12.44, 14.30, 302, 5.279, 7.268. The same term is used for the description of the “shining” of the body through armor or rags: Il. 22.73, Od. 18.68, 74, and others. See Ch. Mugler, Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des grecs, Douze siècles de dialogues avec la lumière (Paris: Klincksieck, 1964), 406–413.

3. Ch. Mugler, Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des grecs, 412.
4. See 23 B Diels.
5. Laws 959 b: “image”—εἴδωλον; “the essence of each of us”-ήμων ἐκαστοῦ τὸν ὦντα.
6. In scholarship the “nous” of Anaxagoras, which is often translated as “reason” or “mind” is treated in the opposite way, as the mental principle in which, in the expression of one writer, there is the “phantom of a creator” and as a particular form of “the lightest and thinnest matter” (see on this question Freidenberg is apparently inclined to understand “nous” like the latter group of scholars. But for Anaxagoras himself the concrete and anthropomorphic characteristics of “nous”—the source of cosmic development and of the law of cosmic formation—must be considered an inheritance of the pre-scientific epoch, which shows only the genesis of the concept and the tendency to think by means of analogy (see Freidenberg’s)

7. Sophist 246 B.

8. See Freidenberg’s

9. Aristotle himself compares the period to the syllogism (see Antichnye, Л.: Гос. Социально-экономическое изд. (теории языка и стиля, 1936), 184) It would be more accurate to say that the period corresponds in its syntax to the structure of formal-logical cause and effect thought. But more often the Greek period reflects antithetical thought without a conclusion. This circle of oppositions without a third member is typical of folklore syntax. See Freidenberg’s

10. (1884).

Chapter 6


2. Freidenberg has two articles devoted to parody: «Иdea пародии», Сборник статей в честь С. А. Жебелева, Л., 1926, 378–76, and «Происхождение пародии» (1923–25), Т3С, т. 6, 1973, 490–97. The latter, which is actually an earlier and less complete variant of the former, is translated as “The Origin of Parody” in Henryk Baran, ed., Semiotics and Structuralism: Readings from the Soviet Union (White Plains: Intl. Arts and Sciences Press, 1974), 269–83. The phenomenon Freidenberg calls “parody” in these articles (most of the material is ritual) and “vulgar realism” in The Poetics of Plot and Genre, is called in the works of M.M. Bakhtin the “folk culture of laughter” and “carnivalization of literature.” The contents of the first two terms almost coincides, the relation between “vulgar realism” and “carnivalization” is more complex. For all they had in common, the goals of Bakhtin and Freidenberg were different. Freidenberg wanted to find the “primitive semantics” of reversals, of parodic doubling, of the double, the “pseudo,” the “phantom likeness of the truth,” Bakhtin the function of the forms of these “semantics” in developed culture, far from the primitive stage.


6. ἀνάδοναι: giving up, sending up (of the dead from the underworld).

7. From “parabasis,” the part of Old Attic Comedy in which the chorus breaks the stage illusion by addressing the audience directly in the voice of the author, praises the play taking place, criticizes the competition, and asks to be granted the prize.

8. Bergk. PLG, fr. 94=fr. 172 West IEG.


10. Page LGS fr. 117 (43D), 140, 141.

11. A lyric poetess of Argos.

12. Festival of Apollo and Diana in Greece. For two days the young would carry olive branches with cakes and fruits; Athen. 12.


14. West IEG, fr. 37. The story is that Hipponax’ attacks were so scathing that Bupalus (fr. 1, 4, 12, 15) committed suicide.

15. Problems of archaic lyric are discussed by Freidenberg in *Poetics* (pp. 42ff., 131ff., 274ff.) and in her unpublished monograph *Sappho* (1946–47). Some idea of the latter can be gleaned from *Рассказы поэтики*, Вопросы литературы, *Сафо*, Доклады и сообщения Филологического института ЛГУ им. А. А. Жданова, Вып. 1, 1949, 190–98.


17. Timocreon of Rhodes, comic poet, ca. 476 BC.


22. In the *Ecclesiazusae*.

23. CAF 1., p. 7–9.


25. CAF 1.32–8.

26. Lamachus is a character in *The Acharnians*; Cleon is mentioned in *The Acharnians*, *The Wasps*, and *The Clouds*.


28. Openly attacked in Eupolis’ *The Dippers*, *The Demes*, and *The Flatterers*, he instituted a law forbidding direct representation of living leaders.

29. In Eupolis’ *The Demes*.

30. These are characters, respectively in *The Knights*, *The Birds*, and *The Clouds*.
31. Freidenberg may have borrowed this description from Spengler, who refers to the “point-formed Euclidian existence of Classical man” who conceived only of the here and now; Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, tr. Charles Francis Atkinson (NY: Knopf, 1926), 136.

32. A poetess of Augustus’ time, printed with Tibullus.


34. In The Persians.

35. His Δήμως. CAF p. 279.

36. His Χειρώνες. CAF p. 82.


38. Not the philosopher, but the “prince of Middle Comedy,” CAF p. 624, fr. 83–7. The long night describes the night of Heracles’ birth.


Chapter 7

1. 380–95.
2. 423–36.
4. 486–500.
5. 526–49.
7. 631–52.
8. 388.
9. 389–90.
10. 434.
11. 466–7.
12. 468–9.
13. 494.
15. 541–44.
16. 643.
17. 646–8.
20. 444–45.
22. 558–60.
23. 682.
24. 680.
25. 390.
26. 714.
27. In Poetics Freidenberg makes explicit the connection between the three doors in tragedy and those in the iconostasis used in the liturgy. The door/gate represents the boundary between the two worlds, between life and death (209–10, 215, 218).


31. 593–94.

32. 601.

33. 44.

34. 52–53.

35. 85–86.


37. 758–61.

38. 689–91.

39. 353.

40. 348–50.

41. 357–58.

42. 687–88.

43. In *Poetics*, Freidenberg presents food (ritual eating of the totem), death, and sex/new birth as variants of the same primordial image. This is why rituals associated with the death and resurrection of the divinity are performed at weddings (71–2). Freidenberg finds the same image in the story of the matron of Ephesus: “In order to enact the image of life born of death, there is a tomb, and in the tomb, the act of reproduction” (“Three Plots, or the Semantics of One,” Formalism: History, Comparison, Genre [Russian Poetics in Translation, 1978, No. 5], 34; Язык и литература. т. 4, Л.:1929, с. 340. She also discusses sex, imprisonment (a metaphor of death) and death in her work on Joseph and Potiphar’s wife:

44. 781.

45. 793–94.

46. 891.

47. *Poetics*, 91.

48. 1076–77.

49. 704.

50. 695–7.

51. *Theogony*, 211.

52. 907–8.

53. 947–50.

54. 753.

55. 754–55.

56. 603.

57. 601.

58. 241.

59. 250–52.

60. Chantraine supports the relation between φοίνιος and φοίνιξ, which he derives from the root *bhen*. The connection may be that the Phoenicians exported both red dye and oriental palms. Φόνος, however, is from a different root, *g"hono*, and is related instead to θείνω.
61. In *Poetics*, Freidenberg cites “madness” as a metaphor of “death” (141ff.).
63. 1215.
64. 1229.
65. 1034.
66. 908.
67. ἀνάβοσ: ascent, rising.
68. 768–70.
69. 848–49.
70. 928–30.
71. 344.
72. 346.
73. 4.
74. 10.
75. 125–26.
76. Covering with a cloth is a metaphor of death: the dead were covered because of reduplication; *Poetics*, 222.
77. 916.
78. 992–93.
79. 1004.
80. 452.
81. “The object of shame and mockery is the divinity of death himself. This is why the false king is laughed at and showered with mockery: on the principle of repetition this is an act which doubles death. And this is why the death of fertility gods takes place amidst merriment” (*Poetics*, 113).
82. 1163.
83. The mythological image does not distinguish between active and passive, subject and object. “In the motif of ‘victim’ and ‘destroyer’ we discover their identity, the complete unity of the divinity and his enemy, of the punisher and the punished” (“Thamyris,” Яфетический сборник, 5, Л Яфетический: 1927, 73). Freidenberg also quotes Cornford (The Origin of Attic Comedy [London: Arnold, 1914] 129): “the enemy of the God is also a double of the God himself;” and she cites Viacheslav Ivanov, Баху (Дyonis и прадионисиество, 1923), excerpts of which have been republished in

84. 6–9, 20, 32.
85. 654–5.
86. 206–7.
87. 351–52.
88. 144–46.
89. 159–60.
90. 674–75.
Endnotes  330

91. 1263.
92. 1264–65.
93. 100–101.
94. On the role of the messenger in tragedy see also chapter 3, section 5 of this work and *Poetics*, 185–6.
95. 2.
96. 1018.
97. Age here means not a historical or any other “epoch,” but the time one is given to live.
98. 1348–49.
99. 1030.
100. Mythically the “light of eyes” can be seen in the fact that ancient optics were based on the idea of the “shining eye:” a ray of light comes out of the eye and is refracted through a reflecting surface to the source of light. The verb ὄραμα—“see” as applied to the sun should be translated in the language of modern concepts as “illuminate” (see Ch. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des grecs*, 282–83). “To watch” for the ancients meant “to live” (*Il.* 18.61, *Od.* 6.833; Sophocles, *Oedipus the King* 398; Euripides, *Orestes* 1523; *Alcestis* 691; *Andromache* 113 et al.); and “blind”=“dead”, e.g. Russian dialect *жмур* is a dead man. The herald tells Agamemnon, “On the same day I saw your child dead and seeing” (*Iphigenia at Aulis*, 1607–12). If the glance of a dead man or some “person of death” figures in myth, it brings death (Vii, the Gorgons). See


101. 1002–3.
102. 1122–24.
103. 1146–47.
104. 1197–99.
106. 656–57.
107. 536–7.
109. Legend has it that Stesichorus was blinded for telling the usual version of Helen’s story in *Helen* (PMG fr. 187) and did not recover until he recanted in his *Palinode* (PMG fr. 192).
110. 587.
111. 571.
112. 1194.
113. 557.
114. 558.
115. 559, 563.
116. 564.
117. 569.
118. 570.
119. 575.
120. 576.
121. 577.
122. 578.
123. 579.
124. 580.
125. 583.
127. 626.
129. On ritual catharsis through laughing invective see Poetics, 107, 170. Here, as elsewhere, Freidenberg was strongly influenced by Frazer’s Scapegoat.
131. Archaic hymn preserved in Plutarch (Qu. R. 36=Diehl, Anth. L. Gr. II.206). In this hymn Dionysus is asked to appear “with a bull’s leg”. By Eleatic women Plutarch means the group of six priestesses.
132. 728.
133. On silence as a metaphor of death see Poetics, 133–37; the dead were silent, until they drank blood, which leads to rebirth; pronunciation of the text prevents death (Sheherezade); one had to descend into the underworld (death) to obtain an oracle. On blinding as a punishment equivalent to death see “Thamyris,” Яфетический сборник, 5, 1927, 72. Here and in 1932, blindness is treated as a relic of the solar nature of the hero. See also 7.1.25.
134. 1064–68.
135. 1121–22.
136. 1123–24.
137. 1127.
138. 1129.
139. 1133–34.
140. The Classical commentators (Satyrus, Aristophanes of Byzantium, the scholiasts) call all the “heroes” of this tragedy repugnant, the tragedy lacks all sublime pathos, has many comic scenes, and should occupy the fourth place in the tetralogy, the place of the satyr play, like the tragedies Alcestis and Andromache.
141. 83–4.
142. 385.
143. 386.
144. 390.
145. 407.
146. 1018–19.
147. 1561–62.
148. 1567–72.
149. On stichomythia as verbal agon see Poetics, 181.
150. 1590.
151. “Not only do doors and gates signify the otherworld-heavenly horizon, like every border and boundary, thresholds, doorjams and lintels are the bearers of the same semantics. On one side is the personification of death, on the other, of resurrection and the new birth of the sun” (Poetics, 210). See later 7.1.24.
152. 1560.
153. 103.
154. 188.
155. 187, 1342, 1358.
156. 1407.
157. 531.
158. 540.
159. 1313.
160. 1315.
162. 1161–62.
163. 1167.
164. 903.
165. 914.

166. Chantraine confirms that the names Hecuba/Hekabe and Hecate are derived from ἔκατος, “distant.”

167. 67—“lest there be a mortal on the path.”

168. 68.
169. 76.
171. 1321.
172. 1581.
173. 1586.
174. 1607–12.
175. 1218–19.
176. 1250–51.

177. 7.1.19 and Poetics, 210.
178. 317–33.
179. 311.
180. 323.
181. 317.
182. 320.
183. 321.
184. 322.
185. 323.
186. 326.
187. 232–33.
188. 275.
189. 118–22.
190. 138–39.
191. 140–41.
192. 39.

194. See 7.1.17; «Следы над обрывом, Язык и литература, Т. 8, Л., 1932,
238.
195. See 7.1.2.
196. 1706–7.
197. 1703.
198. 1727.
199. 1730–32.
200. 1549.
201. 1610.
202. 1649.
203. 1651–52.
204. 1656–62.
205. 1683–84.
206. 1686.
207. 1688–90.
208. 1080–93.
209. 88–91.
210. 69.
211. 70.
Exodos in Tragedy

1. In Poetics Freidenberg describes them as remnants of the former ritual procession (182).
2. Eumenides, 754–58.
3. Homer has two cities depicted on Achilles’ shield: one peaceful and thriving, where justice is accomplished (17.490–508), the other at war, besieged by enemies, where “Evil and Rebellion and terrible Death roam” (509–540). In the Works and Days Hesiod also compares two states: justice reigns in one, and it flourishes—there are no wars, the earth bears fruit abundantly, everyone has many children; in the other state, where both the king and the court are unjust, there is famine and plague and no children are born, warriors perish, the walls of the town are falling down, ships are sinking (225–47); furthermore, in Pseudo-Hesiod’s “Shield of Heracles,” which imitates Homer’s description of the shield of Achilles, we again find the motif of the unlucky warring city and its opposition to the joyful city with golden gates, where the citizens sing, dance, and celebrate a wedding (237–373); Cf. a similar
opposition of the mythical warring city Machimos and the righteous Eusebes in the story of Theopompus (Claudius Aelianus, *Varia Historia* 111.18).

5. 1274–83.

6. In *Poetics* Freidenberg argues that cities and countries in myth were both real and fantastic: “Did not the god of the sun live in Lycia and Egypt, did the gods not rest among the blessed Ethiopians?... This metaphorical side of real localities, which grew into myth, is of great value: the localization of the plot is important not so much for its designation of the geographical scene of the story as for the semantic indication of internal connections between the name of the country and the story localized in it.” (268) The same idea was expressed in Freidenberg’s early work on the Greek novel: “Semantic localization is more reliable than topographical localization” (“Thamyris,” "Яфетический сборник", Л., 1927, 5., 76).

7. 1023–25.
9. 1048–53.
11. 1056.
12. 1057–58.
13. 1059.
15. 659–66.
17. 681–82.

**Melic-Iambic**

1. I.M. Tronskii notes that the dialect coloring of a literary genre never derives from a single local dialect, but from the start represents a dialectal mix traditionally followed by all authors of this genre. Thus every genre of lyric, for example, has its particular dialectal structure “in which the dialect of the place where the genre originated is colored by the traditional dialect of the ancient poetic koine” (И. М. Тронский, «О диалектной структуре греческого языка в раннем античном обществе» Вопросы социальной лингвистики (Л.: Нauka, 1969), 283). Similarly, N.S. Grinbaum, who at the beginning of his book on choral lyric in Pindar (Кишине: Штиница, 1973) quotes Freidenberg on the origins of the Greek literary language, writes that choral songs began to be called Doric because the Doric regions preserved the archaic conditions which promoted exactly such lyric, archaic in language and content (pp. 12–13).

2. 894–907.
3. 934.
4. 716–36.
5. 668–719.
6. 332–372.
7. 781–800.
8. 1116–1151.
11. OLG Fr. 206,218.
12. Further (VII.3.8) Freidenberg analyzes apposition on a micro-level. Yet the principle of apposition has a wider significance; it characterizes archaic “composition” as a whole. Freidenberg’s monograph on the semantics of the composition of Hesiod’s *Works and Days* (1939) is devoted to this problem. “Apposition” means that in archaic syntax there is no formal-logical motivation. The “compositional conjunction” here is “and.” Simple linking fulfills the function that in time will be handed over to cause and effect, conditional, and other “conjunctive-motivations.” Many works of Classical literature bear the traces of this apposition, which is often interpreted as the principle of “insertions” or “digressions,” etc. The appositional series of motifs, which lacks any unifying center, represents, according to Freidenberg, various metaphorical formations of the same semantics both within one image system and of various “stadially” (typologically) different systems (luminary, zoomorphic, or agrarian metaphors). For modern understanding, which is brought up on complex compositional relationships, appositive organization seems rather “non-organization,” especially as the unity of the common semantics of the entire compositional makeup is accessible only through specialized analysis. As one modern critic writes, “the conjunctive connection is the only means of organization in paleolithic texts (both artistic and verbal) which is conducive to more or less reliable reconstruction. This is not to deny the extremely rare cases of more subtle organization of the text, which may rely on more complex forms of rhythmic repetition with the use of symmetrical constructions” (B. Н. Топоров, “К происхождению некоторых поэтических символов (Палеолитическая эпоха). Ранние формы искусства (М: Искусство 1972)).

13. 100–162.
14. 638–89.
15. 498–530.
16. 934.
17. 935–40.
18. 942–45: “Shout for joy at the escape of our master’s house from woes and the loss of possessions, escape from the polluted pair, from it’s grievous fate.”
19. 946–51.
20. In *Poetics* Freidenberg refers to such sequences as “*nanizannost’*”—“strung-together-ness:” “this system has the regular composition of strung-together-ness, and the apparent unconnectedness of separate episodes or motifs turns out to be a well-constructed system, in which all the parts are semantically equal and only varied morphologically—the result of a kind of thinking which strings together identical meanings which are objectively different. In other words metaphors in myth or ritual are never connected by relations of cause and effect” (117).
22. Ox. fr. 78.5–6 Bowra.
24. *Phoenician Women* 102, 238, 826, 368; *Bacchae* 520, 530 inter al.
27. 1115–1151.
29. 276–79.
30. 404–7.
31. 462–82.
32. 22–30.
33. 151–3.
34. 168–215.
35. 196–7.
36. 190–91.
38. 716–36.
40. 716–36.
41. 737–62.
42. 763–81.
43. 585–651.
44. 594–611.
45. 612–22.
46. 538–42.
47. 1282–89.
48. 511–18.
49. 945–987: actually the reference is to Cleopatra, the daughter of Boreas and Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus. According to one version, Cleopatra blinded her sons in anger at being cast off by her husband Phineus; according to another, they were blinded by their stepmother. Further I have substituted “Cleopatra” for “Oreithyia.”
50. 945–987.
51. ἀγαπόω, supplied by Boeckh?
52. 1036–79.
53. On marriage, sex, and death see above 7.1.4 and Poetics, 71.
54. This, according to Freidenberg, is why the Biblical Joseph and the Greek Bellerophon marry daughters of their would-be seductresses: mother and daughter are identical in myth.
55. «Миф об Иосифе Прекрасном», Язык и литература, Т. 8, Л., 1932, 140).
56. 812.
57. 819–43.
58. 498–516.
59. Rather it is the blood of another suitor, the centaur Nessus, with which Deianira anoints the cloak.
60. 1072–3.
61. “The battle…was no longer like the Olympic or gladiators’ games; yet the whole spectacle remained thoroughly a duel, and author competed with author, choregus with choregus, actor with actor” (Poetics, 159).
62. On stichomythia as verbal agon see Poetics, 181.
63. “In Greece iambics were verses which contained mockery and personal attacks; “to iamb” ἰαμβικός means to poke fun at individuals in verse” (Poetics, 110; see also 295).

Women’s Choruses

1. Poetics, 162.
7. 903.
8. 1–175.
10. 741–42.
11. 596–97.
13. 800: “the invincible Goddess Aphrodite plays”?
14. 1205 or 693.
15. 515.
16. 525–64.
17. 1267–82.

The Origins of Tragedy

1. In Poetics Freidenberg compares the prologue to a zapev, a solo introduction or introit which introduces the theme of a song.
2. Lexicon of Hesychius of Alexandria, 5th Century AD.
3. In Poetics Freidenberg calls the eccyclema a “curious model of the stage, one which has yet to cease to be a wagon or a hearse” (214).
5. fauns, satyrs in general.
6. Aristotle, Poetics 1450 b 18–21: “and spectacle (ὄψις), to be sure, attracts our attention but is the least artistic and least essential part of the art of poetry. For the power of tragedy is felt even without a dramatic performance and actors. Furthermore, for the realization of spectacle, the art of the costume designer is more effective than that of the poet.”
7. Aristotle, Poetics 1453 b 1–11: “Pity and fear can arise from the spectacle (ὄψις) and also from the very structure of the plot, which is the superior way and shows the better poet…The achievement of this effect through the spectacle does not have much to do with poetic art and really belongs to the business of producing the play. Those who use the spectacle to create not the fearful but only the monstrous have no share in the creation of tragedy; for we should not seek every pleasure from tragedy but only the one proper to it.” Cf. 1456 a 2.
8. Much the same material is covered in Poetics, 160ff.
9. According to Herodotus I.23–24, Arion of Methymna on Taenarus first composed and named the dithyramb. Sailors plotted to murder Arion, but he sang, jumped into the water, and was carried to safety by a dolphin. (Russians tend to confuse this Arion with the helmsman in the Homeric “Hymn to Dionysus:” e.g., Pushkin’s 1827 poem, “Arion.”) In Apollodorus’ account Adrastus, king of Argos (III.6.4–6), was a cofounder of the Nemean Games, in which he won the horse race. After the campaign with the seven against Thebes, he alone escaped alive, carried off by his horse Arion. W.R.Paton suggests the two Arions are one: see “Arion,” Classical Review, IV (1890), 134–5. Melanippus died fighting on the Theban side. According to Apollodorus, he was killed by Tydeus, Adrastus’ son in law, who then gobbled up his brains. In Herodotus’ account (V.67), Cleisthenes put an end to the Sicyon poets’ contests and cast out the hero Adrastus (because he was an Argive). Sicyonians celebrated Adrastus’ fate with tragic choruses in his honor (instead of that of Dionysus). Cleisthenes gave the choruses back to Dionysus and the rest of the worship to Melanippus. In Pausanias (VIII.25.8) Arion was the offspring of Poseidon and Demeter or sprang from the earth. He is thus both chthonic and connected with the sea, like the other means of transport in the poet Arion’s story, the dolphins.
11. On the sun as victor over darkness see also Poetics 73–75.
14. Bowra cites Lysistrata 1308–15, where Helen’s votaries are maidens “like fillies.”
   C.M. Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry from Alcman to Simonides (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 53.
16. Freidenberg means that lyric and dramatic poets participated in an agon, entering their works into a competition.
17. 102–3.
19. Oedipus the King, 1313–14: σκότον νέφος.
20. Freidenberg has in mind Adrian Piotrovski’s theory of the “amateur” theater. See his works: «Античный театр. Театр эпохи феодализма, M.–Л., 1931.»
22. See Diehl, Anth. L. Gr. III fr. 77.
23. Poetics, 166, 178.
25. Id. 8 and 9.
26. Id. 1.
27. Id. 4 and 10.
28. Id. 3 and 7.
29. Id. 6 and 11.
30. Id. 24 and 25.
31. Id. 18, 13, and 23, respectively.
32. Βουκόλος: herdsman; from the same root we get “bucolic.”
34. Id. 10.
35. Writer of Sicilian comedy, 5th century.
36. See Horace, Letters, 2.1.58.
37. See Schol. Theocr. II.270 (Wendel).
38. From ἀμοίβαιος, interchanging, alternately answering, alternating verses. On amoebian and stichomythia in Theocritus see Poetics, 181.
39. A mask to frighten children, an apparition from the grave.
41. Hero Mechanicus, Automatopoetica. Heron was a first century AD mathematician and inventor; this work is on making θαύματα, miracle-working devices for temples.
42. See Freidenberg’s Palliata on ήρων and ἀλάζων. Миф и театр, M, 1988, 60.
43. A box with magnifying glasses for viewing pictures which were accompanied with special explanations, the rayók was common at fairs in Russia in the 18th-19th centuries. See Н.С. Тихонравов, «Начало...»
5. 26. 328ff.
44. 663.
45. 628.
46. 457.
47. 459.
48. 459.
49. 463.
50. 375.
51. 354.
52. 502.
53. 665.
54. 675.
55. 687.
57. 918–19.
58. 1267.
59. 213.
60. 682–86.
61. 641–49.
62. See above notes on Aristotle’s *Poetics*.
63. Rather “Wooden” Helen (Δενδρίτις). The cult of this ancient Mycenaean vegetative divinity, whose ritual included hanging a doll on a tree (Paus. III.19.9, 23.10) is accompanied by an etiological legend: after Menelaus’ death Helen arrives in Rhodes, where she is honored as Dendrite (cf. Theocr. Id. 18.48) and hangs herself from a tree, or women hang her in revenge for the death of their husbands in the Trojan war (See A.Evans, “Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 21., 1901; L.R.Farnell, *Greek Hero Cult and Ideas of Immortality*, Oxford: 1921, 31, 323ff.).
65. *Il.* 3.130.
67. *Il.* 3.130: θεσκέλα ἕργα
68. “The structure of the Classical genres of action which later became literary shows that its origins do not lie in any concrete cult or ritual; in this structure the same ideas of a general world-view nature took shape, the same ideas which are revealed in archaic ritual and verbal forms; only a certain way of thinking, a way of perceiving surrounding reality, a way of reproducing the world in ritual-verbal action—this is what lay in its origins” (*Poetics*, 190).
69. 959 B: “the bodies of the dead are images (εἴδωλα), but the essence (τὸ ὄν) of each of us is called the immortal soul.”
70. *Od.* 15.225ff.
73. 1455.
74. 1458.
75. 1458–9.
76. 1468.
77. 1474.
78. 1475.
79. 1492–93.
80. 1494–95.
81. 1498; it is the roof that must see the evils of the house.
82. 1227–29.
83. 1230.
84. 1125.
85. 1217–19.
86. 652–54.
87. 875–80.
88. 973–79.
89. 1267.
90. 1524.
91. 1297.
92. 1332–33.
93. 1270.
94. 1280:
95. 1332.
96. Poetics, 154–56.
97. Poetics, 156.
98. Poetics, 290.
103. In Freidenberg gnome means more or less epigram, aphorism, proverb.
104. Freidenberg discusses the same ideas under the heading “vulgar realism” in Poetics (293–96).
105. Horace’s “Exegi monumentum...” (III.30.3).
106. Berta L’vovna Galerkina was a student of Freidenberg’s. She studied this problem in her unpublished «Элементы предсказания в монологах греческой трагедии».

**Problems of Aesthetics**

1. Anactoria, like Atthis, was loved by Sappho. The poem in question is presumably Page LGS 200, though Anactoria is not named.

C.B. Толстая–Меликова, «Учение о подражании и об иллюзии в греческой теории искусства до Аристотеля», Известия АН СССР, 1926, № 12, 1151–58.
4. Freidenberg refers here to her early work “Grecheskii roman, kak deianiia i strasti,” which she defended as her candidate’s dissertation 14 November 1924. Some idea of this unpublished work can be gleaned from “Evangelie—odin iz vidov grecheskogo romana,” 

Ateist, No. 59 (Dec. 1930), 129–47. Freidenberg analyzes the apocryphal Acts of Paul and Thecla. Thecla rejects her suitor Thamyris and remains a virgin. She survives trials including being thrown to the lions and jumping into a pool with killer seals. She is taken in by Tryphaena, whose daughter Falconilla has died. Thecla prays for her eternal life. Eventually Thecla is saved from another suitor by being swallowed up in a rock. See The Apocryphal New Testament (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924). Similar claims can be found in “Thamyris,”

Яфетический сборник, 5, Л., 1927, 72–81, and Poetics: “the meaning expressed in the name of the character, and consequently in his metaphorical essence, unfolds in the action which makes up the motif; the hero does what he himself semantically signifies” (249).

5. Strongulius or Stranguillio appears in the anonymous novel History of Apollonius, King of Tyre. He is the teacher of Tarsia (Ch. 29). Strongulius’ wife’s name is Dionysias, and the god Dionysus’ birthplace Naxos was once called Στρογγύλη (Parthenius Amat. Narr. 19). Freidenberg would argue that Strongulius and Dionysias are an ancient paired divinity concealed by the author in his novel. For a new translation by Gerald Sandy see “The Story of Apollonius King of Tyre” in B.P. Reardon, ed., Collected Ancient Greek Novels (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1989), 736–772.

6. Perhaps Freidenberg is thinking of Holinshed’s Chronicle, which was a source for Lear and other plays. The source for Hamlet was the Historia Danica or Gesta Danorum of Saxo Grammaticus.

7. A poem by Lermontov.
10. 1195.
11. 1194.
12. Oedipus the King 463.
14. The first line of an old prison romance, the following lines are “day and night guards keep watch at my window.”
16. Page PMG 413.
17. The concluding lines of Tiutchev’s “What are you howling about, night wind?” («О чем ты всю ночь зевать ночной?»). Actually the original says “storms that have gone to sleep”: заснувших rather than подземных:

Ф. И. Тютчев, Лирика, М: Наука, 1965, т 1, 57.

18. Eugene Onegin 5.22.
24. Freidenberg quotes Lermontov’s version, which is itself an adaptation of Goethe’s “Uber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh.”
25. Page PMG 89.
27. Page PMG 360.
29. Songs sung by or about virgins.
31. Plut. Qu. C.717 A.
32. Pollux, *Onomastikon*, IV. 123: “the eleos was an ancient table onto which before Thespis some one would get up and respond to the chorus.”
34. 457.
35. 458.
36. 459.
37. 461.
38. 463.
39. 464.
40. 468–71.
41. 409–10.
42. 33–36.
43. 165–66.
44. 885–93.
45. 886.
46. 887.
47. 1478–9.
48. 1475.
49. 906–7.
50. 320.
51. 1178–83.
52. 1183.
53. A typical Archaic Greek kouros; Munich 168.
54. The hair arrangement worn by tragic actors; apparently it was unnaturally large: from ὕγκος “bulk, mass.” See Pauly 14.2077.
55. High boots worn by tragic actors: κόθορνοι.
56. Quint. Inst. XI.3.73.
57. 46–48.
58. 49–51.
59. 56–60.
60. 141–77.
61. 177.
62. 178.
63. 180–83.
64. 311–21.
65. 351–68.
66. 552–77.
67. 578–87.
68. 672–79, 689–704.
69. 680–87.
70. 749–812.
71. 151–215.
72. 316–79, 437–44.
73. 463–511.
74. 532–615.
75. 726–70.
81. “Solving and posing riddles are an important element of archaic acts. We know that verbal posing and solving of riddles brought life or death. Usually in a folktale someone who cannot answer a riddle dies and someone who can attains salvation and victory” (*Poetics*, 138).

86. On mimemata see *Republic* 395 A–B; on *eidolon*, phantom likeness of the real, 600 E and 601 B–C.

87. *Poetics* 1449 b, 1453 b: τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἑλεινὸν.

89. 871: φόβω.

90. 816: φόβου.

91. A 5th century sculptor from Eleutherai.


93. *Suppliant Maidens*, 469.